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THE
BIBLICAL REPERTORY
AND
PRINCETON REVIEW
FOR THE YEAR
1856.

EDITED BY THE
REV. CHARLES HODGE, D. D.

VOL. XXVIII.

PHILADELPHIA:
OFFICE OF THE BIBLICAL REPERTORY, 265 CHESTNUT ST.

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CONTENTS OF VOL. XXVIII.

No. I.

	PAGE.
ART. I.—The Church Review on the Permanency of the Apostolic Office.....	1
ART. II.—Arminianism and Grace.....	38
ART. III.—Compte's Positive Philosophy.....	59
ART. IV.—Mill's System of Logic.....	88
ART. V.—Character and Writings of Nicole.....	112
ART. VI.—Quesnel and the Jansenists.....	132
SHORT NOTICES.....	156
LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.....	170

No. II.

ART. I.—Kurtz's History of the Old Testament.....	173
ART. II.—Protestantism in Hungary.....	208
ART. III.—The Money of the Bible.....	238
ART. IV.—Foote's Sketches of Virginia, Second Series.....	244
ART. V.—Miracles and their Counterfeits.....	255
ART. VI.—Macaulay's History of England.....	286
ART. VII.—Memoirs of John M. Mason, D. D.....	309
ART. VIII.—The Princeton Review and Cousin's Philosophy.....	331
SHORT NOTICES.....	387

No. III.

	PAGE.
ART. I.—Harmonies of the Gospels	393
ART. II.—Sydney Smith as a Minister of Religion	418
ART. III.—Principles of the Philosophy of Language.....	444
ART. IV.—Ruskin's Lectures on Architecture and Painting.....	461
ART. V.—Lytal's Mental Philosophy.....	494
ART. VI.—Waldegrave on Millennarianism.....	524
ART. VII.—The General Assembly of 1856	552
SHORT NOTICES	591
LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.....	597

No. IV.

ART. I.—The Bible, the Missal, and the Breviary.....	601
ART. II.—The Sacred Writings of the Parsis.....	618
ART. III.—Baird's Religion in America.....	642
ART. IV.—The Matter of Preaching.....	655
ART. V.—The Church—Its Perpetuity.....	689
ART. VI.—Egyptology	715
ART. VII.—Eli Smith's Arabic Bible	732
SHORT NOTICES.....	737
LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.....	749

26
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By Arrangement

THE

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ART. I.—The Church Review on the Permanency of the Apostolic Office.....	1
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ART. IV.—Mill's System of Logic.....	88
ART. V.—Character and Writings of Nicole.....	112
ART. VI.—Quesnel and the Jansenists.....	132
SHORT NOTICES.....	156
LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.....	170

ERRATUM.

Page 9, line 5,—*for* does understand, *read* does not understand.

THE
PRINCETON REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1856.

No. I.

ARTICLE I.—*The Church Review and Register for October 1855.* Art. VI. "Professor Hodge on the Permanency of the Apostolic Office."

As even the more important periodical publications of one denomination circulate only to a limited extent within the bounds of other Churches, we may, without offence, state for the information of some of our readers, that the *Church Review* is an Episcopal Quarterly, published in New Haven, Connecticut. It is ably conducted, and seems to represent the high-church party in the Episcopal Church, as distinguished on the one hand from the Puseyites, and on the other from the Evangelicals.

In the last number of the *Review* there is an article on an Address delivered in May last before the Presbyterian Historical Society. The object of the article is to present an argument, from the pen of Bishop McIlvaine, in favour of the permanency of the apostolic office. This argument the Reviewer commends to our special notice. He pronounces it perfectly unanswerable; saying that a man might as well question one of the demonstrations in Euclid, as to contest either its pre-

mises or conclusions. He predicts with confidence that the author of the Address himself will be convinced, if he will give the argument a thorough examination.

We have never felt any inclination to engage in the Episcopal controversy, for two reasons. First, because so far as the Scriptures are concerned, there does not seem to us to be any room for controversy; and secondly, because when we go beyond the Scriptures, and get into the field of historical testimony, there is no end to controversy. The discussion cannot by possibility be brought to a satisfactory conclusion, not only because the field is so extensive, but also because the testimony itself is so ambiguous or contradictory; and also because the parties are not agreed as to what is genuine, what spurious, and what interpolated in the writings quoted on the one side or upon the other. If, as was taught by the most eminent of the Christian Fathers, and is conceded by the leading authorities of the Church of Rome, and was held by the great divines of the Church of England at the time of the Reformation, and is now strenuously insisted upon by the Anglican or Oxford party in that Church, Episcopacy cannot be proved from Scripture alone, then the controversy must be left in the hands of those who have made historical research their special vocation. But when the advocates of Prelacy venture out of the jungles of patristic lore, and attempt to establish themselves on scripture ground, then any man who can read the Bible may join the conflict, and strive to drive them back to the thickets whence they came.

As the argument to which our attention has been specially called, purports to be a scriptural one, we feel bound to give it our serious attention. For if Prelacy be taught in the Bible, all men are bound to be prelatists.

Before turning to the question concerning the perpetuity of the apostleship, the Reviewer takes exception to the statement in the Address, that according to the prelatial theory, all church-power is in the hands of the clergy. He says the writer could not have looked at the Diocesan or General Constitutions of the Episcopal Church in this country, without finding abundant evidence that the lay element has free scope for healthful and vigorous action. The Reviewer however should have noticed

that the Address does not treat of the constitution of the Protestant Episcopal Church in America, but of the prelatical theory as it is known in history and in theological discussions. That theory teaches that all church-power was originally given to the apostles, and by them transmitted to prelates as their successors in the apostleship. To them alone it belongs authoritatively to teach, and to decide what is, and what is not, part of the revelation of God. They alone have the right to rule, to confirm, to ordain and to depose. Priests and deacons are their delegates, deriving what power they have from them and holding it at their discretion. This is the theory which underlies all the great historical Churches of the East and West. It is the formative idea of which those Churches are the development, and which has made them what they are.

This, however, is not the only form of Episcopacy. It was an opinion held by many of the Fathers, retained by many in the Roman Church, and embraced by the leaders of the Reformation in England, that presbyters and prelates were originally of the same order, and that on the ground of expediency, one presbyter was by the Church set over other presbyters with the title of bishop; as subsequently archbishops were set over bishops. This is held to be lawful and in accordance with the liberty given to the Church, which the theory assumes has the same right the State possesses to modify her organization at discretion. The general principle of this theory is, "government is of God, the form of man." According to this view, bishops have no higher divine right than kings, and those who make, can unmake them; as queen Elizabeth once profanely said to a refractory prelate.

Others go a step higher. They admit that the apostleship was temporary. Bishops are not apostles, but superintendents appointed by the apostles and intended to be permanent. Some hold that this element in the organization of the Church is essential, and adopt the maxim, "no Bishop, no Church." Others do not hold episcopacy to be essential to the being of the Church, though they regard it as a matter of divine appointment. They simply assert the fact that the apostles instituted a permanent office in the Church lower than their own, and higher than that of presbyters.

Advocates of all these theories are to be found among Episcopalians. In England the subjection of the Church to the State has materially modified its organization—and in this country it has been greatly modified by the influence of Presbyterians. As Independents have borrowed from us their Associations and Consociations; so Episcopalians have borrowed from us their lay-delegates. This is a new feature, unknown to any Episcopal organization in the old world. What degree of church power these lay-delegates really have, we shall not attempt to determine, lest we should betray an ignorance as gross as that betrayed by the Reviewer when he speaks of Presbyterians. "If there is one ecclesiastical system," he says, "in our country from which the lay element is effectually excluded, that system is the Presbyterian. Professor Hodge must confess that it is the merest sophistry to pretend that the lay-element is fairly represented by ruling elders. For the ruling elder by becoming such by ordination, ceases to be a mere layman." Our ruling elders are merchants, farmers, mechanics, lawyers, physicians, men without theological training, engaged in secular pursuits, mingling with the people to whom, as a class distinguished from the clergy, they belong, having the same spirit and interests. Their ordination is simply a declaration by the proper authority, that they have the gifts to qualify them to represent the people in church courts. That ordination has such magic power as to change the very nature of things, could never have entered the mind of any man not trained to take shadows for substance, and names for things. Our ruling elders are truly laymen, they belong to the people, and not to the clerical body; and yet they have real church-power. No one can be received to the communion of the church, or excluded from it, without their consent. No minister can be ordained or deposed, acquitted or condemned on the charge of immorality or heresy, but with their co-operation. If the Reviewer can say as much for the lay-delegates to Episcopal Conventions, we shall be glad to hear it. We warn him, however, that the revelation of the fact will go far to destroy the prestige of the Episcopal Church. The idea of priestly power has a great charm for the human heart, and great power over the imagination. Once convince men that

there is no mystic virtue in a mitre, no grace of orders, and they will soon believe that Episcopalians are no better than other people.

This, however, is a subordinate matter. The main point is the perpetuity of the apostleship. This is the question on which the Reviewer joins issue. He correctly remarks that the whole force of the argument contained in the Address, against the doctrine that bishops are apostles, lies in the syllogism: "If prelates are apostles, they must have apostolic gifts. They have not those gifts, therefore they are not apostles." This, he adds, is a "very convenient method to dispose of the prelatistical theory." We think it is. It is convenient, because it is so short and so effectual. It is not new. It is the old scriptural method of disposing of false pretences. In the apostolic age, if a man claimed to be an apostle, he was asked to furnish "the signs of an apostle." If he claimed to be a prophet, he was asked to produce proof of his inspiration. It was not then the custom for a man to say, I have the office of an apostle, but not his gifts; I am a prophet, but am not inspired. In those days such language would have exposed any man to ridicule. The propriety of this convenient method of settling the question whether a man was an apostle or not, was then universally recognized except by pretenders. The genuine apostles and prophets cheerfully submitted to it. Paul said to the Corinthians, If ye seek a proof of Christ speaking in me, I will give it to you. The Reviewer objects to this method. He says, "the supposition that if the apostolic office was to be continued, the miraculous gifts originally appertaining to that office would have been continued also," is a mere *petitio principii*, or begging of the question. He is probably labouring under a misapprehension of the doctrine which he opposes. He uses the expressions "miraculous gifts of an apostle," and "apostolic gifts," as though they were synonymous, and so does Bishop McIlvaine whose argument he quotes. They are however very different. The former is generally and correctly understood to mean the power of working miracles. This is the sense in which the expression is used throughout this article, both by the Reviewer and by the Bishop whose discourse is included in it. The latter expression, "apostolic gifts," means

those inward gifts which qualified their possessor to exercise the functions of an apostle. The power to work miracles was an evidence that a man possessed those gifts, if the miracles were wrought in confirmation of his claim to be an apostle. The gifts of an apostle were inspiration and infallibility; or more correctly stated, such a measure of inspiration as to communicate to the recipient full knowledge of the gospel, and to render him infallible in the communication of it. It was this that made a man an apostle; working miracles only proved him one. The doctrine of the Address is not, that if prelates are apostles they must have the power to work miracles; but that if they are apostles they must be inspired and infallible. It might be very reasonable to call upon those who claim to be thus the messengers of God, to work miracles in attestation of their claim; but that was not insisted upon. All the Address asserts, is that to claim to be an apostle without infallibility, is as absurd as to claim to be a prophet without inspiration, or to claim to be a man without a soul. The Reviewer does not see fit to discuss this principle. He prefers presenting an independent argument which he pronounces to be unanswerable in favour of the permanency of the apostolic office. The argument is found in a discourse delivered by Bishop McIlvaine on the occasion of the consecration of Bishop Polk in 1838.*

We have no recollection of ever having seen this discourse before. For its author we have the highest personal regard, founded not only on the associations of early life, but also on his elevated character and services. It is because we know that

* The following letter was addressed to Bishop McIlvaine requesting a copy of his sermon.

Cincinnati, Dec. 9, 1838.

Right Rev. and dear Brother:—We have listened to your discourse this morning with emotions we will not attempt to describe. We pray the divine blessing on the holy truth contained therein. In asking you to furnish a copy for publication, we feel assured that we shall gratify, not merely those who heard it, but far more who will delight to read it. We pray that God may long spare you, and give you grace to exhibit and recommend in your life and labours, the exalted sentiments set forth in the sermon of which we hereby request the publication.

Yours most affectionately in the gospel of Jesus Christ,

WILLIAM MEADE, Assistant Bishop of Virginia.

B. B. SMITH, Bishop of Kentucky.

JAMES H. OTT, Bishop of Tennessee.

LEONIDAS POLK, Missionary Bishop of Arkansas.

he sets Christ above the Church, truth above form, regeneration above baptism, and the communion of saints above agreement in church polity, that we regard him as an ornament to his profession and a blessing to the Church of Christ. We wish that some one other than a life-long friend had written the discourse we are called upon to review. We would much rather dwell upon the points in which we agree with such a man, than upon those on which we differ.

The proposition which Bishop McIlvaine undertakes to sustain is, that the apostolic office is permanent, and that bishops are the official successors of the original apostles, clothed with "the same power and authority." As, however, he does not hold the prelatical theory, in the form in which it was stated above, he is forced to begin by an attempt to reduce the apostolic office to a minimum. He makes it a mere episcopate. The office which he claims to be perpetual is not really the office which Paul and Peter filled, but one essentially different, though agreeing with it in certain points, as is the case with the office of every minister of the word. Unless we first come to an understanding as to what an office is, it is all lost time to dispute about its continuance. Something is perpetual. Some of the functions exercised by the apostles, have been continued in the Church—the authority to preach, rule and administer the sacraments. But these functions were not peculiar to the apostles, and therefore did not constitute their office as distinguished from that of other preachers. What is true of the apostles as such, and true of no other class of officers mentioned in the New Testament, is, 1. That their teaching was authoritative. It constituted for that age and for every other the rule of faith and practice. This is not true even of the New Testament prophets, whose inspiration was merely occasional, and whose instructions, except on those occasions, had no more authority, than those of other teachers. If any epistle written by Timothy, Titus, Barnabas or Silas should now be brought to light, it would have no more authority than the writings of Clement, Polycarp, or Irenæus. But if any well authenticated production of one of the apostles could be produced, it would bind the faith of the whole Church. There is an impassable line between the apostles and all other teachers, as to the authority with which they taught. And it is this that consti-

tutes one of the distinguishing elements of their office. It belonged to them as apostles and to all apostles. If any man taught with divine authority in the Church he was an apostle; if his teaching was not infallible, he was no apostle. 2. It is equally plain that the apostles exercised a jurisdiction which had no limits either as to its geographical sphere, or as to its degree. An apostle was an apostle everywhere, because his authority arose out of his personal gifts. Peter had the same authority in Babylon as in Rome. Paul laid down the rule of faith as authoritatively to those churches which had not seen his face in the flesh, as to those which he had himself founded. All their ordinances and decisions were as binding as the express commands and decisions of Christ. 3. They had the power of communicating miraculous gifts by the imposition of hands. These things the apostles had, and others had not. These things therefore are the distinguishing functions of the apostolic office; so that to say the office is continued without these gifts is a simple contradiction. The consequence is and ever has been, that those who claim to have the apostolic office, also claim these apostolic prerogatives. Romanists make the teaching of the bishops of any age the rule of faith for that age—it is infallible and authoritative. They also hold that the institutions, ordinances and decisions of those bishops bind the conscience, and, finally, they hold that the bishops, and they only, have power to give the Holy Ghost by the imposition of hands. There is some sense in this. But for a man to claim that bishops are apostles, and yet renounce for them every one of these distinguishing functions, is self contradiction. We do not overlook the flaw even in the Romish theory. It attributes to the bishops collectively what belonged to the apostles individually. Bishops are not, even according to Papists, apostles; but the order of bishops have apostolic authority. Individually they are fallible, and may be heretical, but collectively they are infallible. This is a very lame apostleship. Still it keeps alive the office. It claims that true apostolic authority in teaching, ruling and discipline, exists in every age of the Church. This, which is the only intelligible theory of a perpetual apostleship, no man can hold without being or becoming a Romanist. The Puseyites, therefore, who revived this

doctrine in England and in this country, are going over in shoals to the Church of Rome. It is with profound regret we learn that Bishop McIlvaine has given his sanction to a proposition which contains the fundamental error and very formative idea of Romanism. It is true, he does understand the proposition in the sense in which Romanists do. But their sense is the true one; it is the only sense the proposition will bear; and it is the sense which has always been put upon it. The simple and stringent logic of Rome is: All men are bound, on pain of perdition, to submit to the teachings and authority of apostles. The bishops are apostles. Therefore all men are bound, on pain of perdition, to submit to the teaching and authority of bishops. Bishop McIlvaine admits the first and second of these propositions, and denies the third. Romanists thank no man for admitting the third, if he will grant the first and second. That is all they want, and all they need ask. Bishop McIlvaine would of course say that the fallacy in the above syllogism, is that the word *apostle* is used in a different sense in the second proposition, from that in which it is used in the first. That is, that bishops are not apostles in the same sense as the original messengers of Christ. That however is saying they have not the same office; and therefore is contradicting the very proposition his sermon is intended to demonstrate. If bishops have the same office that Peter and Paul had, they are intitled to the submission due to the official authority of Peter and Paul. For what is sameness of office, but sameness of functions and prerogative? Bishop McIlvaine cannot maintain his ground before Romanists. He has conceded everything, in conceding the perpetuity of the apostleship. With that concession they can lead any man, who follows his reason and conscience, to the feet of the Pope. They need ask no man to believe in transubstantiation, the priesthood of the ministry, the sacrifice of the mass, the supremacy of the Pope, purgatory, the worship of saints, or adoration of the virgin; all these and other doctrines are included in that one concession. For if the apostleship is perpetual, apostles have taught those doctrines, and we are bound to submit.

That the Roman view of the nature of the apostolic office,
VOL. XXVIII.—NO. I.

which is the view almost universally recognized as correct, is the right view, is plain—First, from the fact, that the apostles rested their claim to absolute and universal obedience in matters of faith and practice, upon their office. It was because they were apostles they called on all men to acknowledge that what they wrote were “the commandments of the Lord.” 1 Cor. xiv. 37. Secondly, from the fact that submission to the apostles in matters of faith and practice was universally recognized as due to them in virtue of their office. Thirdly, from the fact, that the New Testament is the standard of faith to Christians, because it was written by the apostles or received their sanction. The argument for the inspiration of the New Testament is invalidated, unless infallibility belonged to the apostles as such. Fourthly, because Christ in constituting them apostles promised to give the Holy Spirit in such measure as to render their teaching as authoritative as his own; and he forbade their entering on the discharge of the duties of their office, until they had received the Holy Ghost. Fifthly, Christ authenticated their claim to be regarded as his immediate and infallible messengers, by signs, and wonders, and divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost. Sixthly, Paul, in claiming to be an apostle, disclaimed having derived either his knowledge or authority from men, and asserted that he had received the one by direct revelation, and the other by an immediate commission from Christ. He admits that had this not been the case, he would not be an apostle. Finally, we appeal to the maxim so much perverted and abused, *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*, must be true. In every age and in every part of the Church infallibility in teaching and supreme authority in ruling have been recognized as belonging to the apostles in virtue of their office. It is on this ground Rome claims this infallibility and authority, because she claims that the apostleship is continued in her prelates. It is the height of suicidal infatuation, therefore, in Protestant bishops, for the sake of exalting their order or strengthening their position, to claim to be apostles, with whatever explanations or limitations that claim may be presented.

As Bishop McIlvaine and ourselves differ so essentially as to the nature of the apostleship, there might seem to be no use

in continuing the discussion. He admits that what we, in common with most other men, understand by the apostleship was not continued. He only contends that the episcopal authority of the apostles has been perpetuated. There are, however, two points included in the proposition which he labours to sustain. First, that the apostolic office is perpetual—second, that that office was an episcopate. But the danger of this method is, that in attempting to prove the divine origin and permanency of the episcopate, he proves fatally too much; too much for himself, too much for Protestantism, and too much for the truth of God. Suppose he succeeds in proving the first of these points, as he thinks he has beyond contradiction, and fails in proving the second, as beyond contradiction he has failed, what becomes of him and of Protestantism? Both are hopelessly engulfed. There is an unbroken succession of infallible teachers, and those teachers are the Romish prelates. Bishop McIlvaine has attempted to walk on a paper bridge over a sea of fire. Everything, therefore, is at stake, and it is surely worth while to examine what he says on both the points just indicated.

He takes the second first, and attempts to show that the apostleship was and is a simple episcopate. His proof is drawn from the commission recorded in Matt. xxviii. 19, 20, and from Acts i. 20, where the office from which Judas fell is said to be his bishopric or episcopate.

The commission is in these words: "Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe whatsoever I have commanded you; and lo, I am with you always, *even* unto the end of the world." Whatever, says our author, is not contained in this commission, "expressly, or by necessary inference, must be considered as not pertaining to the characteristic duties and powers of the apostles." Nothing is here said of their having seen Christ after his resurrection; nor of an immediate appointment from Christ; nor of miraculous powers and endowments. All these must therefore be considered as unessential to the office. What then is the office? Peter expressly styles the office which Judas "vacated, his bishopric, or his episcopate, as the original reads." But as

the word *episcopate* means supervision in general, we must go, he says, to the commission to learn its nature. The commission reads, "Go teach all nations," &c. "Therefore, whatever powers their apostleship or episcopate embraced, were not limited to any particular congregation of the Church, but extended to the whole Church; in other words, the *bishopric* in the hands of the apostles was evidently general, as distinguished from congregational. What particular functions belonged to that general oversight or episcopate, their commission leaves no room to doubt. First, 'go and teach all nations;' or as the more accurate and universally preferred translation is, 'go and make disciples of all nations.' Thus was given authority to propagate the gospel; 'baptizing them,' &c. Here was authority to administer the sacraments of the Church; and by the sacrament of baptism, to open the doors of the Church, and of its privileges, to disciples out of all nations. Finally, 'Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you.' These words conveyed to the apostles the authority to rule the Church, after they had made disciples by preaching, and members by baptism. An essential part of the government of the Church, consisted in seeing to the succession of its ministry. That the authority to do this, to ordain successors in the ministry, was included among the powers of the apostles, is not only necessarily implied in their authority to govern, but also in those impressive words of the Saviour, 'As the Father hath sent me, even so send I you.' For as it was part of the office on which Jesus was sent, to institute the ministry of his Church, so, it follows from these words, that it was part of the sending of the apostles, to continue that ministry, by the ordaining of others to its functions. The conclusion, then, with regard to the characteristic nature of the apostolic office, is that it was one of a general supervision or episcopate; and embraced essentially, the authority to preach and propagate the gospel; to administer the sacraments of the Church; to preside over its government, and as a chief part of government, to ordain helpers and successors in the ministry. All these powers the apostles held, not as a collective body, or college, but severally and individually."

There are two modes of defending episcopacy, either of

which is intelligible and worthy of consideration. The one is to admit that bishops are not apostles, and endeavour to prove that an order of the ministry was instituted higher than that of presbyters, with the exclusive right to rule and ordain. The other is, to maintain that bishops are apostles, having their gifts as well as their office. But this attempt to reduce the apostleship to a mere episcopate, shocks the common sense of every reader of the New Testament. It is so palpable that Peter and Paul held a higher position than a mere bishop, that our author attempts to account for this undeniable fact by a reference to their "extraordinary endowments and all that striking array of miraculous powers with which they were furnished for their enterprise. Such endowments were needed," he says, "for the first propagation of the gospel. They have not been needed since."

We have already adverted to the distinction between the gifts essential to the office of an apostle, and the miraculous powers by which the claim to those gifts was authenticated. A man might be an apostle without those powers, but not without the gifts. The high position of Peter and Paul was not due to their miraculous powers, but to their inward gifts. Their office was only a commission giving authority and command to exercise those gifts. Our author says, we must distinguish between "the office of an ambassador, and the force of mind, or personal endowments with which he sustains his embassy." It is true that an ambassador may be more or less intelligent, but he must have intelligence. You cannot make a log of wood an ambassador. His embassy is only authority to exercise his intellectual gifts in the discharge of a certain duty. A man who has no eyes cannot be appointed a painter; nor a deaf man a musician; nor a dumb one an orator; nor an idiot a teacher; nor an uninspired man a prophet. Who then will believe that a man can be an apostle, one sent to prescribe the rule of faith and practice for all ages and for all nations, without plenary knowledge and infallibility?" The principle that every office implies a gift suited to its nature, runs through the Bible and applies to all cases from the lowest to the highest. If Jesus Christ is exalted to dominion over the universe, does not this imply the possession of divine perfections? Will it

be said we have no right to infer he is God from the nature of his work, because we must distinguish between the office and the qualifications for it? He could not be clothed with the office of God, without possessing the attributes of God. Neither can a man be clothed with the office of an apostle, without possessing the inward gifts of the apostleship. The endowments and the office are from the nature of the case inseparable. Bishop McIlvaine confounds inward gifts or endowments with miraculous powers, and the distinction between the superior qualifications for an office and the office itself, has no application to the case before us. What is meant by superior qualifications for infallibility?

Again, it is not only an arbitrary, but an unreasonable assumption, that we must confine ourselves to the original commission, in ascertaining the nature of the apostolic office. There are several ways in which the nature of an office may be legitimately determined. One is, the instructions given to those who hold it. Another is, the powers which they actually exercised in virtue of it, and the kind and degree of authority which it conferred. Another is, the qualifications declared to be essential to the exercise of its functions. We know that a presbyter is a teacher, because he is required to be "apt to teach." Another is, the nature of the end the office was designed to accomplish. These are all legitimate sources of information as to the nature of the apostleship, and they all furnish abundant evidence that it was not a mere episcopate. The men selected by Christ for this office were instructed to make known the gospel which they had received by immediate revelation; to establish the Church, to lay down rules for its organization and government. They everywhere exercised the powers of infallible teachers and supreme rulers. They claimed for their teaching the authority of God, and for their ordinances the submission due to divine commands. They were utterly unfit for the exercise of their office until they were endowed with power from on high; and were forbidden to act as apostles until they had received the promise of the Holy Ghost, and finally, the design of their appointment was to lay the foundation of the Church, and to furnish it with an infallible rule of faith and practice.

But suppose we ignore all these sources of information as to the nature of the apostleship, and confine ourselves to the commission. The commission does not contain a word about episcopal authority either expressly or by implication. Every word it contains might be addressed to presbyters. In Mark the whole commission is contained in these words: "Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature." How simple and sublime is this! but what does it say about episcopacy? Our author argues that the first clause of the commission, as given in Matthew, "Go teach all nations," &c., gives authority to instruct; the second, "baptizing them," &c., gives authority to administer the sacraments; and the third, "teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you," gives authority to rule the Church! Since the world began was the claim to a divine right to rule ever rested upon such a foundation as this! Suppose the emperor of the French should say to a company of schoolmasters, Go into all France, and teach the people to obey my commands; would that confer on each of these teachers severally and individually the right to superintend the education concerns of the nation, and to appoint successors to this educational episcopacy? If the command in the first clause to teach conveys only authority to instruct, how is it that the command to teach in the third clause, which is only a repetition of the first, conveys the episcopate? Again, if the authority to teach conveyed in the first clause, and the authority to baptize conveyed in the second, do not belong exclusively to bishops, how is it that the authority to rule the Church, said to be conveyed in the third clause, belongs exclusively to them? Again, if the command to rule involves the right to ordain, when addressed to bishops, why does not the same command involve the right to ordain, when addressed to presbyters? Here is a commission of three clauses, the first and second convey powers common to all ministers, and the third, powers belonging exclusively to a particular order of ministers. Why is this? Why is the right to rule claimed as an exclusive prerogative, when the rights to teach and baptize, all contained in one commission and addressed to the same persons, are admitted to be common to ministers?

Conscious, as any sane man must be, of the insufficiency of

the language of the commission, to prove that the apostolic office was a mere episcopate, Bishop McIlvaine turns to two other passages for aid. The one is, "the impressive words of the Saviour, 'As the Father hath sent me, even so send I you.'" On this passage he argues thus: "As it was part of the office on which Jesus was sent, to institute the ministry of his Church; so it follows from these words that it was part of the sending of the apostles to continue that ministry by the ordaining of others to its functions." Then, by parity of reason, as it was part of the office on which Jesus was sent, to make expiation for sin, it is part of the sending of the apostles, and of the bishops exclusively, as their successors, to continue that expiation! The other passage, outside the commission to which appeal is made, is Acts i. 20, in which the office held by Judas is called a bishopric or episcopate. From this it is inferred that the apostleship is in its specific nature an episcopate. The word however so translated is in the margin rendered, "*office or charge*." And in Ps. cix. 8, whence the passage is quoted, the expression is, "His office let another take." How then can the specific nature of the apostolic office be determined by a word which may express an office of any kind? It might just as reasonably be argued that the apostleship is a *diaconship*, because it is expressed by the general term *δρακονία*. It is nothing less than humiliating to see good men catching at such straws as these, to prove themselves apostles. To men perishing with thirst, the mere sound of water is refreshing. We consider the argument for the supremacy of the Pope founded on the passage: "Thou art Peter, and on this rock I will build my Church;" and the still stronger passage: "Peter, lovest thou me? feed my sheep," (i. e. be their shepherd,) a thousand fold more plausible than Bishop McIlvaine's argument for episcopacy.

The most extraordinary feature of this case, however, is still to be presented. Our author attempts to determine the nature of the apostolic office, and thence deduce the permanency of the episcopate, from a passage which has no reference to the apostles in their official capacity, nor even to the apostles as ministers of the gospel. The commission in question is neither the commission of the apostles, nor of the ministry, but of the

Church. This has been the common opinion of God's people from the beginning. It was not addressed to the apostles alone, but to a promiscuous assembly of believers, probably to the five hundred brethren assembled to meet their risen Lord. The duty which it enjoins does not bind the apostles only, but the whole Church. Who can believe that the command, "Go into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature," was meant for episcopal ears only? It sinks into the heart of every member of the Church, man or woman, and makes all feel they belong to a body whose vocation it is to disciple all nations. The powers which the commission conveys do not belong to the apostles as such, but to the Church as a whole. It is the essence of Popery to suppose and to feel that all Church power inheres in bishops or in the clergy. Finally, the promise which the commission contains, "Lo, I am with you always, even to the end of the world," was not made to the apostles in their official capacity, but is the promise on which the whole Church has lived from that day to this. If this view of the matter be correct, then Bishop McIlvaine's structure is left standing on thin air. It is founded on the assumption that the commission was given to the apostles as such. If it was given to the Church as a whole, he has no ground left to stand on.

The sum of what we have said of this argument in proof that the apostolic office is a simple episcopate, is—First, that it is unreasonable to confine our attention to the commission alone, and ignore all other means of determining the nature of the apostleship. Second, that if we do confine ourselves to the commission, there is not a word nor a thought in it which has any reference to an episcopate. It might have been addressed to any company of ministers. Third, the commission was not addressed to the apostles, but to the whole Church, and therefore neither defines their office nor enumerates their powers.

Having endeavoured to show that Bishop McIlvaine has misconceived the nature of the apostleship, we come to consider his argument in favour of the permanency of the office.

The permanence of the office, he says, "is undeniably evident from the promise, 'Lo, I am with you always, even to the end of the world.' Now, if neither the persons of the apostles were intended to remain to the end of the world, nor

their miraculous endowments, nor their distinguishing office, we are quite unable to comprehend how that promise has been fulfilled, or what it could have meant. But the persons of the first apostles do not remain. Their miraculous gifts have not been continued in the Church. It follows then, that their distinguishing office must remain; that it was to this office, and to those who should hold it in succession, that the Saviour promised his presence to the end of the world. No other sense can possibly be put on his words." p. 418.

Our answer to this is: 1. That the promise was not made to the apostles, and therefore not to their successors. It has not been fulfilled in reference to bishops. According to the authoritative declaration of the Church of England, there was not a bishop on the face of the earth, at the time of the Reformation, who had not sunk into idolatry and heresy. Is this consistent with the presence of Christ? Would the promise to the Church be fulfilled, if the whole body of those who name the name of Christ turned heathen? The only sense in which the promise in question has been fulfilled, and therefore the only sense in which it was intended, is that Christ has never forsaken his Church. He has always had a seed to confess and serve him; in the midst of persecutions and of corruptions he has preserved his living members, and in the end always brought them off victorious.

2. But if we grant that the promise was made to the apostles, it was made to them as teachers and not as bishops, and therefore secures only the perpetuity of the ministry, and not the perpetuity of the episcopate. As we have already seen, the commission does not contain a word about episcopacy. It reads, "Go teach; and, lo, I am with you always." If it is addressed to the apostles, it must be to them as teachers.

3. If the promise secures the perpetuity of the apostleship, and if, as we have seen, the apostleship implies infallibility in teaching, it secures an uninterrupted succession of infallible teachers in the Church. If Bishop McIlvaine's argument proves any thing, it proves Romanism. If any man wishes to see this argument in the hands of a master, let him read Bossuet, who urges it with a force which might make our author's heart quake, and force him to retract his dangerous concession of the

perpetuity of the apostleship. Half-way measures and half-way arguments are always weak.

Bishop McIlvaine's first and great argument for the perpetuity of the apostleship, is the one just considered. His next is from the actual continuance of the office in the Church in the order of bishops, for whom he claims "the same power and authority which they (*i. e.* the apostles) had." p. 419.

We have seldom felt more sad than when reading these words. So long as the clergy of the Episcopal Church in England and America were content to stand on the ground of Jerome and of their own Reformers, and regard bishops as men lawfully appointed by the Church over presbyters; or even to assume that the apostles instituted such an order, other Protestants, however much they differed from them, felt that the foundation had not been forsaken. But when they claimed that their bishops are apostles clothed with "the same power and authority" as the original messengers of Christ, it was seen that the citadel had been given up; that the radical principle of Popery had been adopted, and that all the corruptions of that system must inevitably follow. Until recently the doctrine of apostolic succession as involving the perpetuity of the apostleship was confined to the Laudéan faction in the Episcopal Church; but now it seems that the heads of the evangelical party have gone over to the enemy. There is no use of disguising the fact. The doctrine that bishops are apostles clothed with "the same power and authority," is the very life and essence of the Romish system. We know Bishop McIlvaine does not mean what he says. Still he says it. He says the very thing Rome says, and all she says. He uses almost the very language of the Oxford Tracts when they present the beginning, middle, and end of their system.

Before prosecuting his argument to prove that bishops are apostles, our author stops to deprecate the charge of arrogance. "Nothing," he says, "is so humble and unpretending as truth." True; but nothing is so arrogant as falsehood. If bishops are really apostles there is no harm in their claiming the authority and power attached to the office. But if they are not—what then? The claim is no trifle. Bishop McIlvaine says that bishops are the official successors of the apostles,

having the "same power and authority;" which authority is episcopal supervision, including the authority "to rule the Church," and the sole right to ordain; and that this authority was given not to the apostles collectively, but to each of them severally and individually; and that it extends over, not a single congregation, but over the whole Church. See particularly page 412. According to this, our author claims to be an apostle—to be entitled as such to the supervision, not only over a single congregation, not over those only who choose him to be a bishop, but over the whole Church on the ground of a divine warrant. The Church universal therefore is bound to recognize this claim—and all Christians within his diocese are bound to submit to it. He is the only man in Ohio who has the right "to rule the Church," or to ordain. All Christians within that State, who do not submit to his jurisdiction, are in a state of rebellion against God. Venerable men here in New Jersey, such men as Drs. Alexander and Miller, have died in this state of rebellion, because they did not recognize the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of Bishop Doane over them, and submit to him as an apostle. This without exaggeration we understand to be included in the claim advanced in this discourse. It may appear to our author very humble and unpretending, but we assure him it appears to others in a very different light. We regard it as an insult to the common sense, and an outrage on the Christian feelings of men. And so long as episcopacy insists on these claims, it will be an offence and a nuisance which every good man is bound to do what he can to abate. If such be the character of these assumptions when the apostleship is reduced to a mere episcopate, what is to be thought of them when the office is regarded in its true light? Then the arrogance of claiming to be an apostle is only short of the arrogance of the Man of Sin, in claiming to be the vicar of Christ, and setting himself as God in the temple of God. To claim the apostleship in this sense of the term, we hold to be an enormous wickedness; and to claim it in a sense in which the office has never been understood, we regard as a proof of such infatuation as portends a fall. With all our love and respect for Bishop McIlvaine we cannot help thus speaking. We fully believe he is sincere; that he does not mean to claim the apostleship for

his order, but something very different under that name. This, though it may save the man, does not redeem the doctrine. The doctrine that bishops are apostles, with the same power and authority, is apostacy to Rome; and must be so, however innocently, through misconception of its meaning, the doctrine may in some cases be propounded.

His argument in proof of the assumption that bishops are apostles, is drawn first, from the fact that the word is used in the New Testament in application to others than the original immediate messengers of Christ; and second, from the assumed fact, that such persons exercised apostolic functions.

We are ashamed to ask our readers to travel with us over a road as much beaten as Broadway or the Strand. It is impossible that either Bishop McIlvaine or ourselves should present anything new, or even in a new form on these topics. It is, however, with knowledge as with food: that millions of men before us have eaten to satiety, does not satisfy our hunger. And that the testimony of Scripture, on these points, has been presented a thousand times before, does not prevent the necessity of considering it afresh, when it is afresh presented.

"That the office of the apostles did descend," says our author, "from them to successors; that it was communicated to others by the hands of those who received it from the Lord, is manifest. For not to mention Matthias and Barnabas, who were apostles, Acts xiv. 14, we find Timothy, who was ordained by St. Paul, 2 Tim. i. 6, not only called an apostle by that writer, as he is called bishop by the writers of the next century, but actually charged by St. Paul with the exercise of all the authority we have mentioned as contained in the apostolic commission. The First Epistle to Timothy is the plainest evidence that he was put in trust with the government of the Church of Ephesus; which at that time, as the Acts of the Apostles declares, contained a plurality of presbyters; that over those presbyters, as well as over the deacons and laity, he was invested with the personal charge of discipline and government, and that in discharging such government, the authority to ordain was distinctly in his single hands. The same is evident concerning Titus, from the Epistle of St. Paul to him. It was his charge from St. Paul to set in order all the Churches of

the large island of Crete, and 'ordain presbyters in every city.' Thus we see the office of the apostles handed down by a succession of hands to one of the latest dates of which the Scriptures speak. It certainly continued in the world as long as the lifetime of the apostle St. John; and he lived to the hundredth year of the Christian æra." pp. 416, 7.

That the apostleship continued in the Church as long as the apostle John lived, we do not deny. For that would be to deny that John lived till he died; or that he lost his inspiration and became a fallible teacher before his death.

The conclusion to which these arguments would lead us involves of course the official equality of Timothy and Paul. There is a preliminary difficulty in the way of this conclusion, which our author does not attempt to remove. It is just as evident from the New Testament that Timothy and Titus were officially subordinate to the apostle Paul, as it is evident from other sources that a Russian colonel is officially inferior to the Russian Czar. They were ordered here and there, directed to do this and that; they were required to make Paul's teachings their rule of faith, and Paul's precepts their rule of life. While his teachings were thus authoritative, their teachings had no authority at all except what it derived from his. To say, therefore, that he and they had the same office, and "the same power and authority," seems to us nothing less than absurd. If the Bishop of London were to write to Bishop McIlvaine as Paul did to Timothy and Titus, we suspect the latter would think that the English prelate was assuming official superiority over him.

Let us, however, look at the arguments. The first is, that Timothy and others were officially apostles because the title "apostle" is given to them.

Our answer to this is—1. That neither Timothy nor Titus, whose cases are principally relied upon to prove the transmission of the apostleship, is ever called an apostle in the New Testament, in any sense. With regard to Titus it is not pretended that he was ever so called. The proof that Timothy is called an apostle is supposed to be found in 1 Thess. i. 1, as compared with chap. ii. 6, of that Epistle. In the former passage it is said, "Paul and Silvanus and Timotheus unto the

Church of the Thessalonians," &c.; and in the latter, "We might have been burdensome to you as the apostles of Christ." From this it is inferred that Paul, Silvanus, and Timotheus were equally apostles of Christ. Every reader of the New Testament knows that Paul was accustomed to associate with himself any of his travelling companions, who happened to be with him at the time, in his salutations to the Churches. Every reader also knows, that he was frequently in the habit when speaking of himself to say "we." To make every thing which he says of himself, in the use of that pronoun, apply equally to those associated with him in the salutations, would upset the authority of all those portions of Scripture. It would make Sosthenes as much the author of the first epistle to the Corinthians as Paul. It would make him and Silas and Timothy inspired and infallible men. It would reduce the Epistles to a mass of contradictions and absurdities. Thus, in this very instance, Paul says, 1 Thess. iii. 3, "We thought it good to be left alone at Athens, and sent Timothy;" that is, Paul, Silvanus, and Timothy, thought it good to be left alone, and sent Timothy—Timothy sent Timothy! So low as this will even good men stoop to sustain a foregone conclusion. Paul associates his companions with him in his salutations, not in his epistles. They are his epistles and not theirs, by the common faith of the Church, and by the common sense of mankind. So far from Paul ever calling Timothy an apostle, he frequently and expressly says he was no apostle, but a brother, a minister. "Paul the apostle of Jesus Christ and Timothy our brother," by all the rules of grammar as plainly declares that Timothy was not an apostle, as in the expression, "the apostles, elders, and brethren," it is declared that the brethren were not apostles. All this ground, however, has been gone over much more thoroughly in our pages years ago.

2. Admitting, as we cheerfully do, that the word apostle is sometimes applied to others than the original messengers of Christ, it proves nothing as to the transmission of the office. Every one knows that all the terms of office used in the New Testament, are significant, and may be used either in their primary sense, in which they may be applied to officers of all kinds; or in an official sense, when they designate officers of only one

kind. Thus the word apostle means *one sent*, and is used of any messenger, as in John xiii. 16, "The servant is not above his master, neither he that is sent (the apostle) greater than he that sent him." In the same sense Epaphroditus is called the messenger of the Philippians, Phil. ii. 25; which is explained by saying "he ministered to my necessities." And in chap. iv. 18, Paul says, "I am full, having received of Epaphroditus the things which were sent from you." 2. It is used of those sent on a religious mission, *i. e.* missionaries, as Barnabas was the apostle, or missionary of the Church of Antioch, having been sent by that Church. Acts xiii. 1, 2. 3. It is used of our Lord Jesus Christ, who is called "the apostle and high-priest of our profession," because he was the messenger of God. 4. It is used in its official sense of the original messengers of Christ; and in this sense it is never used of any but inspired and infallible men. No passage can be produced in which, from the context or from any other source, it can be proved that the word is applied to any one who was not infallible, in the same sense in which it is applied to Paul. Unless, therefore, it can be proved that every messenger is a messenger of God, in the technical sense, it cannot be proved that calling a man an apostle establishes the transmission of the apostolic office. In like manner the word bishop means a superintendent, and may be applied to any kind of office, secular or religious; or it may be used in an official sense for an officer of a particular kind. Presbyter means an old man, and hence Peter says, "I also am a presbyter;" officially it means a particular class of Church officers. Deacon means, follower, servant, or minister, hence all the presbyters and apostles are called deacons; officially the term is restricted to a particular class. Bishop McIlvaine's argument then is, a man's being called bishop does not prove him to have been officially a bishop; a man's being called a presbyter does not prove him to have been officially a presbyter; a man's being called deacon does not prove him to have been officially a deacon; but his being called apostle does prove that he was officially an apostle. This is the total amount of the argument, and it is evidently entirely destitute of weight. Of this our author betrays a secret consciousness, for he says, "We go by office more than name."

The second branch of the argument above quoted, for the transmission of the apostolic office, is in effect this: The powers conferred on Timothy and Titus, and the acts which they were required to perform, prove their official superiority to presbyters; and their official superiority to presbyters proves they were apostles.

Our answer to this argument is again two-fold. First, there is no evidence that Timothy and Titus were officially superior to presbyters; and secondly, admitting that fact, it does not prove that they were apostles.

The first assumption by Bishop McIlvaine, in reference to Timothy, is that he was ordained by Paul alone, from which he seems to infer that he was ordained to the apostleship. In proof of his ordination by the apostle, reference is made to 2 Tim. i. 6, "Stir up the gift of God that is in thee by the laying on of my hands." Ordination, however, does not confer "the gift of God." It is a solemn recognition that that gift is already possessed, and gives authority publicly to exercise it. It is only on the supposition that ordination is a sacrament, or a rite conferring grace, that this passage can naturally be understood to have any reference to that ceremony. The gifts imparted by the laying on of the apostles' hands, were the power of working miracles, speaking with tongues, healing the sick, prophesying, or some other form of miraculous power. When Peter and John laid their hands on certain converts in Samaria, they received the Holy Ghost. When Simon Magus saw this, he said to the apostles, "Give me also this power, that on whomsoever I lay hands, he may receive the Holy Ghost." Acts viii. 15-18. It is evident that these gifts were something, the possession of which was at once manifest to all. When Paul baptized certain disciples and laid his hands on them, immediately they spake with tongues and prophesied. Acts xix. 6. The passage, therefore, in 2 Tim. i. 6, to say the least, has no necessary reference to ordination.

The second assumption in the argument is, that the powers conferred on Timothy and Titus were several and not joint; that is, that they were authorized to exercise the powers of discipline, government, and ordination, individually, and not in connection with others. It is certain, that all that is said to

them may be naturally explained, on the supposition that they were to act as members of a court. If the Secretary of War, in summoning a general court martial, were to address the members severally, he might say to each of them just what Paul said to Timothy. He might say, You are not to take up a charge against a brother officer lightly; you are not to pass sentence on insufficient evidence; every specification must be proved by two or three witnesses, &c. Such language would not imply that every officer thus addressed had individually the right of judgment.

We are willing, however, to admit that Timothy was ordained by Paul, and that he as well as Titus had, as individuals, the right to ordain and to exercise discipline. Still nothing is gained. For the third assumption of our author, that the right of ordination implies official superiority, is not only gratuitous but palpably false. Bishop McIlvaine maintains that Paul ordained Timothy an apostle, and yet that they held the same office; one bishop ordains another bishop, and yet is not his official superior; then why may not one presbyter ordain other presbyters without being officially their superior? What kind of reasoning is this? To ordain apostles does not imply that the ordainer is more than an apostle; to ordain bishops does not prove that the ordainer is more than a bishop; but to ordain presbyters does prove that the ordainer is officially superior to presbyters! How could the ministry be continued on the principle that the ordainer must be officially superior to the ordained? Who then could ordain the highest? As the right to ordain presbyters does not prove official superiority over them, neither does the exercise of discipline. One bishop often sits in judgment on other bishops; one presbyter on other presbyters. A single bishop has often a whole province or kingdom under his jurisdiction, with authority to ordain or depose his fellow bishops at discretion. In the early history of the Scottish Church, one presbyter was invested with all the powers attributed to Timothy and Titus, and yet he was nothing more than a presbyter. The superintendents in Germany are presbyters, and yet they are the organs of the Church in the exercise of discipline over clergy and people. One colonel often has under his command other colonels, and is superior to

them only in age, not in rank. How then can it be rationally inferred from the fact that Timothy and Titus exercised discipline over presbyters that they belonged to a higher order in the ministry?

The plain fact is, that the apostles were the governing authority in the Church; and they sent presbyters to organize churches, to ordain other presbyters, to exercise discipline, to set things in order, just as the Pope or Council sends one bishop to correct abuses, to consecrate other bishops, or to depose them when necessary; and just as in the Presbyterian Church, as formerly in Scotland and still in Germany, one presbyter may be commissioned to exercise similar controul over his brethren. In a settled, organized state of the Church, this is unnecessary. But there is nothing in this kind of jurisdiction of one bishop over others, or of one presbyter over other presbyters, which implies superiority of order. It is a settled principle that mere jurisdiction does not imply official superiority. It has often happened in the Latin Church that a simple deacon, as *legate a latere*, has had a whole province under his authority with power to depose bishops at his pleasure. It is no use to cry out against this as one of the abuses of Romanism. It is simply acting on a principle recognized in all States and Churches. The executive may take a civilian, and give him as Secretary of the Navy, authority over all the officers in the service. In like manner Paul might take any presbyter and send him where he pleased, and give him what power he saw fit. It is at all events clear that whatever authority Titus and Timothy had, they derived it all from him, and remained as inferior to him afterwards as they were before. To Titus he said, "For this cause left I thee in Crete that thou shouldest set in order the things that are wanting, and ordain elders in every city, *as I had appointed thee.*" His commission was from Paul; and when he had executed it, he was required to be diligent to come to his master at Nicopolis, where he had determined to winter. To Timothy he gave a somewhat similar commission in reference to Ephesus, but commanded him when he had done his work, to come to him at Rome. Admitting therefore all that is claimed from the New Testament in relation to Timothy and Titus, there is not the slightest evidence of their being any-

thing more than presbyters. As to one being the bishop of Crete and the other bishop of Ephesus, it is directly opposed to the scriptural record. For as we have already seen their commissions were merely temporary; they continued afterwards, as they had been before, the travelling companions, helpers and servants of the apostles.

We are willing, however, to concede still more. Let it be granted, what of course we do not believe, that Timothy and Titus were officially superior to presbyters, we are as far as ever from the conclusion that they were apostles. Prophets were superior to presbyters, and yet were not apostles. As we have already intimated, something more is necessary to prove that a Russian colonel is autocrat of all the Russias, than that he is officially superior to captains. Still further, the official superiority of Timothy and Titus, even if admitted, is no step towards proving even prelacy. First, because they were not diocesan bishops; they were vicars apostolic, temporary officers appointed for a special purpose. This is as plain as day, so far as the New Testament is concerned; and it never could have occurred to any man to take any other view of the case, were it not that tradition had been allowed a voice in the matter. Men have held up the lantern lighted in after times, to throw back its coloured rays upon the New Testament, and read its pages under their misleading influence.

Secondly, because the mere existence in the apostolic Church of officers superior to presbyters, is no evidence that such officers were intended to be permanent, and, if not intended to be so, they are not so. Nothing but a clear manifestation of the divine will that the Church should always have certain officers, renders it obligatory that she should have them. That will may be expressed by an explicit declaration that certain officers were intended to be permanent; or by a command to appoint them; or by a specification of the qualifications to be required of those who sought the office, and directions as to the mode of their appointment; or by a clear intimation of the continuance in the Church of the inward gift of which the office is the organ. In the absence of these, or similar decisive indications of the divine will, the mere fact that officers superior to presbyters existed in the apostolic age would no more prove that they

were intended to be permanent, than the existence at that time of prophets and deaconesses proves that they were intended to be continued in all ages. The apostles' did many things to meet temporary emergencies, which they did not intend should be done afterwards. Few things have been productive of greater evils to the Church and the world, than the false principle that mere scriptural example is obligatory. It is on this ground that men so long contended it was the duty of the Church and of the State to put heretics to death. That Samuel hewed Agag to pieces, was considered a proof of the propriety and obligation that we should deal in the same way with idolaters. On the same ground it has been contended that civil magistrates are called upon to interfere in matters of religion, because the Hebrew magistrates were the guardians of both tables of the law. Hence also, as Peter was called first to the apostolate, Romanists contend that there must be a visible head to the Church in all times. Hence too, because the apostles were supreme rulers, it is contended she is bound always to have such rulers—clothed with the same authority and power—that is, with the power to give the Holy Ghost, and with the authority to make their teachings the rule of faith and practice to all mankind, and their decisions binding on the consciences of all men. This whole principle is radically false. It is a device of the devil to give to what is human or worse, the authority of God, and thereby to turn off the allegiance of men from their true sovereign, the Lord Jesus Christ. Religious liberty consists in refusing to submit to any authority but that of God, and in refusing to receive, as of divine authority, anything which cannot be proved from his word to have been intended to bind his people in all ages. It does appear to us therefore to be a most dangerous principle, that because the apostles did a certain thing, therefore the Church is for ever bound to do it. This principle is so unreasonable that no body of men act on it further than suits their convenience. Those who are loudest in their assertions that because, as they falsely assume, the apostles appointed a class of officers higher than presbyters, we are bound to have such officers, are as mute as mice about our obligation to have deaconesses. This whole thing is a humbug; not episcopacy, but the doctrine of the divine

right of bishops. The only sensible, manly course for Episcopalians to take, is either to assume the authority of tradition and the infallibility of the Church, and say, that as the Church has decided in favour of episcopacy it is obligatory; or to renounce all claim to divine right and put their bishops and archbishops on the same ground, *i. e.* the ground of expediency. The kindred doctrine of the divine right of kings is pretty generally abandoned, and royalists are content to rest the authority of their sovereigns on the surer basis of the will of the people. It will be a happy day for all concerned, when bishops are brought to the same *σωφροσύνη* or saneness of mind.

The argument then in favour of the permanence of the apostolic office, derived from the case of Timothy and Titus, we consider utterly void of force. Neither they, nor any others, except the original, inspired, and infallible messengers of Christ, are ever called apostles, in the official sense of the term. No distinctive apostolic function is ever attributed to them nor exercised by them. They were invested with no powers which prove their official superiority to presbyters. And if it should even be admitted that they were thus superior, in the absence of all intimation of the will of God, that such officers were to be continued, the Church is no more to have them than she is to have prophets or deaconesses. This claim to apostolic power without apostolic gifts, as we have before said, is not only a delusion, but a gross and wicked imposture. In this sentiment we doubt not Bishop McIlvaine fully concurs. He would revolt as much as we do at claiming for fallible bishops the authority of infallible apostles. We only deplore that he has been led to use language in a sense which it will not bear—when he makes the apostleship to mean only episcopacy—and thus while he contends for the latter, he should appear to the world as contending for the former.

Having exhausted the case of Timothy and Titus, our author turns to the angels of the apocalyptic Churches. “Who,” he asks, “were those angels, or messengers, of the seven Churches of Asia . . . called also ‘the seven stars,’ on the right hand of the Lord, held responsible for the whole Church embraced within the limits of those several extensive cities with their suburban dependencies? Of one of them, Ephesus, we know

from Acts xx. 17, that some forty years before the book of Revelation was written, it had several presbyters, and of course congregations." His answer to this question is that they were presidents, having jurisdiction over clergy and laity, and that they were called bishops and apostles by subsequent writers.

Bishop McIlvaine answers his own question with great confidence, as though that was the only answer the question admitted. He is well aware, however, that there is scarcely a point, regarding which greater diversity of opinion exists among writers of all classes, episcopal and non-episcopal, than as to what is meant by these apocalyptic angels. It would seem from the very nature of the case somewhat adventurous to go among the majestic types and symbols, the visions, and hieroglyphics of this mystic book, which opens heaven to our view, to learn the organization of the Church on earth. No one has ever gone into that magic circle, and returned seeing things as others see them. It is the opinion of some eminent men, that the seven apocalyptic epistles were not addressed to the seven historical Churches named, but are prophetic exhibitions of seven successive ages of the Church, so that the prosaic view of the matter, on which Bishop McIlvaine's argument is founded, vanishes into thin air. The angels then would be the ideal representatives of the controlling powers of these successive periods of Church history, according to the analogy of the other angels mentioned in this book, and not the presiding officers of cities of stone and brick, "with their suburban dependencies."

Another very common opinion, in harmony with the general character of the book, is, that the angels were guardian angels. Every reader of the Bible knows that the imagery of the Apocalypse is borrowed in large measure from the Old Testament, and especially from the prophecies of Daniel, where every nation is represented as having its ruling angel. Others again, as Hengstenberg, think the term expresses the ideal or personified directorship or governing power in the Church, "denoting a number of persons;" as under the Old Testament the priests or prophets are collectively called the angel of God.

We refer to these as a few of the opinions entertained on this subject, simply to show on what uncertain data these prelati-

arguments are founded. Some, as we have seen, rest on sand, this rests on clouds. Here however, as before, we are willing to concede everything that can by possibility be asked. We are willing to admit that "angel" designates an individual, and that that individual was the presiding officer of the Church—and what then? Why then, says our author, as at Ephesus, at least, there were many presbyters, this president must have been a diocesan bishop and an apostle. Here again we have a seven league stride. If these presidents were presbyters, elected by their brethren to preside over the one Church to which they all belonged, (for there was but one church in Ephesus, Thyatira, or in any of these places,) then he was not an apostle, nor even a diocesan bishop. Can any one say this was not so? Can any one pretend to prove that one of the presbyters, constituted by the Holy Ghost bishops of the Church of Ephesus, (see Acts xx. 28,) had by a new ordination been constituted an apostle? Is not this a purely gratuitous assumption? Among the French Protestants, under the empire, the Christians of each city, as in the early ages, constituted one church. They had (as Edinburgh so long had) but one session, or consistory. All the ministers were members of that body. One, however, was the permanent president. He was the organ of communication with the government, and represented the church in all its transactions. He was written to if disorders prevailed, and was called to account and held responsible for the character of the whole body. Yet he was a presbyter, with no higher rank and no greater powers than his brethren. If this argument for diocesan episcopacy be valid, it would prove every president of a French consistory, and every superintendent in Germany, to be a diocesan bishop. An argument which leads to such a conclusion must be false.

The most plausible plea for diocesan episcopacy is its early origin and its general prevalence in the Church. Bishop McIlvaine does not fail to make the most of this argument. He says, "at the present day about eleven-twelfths of those called Christians in the world, are under the spiritual jurisdiction of an order of ministers called bishops, whose individual office embraces the essential particulars of that of the apostles, and whose succession they regard as derived by an unbroken chain

from the apostolic times. It is quite notorious that from the sixteenth century to within a hundred and fifty years of the last of the apostles, the whole Church in all lands was under such jurisdiction." He quotes Blondel as admitting that diocesan episcopacy was introduced (not generally, as his remarks would seem to imply, but in certain places) within sixty years of the death of St. John. "And within this short period, we have shown you," adds our author, "the testimony of writers who then lived, that bishops were then exercising the jurisdiction of the Churches, and were considered, without the moving of a question, as having succeeded to the office of the apostles." If the original organization of the Church was not prelatial, he argues that this great change would not have been introduced "so silently, that history has preserved not the slightest trace of its beginning and progress; and so perfectly and universally, that though the Scriptures were daily read in the churches, and presbyters and laity were made of the same materials they are now, none perceived the usurpation." pp. 420, 421.

We do not intend to waste time with the details of this argument. We take it as it stands. Our answer to it is—First, a distinct denial of the fact on which it is founded. We deny that prelacy prevailed universally until centuries after the apostles. Its rise was gradual and its progress slow. Of all the modern German historical critics, probably the most learned, laborious and untrammelled body of scholars the world ever saw, not one to our knowledge admits this early and general prevalence of prelacy.* As these writers reject any and every peculiarity of the Churches to which they belong, it cannot be pretended that this unanimity of judgment arises from prejudice. The fact assumed, therefore, is contrary to the united testimony of the great body of the most competent and impartial witnesses.

Secondly, the delusion under which Bishop McIlvaine labours

* * Rothe cannot be fairly cited as an exception, although in his work entitled "*Anfang der Kirche*," (a book which his countrymen say excited attention principally by its paradoxes,) he supposes the apostle John introduced diocesan episcopacy just before his death, as a remedy for disorders existing within the sphere of his labours; yet he repudiates all the arguments drawn from the New Testament in support of its apostolic origin.

is easily accounted for. He assumes that the officer called a bishop in one age is the same as that called bishop in another. It is true that episcopacy prevailed universally from the beginning. But in the early ages it was parochial, and not diocesan episcopacy. It suits our author's purpose to borrow his idea of a bishop from the middle ages, and to transfer that idea to the bishops of the first century. He sees bishops everywhere, and therefore supposes he sees prelates. He admits however that bishops were not always prelates; those of the New Testament were presbyters. When did they become prelates? Bishop McIlvaine would have us believe that it was on the night the last apostle died. They all went to bed presbyters, and all awoke the next morning diocesan bishops. This is the greatest miracle ever wrought in behalf of a theory. Prelatists swallow this camel without even knowing it. They admit that as long as the apostles lived, bishops were presbyters; and assert that as soon as the apostles were dead, bishops were prelates. It is not merely a word which changes its meaning throughout Christendom in a night; but the thing meant by that word changes its nature. If it appear incredible that any one could adopt such a theory, let him bring the case before his mind and judge if the representation given is not just. "Bishop," says our author, "was not a specific name of office until after the apostolic age. The highest rank of the ministry had then the title of apostle." p. 417. It follows from this that bishops were not prelates during the apostolic age, but simply presbyters; but during the immediately succeeding age, our author says, they were prelates. The change is instantaneous. In the last apostolic writing, bishops are presbyters. In the first non-apostolic writing, they are prelates. If anything more wonderful than this has ever been assumed in the history of the world, we know not what it is.

Thirdly, Bishop McIlvaine argues that no great change in the organization of the Church could take place suddenly and universally, without attracting attention. This we admit. The government of the Church was always episcopal, that is, it was in the hands of men called bishops. The change from parochial to diocesan episcopacy was gradual, protracted through centuries, was distinctly understood, and deliberately submitted

to. The change was not only gradual, but it was very unequal in its progress in different parts of the Church. The two systems long coexisted; diocesan episcopacy prevailing in cities and centres of influence, and the parochial form in the country. The circle of influence of the city bishop was gradually extended, and his country brethren at last were deprived, though not until several centuries had elapsed, of their original title. It was a thing unheard of in the early ages, that one bishop should be subject to another. At first there were, at least in many cases, several bishops in one church, as at Ephesus and Philippi.* The first change as to title was to confine the term bishop to the presiding officer of each church, as is now done by Presbyterians. Every church, however, had its own bishop. And the churches were then, to all appearance, just as numerous in proportion to the number of believers as they are now. There were to a late period often two or three hundred in a single province, and of course just as many bishops. There was, however, only one church in any one city. We never read of the churches of Jerusalem, Antioch, or Ephesus, but only of the church in those and other cities; whereas we read of the churches of Judea and of the churches of Galatia. The one church, however, in these several cities was very large—having many ministers, and officers of various kinds. The presiding presbyter or bishop of such city churches had the oversight or superintendence therefore of many presbyters, deacons and laymen. But at the same time, every remote village had its presiding presbyter or bishop, independent of any other bishop. This state of things, apparent from the face of history, was very analogous to the organization of the French Protestants, as before remarked, under the empire. The Protestants of Paris, Rouen, Orleans and other large cities, constituted one church with many ministers, and one president or presiding presbyter, while every village containing a sufficient number of Protestants, had its own presiding officer. What more natural, what more in accordance with analogy, what more sure to be

* Paul called together the presbyters of Ephesus and told them the Holy Ghost had made them the bishops of that church. He addressed his Epistle to the Philippians to the "bishops and deacons" of the church in Philippi. Acts xx. 28, and Phil. i. 1.

the result of "the leaven of iniquity" which dwells in the human heart, and that instinctive desire of men to rest on authority in matters of religion, than that these presiding presbyters or bishops of large cities should gradually exalt their claims, and extend their jurisdiction? What more natural than that they should first make their presidency perpetual or for life; then instead of being content with being *primi inter pares*, claim superiority of order—and then make that superiority of order a matter of divine right; and then claim that their jurisdiction extended not only over a city, but a diocese, and reduce their poorer and weaker brethren to the subordination of their own clergy? Soon one city bishop came to assert superiority over other city bishops, and thus became archbishop. In process of time, the heads of great centres of influence, as Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria, Constantinople and Rome, became the patriarchs; and the system finally culminated in a universal Bishop or Pope. This development of the hierarchy was greatly facilitated and controlled by political influences and events, but it is from beginning to end perfectly natural and intelligible, without assuming any divine right or apostolic authority or origin. The rise and spread of monarchical institutions is an event of much the same kind. Kings exist everywhere, as far back as history goes. We find them even in the book of Genesis. They were first elective and temporary, then for life, then hereditary, and then claimed divine right. An old French lady once said to us, There is a king in France, a king in England, a king in heaven, and a king in hell, a king everywhere but in America. This was her argument for monarchy; and we do not see why it is not as good as Bishop McIlvaine's argument for prelacy. It is surely quite as well put.

The *Church Review* called upon us to examine this discourse in favour of the perpetuity of the apostleship. We have done so, and express, as the result of that examination, the opinion that a more inconclusive piece of reasoning we never saw. We have the highest respect both for the abilities and character of its author. But no man can make a bad cause good, or a weak argument strong. He assumes without proof and against evidence that the commission recorded in Matt. xxviii. 19, 20, was

addressed to the apostles and not to the Church as a whole. He assumes that the promise of Christ's perpetual presence, which that commission includes, was addressed to the apostles as such, and not to the Church as such. He assumes that the promise it made to the apostles was made to them as bishops, and not as ministers of the word. He assumes, contrary to the judgment of ninety-nine hundredths of the Christian world, that the apostleship was a mere episcopate, instead of the office of inspired and infallible men. He assumes, therefore, against the almost unanimous judgment of the Church, that whatever proves the permanence of the episcopate proves the permanence of the apostleship. He assumes, contrary to the plainest dictates of reason, that authority in a single individual to ordain presbyters, implies official superiority to presbyters; while he admits that authority in a single apostle to ordain apostles, or in a prelate to ordain prelates, proves no such superiority. He assumes that the angels of the apocalyptic churches were prelates, because they were presidents and representatives of those churches, though such presidency in other cases implies no superiority of order. He admits that so long as the apostles lived, bishops were presbyters, and assumes that immediately after, the world over, they were prelates. He assumes, contrary to the judgment of the great body of the most competent witnesses, that prelacy prevailed universally during the first century after the apostolic age. He assumes that the prevalence of prelacy is unaccountable on any other hypothesis than that of its divine origin, while the like prevalence of monarchy requires no such solution. His argument, therefore, is built on false assumptions from beginning to end. Further, if his argument proves anything, it proves Puseyism and Romanism, and not simply diocesan episcopacy. If the apostleship is perpetual, then a body of infallible teachers and absolute rulers is perpetual. Möller, the ablest modern defender of Romanism, defines, in his *Symbolik*, the Church to be, the people of God under the government of a perpetual apostleship. Bishop McIlvaine in conceding the correctness of this definition, has conceded everything. It is very painful to us to say this of a man who has done so much and so ably to defend evangelical truth against doctrinal Romanism. It is, however, a duty to

say it. Bishop McIlvaine has on this vital point put himself in opposition to all the great authorities of his own Church, and sided with the Laudean and Puseyite faction in that Church. Men will take his premises and legitimately deduce from them conclusions which he would rather die than admit. Even his eulogist in the *Church Review*, we presume, is no advocate of his doctrinal views, and has no fellowship with his evangelical spirit. In the very article under review, he calls Congregationalists and Presbyterians "the sects," in distinction from the Church. So Mohammedans call Christians dogs. The spirit in both cases is the same. And this spirit is the legitimate and inevitable fruit of the doctrine of the perpetuity of the apostleship; for by the clearest declarations of the Bible, those not subject to apostles are not subject to Christ.

We conclude our review of this discourse with the remark, that the author risks everything on a single throw. The divine right of bishops is made to depend on the permanency of the apostolic office; and the permanency of that office is made to depend on its having been a simple episcopate. This is the filament on which the whole cause of diocesan episcopacy hangs. As by the plainest testimony of Scripture and the general judgment of the Church, the apostleship was more than an episcopate, the office was not continued, and therefore diocesan episcopacy is of man, and not of God.

ART. II.—*Arminianism and Grace.*

It is not our desire to wound the feelings of our Arminian brethren. Nor have we any pleasure, except as it may subserve the cause of righteousness, in pointing out what we regard as a most serious conclusion, drawn legitimately from their principles. Both for their own sake, and to avoid distracting the attention of men by the differences of Christian denominations, we would gladly omit the observations now to be made. Such, however, is the prominence given in the Scriptures to the doc-

trine of grace, and such is its admitted importance to the whole scheme of redemption, that where it is impugned or misrepresented, either directly or by fair implication, silence is criminal. This is the necessity laid upon us at present. We believe that Arminianism is essentially wrong on this subject.

It has long been our settled conviction, that the principles on which Arminians object to Calvinism are utterly subversive of the true doctrine of grace; but it is only recently that our attention has been called to certain authoritative statements on their part, which fully confirm this impression. Looking a little more than usual into the publications of "The Methodist Episcopal Church," the palladium of Arminianism in this country, we have been both surprised and grieved at the bold and unscriptural assertions with which they abound on this subject. And with the hope of opening their eyes to the consequences of their principles; of making them a little more moderate and modest in their assaults on Calvinism, if perchance any of them should read these lines; and especially with the hope of defending the truth and guarding the people from deception, we propose to notice a few of these statements, and the conclusions which to our mind necessarily follow. We shall cheerfully submit it to the judgment of the reader, whether we do them injustice.

The sum of our charge is, that Arminianism, in its essential and avowed principles, is subversive of grace. This is certainly a grave charge, which ought not lightly to be made. We should shrink from preferring it, but for the conviction—first, that it is true, and then that the error charged is incalculably injurious. Before proceeding further, it is proper to state the sense in which we use the word *grace*. It means favour—that to which the receiver has no claim, and the performer is not bound. There can be no claim to an act of grace on the one hand, nor can there be any obligation to perform it on the other. It enters essentially and necessarily into the idea that it might be withheld and no wrong done. Otherwise it is not grace. When we say, therefore, that salvation is "by grace," we mean that man has no claim to divine favour; that God is under no obligation to bestow it, and that without this favour he could not obtain eternal life. If the former has a claim,

or if the latter is bound, then grace is out of the question. That which we may demand and he must give, is not grace, but justice.

The correctness of this statement will hardly be denied. And yet we affirm that the avowed principles of Arminianism entirely subvert this idea of grace. According to this system, man in his fallen state had a claim to divine favour; God was bound to provide salvation for him, and give him a measure of grace, (if we can conceive of the term as applying to what God was bound to give) or he could not hold him responsible as an accountable being. Let us look at the proofs.

The first is taken from a volume of "Doctrinal Tracts" issued in their present form, "By order of the General Conference." To show the estimate in which these tracts are held, it may be stated, that most of them were formerly bound with "The Form of Discipline" under one cover, but for convenience sake have been separated from it. They still bear the imprimatur of the Methodist Episcopal Church.

On page 25 of this volume, a Calvinist is represented as saying, "God might justly have passed by all men;" *i. e.* might justly have left the whole race to perish, without providing salvation for any. To this the writer, John Wesley himself, we believe, replies: "Are you sure he might? Where is it written? I cannot find it in the word of God. Therefore I reject it as a bold, precarious assertion, utterly unsupported by holy Scripture." But, says the Calvinist, "You know in your own conscience, that God might justly have passed by you." "I deny it," says Wesley. "That God might justly, for my unfaithfulness to his grace, have given me up long ago, I grant; but this concession supposes me to have had grace." This is plain and unmistakable language. "I deny that God might justly have passed by me and all men. I reject it as a bold, precarious assertion, utterly unsupported by holy Scripture." The opposite affirmation necessarily follows. There is no middle ground between them. God could not justly have left me and all men to perish in our fallen state. He was bound in justice to provide salvation; and of course, to make it known and give grace to accept it, inasmuch as the provision, without these, would avail nothing! It would have been unjust to have

left us without them! But where then is the grace in doing what he could not justly have omitted to do? Is it an act of grace for the Most High to do justice? Certainly not. There is no grace in such a transaction. The gospel provision is only what he was bound to make; and to call that a dispensation of grace which justice required at his hand, is but to stultify ourselves and deceive mankind. This is our first proof that Arminianism subverts grace. It is sufficient and unanswerable were there no other. We have never seen a more bold or dangerous error couched in so few words by any writer who pretended to be evangelical. "It is another gospel, which indeed is not another"—it overthrows all. And yet we shall see that this error, here so boldly set forth, runs through Arminianism.

The next proof is from the same volume of Tracts, p. 154. "We believe that in the moment Adam fell, he had no freedom of will left." If this be true, Adam was no longer a free agent. A free agent without freedom of will is of course an absurdity which no one will maintain. Into the same state also was his posterity brought. We have, by nature, no more freedom of will than he had after the fall. Then either we are unaccountable beings, or, in order that we might be held responsible, God was bound to restore our freedom through the dispensation of Christ. He certainly could not have held us accountable without freedom of will. He must then, on Arminian principles, either treat us as irrational beings, or restore our liberty; *i. e.* he must provide a Saviour, through whom this freedom of will comes, or he could not hold any man responsible for his conduct. The Methodist Church holds that he has done the latter; *i. e.* restored this liberty. But where, we ask again, is the grace—the unmerited favour of God in this transaction—in doing what he was bound to do before we could be held accountable? This principle of Methodism, published "by order of the General Conference," aside from some monstrous absurdities connected with it, which will be noticed hereafter, either subverts all true notions of grace, or leaves man an unaccountable being. If God was bound to give us a Saviour, and through him our liberty of will, there was no room for grace in his fulfilling that obligation.

A third proof that Arminianism subverts grace, is taken

from Watson's Theological Institutes. He teaches very distinctly (and correctly we may add) that in the fall of Adam, all men became liable to bodily, spiritual and eternal death. But mark the ground on which he defends this transaction against the charge of injustice. "In all this it is impossible to impeach the equity of the divine procedure, since no man suffers any loss or injury ultimately by the sin of Adam, but by his own wilful obstinacy—the abounding of grace having placed before all men, upon their believing, not merely compensation for the loss and injury sustained by Adam, but infinitely higher blessings both in kind and degree, than were forfeited in him. . . . As to adults then, the objection from divine justice is unsupported."* But why is it unsupported? Because there is a chance to escape these dreadful consequences. It would have been unjust if there were not this chance, but since they have it, therefore it was just in God to visit them with death temporal and spiritual, and with exposure to death eternal for the sin of Adam!

But if this be the ground on which the justice of that transaction is to be defended, where, we ask, is the grace of salvation? Is it an act of grace in God to do what justice demanded? Can there be any favour in providing salvation, if the provision of it was necessary to vindicate (and according to this writer is the only thing which does vindicate) divine justice? Surely it is not grace for God to vindicate his own honour. Here again is evidence that Arminianism subverts grace. God was bound to make the provision, or he would have been liable to the charge of injustice in permitting us to be ruined by the fall.

Aside too, from its bearing on the doctrine of grace, the course of reasoning adopted by Mr. Watson involves the dangerous Jesuit dogma, that the end justifies the means. God's design to provide salvation, made it right to permit the fall and to visit all mankind with death. It would have been wrong if this had not been his intention. But as he had a merciful end in view, and as he has actually offered compensation, therefore it was just! How much iniquity Rome has perpetrated and attempted to justify on this false principle, we need not stop

* Vol. II. page 57, American Edition.

here to mention. It has been the common defence of their vilest outrages on truth, decency and honesty. And that an acute Protestant theologian should rest his whole defence of the divine justice in our fall on this fallacious ground, is a matter of profound astonishment!

It is not our business here to intimate the ground on which our connection with Adam might be vindicated. We can only say in passing, that unless the thing itself was right, or can be justified by other considerations, the mere offer of compensation (which in fact has never been offered to the heathen—the largest part of mankind) cannot make it right. Should a ruler offer a pension of millions of dollars to one of his maimed subjects, this would not justify his barbarous act in cutting off the limbs or putting out the eyes of that subject, that he might become a cripple and so receive a pension. The very fact that a compensation was due, shows that the thing was wrong in itself considered. Mr. Watson's reasoning then amounts to this, that God did a great wrong to the human family in their connection with Adam, for which he now offers to compensate them through Christ. And this compensation is of grace, according to Methodism!

A fourth proof that Arminianism subverts grace is now to be mentioned. The Methodist Episcopal Church holds that "the condition of man after the fall of Adam is such, that he cannot turn and prepare himself, by his own natural strength and works, to faith and calling upon God; wherefore we have no power to do good works pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by Christ preventing us, that we may have a good will, and working with us when we have that good will."* To this statement there would be no serious objection if it stood alone. It is certainly as strong as any Calvinist would desire. But observe what follows. They hold that this inability would excuse men from the guilt of sin, if they had not a gospel provision by which to escape from their sad condition. Thus Mr. Watson, Vol. II. p. 341, says: "If all men everywhere would condemn it as most contrary to justice and right, that a sovereign should condemn to death one or more of his

* Book of Discipline, Sec. 2, Art. 8.

subjects for not obeying laws which it is absolutely impossible for them under any circumstances, which they can possibly avail themselves of, to obey . . . it implies a charge as awfully and obviously unjust against God, to suppose him to act in precisely the same manner."

Now put these declarations together, and what do they teach? The first affirms, "he cannot turn and prepare himself to faith and calling upon God . . . we have no power to do good works." It would be utterly impossible for us then to perform them, "under any circumstances that we could possibly avail ourselves of," without the gospel. But the second says, "it would be most contrary to justice and right" to punish men for deeds committed in such circumstances. Then it follows, that without the provision and help of the gospel we would have been unaccountable beings—it would have been most contrary to justice and right for the Almighty to have punished us for our improper conduct—in order to hold us accountable justly, he must provide and offer salvation, and give strength to accept it. This is the position of the Methodist Episcopal Church, and of Arminians generally. Where then, we ask again, is the grace of the gospel? According to these statements it would have been unjust in God to have held men responsible without it. It is, therefore, simply an arrangement of justice and necessity without which the Lord could have exercised no moral government over men. Thus again is grace overthrown just as certainly as by Wesley's bold assertion, that God could not justly have passed by all men.

The grand error of Arminians here is in supposing that man's inability, whatever it is, would have destroyed his free agency and accountability, unless the gospel dispensation had supervened. This they constantly assume in their tirades against Calvinism. But the fact is, that the sinner's inability is no excuse for his sin—is no bar to his being held accountable for his conduct, even if there had been no gospel dispensation. Adam was as truly and justly accountable after the fall as before it; so are his posterity. It required no gospel provision or partial restoration (as Methodism supposes) through gospel grace to make them so. To suppose that it did, is to overthrow the grace of the gospel, and to teach the absurdity that sin de-

stroyed free agency and accountability. If it were true that inability destroys accountability, then those who are given up of God to hardness of heart could not sin after that abandonment. Can our Arminian friends understand and remember this point. Calvinists hold to no such inability as is incompatible with strict and just accountability. Arminians do, and thus subvert the grace of the gospel. This is the difference between us on this point.

Our next proof that Arminianism subverts grace is taken from the principal objection which its advocates urge against the doctrine of election. According to that doctrine all men are, by nature, in a lost condition, and might justly be left to perish for ever. They have no claim whatever to the divine favour; and even when pardon and eternal life are offered, such is their depravity that none would accept it without the constraining grace of God. Viewing all in this miserable condition he "elected some to everlasting life," whom he would make willing in the day of his power, while the remainder he suffers to pursue their own wicked choice, and will punish them at the last for their sins.

The universal outcry of Arminianism against this doctrine is that it makes God unjust; and that for two reasons; (1.) that it represents him as withholding from some, influences which he bestows on others; and (2.) that those from whom these influences are withheld, are unable to deliver themselves, and therefore cannot be justly condemned. We cannot now turn aside to present the proper answer to this objection. What we affirm here is, that if it be well founded, it overthrows the whole doctrine of grace. It rests on the assumption that men have some claim on God for gospel grace. One may claim what another has, and all may claim a certain amount, or they are treated unjustly by their Creator, if he hold them accountable for their conduct. If they have no claim, where is or can be the injustice? The very term unjust implies a claim disregarded. It excludes necessarily the idea of grace. It rests upon merit or obligation. If, therefore, God cannot give what he chooses to some without wrong to others, or if he cannot properly withhold from some what he bestows on others, it must be because they have some claim to his favour. But if they have a claim,

where is the grace of that influence to which they are entitled? Its bestowment is not grace but justice. When, therefore, Arminians assert that election makes God unjust, they do therein deny and subvert the doctrine of grace.

We have still another proof that Arminianism subverts grace. Its abettors affirm, as we have seen, that God could not justly have passed by all men, leaving them to perish in their sins. He was bound in justice to provide and offer salvation, and give the strength to receive it. But mark what follows. After God has done all this, they hold that notwithstanding all the influence he can exert on the sinner's mind, he has power to resist it—that even those who have been renewed by grace into the divine likeness, may undo the work of God in their hearts in spite of all he can do to preserve them. Thus Dr. Fisk, in his tract on Predestination and Election, (p. 16,) says, "Man's obedience or disobedience, if it has any just relation to rewards and punishments, must rest in its responsible character, upon the self-determining principle of the will.* And if this view of the will be correct, there is an utter impossibility of an unconditional election; for the very act of God, imparting this self-determining principle to man, renders it impossible in the nature of things, for the Almighty himself to elect a moral agent unconditionally. . . . This would imply irresistible grace, and that would destroy man's accountability." *i. e.* Man has a power of deciding his own will "independent of any cause without himself;" or he is not accountable. He is, therefore, of course able to decide independent of God, or of grace. "The very act of God imparting this self-determining principle renders it impossible in the nature of things for the Almighty himself to elect him unconditionally"—he can do so only upon the condition that man does not choose to resist all possible divine influences!

Now, if all this be true—if man has any such power—if its existence and exercise are essential to his accountability, where

* President Edwards defines this self-determining power or principle to be "a certain sovereignty the will has over itself, and its own acts, whereby it determines its own volitions; so as not to be dependent in its determinations on any cause without itself, nor determined by any thing prior to its own acts." Dr. Alexander calls it a power of deciding "independent of all motives and uninfluenced by any inclination."

is the room for grace in his salvation? He has a just claim, according to Wesley, to the provision and offer of salvation, and to the strength requisite to receive it. There is no grace, therefore, in bestowing these upon him. God could not justly do less. And having these, he has, in his "self-determining principle," power to resist all the grace that God can bestow on him afterwards! Nay, more, "his self-determining principle," which is said to be essential to free agency, forbids that there should be any influence whatever exerted upon him in his decision. If there is, how is it the act of "his self-determining principle?" The very phrase, "a self-determining principle" decided by grace, *i. e.* by something independent of itself, is an absurdity as gross and palpable as it would be to speak of a self-moving machine propelled by something else. In the face of this mighty principle there is neither room nor occasion for grace, in the sinner's self-determination, to submit to God. He can do it himself, otherwise his "self-determining principle" cannot determine itself after all. And he must do it himself, otherwise his "self-determining" principle is not self-determined, and his accountability is gone. It amounts to this then, that he can resist all influences—he can keep God out of his heart, or he can, without any influence, magnanimously open the door and permit the Almighty to enter. Thus again does Arminianism subvert grace by making man able either to dispense with it altogether, or superior to its most potent influences.

There is, connected with this dogma of a self-determining principle, a rich display of theologico-metaphysical acuteness, which is worthy of notice. Where does man get this wonderful principle? It does not belong to him by nature; nor is it a necessary or inherent power of the mind, (although Dr. Fisk says there can be no accountability without it!) for the General Conference says, "that in the moment Adam fell, he had no freedom of will left"—of course his "self-determining principle" was destroyed with his freedom of will, though his mind still existed. The same is true of his posterity. Whence then do they obtain it? We are not left to guess. In immediate connection with the above declaration as to Adam, and as a part indeed of the same sentence, the Conference proceeds,

“but that God, when of his own free grace, he gave the promise of a Saviour to him and his posterity, graciously restored to mankind a liberty and power to accept of proffered salvation,” *i. e.* graciously restored this self-determining principle. Grace then, in its first impartation, and without any voluntary reception of it by the sinner, restores his self-determining principle, and thus puts him in a position to resist all that grace can do afterward! In the exercise of his self-determining principle even the renewed man can undo all that may have been accomplished! Verily, the theology and metaphysics of this school are alike wonderful and baseless.

Such are some of the proofs that Arminianism is subversive of grace. The first is taken from their declaration that God could not justly have passed by all men in their fallen state. If he could not, then there was no grace in providing salvation—it was simply a matter of justice. The second is based on their assertion, that man in his fallen state has no freedom of will—is not a free agent. If this be true, God must either treat him as an unaccountable being, or restore his freedom of will through the gospel, which then becomes a necessary condition of accountability and is not of grace. The third rests on the principle, that men are impotent by nature to all good, and that they are not culpable or liable to punishment in that state of impotency, unless they have the power and opportunity of recovering from it; *i. e.* unless the gospel dispensation had been introduced. If this be true, then its promulgation is not of grace, but a condition without which they could not be held accountable. The fourth is taken from their common objection to Calvinism—that it makes God unjust. If this be true, it must be because the claim of some is disregarded. There can be no injustice where there is no claim. And if any have a claim, then grace is out of the question. The fifth is drawn from the ground on which they defend the fall of man in Adam. It was just because there is compensation for it in Christ. If that be so, then there is no grace in the provision of a Saviour. It is not grace in God to do justice. And the sixth is taken from the absurd dogma of a self-determining principle, which first forbids, and then can resist, all foreign influences. If this be true, it cannot be grace, but the sinner's own

self-determining principle that leads him to God. Thus it is by arguments drawn from six distinct points in the great circle of truth, that our charge is established—Arminianism is subversive of grace. And when grace is overthrown, where is the gospel?

We are fully aware that this conclusion will strike many, and among them, perhaps, even our Arminian friends themselves, with surprise. Far be it from us to charge them with an intentional denial of grace. They glory in "free grace," if we may use their own tautological expression. They seem to imagine that they are the only people in the world who hold or preach it in its fulness and purity. Their notion of grace, however, is a very erroneous one. It has relation mainly to the profusion with which gospel blessings are offered—not to the ground on which they are given. When they look at the former, they sing of grace, and imagine that they hold the scriptural doctrine on this subject. But when they combat Calvinism, which they misunderstand, or misrepresent most egregiously, they avow principles, as seen above, which are utterly at war with gratuitous salvation. They undermine this great truth by representing God as bound to provide it, and yet, overlooking the tendency of their false principles, profess to hold the doctrine in all its completeness—a remarkable instance of persons self-deceived and full of self-complacency in their delusion. We may say of them as Dr. Fisk charitably says of us, "If the supporters of this system must adhere to it, I rejoice that they can close their eyes to its logical consequences, otherwise it would make them wretched in the extreme, or drive them into other dangerous theoretical and practical errors; which indeed in many instances it has done." We reciprocate the kindness. Nay, we do more. For while he plainly insinuates that Calvinists are dishonest in concealing their opinions, or in refusing to look at what he considers the legitimate consequences of their doctrines, we give him and his brethren full credit for sincerity in their belief and honesty in advocating it; we have charity enough to believe that in the fury of their denominational zeal, and in the blindness of their bitter denunciation of sound doctrine, they have not seen the destructive bearing of their own principles. We claim the victory in

charity at least, if not in logic. Here our charity has not been put to a severe test; for we never supposed them to be men whose logical perceptions were remarkably clear. And if we had, these Doctrinal Tracts would have shown us our mistake. We must say that of all theological discussions which we have ever read, they are the most incoherent, illogical and vague. The one on Christian Perfection is a rarity.

But to return. The reader will perceive that the proofs of our position are not founded on mere incautious, unpremeditated admissions, or assertions, but on the mature, deliberate, argumentative averments of Arminianism. These Tracts were prepared with care, (most of them by the father of Methodism,) have been in existence a long time, were bound with "The Book of Discipline" in one cover, and still have the sanction of the General Conference. Watson's Theological Institutes is a standard work, designed to "exhibit the Evidences, Doctrines, Morals and Institutions of Christianity." Dr. Fisk's tract on Predestination and Election is one which they delight to place in the hands of uninformed or hesitating Presbyterians. These are books of authority, prepared expressly for the exhibition of principles—prepared for offensive and defensive war.

Upon the authority of these books we charge the Methodist Episcopal Church with holding and teaching; (1) that God could not justly have passed by all men without providing a Saviour; (2) that Adam by his fall lost all freedom of will, and therefore ceased to be a free agent; (3) that his posterity being in that same state would be excusable for their conduct if this alleged loss were not graciously(?) restored to them; (4) that electing love to some, would make God unjust to those not elected; (5) that our fall in Adam would be unjust but for the remedial scheme of redemption, and (6) that "a self-determining principle" by which a man can resist or dispense with all grace, is a necessary condition of free agency.

More than this. These principles we believe to be essential to the Arminian scheme. Unless they be maintained, or at least assumed, its advocates have no ground on which to defend their peculiar tenets, or to plant their batteries against the for-

trass of Calvinism. Let them admit the following propositions—the opposite of those we have charged upon them; (1) that God might justly have passed by all men without providing or offering salvation through Christ; (2) that Adam after his fall was still a free moral agent, and as such accountable for his conduct; (3) that his posterity, though like him fallen, are still by nature free and accountable; (4) that in bestowing grace on some, God does no injustice to others, as none have a claim to his favour; (5) that the permission of our fall in Adam was just and righteous, so far as our Creator is concerned, without any compensation for it in the scheme of redemption; and (6) that there is no such thing as “a self-determining principle” in the human mind, by which a man can resist all possible moral and spiritual influences brought to bear upon him. Let them admit these propositions, and what have they to say against Calvinism, or in favour of the crudities of Arminianism? We should like to see an Arminian treatise, setting out with the admission of these principles. They are the foundation stones of Calvinism. Admitting them to be true, an Arminian could no more write on theology than David could fight in the armour of Saul. Let them try it.

On the other hand, let them deny these propositions, and grace is overthrown inevitably. It is as clear as noonday, that if God could not justly have passed by all men, then there is no grace in providing a Saviour. If Adam was not still a free moral and accountable being after his fall, and if his posterity are not so by nature, there is no grace in making them so by the gospel. It was simply an arrangement of necessity, without which they could not have been held accountable. If God cannot justly withhold or give his favour in Christ Jesus as he pleases, there is no grace in bestowing it. If the permission of our fall in Adam was not just and righteous in itself, there is no grace in the gospel, which, Mr. Watson says, makes it just. Where can be the grace in doing that which it would have been unjust not to do? Arminians then are shut up to the necessity of overthrowing the gospel, or of admitting the essential principles of Calvinism. The fact is, that they do both by turns. When they preach the gospel, so far as it is ever preached by them in its purity, they do the latter. When they oppose Cal-

vinism, they do the former. Are such inconsistent errorists safe guides for immortal beings?

The subject might here be left to the candid consideration of the reader. There are, however, in addition to the subversion of grace, several other strange and unscriptural conclusions which follow necessarily from some or all the Arminian statements on which we have dwelt. A few of these may now be mentioned.

(1.) "I deny that God might justly have passed by me and all men. I reject it as a bold and precarious assertion, utterly unsupported by holy Scripture." Then the atonement itself was not necessary. For if justice required that men should have the offer of pardon, why should Christ suffer to make it consistent for God to do a just thing? If justice were on the sinner's side, the law which is just and good would justify without any atonement. According to this dogma, therefore, Christ died in vain. Surely, the Father of mercies did not require to be hired to do justice by the unutterable agony of his beloved Son. What a picture of his character and of the glorious doctrine of the cross is thus afforded!

(2.) "I deny that God might justly have passed by me and all men." Then he has treated the heathen very unjustly. For if he was bound to provide, he must certainly have been equally bound to offer salvation. Simply providing a remedy, and leaving them without the knowledge of it, would not satisfy justice. What avails it to them that there is balm in Gilead, or a physician there? "How can they believe in him of whom they have not heard?" To be ignorant of it is to them as if no such provision had been made. And since, in fact, the gospel has not been made known to the great mass of mankind, it follows that they have been treated unjustly by their Creator. He has withheld from them what he was bound to give!

(3.) "We believe that in the moment Adam fell, he had no freedom of will left." Of course he could not sin in that state. Transgression without freedom of will is no sin. Then the first effect of Adam's sin was to put himself beyond the possibility of ever sinning any more, unless God would graciously restore to him the power of so doing; *i. e.* make him a free moral agent again! Fallen angels too, according to this

dogma, are no longer free agents or capable of sinning. They have no more freedom of will than Adam had. No guilt, therefore, can pertain to any of their devices! We mistake when we think and speak of them as awfully wicked beings, waxing worse and worse!

(4.) "We believe that God, when of his own free grace he gave the promise of a Saviour, graciously restored to mankind liberty and freedom." Then the first effect of grace (for we were graciously restored, notwithstanding it would have been unjust to hold us accountable if we had not been) was to put us in a position in which we might sin! Left in our fallen state we could not have sinned, but now, by grace, we have the power to do so! Yea, and we have the power too to resist all future grace!

(5.) "We believe that in the moment Adam fell he had no freedom of will left." If the race had been left in that state, only Adam and Eve could have been punished; and they, but for one offence, unless they had been punished for things done after their freedom of will was destroyed. All the rest must have been saved. At least, they could not have been lost, as they could have committed no crime, without freedom of will. Then it follows, that the introduction of the gospel was a great calamity to the human race; for without it, all except the first pair, would have escaped the miseries of hell; but now, multitudes will endure it for ever!

(6.) "Man's 'self-determining principle' renders it impossible in the very nature of things that the Almighty himself should bring him in and keep him by irresistible grace."

Then (1) God is dependent on the sinner, not the sinner on God! (2) When Christians pray that God would keep them by his grace—when they believe that he will keep them, they ask and believe what is, in the very nature of things, impossible! To be constrained by irresistible grace, (just what common poor Christians in their weakness desire and long for,) would leave no room for their self-determining principle, would destroy their accountability, and is contrary to the nature of the divine government! They must therefore cease to pray and long for this divine guardianship, and rely on "their self-determining principle!" Is it in this view of the matter that

our Arminian friends believe in falling from grace? Well they may, for this self-determining principle, which is superior to and independent of all motives or external influences, and which absolutely knows no law, must be a very uncertain dependence. We should undoubtedly believe in falling from grace ourselves, if we held to any such principle.

But this is not all. For (3) according to it, the moment the redeemed soul arrives in heaven it ceases to be an accountable spirit, being kept by irresistible grace: or (4) if not, for aught the grace of God can do for its preservation, it may, like fallen angels, sink down to the blackness of darkness for ever! We are not sure then of eternal life even after we get to heaven, much less can we be in this world! Who can tell what turn this lawless self-determining principle may take, and how soon it may plunge the redeemed down to hell?

But the mind tires and the heart grows sick in tracing the sad conclusions which flow legitimately from these distinct averments of Arminianism. Enough has been said to show the tendency of their principles. We submit it to the judgment of every candid reader whether we have done them injustice. As said before, it affords us no pleasure to make these exposures. It is a painful duty, made imperative by our love of the truth, and by the course of those who hold such principles. They are not content to propagate error, but seem to consider themselves called of heaven to overthrow Calvinism. These so-called "Doctrinal Tracts," which the General Conference ordered to be published that they might be "within the reach of every reader," and which they are so fond of putting into the hands of Presbyterian readers, are mainly intended to refute that system. They contain but little of the peculiar or positive teachings of Arminianism. Only here and there a cloven foot—an egregious blunder—appears, as in the extracts we have given. The full phials of their vituperation are poured out on Calvinism through more than two hundred pages of the volume. The following specimens of the controversial style are worthy of preservation. Calvinism "represents the most holy God as worse than the devil, more false, more cruel, and more unjust. On their principles, one might say to our adversary, 'Thou fool, why dost thou roar about any longer? Thy lying in wait

for souls, is as needless and useless as our preaching. Hearst thou not that God hath taken thy work out of thy hands? And that he doth it much more effectually? Thou temptest, he forceth us to be damned, for we cannot resist his will.' ”

Leaving the appropriate and heavenly work of disseminating truth, they assail, misrepresent and denounce other denominations in such a style as this. That this is characteristic of their pulpit performances also, as well as their publications, is notorious. With both they come stealthily into quiet and peaceful neighbourhoods, or enter heartily into divided congregations and glory in the work of making proselytes. In such circumstances we feel that it is no breach of Christian charity to exhibit their own principles and show their tendency. They are (1) utterly subversive of all grace in the gospel of Christ; and (2) encumbered beside with the absurd and unscriptural conclusions mentioned above.

In writing the foregoing pages we have been constantly oppressed with the painful conviction that Arminianism is a delusion. We say painful, because it is with sorrow that we have felt ourselves forced to the conclusion. It is mournful to think of so many persons deceived and deceiving others. But the evidence is irresistible. We have presented it in part, and shall see more of it in the sequel. It pretends to be what it is not. Its advocates claim that they hold the doctrine of grace in perfection; whereas there is no grace in the gospel, as held by them in distinction from Calvinists. They cannot preach a sermon on grace, but on the great Calvinistic principle, that God might justly have left all men to perish in their sins without giving his Son to make an atonement—that men are accountable by nature, as free moral agents, without the grace of the gospel to make them so—that as such they may properly be rewarded or punished for their conduct—that God may justly give or withhold his grace as he pleases; and that in the exercise of it, he can move and keep the heart with perfect certainty, without destroying free agency—making his people “willing in the day of his power.”

If they can, let them preach on their own principles. “God could not justly have left me to perish without the offer of sal-

vation—I should have been irresponsible without it, and without a measure of the grace which it bestows. And now he cannot bring me into his favour and keep me by an irresistible influence without destroying my freedom.” Where could any just idea of grace be introduced into a sermon built on such principles? Yet these are the principles of Arminianism.

We feel constrained to add here, our decided opinion, that no small part of the alleged success of Arminian sentiments has arisen from a popular delusion on this point. Multitudes have believed that those who cry “free grace, free grace,” so vociferously, must understand and hold the doctrine, and hence have fallen into their ranks without examination. Let the people see, however, that Arminianism and grace are utterly inconsistent, and the wings of its progress will be clipped. The doctrine of grace is too clear and too precious to be overthrown by a delusion. Even the natural heart, much as it is inclined to such sentiments, cannot commonly embrace them at the expense of grace.

Other questions also have pressed upon us in the preparation of these pages, with painful interest. They are such as these. Can those who hold the Arminian principles, presented above, preach the gospel fully? Can they fairly present to their hearers the God of the Bible, or the Saviour there revealed? Suppose them not to preach the positive errors which these extracts contain, (and it is mostly in their attempts at controversy that these false and dangerous principles are avowed,) can they ever preach the truths to which these errors stand opposed? Can they, and do they, preach that God was under no obligation to provide a Saviour—that he is absolutely free and sovereign in his grace, giving or withholding it as he pleases—that he is able to break the most stubborn will, and to keep even the most wayward of his children against the snares of the devil? We think not. Then do they preach the pure gospel? Is it not an eviscerated gospel in which God’s sovereignty, his perfect freedom in the gift of his Son—in the bestowment of his grace, and his ability to reach and keep the vilest sinner, are left out? Is it the Father, Son, and Spirit, revealed in the Scriptures, whom they set forth? Or is it not

their own mistaken idea of what that God ought to be and to do, which is proclaimed?

Having presented the doctrinal aspect of Arminian Methodism, it would be fair and important to inquire into its practical working. This however would be an invidious and a very different task, the responsibility of which we do not feel called upon to assume. The recent volumes by the Rev. Parsons Cooke, D. D., go at large into this part of the subject, and to them we refer our readers for many important facts and statistical details. We gladly acknowledge that the Methodists, both in this country and in England, have accomplished a great work. They have carried the gospel to thousands whom it would have never reached in any other way. They are now pressing forward in the outlying portions of society, and by their system of itinerant preaching can reach scattered and feeble communities, which the more cumbrous organization of other churches cannot so well supply. We would be most unwilling to detract from their merit as a pioneer, hard-working body of men and ministers. We cannot however shut our eyes to some crying evils connected with their system and their spirit. They are, we fear, to a degree which gives them a sad pre-eminence, denunciatory and proselyting. We have hardly in our whole life, ever heard a sermon from a Presbyterian avowedly against Methodism or Arminianism, and not more than half a dozen formal discourses on any distinguishing doctrine of Calvinism. It is the glory of Presbyterian preaching, that the distinguishing doctrines of Augustinianism underlie and sustain all its exhibitions of truth, just as the granite formations underlie the upper and fruit-bearing strata of the earth, without protruding their naked rocks constantly to view. It is thus in the Bible. Those doctrines are everywhere presumed, everywhere implied, but seldom brought openly to view. Their necessity and value are not the less. What would the earth be without its granite foundations? On what would seas and soils rest? These doctrines are as precious to God's people as any other portions of his truth, but true men—men imbued with the true spirit of the Bible—leave them as they are left in the Scriptures—to lie at the foundation, and not to constitute the whole building.

Can this be said of Arminian Methodists? Do they thus preach the truth in its biblical and edifying form—or in a controversial manner? Are there not a hundred or a thousand sermons preached by Methodists against Calvinism to one preached by Presbyterians against Arminianism? We have no doubt that it is so, and this preaching, as it is in general that of uneducated and fanatical men, is pure rant—disgusting to men of sense, and shocking to men of right feeling. This we regard as one of the great reproaches of Methodism.

Another evil with which they are charged, and we fear with too much justice, is that of a proselyting spirit. We know of instances within the sphere of our observation, and hear of them from all quarters, of the surreptitious creeping in of Methodists into the bounds of other churches, and little by little seducing their members, and erecting churches where the only possibility of their living or growing is by proselyting. We do not mean to say that is a sin peculiar to Methodists. It belongs more or less to all denominations. New-school Presbyterians plant a minister by the side of a feeble Old-school congregation, where the one can live only on the death of the other. Old-school Presbyterians often do the same thing. Episcopalians carry their heads so high they do not see any other churches, and therefore are never conscious of the sin of intrusion, though they are as often guilty of it as others. Consistently with this confession of the common sin of churches in this matter, it may we think be justly said that Methodists have a very undesirable reputation for being specially offensive and pertinacious in their proselyting temper and measures. Their system gives them peculiar facilities for this work. To plant a Presbyterian or Episcopal church in any place, there must usually at least be a reliable body of Presbyterians or Episcopalians to begin with. But Methodists, getting their support from a central fund, can go where there is not a single family of their own denomination and continue their work from year to year. As they can do this work more easily than others, it is not wonderful they do more of it than others, and that practice gives them skill.

The great practical evil of Methodism, however, as we believe, is the false conversions and the false form of religion which it fosters. We believe the fact is so notorious that the better

class of Methodists themselves do not deny it, that their system of revivals and periodical excitements brings within their churches multitudes who profess to be the subjects of divine grace, who are deluded by mere emotional excitement, and who relapse into their former state, and become almost inaccessible to all subsequent impressions. The facts connected with this subject are so numerous and so well authenticated as to be really appalling. It cannot be otherwise. What is false in their system of doctrine and theory of religion, must produce the bitter fruits of evil, just in proportion as it is prominently presented and acted out. We have no disposition to pursue this subject; though it is one which calls loudly for the serious attention of all the friends of religion. In proportion as the Methodists become educated, and enabled to understand what Calvinism is, they become less bigoted and denunciatory, and we hope that many of the evils connected with their system will be lessened, if not entirely removed, by their progress in professional knowledge, which need not interfere either with their zeal or their hard working.

ART. III.—*The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte.*—
Freely translated and condensed by Harriet Martineau.
New York: Published by Calvin Blanchard, 1855.

WHILE the truth is evermore one, it follows that all believers have "one faith," in so far as their faith is genuine. Their differences, therefore, arise from the residues of unbelief which still abide in them to weaken and corrupt that faith. As they go onward increasing in faith and knowledge, this residual disturbing element is proportionally eliminated—a process which is destined to continue, till all differences shall vanish by the ultimate extinction of all unbelief; "till we all come in the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ." Meanwhile, during the upward struggles towards this celestial summit, the highest and lowest claim of the Church

must be, "in essentials unity, in non-essentials liberty, in all things charity." Less than this, she cannot demand of her members; to more than this, she cannot pretend in answer to the aspersions of her foes.

As this residuum of unbelief in real though imperfect believers, gives rise to innumerable diversities of opinion in minor matters, even among those who agree in the great fundamentals of Christianity; so, where this unbelief in the truth is total, it displays itself in forms, not only endlessly diversified, but mutually repugnant and contradictory in their essential character and radical principles. They agree only in springing from unbelief, in being constructed for the defence of unbelief, and in striving to offer a theoretical ground for infidelity or atheism open or disguised, which shall command the assent of our rational faculties. As to all else, they are often mutual contradictions, which simply show how extremes meet.

This absolute repugnancy was never more conspicuous than between the two systems now current among atheistic and infidel speculatists, especially as these are set forth by what they call their "more advanced thinkers," their chief defenders and oracles. Both were born on the continent of Europe, and both have been transplanted to Britain and the United States, where, though exotics, they have found, in certain classes, a congenial soil, and attained a vigorous growth. Never were two schemes in more absolute defiance and denial of each other, than the Transcendental Pantheism of Germany and the Positive Philosophy of France. Each is a negation of every radical principle of the other, and dooms it to annihilation. In its spirit and principles, the former is in the highest degree ideal and supersensual. With instinctive scorn for the grossness of matter, (the very existence of which it often denies,) it luxuriates in the realms of abstraction and mysticism. It refines and speculates, till whatever of existence it cannot philosophize away, it sublimates into divinity. Passing by phenomena, it regards rather the *noumenon*, (Coleridge adds to this word, the pregnant expletive, *numen*,) the *suppositum intellectuale*, which the mind places under them, and which bears the same relation to them as the substance to the shadow. Thus it deifies whatever it cannot explain away. Whatever is, is God. But with

the latter, Positive Philosophy, all this is reversed. This is wholly sensuous, materialistic, phenomenal. It recognizes nothing but phenomena. All else it either denies or ignores, as may best suit its purpose. All belief in the invisible is scouted as tolerable only in the rudimentary stages of human culture. The only realities cognizable by us are sensations, their antecedents and consequents. Whatever cannot be cognized by the senses, cannot be known, has no reality, at all events, for us. Whether there be anything beyond this or not, man might as well attempt to fly as to exercise his faculties to any purpose about it. The Positive Philosophy rules it out of the sphere of lawful inquiry, thought, and belief. In a word, it is blank, avowed, unblushing Atheism. So far from deifying man, it makes him only a refined animal. It signalizes his points of alliance with brutes, while it denies all superior beings to whom he could be allied.

Thus these two forms of desperate unbelief are poles asunder as to all their radical principles. Yet they originate in the same evil heart of unbelief, and they come together in the same antagonism to the very being of God and the gospel of his grace—as streams rising in the same mountains, and flowing down on opposite sides, often find their way to the same ocean. The Positive Philosophy avowedly and purposely un-gods the universe. By so doing, it surely erects man into the Great Supreme, who, since he can swear by no greater, swears by himself. Pantheism, on the other hand, deifies everything in pretension. What is this but to make man the Most High, and to deny that there is any God above nature; *i. e.* any God at all? Pantheism then is only refined Atheism. Both alike, in effect, deify the creature, and disown and claim to annul the Creator.

Of these two philosophies, the Pantheistic has long been familiar to us. Either in its completed form, or in some of the radical principles on which it is based, it had an early and favourable introduction among us; and in one or the other of these forms, has been an operative vital force in American literature and theology. Indeed, the transcendental philosophy, in its extreme as well as its safer forms, found an earlier and wider welcome, and a larger body of expositors and propagand-

ists here, than in Britain. We find it of every shape and hue, from the unmitigated and undisguised Pantheism of the Emerson school, down the descending series of Pantheism in a Christian garb, and Christianity in a Pantheistic garb, till we come to that large class of divines and *litterateurs* whose thoughts and style have been somewhat vivified, but not corrupted, by a slight tincture from Coleridge or Carlyle. For those who have mastered these and like authors, instead of being mastered by them, have been frequently benefitted by them; while another large class, who have wanted the sense to separate the precious from the vile, have only caught "the contortions of the sibyl without its inspiration."

The Positive Philosophy, however, has thus far not been sufficiently prominent in this country to command the attention of our chief thinkers. It is, nevertheless, as we shall yet see, insinuating itself surreptitiously, or obtruding itself openly among us, to an extent and through channels that cannot be much longer overlooked or ignored. We observe that it already has attracted a good deal of attention in Britain. It has enlisted there an enthusiastic corps of able expositors and defenders, whose productions are undergoing rapid reprint and circulation among ourselves. Among these, the great work of the inventor and oracle of Positivism, at the head of this article, of course stands pre-eminent. As a precursor and preparative for it, however, we have for some time had Mill's *Logic* extensively current among us; a work of consummate ability and skill, which is designed to train the intellect of our day to those modes of thought which must terminate in the Positive Philosophy. This book is all the more dangerous, as no such purpose is avowed, and it is constructed with admirable skill for averting the suspicions of the student. But that we have not misrepresented its real aim and scope, we hope hereafter to offer ample and undeniable proof. These and affiliated works have already made impression enough in Britain to engage the more recent defenders of theism and Christianity in their refutation. In the late works of McCosh, Tulloch, Thompson, and Bayne, we have observed that Positivism and Pantheism are alike combatted, as the chief adversaries in our day to the religion and the existence of God.

We have said that this Positive Philosophy is Atheism avowed and undisguised. But we do not ask assent to so grave a charge, till we prove it. This, however, would be, of itself, a short and easy task. But we also propose, in connection with this evidence, to present a brief outline and analysis of the radical principles on which this system is based, of the consummation to which it aspires, and of the methods to be adopted for its achievement.

The volume before us is a translation of M. Comte's series of discussions on the Positive Philosophy of which he claims and is conceded to be the father, by Miss Harriet Martineau, a lady already famous for her masculine literary productions, and her strong sceptical tendencies. Such a stupendous undertaking to rob creation of its God, and man of his nobler nature and destiny, seems monstrous in any one. For a woman thus to animalize her race, under the plea of ameliorating it, is absolutely horrible. We observe that the popular authoress, Mrs. Childs, has just published a huge work on the History of Religion, which is strangely recommended by some of our religious journals, in the same paragraphs in which they bear witness that she puts the Bible on a level with Confucius. This hostility to the gospel of truth and love, which has redeemed woman from heathenish debasement, on the part these and other gifted ladies, who are clamorous for the reconstruction of society, and the elevation of their sex, we hardly know how to explain. It was a maxim of Hume, the father of modern scepticism, to whom the Positive school is largely indebted, that "the best things, when perverted, become the worst." We remember a distinguished advocate, who was in the habit of quoting this maxim, with effect, to juries, when he had occasion to break the force of that delicate regard for the sex, which recoils from associating with it coarseness or indecency, scoffing or irreverence.

The animus with which Miss Martineau has undertaken the Herculean task of anglicising this work, appears in the following extracts from the Preface, which are also of value, as showing the interpretation put upon it by its intelligent friends and admirers. Referring to the probable reception of the book, she says: "The theological world cannot but hate a book

which treats of theological belief as a transient state of the human mind. As M. Comte treats of theology and metaphysics as destined to pass away, theologians and metaphysicians must necessarily abhor, dread, and despise the work. My hope is, that this book may achieve, besides the purposes entertained by its author, the one more that he did not intend, of conveying a sufficient rebuke to those who, in theological selfishness or metaphysical pride, speak evil of a philosophy which is too lofty and too simple, too humble and too generous for the habit of their minds." How could a few words vent more hate and bitterness for every form of doctrine which acknowledges the existence of God, and an overruling Providence?

The theory of M. Comte is, that in all the departments of science, *i. e.* of human knowledge and inquiry, the mind passes through three successive stages, the Theological, the Metaphysical, and the Positive, and that, in the last alone, does it rest in a sure conviction of truth, or success in searching for it. "The first is the necessary point of departure for the human understanding; and the third of its fixed and definite state. The second is merely a state of transition."

"In the Theological state the human mind seeking the essential nature of beings, the first and final causes (the origin and purpose) of all effects—in short, Absolute Knowledge—supposes all phenomena to be produced by the immediate action of supernatural beings."

In the Metaphysical state, which is only a modification of the first, the mind supposes instead of supernatural beings, abstract forces, veritable entities (*i. e.* personified abstractions) inherent in all beings, and capable of producing all phenomena. What is called the explanation of phenomena in this stage, is the mere reference of each to its proper entity.*

"In the final, the Positive state, the mind has given over the vain search after absolute notions, the origin and destination of the universe, and the causes of phenomena, and applies itself

* We understand the author to mean by "proper entity" just what we all mean by those forces, powers, causes, instruments, agencies, which God uses to produce phenomena. As when we are warmed by the sun's rays, we refer this effect to some property or power of that luminary.

to the study of their laws—that is, their invariable relations of succession and resemblance. Reasoning and observation duly combined are the means of this knowledge. What is now understood when we speak of an explanation of facts, is simply the establishment of a connection between simple phenomena and some general facts, the number of which continually diminishes with the progress of science.” p. 26.

The Theological system, according to him, culminated in Monotheism, or in referring all phenomena to the agency of a single being. The Metaphysical reached perfection likewise when it came to refer all things to a single entity, which it called Nature. The Positive system, in like manner, would be complete, if it could refer all phenomena and laws, *i. e.* uniformities, to some single and all-inclusive uniformity, such as the law of gravity. This, however, is hardly to be expected. The most that M. Comte hopes is, in the ultimate progress of scientific research, to resolve all particular phenomena, and special uniformities or laws, into a few that are general and ultimate.

All sciences, says he, that have reached “the positive stage, bear marks of having passed through the others.” Thus astronomy, which has become more purely Positive than any other, first existed in the form of Astrolatry. Then its phenomena were referred to abstract causes, laws, or entities. Now they are all referred and reduced to those great observed uniformities of succession which we express by the law of gravitation and the law of motion. Fetichism, the superstitious worship of natural forces and objects, then alchemy, and the fruitless search after quiddities and entities, indicate similar successive stages in natural philosophy, chemistry, and other sciences.

According to M. Comte, there is a profound rational necessity for these successive methods of philosophizing adopted by the human mind. In its primitive stage, before as yet any facts had been observed, there could be no legitimate theories, since these can be based only on such observed facts. But says he, “If it is true that every theory must be based on observed facts, it is equally true that facts cannot be observed without the guidance of some theory. Without such guidance

our facts would be desultory and fruitless; we could not retain them, for the most part we could not perceive them. Thus, between the necessity of observing facts, in order to form a theory, and having a theory in order to observe facts, the human mind would have been entangled in a vicious circle, but for the natural opening afforded by theological conceptions." p. 27. Moreover, the human mind inclines to pry into the most inaccessible truths, and to neglect what is within its reach, until by dire experience, it finds the limit of its powers. Hence, at such a period, "there could have been no reception of a positive philosophy, whose function is to discover the laws of phenomena, and whose leading characteristic it is to regard as interdicted to human reason those sublime mysteries which theology explains." While untaught by experience, the human mind would shrink from the patient examination of facts, because it could not conceive that it would thus be led to the discovery of laws. Hence it sought to leap by a single bound to the knowledge of supernatural agents, which rule over nature, and can shape its workings to suit the needs of their votaries. Thus, it is plain, that the theological stage of knowledge is requisite as a stimulus to that observation of facts, without which there could never be any advance to the positive method, while its inevitable tendency and effect must be to inaugurate that method. So astrology and alchemy induced the observation of facts, which have resulted in bringing physical science to a positive basis.

"This was a spontaneous philosophy, the theological, the only possible beginning, method, and provisional system, out of which the Positive philosophy could grow. It is easy to perceive Metaphysical methods and doctrines must have afforded the means of transition from one to the other. The human mind, slow in its advance, could not step at once from the theological into the positive philosophy. The two are so radically opposed, that an intermediate system of conceptions has been necessary to render the transition possible. It is only in doing this, that metaphysical conceptions have any utility whatever. In contemplating phenomena, men substitute for supernatural direction a corresponding entity. This entity may have been supposed to be derived from the supernatural

action; but it is more easily lost sight of, leaving attention free from the facts themselves, till, at length, metaphysical agents have ceased to be anything more than the abstract names of phenomena. It is not easy to say by what other process than this our minds could have passed from supernatural considerations to natural; from the theological system to the positive." p. 28.

Let it be observed here, that this school rejects and abjures as metaphysical, the hypothesis of laws, forces, properties, considered as "derived from supernatural (*i. e.* divine) action." All these, as science takes on its Positive form, come to be "only abstract names of phenomena," *i. e.* of the registered uniformities of succession.

The sum of the whole is, that the "first characteristic of the Positive philosophy is that it regards all phenomena as subjected to invariable natural *Laws*. Our business is, seeing how vain is any research into what are called *Causes*, whether first or final, to produce an accurate discovery of these laws, with a view to reducing them to the smallest possible number." p. 28. By invariable laws is meant, as has already been made to appear, "invariable relations of succession and resemblance." These are the only categories under which the mind can lawfully contemplate phenomena. Causality, substance and quality, necessity and possibility, all *a priori* knowledge is peremptorily disowned as spurious, unless we allow this character to the relations of succession and similitude. As to quality, M. Comte teaches us that it is a modification of quantity. (p. 58.) While Mr. Mill suggests that quantity is a mere form of similitude and dissimilitude.* Says our author, "Our positive method of connecting phenomena is by one or the other of two relations, that of similitude or succession; the mere fact of such resemblance and succession being all that we can pretend to know; and all that we need to know, for this perception comprehends all knowledge, which consists in elucidating something by something else—in now explaining and now foreseeing certain phenomena, by means of the resemblance or sequence of other phenomena." p. 802. According to this, knowledge and legi-

* *Logic*. Harper's edition, p. 49.

timate inquiry are restricted to objects of sense, as contemplated under the categories of succession and resemblance—these being allowed, because they are involved in the very conception of uniformity of sequence in phenomena.

No one can have failed to observe already the arrogant assumptions and the supercilious dogmatism with which Positivism rules out every mode of knowing the invisible, of arguing from the seen to the unseen, from creation to its Creator. But it may be asked, Does it not admit a knowledge of the human mind, which though not cognizable by the senses, is known through its own consciousness? This also is interdicted as abnormal in its character, and treacherous in its results. It is "out of the question to make an intellectual observation of intellectual processes. The observed and the observing organ are the same. In order to observe, your intellect must pause from activity; yet it is this very activity you want to observe. If you cannot effect this pause, you cannot observe. If you do effect it, you have nothing to observe. The results of such a method are in proportion to its absurdity. After two thousand years of psychological pursuit, no one proposition is established to the satisfaction of its followers." p. 27. Thus, after prohibiting all recognition of the spiritual and supersensual without ourselves, he forbids us to inspect our inner nature, where the activity of a thinking immaterial substance unmistakably appears. The fallacy of the pretexts urged in support of the author's views, is only equalled by their audacity. Every exercise of the human mind is an exercise of consciousness, in which we not only know or feel, or desire, or purpose, but also *know that we thus know, feel, desire, and purpose*. To deny the power of knowing our own thoughts and cognitions, is to deny the power of knowing anything. We may be in doubt of other things; we may even doubt whether our consciousness does not bear witness to a falsehood. But that of which we can never be in doubt, is that we are conscious of what we are conscious. If anything can be inspected or studied, it is this. And is no proposition in Psychology established to the satisfaction of its followers? Will M. Comte claim that it is still a matter of doubt whether men have the power of sensation, external perception, of memory, of association, of conception, of judgment,

of imagination, of ratiocination, and much more, which is past question with all but Sceptics and Positivists?

But how would this school lead us to the knowledge of the human faculties? Locke thought that we could not investigate other subjects with safety and advantage, till we understood the nature and extent of the powers of the instrument with which we investigate. Hence he was led to those psychological inquiries which have given him enduring celebrity. The Positive Philosophy, however, reverses this order. It is going to regenerate the study of the logical laws of mind, by inaugurating the only fit method of investigation. "Every active, and especially every living being, may be viewed under two relations—the statical and the dynamical; that is, under conditions, or in action."

"If we regard these functions (of the mind) under their statical aspect—that is, if we consider the conditions under which they exist—we determine the organic circumstances of the case, which inquiry involves it with anatomy and physiology. If we look at the dynamic aspect, we have to study simply the exercise and results of the intellectual powers of the human race, which is neither more nor less than the general object of the Positive Philosophy." pp. 32, 33.

Thus one fundamental part of Intellectual Philosophy and Logic is remanded to anatomy and physiology. The other resource is the study of the admitted conclusions which have been reached in physical science (on this scheme the only science,) and the methods by which they have been reached. Thus, says M. Compté, "The illusory psychology, which is the last phase of theology, is excluded." We leave this for the "physiological study of our intellectual organs." No wonder then that he eulogizes Gall as the father of the true method—the Bacon of mental science.* The grand climacteric to which Positivism brings us in this sublime department, which has tasked the loftiest intellects, from a Plato to a Hamilton, is a wretched *caput mortuum* of craniology. We are turned over from self-inspection and meditation to the dissecting room. Phrenology is *scientia scientiarum*.

* See pages 381—757.

But in answer to such gross materialism, so dogmatically propounded, we venture to assert that were one to dissect skulls all his days, and spend his life among the tombs, and were he shut out from all view of his own consciousness, he would never get the first glimpse of any mental property, faculty, or exercise. No truth is more evident than that, if we cannot gain a knowledge of the mind from consciousness, we can gain it nowhere. When the science of mind has been thus constructed by a patient study of our own consciousness, we do not dispute that the connection of its faculties with our physical organism, and the form and extent to which the latter conforms to and shadows forth the former, is a fair subject of inquiry. Whether a science of this sort may yet be constructed, remains to be seen. As yet, however, phrenologists, so far from surmounting its difficulties, and meeting its requisite conditions, do not seem, Mr. Mill being judge, even to have conceived them.* They have thus far made only a flimsy contribution to Materialism, and Positivism, of which Mill, at least, notwithstanding the plaudits of M. Comte, appears quite chary—*Non tali auxilio nec defensoribus istis*.

As to the Dynamical aspects of the mind, these are to be ascertained by a historical survey of what it has accomplished in the various sciences; *i. e.* in physics, for elsewhere it is, as we have seen, a fundamental postulate of this system, that man has accomplished, and can accomplish nothing. Material phenomena furnish the *omne scibile*.

From this survey of the sciences in connection with the developments of our race as shown in history, M. Comte erects a science which he calls Sociology. This exhibits man in his social relations, and thus his moral aspects, so far as the idea of morality can find place in such a system. M. Comte boasts himself as the inventor and constructor of this science. He constantly expresses the sublimest assurance of its rapid growth and speedy ascendancy, to the extinction of theological and metaphysical systems. He fancies that he has placed this on a positive basis, *i. e.* on the basis of an observed uniformity of sequence in the phenomena of society, or of man in his social

* Mill's Logic, Harper's edition, p. 295, 296.

relations. We, however, drop this topic just now, expecting soon to revert to it, as being the grand consummation in which the whole system culminates.

It is not surprising that M. Comte looks for great and beneficent revolutions from Positivism. Not only is the science of mind to be reorganized—education is to be regenerated not only by teaching in a positive and sure way, but by viewing each science in its relations to all. This, in the third place, will further the progress of each science, because each contains many problems insoluble except as seen in the light of related sciences. Fourthly, it will afford “the only solid basis of Social Reorganization.” Thus this besom of destruction, which begins by sweeping out of existence the divine, the supernatural and supersensual—all religion, and the very basis of morals—proposes to end with the overthrow of all ordinances and institutions in which they are embodied.

With these fundamental principles and purposes, M. Comte proceeds to construct his Positive Philosophy. He commences, (having abolished every religious ministry,) to organize what he calls the “hierarchy of the sciences.” These he sets in the order of their relative complexity and obscurity. With this view he makes one grand division into—1. Science of inorganic; 2. of organic objects. To the former belong in the order of complexity—1. Astronomy; 2. Physics, properly so called; 3. Chemistry. To the latter, 1. Physiology; 2. Social Physics—the former concerning itself with vital organization as it exists in the individual—whether vegetable, animal, or human; the latter with the phenomena exhibited by them as gregarious, which modify their individual properties and workings, and as seen in man, surpass all other things in moment and interest. These sciences thus arranged present an ascending series of increasing complexity, and decreasing generality in their laws. For, says M. Comte, with all his horror of *a priori* principles, “it is clear *a priori* that the most simple phenomena must be the most general: for whatever is observed in the greatest number of cases is of course most disengaged from the incidents of particular cases.” p. 44. Thus two or three simple laws run through and determine the whole of astronomy. But they pervade all matter; and they are best seen in their true char-

acter by the study of that science, in which they are most universal and unmixed. In Physics we find all the laws developed by Astronomy mixed with others which complicate them. Therefore this is best understood after a previous training in Astronomy. In like manner Chemistry involves every law of Physics with others in addition. Physiology contains all of Chemistry with the vital, organic element added. Social Physics all of Physiology and much more. Thus each of these sciences requires the study of the preceding as a due preparation for it. It cannot be denied that this arrangement gives evidence of a philosophic mind. It is one among innumerable proofs, that if the system here arrayed against Christianity is in itself contemptible, the ability and tact of its advocates are far from being so. Of course, they allow no place to Metaphysics, Theology, and affiliated sciences. But what, meanwhile, shall be done with Mathematics, which is neither organic nor inorganic, which is in itself purely abstract and immaterial, and yet, without which, no progress can be made in the simplest of the inorganic sciences? M. Comte, after purposely omitting all allusion to them, till the grand distribution which we have noted had been completed, places them first in his ascending series because of their simplicity, universality, and the necessity of employing them in all the succeeding sciences. They are also needful as an intellectual gymnastic to prepare the mind for the due investigation of the departments which follow. This, then, is the ascending series of the hierarchy of the sciences, in the order in which they can be most profitably studied, while each preceding one runs into and pervades that which follows, and thus all tend towards scientific harmony and unity.

But how do the Positivists meet the fact, that while mathematics are the surest, the most positive, the most universal of the sciences, they are nevertheless founded on axioms which are not phenomena perceived by the sense, or deductions from such phenomena, but which, by an intuitive judgment of the mind, are seen to be self-evident, universal, and necessary truths? The Positive philosophy cuts this knot at a single stroke. The first principles of mathematics are not allowed to be intuitive truths. Our very ideas of space itself, and of points, lines, and figures in space, are mere deductions from

sensible experience. The axioms which we take for *a priori* truths are obtained in this way—"After observation has shown us, for instance, the impression left by a body on a fluid in which it has been placed, we are able to retain an image of the impression, which becomes a ground of geometrical reasoning. We thus obtain, apart from all metaphysical fancies, an idea of Space. This abstraction, now so familiar to us that we cannot perceive the state we should be in without it, is perhaps the earliest philosophical creation of the human mind." p. 92. Need we say in answer to all this, that all knowledge of extension got thus, or otherwise by sensation or perception of bodies, is one thing; the intimate and inextinguishable conviction that there is no time in which, no conceivable limits beyond which, space is not, and, in short, that there are no circumstances in which we can conceive its non-existence, is another and very different thing? The idea of body may first be consciously in the mind; it may be the occasion of wakening the notion of space into consciousness, because we see that, although bodies are not space, yet they cannot exist without space to contain them. But the idea of body is not the idea of that space whose non-existence we cannot think. If the notion of space is chronologically posterior, it is logically prior to that of body, because presupposed in order to its existence. Body is conceived as limited, space as unlimited: body as contingent, space as necessary; body as a sensible representation, space as a pure rational conception. With all their contempt for Psychology, Positivists could not help seeing this, if they would interrogate their own consciousness.

We pass now to the "second abstraction which it is indispensable for us to practise—to think of surface and line apart from volume. We effect this by thinking of volume as becoming thinner and thinner, till surface appears as the thinnest possible layer of film; and again, we think of this surface as becoming narrower and narrower till it is reduced to the finest imaginable thread; and then we have the idea of a line. Though we cannot think of a point as a dimension, we must have the abstract idea of that too; and it is obtained by reducing the line from one end or both, till the smallest conceivable portion of it is left. This point indicates, not extension of

course, but position, or the place of extension. Surfaces have clearly the property of circumscribing volumes; lines again, circumscribe surfaces; and lines, once more, are limited by points." p. 98.

This theory breaks down in the very statement. Compare its parts for a moment. Surface is the "thinnest possible layer of film." "Surfaces circumscribe volumes." Is not film, when attenuated to the thinnest, still a volume circumscribed by surfaces? And, according to this genesis of the idea of a surface, is it not that which is included between surfaces? So of a line. Take the finest thread you will; it is still circumscribed by lines and surfaces too. How then can it be a line itself? Or again, take the "smallest conceivable portion" of that line; it has length, breadth, depth, points in proportion. How then, on this theory, can it indicate "position" merely, without extension? The truth is, these boundaries in space are not given in, though they may be suggested by, sensible, external representations. Any such representation is circumscribed by, and cannot constitute, them or any of them. They are forms which the mind conceives, but not objects cognizable by the senses. Visible geometric figures are symbols which suggest them, but are still included in, without *being*, them. Every material, visible, or tangible line, is in reality a minute parallelogram included within other geometric lines. We are so constituted, that the moment we conceive of matter, *i. e.*, substance occupying space, however minute, we cannot but conceive of it as circumscribed by these pure lines, points and surfaces. Positivists themselves admit, that if there be any necessary intuitive truths, they are such as these. They however deny them altogether; yet they cannot reason or discourse long, without implying their existence. Says M. Comte, in this very connection: "We *cannot conceive* of any space, filled by any object, which has not at once *volume, surface, and line.*" Assuredly not; and therefore, and just as surely, we cannot conceive of it except as limited by surface without depth, by lines without breadth, by points without extension.

Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret.

If this system will not hold with regard to the primitive

geometric ideas and definitions, it must of course fail with regard to the origin of mathematical axioms which have a more obvious generality, and are still less implicated, in our conceptions, with sensible representations. We hope, however, in the next article to notice Mr. Mill's memorable attempt to overthrow their attributes of self-evidence and necessity.

Having constituted his ascending hierarchy of the sciences in the order of Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Physiology, and Social Physics, (all others being regarded as branches of these,) M. Comte proceeds to consider the essential characteristics, the historical development, and the present state of these sciences, for the purpose of showing their successive emergence, through the theological and metaphysical, into the positive state, and the degree of approximation to, or distance from, that state, in which they now are. They are in the positive state just in proportion as they have been brought under the rule of invariable laws of sequence, inductively ascertained; as they are prosecuted with a view to the discovery of other similar laws, similarly ascertained, and the mutual interconnection of these with the general laws of other sciences; and above all, in proportion as they have eliminated the theological and metaphysical methods, *i. e.* all reference of phenomena to causes first, second, final, or instrumental, natural or divine. It is not too much to say, that, in this colossal undertaking, the author displays prodigious power—a cyclopediac mastery of the whole field of physical science—and that he throws out a multitude of original and valuable suggestions, deformed of course, by being connected evermore with the fontal heresies which underlie his whole system, and which the whole survey in question is designed to strengthen. Upon these, we have no time to remark in detail. We gladly hand them over to the masters in the several departments. We must hasten to the crowning science in the series, which more especially concerns us, because it has to do directly with man, as a social, moral, and religious being. We refer to Sociology, which occupies the larger part of the volume. The author boasts that he is the first to put this science on a positive footing, and complains that it has hitherto been exclusively under the dominion of Metaphysics and Theology. Those who have

paid any attention to the foregoing analysis, must have observed, with what ingenuity and thoroughness he has prepared to reduce the phenomena of our spiritual being to a mere branch of physical science, controlled by physical laws and conditions. Indeed he teaches that physiology, biology, and sociology, are all in their nature as capable of mathematical computation as astronomy. But the elements involved in these sciences are so complex and subtle, that we cannot seize all the data (for the present at least) which are necessary to render the calculations reliable. If we could, they would undoubtedly be amenable to mathematical laws. (p. 59.) Thus virtue and vice, holiness and sin, beauty and deformity, liberty and order, magnanimity and baseness, truth and falsehood, can be brought to the test of arithmetic. "The age of chivalry has gone; that of sophists, economists, and calculators has succeeded."

In approaching Sociology from the stand-point of Physiology, M. Comte unceasingly and emphatically reiterates his protestations against the broad and impassable distinction, which Psychologists set up between man and brutes. This, he thinks, arises wholly from the vicious study of man by self-inspection, whereas no such process is possible in case of brutes. The positive method of studying them physiologically and by external observation, would greatly attenuate, if not finally obliterate this distinction. He says, "animals, in the higher parts of the scale, at least, manifest most of our affective and intellectual faculties, with mere differences of degree." p. 383. "The famous theory of the *I*, is essentially without any scientific object, since it is destined to represent a purely fictitious state. There is, in this direction, as I have already pointed out, no other real subject of positive investigation, than the study of the equilibrium of the various animal functions—both of irritability and sensibility. . . . Among superior animals, the sense of personality is still more marked than in man, on account of their more isolated life." p. 385. "There is no other essential difference between humanity and animality, than that of the degree of development admitted by a faculty, which is, by its nature, common to all animal life, and without which it could not even be conceived to exist. Thus

the famous scholastic definition of man as a *reasonable animal*, offers a real no-meaning." p. 386. "On the ground of this hypothesis, it is said that man must have begun like the lower animals. The fact is so—allowing for superiority of organization; but perhaps we may find, in the defects of the inference, a misapprehension of the states of the lower animals themselves. Several species of animals afford clear evidence of speculative activity; and those which are endowed with it attain a kind of gross fetichism as man does, supposing external bodies, even the most inert, to be animated by passion and will." p. 546. "It is a very irrational disdain which makes us object to all comparison between human society and the social state of the lower animals. This unphilosophical pride arose out of the protracted influence of the theologico-metaphysical philosophy; and it will be corrected by the positive philosophy, when we better understand and can estimate the social state of the higher orders of mammifers, for instance." p. 478. "The real starting-point (of our race) is, in fact, much humbler than is commonly supposed, man having everywhere begun as a fetich-worshipper and a cannibal." p. 545.

We have quoted these passages simply for the purpose of signaling them. They speak for themselves. Of course we are now ready to see M. Compté tracing the philosophical source of the greatest error prevalent in Sociology, to "the great theological dogma of the Fall of Man." On the basis of the principles we have brought to light, he proceeds to evolve the principles of social science. "From Science comes Prevision, from Prevision comes Action," is his favourite motto. By ascertaining from history the social and political organizations under which man has lived, he gathers the laws of Social Statics. By contemplating his course and progress under these organizations, he works out the laws of Social Dynamics. From the nature of the case the two largely interblend. These laws, if truly deduced, will enable us to predict the future, because if applied retrospectively, they would enable us to "predict the past." They can only be relied on for the future, when they will endure this test. But, as in other departments of science, when we know the laws of sequence, we can control and modify results by a due adjustment of such antecedents as are in our power,

(*e. g.*, by a due adjustment of fire, water, and iron, the locomotion results;) so here, by adjusting our social arrangements to the ascertained laws of human action and development, we can control and perfect the future of society. Such will be the benign results which these men predict from the introduction of Positivism into man's ethical and political relations.

According to the fundamental law of the development of every science, Sociology has its three stages, the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive. As has been the case with other sciences also, so this now is in that state of confusion which results from the intermixture of the three methods. This, however, only shows that it is entering the positive stage, and the others having prepared the way for it, have decayed and are ready to vanish away. The theological stage, too, of human development had a three-fold succession, first of Fetichism, then of Polytheism, then of Monotheism. The Metaphysical also has its three-fold stage; first of Protestantism, or liberty of conscience and private judgment; next, of Socinianism or Deism; and third, of Atheism and referring all phenomena to an entity called Nature—these two last, however, being two downward, suicidal, yet unavoidable strides of Protestantism as well as Metaphysics; for each of the false methods of human science, though provisionally necessary to prepare the way for a higher, and at length for Positivism, yet by its very progress becomes self-destructive.

The hostility of this Philosophy to the doctrine of the Fall, arises manifestly from the repugnance of this truth to this whole scheme of the successive development of the race, from a kind of ourang-outang state, to an approximate perfection commensurate with its advancement in Positive Philosophy. M. Comte attributes the universal tradition of an ancient state of perfection from which the race has degenerated, to a false pride of origin. He thinks the Positive theory of progress from cannibalism to the present condition of civilized nations, a truer ground of pride. We have no doubt of it. This doctrine of a continuous advance toward perfectibility, by the development of our own inherent and unaided powers, coupled with disbelief in superior beings, must of course nurse in man whatever pride arises from regarding himself as the Greatest and Best.

The success of the Positive Philosophy requires that we gain the power of "prevision;" i. e. of foreseeing future phenomena. This can only be obtained by ascertaining from observation, the invariable laws which govern man's action in his social relations. But this is impossible, if will, human or divine, have any part in regulating these phenomena; for this would subject them to caprice instead of invariable laws. And hence, the persistency with which Positivism excludes theology and metaphysics from philosophy, and the realities with which they have to do, from existence. "The arbitrary can never be excluded while political phenomena are referred to will, divine or human, instead of being connected with invariable natural laws." p. 435. "If social events were always exposed to disturbance by the accidental intervention of the legislator, human or divine, no scientific prevision of them would be possible." p. 456. When he elsewhere tells us that the doctrine of Providence is inconsistent with such prevision, he is only declaring the same thing in other words. And the consequence of the whole is, what he asserts in forms innumerable, that man must disown his spiritual and immortal nature and turn atheist, as a prerequisite to the vaunted regeneration of society which Positivism is to usher in.

In evolving his theory, M. Comte takes the most advanced nations, in other words, Christendom, as the supposed theatre in which it is most fully exemplified. In these, as all other nations, man standing as a cannibal, could not avoid "fetichism, which allowed free exercise to that tendency of our nature by which man conceives of all external bodies as animated by a life analogous to his own, with differences of mere intensity." p. 545. In the lowest debasement of man, "a certain degree of speculative activity exists which obtains satisfaction in a gross fetichism." "Thus is fetichism the basis of theological philosophy . . . no aberration of theology, but the source of theology itself." pp. 546, 7.

Gross however as fetichism is, it was provisionally necessary as an incentive to that observation and classification of phenomena, which is the beginning of that positive spirit which reduces it first to polytheism, then to monotheism, then to metaphysics, till finally nature is substituted for divinity, and

at last, beneath this hitherto lowest deep, we find a lower still in Positivism.

The *rationale* of this transition from fetichism to polytheism, is thus given. "When certain phenomena appeared alike in various substances, the corresponding fetiches must have formed a group, and at length coalesced into one principle, one, which thus became a god. Thus, when the oaks of a forest, in their likeness to each other, suggested certain general phenomena, the abstract being in whom so many fetiches coalesced was no fetich, but the god of the forest. Thus the intellectual transition from fetichism to polytheism is neither more nor less than the ascendancy of specific over individual ideas, in the second stage of human childhood, social as well as personal." p. 559.

Polytheism, according to M. Compte, had three phases; the "Egyptian or theocratic, the Greek or intellectual, the Roman or military." The destination of the Greek philosophy being to serve as the organ of the irrevocable decline of polytheism, in preparations for the advent of monotheism. . . . The confused sense of the necessary existence of natural laws, awakened by the introduction of geometrical and astronomical truth, was the only means of giving any philosophical consistence to that universal disposition to monotheism which arose from the steady progress of the spirit of observation circumscribing supernatural intervention, till it was condensed into a monotheistic centre." p. 595.

Thus the author reaches Christianity. The light in which he regards it, will soon be seen to correspond with the theories already noted. Meanwhile, a quotation or two, showing his estimate of the Scriptures, will not be out of place. "These considerations point to the little Jewish theocracy derived in an accessory way from the Egyptian, and perhaps also, the Chaldean theocracy." p. 598. He censures Protestantism, as "offering for popular guidance, the most barbarous and dangerous part of the Scriptures—that which relates to Hebrew antiquity." And while he concedes that "the first dawning sense of human progression was inspired by Christianity, which, by proclaiming the superiority of the law of Jesus to that of Moses, gave form to the idea of a more perfect state, replacing a less perfect," nevertheless, he insists that any such pro-

gression was "barred at once by the claim of Christianity, to be the ultimate stage at which the human mind must stop." p. 440. It was a great merit of Romanism that it restricted the media of inspiration, which must be admitted, to some extent, in order to the very existence of theology, to the supreme ecclesiastical authority. "This papal infallibility which has been regarded as such a reproach to Catholicism, was thus, in fact, a great intellectual and social advance." p. 609.

Taking the Roman Church as the grand concrete embodiment of Christianity, M. Comte passes by other churches till he reaches Protestantism, which he regards not so much a form of Christianity, as its annihilation. It is chiefly a negation of Romanism, and it is simply destructive, not constructive. This self-destructive element is inherent in theology, which advances towards perfection, only by a proportionate growth of the positive element, which, in its turn, only advances by eliminating theology itself. "So provisional is the theological philosophy, that, in proportion as it advances, intellectually and morally, it becomes less consistent, and less durable. . . . Fetichism was more deeply rooted than polytheism, yet gave way before it. Polytheism had more intrinsic vigour and a longer duration than monotheism." p. 642. Thus the intellectual activity prevalent among the learned class, always cherished in the bosom of the Roman Church, made continual progress in the observation of phenomena—in the discovery of their uniformities. The speculative mind was, in this way, led to look, more and more, away from will to laws, from God to abstract forces as the causes of phenomena. Thus the way was preparing with constantly increasing rapidity, for supplanting the theological, by the metaphysical or Protestant element, which bridges over the gulf between theology and Positivism.

M. Comte constantly treats Romanism with respect, Protestantism with contempt—so far as their intrinsic merits are concerned. All systems, indeed, are alike to him as rendering provisional service in removing the obstacles to Positivism. In his view the mischievous part of Romanism was its doctrine—the meritorious part its polity. The former is destined to expire. The latter, in substance, will live and constitute a

part of the benignant *regime* of Positivism. Protestantism assailed and broke down the organization of Rome, for its chief work. The doctrinal part of Catholicism it retained with partial and incidental modifications. "The part of Catholicism which was thus destined to expire was the doctrine, and not its organization, which was transiently spoiled through its adherence to the theological philosophy; while, reconstructed upon a sounder and broader intellectual basis, the same constitution must superintend the spiritual re-organization of modern society, except for such differences as must be occasioned by diversity of doctrine." p. 636. Hence Protestantism, retaining as it did only the weaker part of the Roman system, was destined to speedy dissolution—passing through Socinianism and Deism, until it culminated in Atheism, and referred all things to a metaphysical entity called Nature. Thus Protestantism, weak as it is in itself, becomes a powerful coadjutor of Positivism, being first born of its spirit, and then, with suicidal progress, removing every obstacle to its complete ascendancy.* As to modern Pantheism, our author, with unusual felicity, disposes of it as a refined fetichism, and finds in it a fresh proof of the innate tendency of the human mind to that type of theology.

The metaphysical entities which have been set up to govern society during the revolutionary interregnum between the reigns of Theology and of Positivism, are the rights of man and unbounded liberty of conscience. These, it is claimed, are the ruling forces introduced by Protestantism. They are in their nature revolutionary, and therefore temporary. They simply remove barriers to the speedy enthronement of Positivism. They are neither constructive nor conservative; they avail only for destruction. "Negative as we now see this dogma (liberty of conscience) to be, signifying release from old authority while waiting for the necessity of Positive science, (a necessity which puts liberty of conscience out of the question in astronomy, physics, etc.) the absolute character supposed to reside in it, gave it energy to fulfil a revolutionary destination. This dogma can never be an organic principle; and, moreover, it constitutes an obstacle to re-organization, now that its activity

* See pages 643, 644.

is no longer absorbed by the demolition of the old political order. . . Can it be supposed that the most important and the most delicate conceptions, and those which by their complexity are accessible to only a small number of highly prepared understandings, are to be abandoned to the arbitrary and variable decisions of the least competent minds?" pp. 409, 410. To the same category M. Compté refers the dogmas of equality, popular sovereignty, and national independence. Provisionally necessary to the destruction of the old *regime*, and the conservation of society in the interim, they are now hinderances to its proper re-organization!

We think we have now found the clew to M. Compté's meaning, when he teaches, as we have seen, that the valuable element in Romanism was its polity, and that this was spoiled by the Christian doctrine which was mixed with it, while purged of this poison, it is to be restored without taint or abatement during his sociological millennium. The infallibility of the Pope is to be superseded by the infallibility of the Positive Philosophy. The hierarchy of Rome is to be supplanted by a hierarchy of atheistic speculatists. Pope Pius and his successors are to be displaced by Pope Compté and his successors, disobedience to whose decrees and fulminations is no more to be tolerated, than disbelief in the principles of astronomy! If liberty of conscience is to be cloven down, we would greatly prefer the iron sceptre of one who owns his accountability to the Most High, from whom he claims to hold his power, to the remorseless tyranny of the atheist, who knows none higher than himself!

But how are the nations, after having cast off the yoke of civil and spiritual despotism, to be induced to submit to this more terrible bondage? This problem is easily solved by M. Compté. The law of human progress, as inductively shown by all past history, is, that the social development of the race follows in the track of its more advanced speculative thinkers. It is, therefore, established with as much certainty and positiveness, and as full a claim to the assent of men, as the laws of astronomy, physics, etc., that the most advanced thinkers should be installed and obeyed as the guides and counsellors of society. They need not indeed be the formal civil rulers of the

nations. They will hold a relation to civil government analogous to that which the Roman hierarchy has held—a power behind the throne, greater than the throne itself; or like that which science holds to art. As artists are controlled by men of science, because they see the truth and evidence of the principles the former discover and propound; so “we see by the universal admission of scientific truths, notwithstanding their opposition to religious notions, how irresistible will be the sway of the logical force of demonstration when human reason attains maturity; and especially when its extension to moral and social considerations shall have imparted to it its full energy.” p. 773. Thus there is every reason to suppose, that what first establishes itself as true in single superior minds, will also establish itself in the mind of collective humanity. As the sailors obey the captain, the captain his compass, and the maker of the compass the discoveries of science; so under the positive *regime*, “all in their several order and manner,” will obey the dictates of the hierarchy of intellect, because they will carry with them demonstrative evidence. The new system is to teach men, “that there is a public utility in the humblest office of coöperation, no less truly than in the loftiest function of government. Other men would feel, if their labours were but systematized, as the private soldier feels in the discharge of his humblest duty, the dignity of public service, and the honour of a share in the general economy.” p. 774. With a coolness, which, if not sublime, is ridiculous, says M. Compté, “I will venture to say, that sociological science, though first established by this book, already rivals mathematical science itself, not in precision and fecundity, but, in positivity and rationality.” p. 803. And much more of the like.

But we cannot extend our quotations further. We have in a few pages, aimed to give a faithful, though necessarily inadequate, exhibition of the fundamental principles of the Positive Philosophy. When it is considered that the unfolding of the system by its author, as given in this volume, occupies more than eight hundred closely printed octavo pages, our readers will make due allowance for any omissions of importance which have occurred, whether through inadvertence or necessity. Yet we certainly have endeavoured, and hope we have not entirely

failed, to give a fair and just exhibition of the radical principles and peculiarities of the system. As to all that is most momentous, our readers can judge whether the quotations we have given are explicable on any supposition, except the construction we have put upon them—a construction which we do not hesitate to say is borne out by the entire scope, and the minuter details of the work.

Our object in thus presenting the outlines of the system, as a compact whole, and with due authentication, has been not to present an argumentative refutation of it. Such gross atheism and materialism must stand self-refuted with the readers of this journal, who may be presumed to be theists and Christian believers. We have rather desired to let them know what the system is, in its principles, reasonings, and results, that they may the more readily detect them, as they furtively insinuate themselves into the literary, philosophic, scientific, and educational works of our day. As some conception of the drifts of modern Pantheism is requisite to an intelligent appreciation of the origin, reach, and animus of pantheistic ideas, as they run, like veins in marble, through certain descriptions of theology, philosophy, and literature, so a similar knowledge of the great principles of Positivism is requisite to a due discernment and estimate of the virus, when it partly conceals that it may the better insinuate itself, in powerful and influential treatises. A memorable work of this sort is Mill's *Logic*, as we purpose to show in our next article.

We would not be understood as disparaging the ability of M. Comte's great work, or of the auxiliary productions of his co-adjutors, when we treat them as needing not so much laboured refutation as exposure.

The encyclopediac scientific knowledge displayed in this work, the many profound, striking, and comprehensive thoughts of which it is prolific, will ensure for it consideration and influence, in spite of its atheism. Not only so: so far as it is within the compass of human ability to render such monstrous doctrines plausible and current, that ability is here displayed. All that we mean to intimate is, that our readers need not arguments to fortify them against a system which teaches either that phenomena are in such a sense "uniform and invariable"

as to be unalterable by the Almighty; or that so far as they possess uniformity, they are therefore incompatible with a reigning God and a superintending providence, (of which they are rather the instruments and illustrations;) that man can attain any "prevision" and control of the future, which is not either revealed from above, or liable to be dashed by a thousand contingencies, beyond either his foresight or his power; that when men come to the positive knowledge of the principles of social order and right conduct, they will of course freely obey them; that man is only a superior brute; that society is to be advanced to perfection by the extinction of Christianity and all religion; that effects were without causes; qualities without substance; the body without a soul; the universe without a God.

Nor do we imply that we think there is no danger of this system spreading to any serious extent. If absurdity were a sure guaranty of harmlessness, all systems of scepticism would be impotent. But their power lies not so much in any pretended proofs and demonstrations, as in the heart of sinful man, not willing to retain God in its knowledge.

No system of atheism or infidelity indeed is likely to be permanent. In the long run, their folly shall be so manifest, that they will shame their abettors, and can "go no further." Yet, if not lasting, it may be wide-spread, and its blighting effects may be both broad and enduring. Atheism, and materialism, propagated first by a band of speculatists, diffused itself through the masses of the French people, and combined with the madness induced by oppression, to precipitate and aggravate whatever was terrible in the French Revolution. Although the forms of unbelief have changed, yet the scepticism of the French Revolution was not confined to the limits of that age or nation. In the Positive Philosophy it has its resurrection. No man ever more completely argued away the primitive and irresistible judgments of the human race, than Hume. Yet no philosopher ever gave a more decisive bias to speculation, whether among supporters or adversaries. The influence of his shrewd and astute speculations still lives, and even the Positive Philosophy is little else than the following out of his principles to their logical result—the superstructure, of which he laid the foundations, reared and made imposing with the aid of

materials borrowed from modern science. The folly and absurdity of a system which ministers to the ungodly propensities of fallen man, will not deprive it of adherents among the high and the low, philosophers and the vulgar. Surely we must be convinced of this, when we see entire schools of philosophers, devoted to the propagation of the whole spawn of mystical and profane German absurdities, from infinite egoism to infinite nihilism. It is the essential characteristic of them all, that "professing to be wise they become fools." Pantheistic infidelity and atheism offer an attractive side to men's moral corruption and intellectual pride, not only by undermining accountability, but by their mysticism, their profound inanities, and meaningless platitudes. The Positive Philosophy, in its turn, by its clearness and narrowness, its show of evidence and demonstration, its "mock humility" in giving up all pretence of knowing anything, not evident to the senses, will not be without its attractions, not only for sceptical minds of the sensational school, but for the uneducated and unthinking, the socialist and the sensualist. Miss Martineau and M. Comte are loud in their protestations against the reproaches that have been hurled at their philosophy, for the "lowness of its aims." For ourselves, if mankind should cease thus to reproach it, we should take it for a strong symptom of the tendency of the race towards that cannibalism and brutality which this school makes its starting point.

Irreconcilable as Pantheism and Positivism are in their principles and methods, there is a wondrous confluence or similarity in their practical results. With both alike, the race is a great social unit, a collective man, to which the individuals composing it are but as the sparks on the anvil to the iron whence they fly, as the chips of the sculptor to the statue he makes, by chiselling them off.* All the phases of opinion and practice, even the foulest abominations that have ever prevailed, have been good and true for their day and generation; just as good and true for the time, as Christianity, which like them, is evanescent in the end. There is no such thing as

* See an able Article, entitled "Realism Revised," in the last "*New Englander*," and *Compte passim*.

absolute and immutable truth. It is the boast of M. Comte, that, on his theory, truth is not absolute but relative—just what observed uniformities of phenomena happen to make it, to each individual, a mere dress, varying with every change of circumstance, and grade of intelligence. How well this accords with the style of modern pantheists, to whom all opinions and religions are equally true, and who can accept as many creeds as are offered them, all understand, alas, too well. But by whomsoever held or taught, such opinions sap the foundations of all responsibility, religion and morality, and of all real earnestness in the investigation of truth. For how shall men seek that, in whose existence they have no faith?

ART. IV.—*A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive*: Being a connected view of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation. By John Stuart Mill. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1855.

ACCORDING to the intimation given in the article on the Positive Philosophy, we now invite the attention of our readers to an examination of Mill's Logic. This is no ordinary book. False or true, pernicious or salutary, for better or for worse, it is, like the great work of Comte, to which it is auxiliary, of an order of which no single generation produces more than one. Indeed, while a rapid succession of treatises, from different hands, on Logic as a whole, or on some of its controverted questions, has appeared, since the memorable work of Whately, which, by universal consent, has done more than all else to restore this branch to its proper place in education, the whole put together do not, in our opinion, contain as much clear, close, and deep thinking, as the work under consideration. The six hundred formidable octavo pages of fine, closely set type, which this edition contains, are guiltless of vapid generalities, barren repetition, verbose diffuseness, or, with reference to the objects the author had in view, waste matter of any sort.

Having thus shown that we are neither unable nor indis-

posed to do justice to the ability of the work, we hope it will appear that it is in no captious or narrow spirit that we find ourselves constrained to condemn some of its leading and characteristic doctrines. If these should be found to brand it with the stamp of Positivism, as we have before hinted, this is the fault not of us, but of the book itself. We find, however, that we are not alone, nor the first, in attributing this character to the book. This is freely done, as if it were a matter of course, by Christian apologists, who find themselves under the necessity of combatting its principles.* While we rejoice in whatever truths the book contains, this pleasure is more than neutralized by the monstrous system of error into the support of which these truths are impressed.

There has indeed been great dispute as to the proper subject-matter of Logic. A large share of the controversies relative to the science, are traceable to a radical difference on this point. Dr. Watts's treatise, which has probably been studied more than any other in the English language, extends the compass of the science so far, as to make the object of it the "right use of Reason." It is quite clear that this opens a field broad enough to enable one, under the colour of a treatise on Logic, to advocate any opinion or theory he chooses, on any subject whatever. It was doubtless the amiable design of Watts in thus ampliating the sphere of the science, to obtain a license for stringing together, under the title of Logic, a collection of useful rules, whether pertaining strictly to it, or to mental and moral philosophy, or rhetoric, for the assistance of young persons in the culture of their minds. Nor is it to be denied, that some of the more celebrated treatises on Logic have given some countenance to this latitudinarian view, by appending to their unfoldings of it useful suggestions more properly belonging to the adjacent sciences. On the other hand, it is our conviction, that Whately is guilty of a reverse and radical error, when he teaches us that Logic is "entirely conversant about language." It is so wide of the truth, that he himself contradicts it in the first sentence of his book, where he says, "Logic may be considered as the science, and also the art of *Reasoning*." It can

* See the Burnett Prize Essay, by Tulloch, pp. 278, et seq.

scarcely be doubted that, of these seeming contradictions, the latter is nearer the truth. Logic undoubtedly has a primary respect to the reasoning process and the laws thereof; but inasmuch as language is the vehicle of thought, and is the ordinary instrument of the mind in reasoning, it has a secondary and incidental respect to that also, as Hamilton has well observed. But under no stretch of meaning which the word has hitherto borne, had we a right to look for what amounts to an ingenious plea for the Positive Philosophy, under the title of Logic. But the Trojan horse is still serviceable and keeps up with the "most advanced thinkers." We would not complain of the relation of the title of the book to its subject-matter, were it not a type of the author's general manner of approaching subjects of infinite moment to us, and of undermining the first principles of a faith which is dearer to us than worlds. We are not insensible to the gravity of these implications, or the wrong of making them, without sufficient grounds. But we submit, whether they are unreasonable, when an author, in a treatise on Logic, in setting forth "the ground of induction," elaborately argues against the doctrine of efficient causation; of our possible knowledge of anything but phenomena in their relations of "similitude and succession;" against any intelligible property in matter except that it is the unknown antecedent of certain sensations in ourselves; against will as the cause of any, much more as the ultimate cause of all phenomena; when, more especially, he brings an encyclopediac review of the proper methods, and the present state of investigation in the sciences, to a climax, in an elaborate article on "Sociology," which closes with the following announcement, made for the first time in a long work, in the whole of which he had been cautiously laying the foundations for it.

"I cannot, however, omit to mention one important generalization which he (M. Compté) regards as the fundamental law of the progress of human knowledge. Speculation, he conceives to have, on every subject of human inquiry, three successive stages; in the first of which it tends to explain the phenomena by supernatural agencies; in the second, by metaphysical abstractions; and in the third, or final state, confines itself to ascertaining their laws of succession and

similitude. This generalization appears to me to have that high degree of scientific evidence, which is derived from the indications of history with the probabilities derived from the constitution of the human mind. Nor could it easily be conceived from the mere enunciation of such a proposition, what a flood of light it lets in upon the whole course of history; when its consequences are traced, by connecting with each of the three states of the intellect which it distinguishes, and with each successive modification of these states, the correlative condition of all other social phenomena." pp. 586, 587. When the drift and aim of a book is to prepare the mind for such a doctrine as this; to attract the student towards the great work of which it is the beginning, middle, and end; to train his modes of thinking so that he shall meet the bold and persistent avowal of this doctrine, without that instinctive recoil which to unsophisticated minds would be inevitable; is it quite fair to give him to understand that he is studying Logic, and nothing but what properly belongs to it, till the fell work has been accomplished? Had the title of the work been "The Logic of the Positive Philosophy," or "A System of Logic, being an Introduction to the Study of Positive Philosophy, by M. Compté," it would have been a true description of its real character and purpose.

And yet Mr. Mill, we conceive, has set forth the true province of Logic with uncommon precision and accuracy. He says, "Truths are known to us in two ways; some are known directly, and of themselves; some through the medium of other truths. The former are the subject of intuition, or consciousness; the latter, of inference. The truths known by intuition are the original premises from which all others are inferred. . . . The province of Logic must be restricted to that portion of our knowledge which consists of inferences from truths previously known, whether those antecedent data be general propositions, or particular observations and perceptions. Logic is not the science of belief, but the science of proof, or evidence. So far forth as belief professes to be founded upon proof, the office of Logic is to supply a test for ascertaining whether or not the belief is well-grounded. With the claims which any proposition has to belief on its own intrinsic evidence, that is,

without evidence, in the proper sense of the word, Logic has nothing to do." pp. 3—5.

The foregoing seems to us a true statement, in so far as it restricts the subject-matter of Logic to the process of inference; of deducing the unknown or the uncertain from truths previously known. It is clearly the science which develops the rules and methods for doing this in a sure and reliable manner, and it is nothing else. But, then, when it is said that intuitive truths are "without evidence in the proper sense," nothing can be more false. They have the highest of all evidence, even self-evidence. Besides, Mr. Mill justly makes them the "original premises" *i. e.* the evidence, of all deductive truths. But if they are not evidence of themselves, how can they be evidence of anything besides themselves? Such a theory gives us a chain without a staple. Although then, Mr. Mill assures us that Logic has nothing to do with intuitive truths, yet when he also tells us that "Logic is the science of the operations of the mind which are subservient to the estimation of evidence," (p. 7,) he opens what would be the widest door for inquiry into the validity of our belief in self-evident truths, if he had not, in the same paragraph closed it, by the false assertion that self-evidence is no evidence. But notwithstanding this; notwithstanding he so often relegates "any ulterior and minuter analysis to transcendental metaphysics; which in this, as in other parts of our mental nature, decides what are ultimate facts and what are resolvable into other facts; (p. 8.) notwithstanding his protestation, "that no one proposition laid down in this book has been adopted for the sake of establishing, or with any reference to its fitness for being employed in establishing, preconceived opinions in any department of knowledge or inquiry on which the speculative world is still undecided;" (p. 9.) it is yet undeniable, that some of his most toilsome chapters are occupied with proving that phenomena in their relations of similitude and succession are the *omne scibile*; that we can know nothing of matter but the sensations it produces in us; that there is no objective perception of it or its qualities; that we have no warrant for attributing to it either substance or qualities further than to regard it as the unknown cause of creative sensations in ourselves; that the doctrine of causality as

involving efficiency or anything else besides invariable antecedence, is baseless; that the doctrine of the existence of any necessary truths is a delusion; and much more of the like—to say nothing of the sciences of Ethology and Sociology which he introduces. The foregoing involve, directly and indirectly, most of the leading questions of mental philosophy and the higher metaphysics. The author's disposal of them clears away the great obstructions to Positivism. And when they all culminate in removing from “every subject of human knowledge,” “supernatural agencies,” “metaphysical abstractions,” everything but their mere “relations of similitude and succession,” we submit whether the end of the book does not give us more than we bargained for in the covenants at the beginning.

This book studiously avoids those unguarded extravagancies of M. Comte, which would have been fatal to its favourable introduction to the British mind. Thus, had he spoken with the same contempt of searching after causes of phenomena as M. Comte, he would have revolted his readers. He, however, subserves the end in view far better, by retaining the name and denying the thing. But let him speak for himself. He says: “It seems desirable to take notice of *an apparent, but not a real opposition* between the doctrines which I have laid down respecting causation, and those maintained in a work which I hold to be far the greatest yet produced on the Philosophy of the Sciences, M. Comte's *Cours de Philosophie Positive*. . . . I most fully agree with M. Comte that ultimate, or in the phraseology of the metaphysicians, efficient causes, which are conceived as not being phenomena, nor perceptible by the senses at all, are radically inaccessible to the human faculties; and that the constant relations of succession or of similarity which exist among phenomena themselves, (not forgetting, so far as any constancy can be traced, their relations of co-existence,) are the only subjects of rational investigation. When I speak of causation, I have nothing in view, other than those constant relations. Nor do I see what is gained by avoiding this particular word, when M. Comte is forced, like other people, to speak continually of the *properties* of things, of *agents* and their *action*, of *forces* and the like.” pp. 209, 210.

This passage is a pregnant one, and proves several things within a very brief compass.

1. That, although retaining the word *cause*, he agrees entirely with Comte in rejecting the thing indicated by it, as it is generally understood and believed by men. He goes all lengths with his master in placing this beyond the reach of human knowledge or inquiry.

2. He explicitly rejects "efficient causes which are not conceived as phenomena, nor perceptible by the senses at all, as radically inaccessible to the human faculties." How could language more explicitly rule out the possibility of the knowledge of God as First Cause and Creator, of superhuman or even human spirits, "not perceptible by the senses?" What room does such a system leave for believing "that the worlds were made by the word of God, and the things which are seen are not made of things which do appear?"

3. It is impossible for these men, who reason away the intuitive convictions of the soul, to proceed far, without being forced to recognize them. They may abjure causality, or resolve it into mere antecedence; but they cannot write a dozen pages without recognizing "agents, action, forces," and the like, all which imply efficient causality. Men who deny all morality, will soon show that they have not utterly extinguished the self-evidencing light of conscience, when they suffer insult or injury from others.

Again, in place of the scorn which Comte expresses for Psychology, we find Mr. Mill vindicating it against his aspersions, and exposing the fallacy of confounding it with physiology or phrenology. He shows that the faculties and laws of the mind can be learned only from the inspection of consciousness, (which Comte utterly scouts as impossible,) and that such knowledge is a *sine quâ non* of ascertaining any supposed relation of these faculties to the cerebral or other corporeal organs. p. 581. We do not notice any other difference of opinion of any moment between these authors. And the essence of this, we take to be, that the one fancies that mental philosophy can, the other that it cannot, be turned to the account of Positivism.

Another feature of this treatise is, that instead of treating

the terminology and formulas of the school logicians with contempt, after the style of Comte, it scrupulously preserves and honours them, taking due care to surround them with discussions and explanations, which make them serviceable to the author's scheme. This method has the advantage not only of violating no prejudices, but of investing old formulas with a fresh and vivid import. And in all these ways, as well as by habitual caution and moderation, the author escapes the disadvantage which would arise from imitating the audacity of Comte, or appearing as the servile follower of his opinions. Yet we think we have shown already, that he adopts whatever is most vital, or rather deadly, in those opinions, and by these small and immaterial variations, contributes more effectually to promote them on British and American soil.

After the manner of the logicians, he begins with the consideration of language, as employed in the reasoning process, and pursues the subject at great length and with great ability. No portion of the work, if we except those relating to the methods and tests of valid inductions in physical science, are more satisfactory than those which relate purely to language. If we except the metaphysical and other passages bearing a special outlook towards his peculiar philosophy, (some of which we shall speedily notice,) his observations are profound and just, full of suggestive educating power. As an eminent example, we refer to his luminous chapter on connotative and non-connotative words. Notwithstanding its formidable length, we cannot refrain from quoting an extract in reference to preserving intact the formulæ which record the past beliefs of men, not only because we love to fortify severely contested principles of our own from so unexpected a source, but also because it is a pleasure to present to our readers a bright side of a book obnoxious, on other accounts, to the strongest reprobation. It is all the more unexpected and welcome, when, on another page (515,) we find the following answer to the question, "Why are we bound to keep a promise at all? No satisfactory ground can be assigned for the obligation, except the mischievous consequences of the absence of faith and mutual confidence to mankind. We are therefore brought around to the interests of society as the ultimate ground of the obliga-

tion of a promise." Here is sheer utilitarianism set up as the ground of moral obligation. There is then no intrinsic obligation to speak the truth and keep plighted faith. We apprehend, that if men ignore all ground of obligation but utility, they will think that utility to themselves creates a more stringent obligation than utility to others. Still, this theory offers the only possible basis of morals, left by a purely sensational and phenomenal philosophy, which rules out all intuitive, *a priori* truths and ideas, and therefore the idea of morality. But to our proposed extract, which is in pleasing contrast with this and much else in the book.

"Considering, then, that the human mind, in different generations, occupies itself with different things, and in one age is led by the circumstances which surround it to fix more of its attention upon one of the properties of a thing, in another age upon another; it is natural and inevitable that in every age a certain portion of our recorded and traditional knowledge, not being continually suggested by the pursuits and inquiries with which mankind are at that time engrossed, should fall asleep as it were, and fade from the memory. It would be utterly lost, if the propositions or formulas, the results of the previous experience, did not remain, and continue to be repeated and believed in, as forms of words it may be, but of words that once really conveyed, and are still supposed to convey, a meaning: which meaning, though suspended, may be historically traced, and when suggested, is recognized by minds of the necessary endowments as being still matter of fact, or truth. While the formulæ remain, the meaning may at any time revive; and as on the one hand the formulæ progressively lose the meaning they were intended to convey, so on the other, when this forgetfulness has reached its height and begun to produce consequences of obvious evil, minds arise which from the contemplation of the formulæ rediscover the whole truth, and announce it again to mankind, not as a discovery, but as the meaning of that which they have long been taught, and still profess to believe." . . .

"There is scarcely anything which can materially retard the arrival of this salutary reaction, except the shallow conceptions and incautious proceedings of mere logicians. It sometimes

happens that towards the close of the downward period, when the words have lost part of their significance and have not yet begun to recover it, persons arise whose leading and favourite idea is the importance of clear conceptions and precise thought, and the necessity, therefore, of definite language. These persons, in examining the old formulas, easily perceive that words are used in them without a meaning; and if they are not the sort of persons who are capable of rediscovering the lost signification, they naturally enough dismiss the formula, and define the name without any reference to it." . . .

"An example may make these remarks more intelligible. In all ages, except where moral speculation has been silenced by outward compulsion, or where the feelings which prompt to it have received full satisfaction from an established faith unhesitatingly acquiesced in, one of the subjects which have most occupied the minds of thinking men is the inquiry, What is virtue? or, What is a virtuous character? Among the different theories on the subject which have, at different times, grown up and obtained currency, every one of which reflected as in the clearest mirror the express image of the age which gave it birth, there was one, brought forth by the latter half of the eighteenth century, according to which virtue consisted in a correct calculation of our own personal interests, either in this world only, or also in the next. There probably had been no era in history, except the declining period of the Roman empire, in which this theory *could* have grown up and made many converts. It could only have originated in an age essentially unheroic. It was a condition of the existence of such a theory, that the only beneficial actions which people in general were much accustomed to see, or were therefore much accustomed to praise, should be such as were, or at least might without contradicting obvious facts be supposed to be, the result of the motive above characterized. Hence the words really connoted no more in common acceptation, than was set down in the definition: to which consequently no objection lay on the score of deviation from usage, if the usage of that age alone was to be considered.

"Suppose, now, that the partisans of this theory, had contrived to introduce (as, to do them justice, they showed them-

selves sufficiently inclined) a consistent and undeviating use of the term according to this definition. Suppose that they had succeeded in banishing the word *disinterestedness* from the language, in obtaining the disuse of all expressions, attaching odium to selfishness, or commendation to self-sacrifice, or which implied generosity or kindness to be anything but doing a benefit, in order to receive a greater advantage in return. Need we say, that this abrogation of the old formulas, for the sake of preserving clear ideas and consistency of thought, would have been an incalculable evil? while the very inconsistency incurred by the co-existence of the formulas with philosophical opinions, which virtually condemned them as absurdities, operated as a stimulus to the re-examination of the subject; and thus the very doctrines originating in the oblivion into which great moral truths had fallen, were rendered indirectly, but powerfully, instrumental to the revival of those truths.

“The doctrine, therefore, of the Coleridge school, that the language of any people among whom culture is of old date, is a sacred deposit, the property of all ages, and which no one age should consider itself empowered to alter, is far from being so devoid of important truth, as it appears to that class of logicians, who think more of having a clear, than of having a complete meaning; and who perceive that every age is adding to the truths which it had received from its predecessors, but fail to see that a counter-process of losing truths already possessed, is also constantly going on, and requiring the most sedulous attention to counteract it. Language is the depository of the accumulated body of experience to which all former ages have contributed their part, and which is the inheritance of all yet to come. We have no right to prevent ourselves from transmitting to posterity a larger portion of this inheritance than we may ourselves have profited by. We continually have cause to give up the opinions of our forefathers; but to tamper with their language, even to the extent of a word, is an operation of much greater responsibility, and implies as an indispensable requisite, an accurate acquaintance with the history of the particular word, and of the opinions which in different stages of its progress it served to express. To be qualified to define the name, we must know all that has ever been

known of the properties of the class of objects which are or originally were, denoted by it. For if we give it a meaning according to which any proposition will be false, which philosophers or mankind have ever held to be true, it is at least incumbent upon us, to be sure that we know all which those who believed the proposition understood by it." pp. 411—414.

But in portions of the preliminary exercitations on language, the author labours out certain metaphysical and psychological principles, which must now receive attention.

Under the questions, What do names denote? what are namable things? what are substances and attributes? the author avails himself of the opportunity to throw out such views relative to Psychology, Metaphysics, and Ontology, as suit his purpose. The following is his enumeration and classification of all namable things:

"1st. Feelings or states of consciousness.

"2d. The minds which experience these feelings.

"3d. The bodies or external objects which excite certain of those feelings, together with the properties or powers whereby they excite them; these last being included rather in compliance with common opinion, and because their existence is taken for granted in the common language, from which I cannot prudently deviate, than because the recognition of such powers or properties as real existences appears to me warranted by sound philosophy.

"4th and last. The successions and coexistences, the likenesses or unlikenesses, between feelings or states of consciousness. Those relations when considered as subsisting between other things, exist in reality only between the states of consciousness which those things, if bodies, excite; if minds, either excite or experience. . . . These, or some of them, must compose the signification of all names." p. 52. "All we know of objects is the sensations which they give us, and the order of the occurrence of those sensations. . . . It may therefore be safely laid down as a truth, both obvious in itself, and admitted by all whom it is necessary at present, to take into consideration, that of the outward world, we know and can know absolutely nothing, except the sensations we experience from it. Those, however, who still look upon Ontology as a possible science . . . must not

expect to find their refutation here." pp. 40, 41. Conformably to all this he proceeds to define *body* as the "hidden external cause to which we refer our sensations," and to contend for "the essential *subjectivity* of our conceptions of the primary qualities of matter, as extension, solidity, &c., equally with those of colour, heat, and the remainder of what are called secondary qualities." p. 41. "We may say, then that every objective fact is grounded on a corresponding subjective one; and has no meaning to us, (apart from the subject fact which corresponds to it,) except as a name for the unknown and inscrutable process by which that subjective or inscrutable psychological fact is brought to pass." p. 52.

Upon all this we remark :

1. That there is an obvious purpose in this whole analysis of the modes and matter of our knowledge. That purpose is to reduce all that is knowable to phenomena under the relations, succession, or co-existence, likeness or unlikeness. Hence the persistent denial of any knowledge of the objective properties of matter. For this would be granting that we can know more than such relations. Hence the reduction of succession and similitude themselves to mere states of consciousness. For if we could assert these as existing objectively in aught else besides the mind, we could with the same propriety assert the existence of other properties of matter. The author's purpose then is palpable, all his protestations to the contrary notwithstanding.

2. We utterly deny that all we know of body is, that it is the hidden cause of sensations in ourselves. Such a definition contains simply the fallacy of putting a part for the whole. Like all other things, matter is known to us in some respects, but not in others. It is known by its qualities, some of which are more, some less, perfectly understood. It is an intuitive conviction of the mind, that these qualities belong to something which we call substance. Now that we know of this substrate *that* it is, while, at the same time, we do not know *how* or *what* it is, is readily conceded. Whatever objections Mr. Mill may raise against the recognition of the *existence* of a substance which is in its nature unknown, lies with full force against his doctrine of matter as the "unknown cause of our

sensations;" nay, on his philosophy, which ignores all knowledge of anything but phenomena, they bear with a greater, an absolutely annihilating force, against this assumption of an occult cause. On the other hand, on our scheme, this substrate, though not explicable in itself, is manifested both by the sensible and by the *a priori* qualities which are seen to belong to it objectively, which are more than mere subjective sensations having no correspondent reality in the object producing them. We are here brought to face the whole question of the primary and secondary qualities of matter, the relation of which to the very foundations of faith and of sceptical idealism, must be our justification for dwelling further on the subject. This distinction, though not first noted, was signalized by Locke, strenuously maintained by Reid and the most distinguished modern philosophers, British and Continental, and has been developed in a singularly clear, exhaustive, and conclusive manner by Sir William Hamilton.*

Whence comes our notion or knowledge of matter, and in what does it consist? All knowledge implies a subject knowing, and an object known. The object so known, may be either the mind, the Ego knowing, *i. e.* it may know itself or some affection of itself, and thus become subject-object, or it may know something as separate and distinct from itself. On the possibility and reality of this latter knowledge, depends the possibility of escaping absolute Egoism, or Idealism, which simply resolves the universe into a mode of the thinking-self, or mind. If we are called on to show how the mind can know anything beyond its own acts and states, we are no more obliged to solve the problem, provided our consciousness testifies to such acts of intelligence, than to show how it can know itself or its own states. Each fact may be, and, to our present faculties, doubtless is, alike ultimate and irreducible to any simpler facts.

Now, in the exercise of the senses of sight and touch, especially the latter, there is not merely a subjective sensation, but a perception of a something that is seen to be not-self. As surely as there is a consciousness of the Ego perceiving, there is

* Hamilton's Reid, Note D, p. 825.

a consciousness of the non-Ego perceived. Both are equally asserted in one indivisible act of consciousness, or of our intelligent faculty. Is this witness to be believed when it asserts the non-Ego? So all mankind, except a few philosophers and sceptics run mad, have believed. So we must believe, unless we make consciousness a false witness. And if it is false in affirming the non-Ego, why not in affirming the Ego? *Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus*. And so we are given over to absolute scepticism.

Thus the mind comes to the knowledge of matter, as an objective reality existing in space. And as surely as it knows this, it knows matter, as having *in itself*, not in the mere sensations of the knower, extension, figure, hardness, divisibility, to say no more. By the senses, the mind perceives these qualities in all matter. Not only so: but no sooner does it cognize matter, as substance occupying space, than it knows *a priori*, that it *must* have extension, form, incompressibility, divisibility, etc. The existence of matter is indeed contingent on the will of the Creator. But being once given, these are its necessary attributes, whose non-existence the mind cannot conceive, whoever may undertake to explain them away. Being thus universal and necessary, they are justly styled primary qualities; known, perceived directly and objectively through the senses, and also discerned independently of all sensation and external perception, by the Reason.

There is another set of properties in matter such as odors, heat, &c., which differ from the foregoing in the following particulars. 1. They are contingent, not necessary. They belong to some bodies, but not to others. 2. They are known, not objectively in themselves, but only through the sensations they produce in us, and are named chiefly from those sensations. The sweetness of the rose, is only that occult quality in it which gives us the sensation of sweetness. 3. The co-existence of these qualities is not known directly, but by inference, from the sensations which their presence is found to produce. 4. Had we not the direct perception of matter in its primary and secundo-primary qualities, as an objective reality, there would be no ground nor possibility of inferring that it possesses those which are the secondary qualities. 5. Mr. Mill's definition of matter

only holds good with respect to these its secondary qualities. By one audacious leap in definition, designating matter from its occasional and incidental, instead of its essential and universal properties, he has prepared the way for boundless confusion and scepticism in relation to the whole subject. Gathering now to a focus the distinctions between the primary and secondary qualities, we find that the one sort are necessary, the other contingent; the one universal, the other occasional; the one originally matters of intelligence, the other of feeling; the one objective, the other subjective in the mind's first relation to them; the one are objects of perception, the other simply causes of sensation; the one of immediate intuition and perception, the other of inference from our sensations.

Besides these, Hamilton has marked a third class, such as gravity, cohesion, repulsion, and inertia, which he denominates secundo-primary, because they partake partly of the primary and partly of the secondary characteristics—*e. g.* they are universal but not necessary, in part known by perception, and in part by sensation, etc. But upon these it is unnecessary for us now to dwell.

3. If the theory that our knowledge of matter consists wholly of sensations is groundless, no less so is the correlate theory that similitude and succession are exclusively between sensations. It is doubtless from within the mind, that the ideas of similitude, identity, succession, etc., arise. But the things of which they are true are as really objects without, as within us. Similarity is as much an objective reality between the water that flows in a stream to-day and that which flows to-morrow, as between any subjective sensations connected therewith.

4. What is sensation? According to Reid it is an act of the mind which "has no object beyond itself;" according to Hamilton a "mere apprehension of affection of the Ego." What is perception? It is an act of the mind which goes beyond itself to the cognition of an external object—not of an idea, image, sensation, or representation of an object, but of the object itself. It is therefore a higher energy of intelligence than mere sensation. Upon it, and upon a true view of the reality of the knowledge it gives, rests our whole security against infinite subjectivity, utter idealism. But Mr. Mill confounds the

two, or rather negates perception altogether, pp. 85, 86. This is in fact the abnegation of all knowledge of the external world. And, therefore,

5. We remark finally, that this attempt to lay the basis of Positive Materialism terminates in absolute Idealism. We in reality know nothing beyond our own sensations: "Every objective fact is grounded on a corresponding subjective one." To concede that phenomena themselves are known as objective realities, as anything more than modifications of the sentient self, would be conceding too much. If we concede this degree of knowledge, we must concede a great deal more, which would be fatal to this scheme. Therefore we know nothing but sensations or modifications of self. All that we recognize beside, is a "hidden external cause" of these sensations. But how know this? What can we know besides phenomena? Even this assumption is in denial of this whole philosophy. It is impossible to put the different parts of this scheme together without making an end of all knowledge of anything beyond ourselves. Its phenomena, of which it professes to give us knowledge so certain and positive, evaporate in sensations. For certain knowledge of phenomena, their very existence outside of ourselves is put in doubt. So the extremes of Idealism and Materialism meet.

We now turn to Mr. Mill's doctrine of causation. We have already seen that he makes cause mean mere uniformity of antecedence. Of efficient causes, since the causal efficiency is not a phenomenon, we can have no knowledge. Yet he tells us the principle, "that what happens once, will, under a sufficient degree of similarity of circumstances, happen again, and not only again, but always; this, I say, is an assumption involved in every case of induction." p. 184. Now, we ask, what warrant have we for such an assumption? Is not that something more than the knowledge of phenomena in their mere relations of similarity and succession? If the mind may lawfully superinduce this "assumption" upon observed phenomena, why may it not fully superinduce that of a *causal energy* producing these phenomena, and sure, in like circumstances, to produce them again? Is not this the actual and only legitimate form, which this assumption takes spontaneously among all men who have

not speculated away their innate convictions? What can be gained then, by substituting for this native causal judgment, the "assumption" of Mr. Mill? Plainly nothing, except that the very basis of the argument for "supernatural agents," and a Divine First Cause, is thus removed. Moreover, we deny that the causal judgment is restricted to the mere case of uniform antecedence and consequence. This exemplifies merely a single form of this judgment, viz. that like causes produce like effects. The causal judgment proper is, that every event *must* have a cause, a cause efficient for its production. The universal language and conduct of men proves this to be a native and universal judgment of the race. The futility of the notion that causality consists in mere uniformity of antecedence is made conspicuous by Mr. Mill himself, in his notable attempt to meet the great example of uniformity in the succession of day and night, adduced by Reid. He says, "We do not believe that night will be followed by day under any imaginable circumstances, but only that it will be so, *provided* the sun rises above the horizon. . . . Invariable sequence, therefore, is not synonymous with causation, unless the sequence, besides being invariable, is unconditional. There are sequences as uniform in past experience as any others whatever, which yet we do not regard as cases of causation, but as in some sort accidental. Such to a philosopher is that of day and night." p. 203. Clearing away these misty and evasive circumlocutions, can it be denied that the real reason why we judge the sun's radiance, and not night, to be the cause of day, is that the one is an illuminating agency, efficient to dispel darkness, while the other is not? Besides, Mr. Mill is obliged to concede that the mind recognizes something more in cause than mere invariable antecedence, viz. "unconditionalness." But this is virtually surrendering the whole. If it must discern some element in cause, besides mere observed uniformity of sequence, why not that which mankind have always intuitively believed it to be, *i. e.* efficiency?

We have before seen that M. Comte holds that the laws of phenomena are reducible to a few, but not to any one original law or force. Mr. Mill says, "There exists in nature a number of permanent causes, which have subsisted ever since the

human race has been in existence, and for an indefinite and probably enormous length of time previous. . . . But we can give, scientifically speaking, no account of the origin of the permanent causes themselves. . . . The co-existence, therefore, of primeval causes ranks, to us, among merely casual occurrences." pp. 206, 207. No such views could be entertained by any one who believes in One First Almighty cause of all things.

Of course, it is indispensable to this scheme to deny the existence of any necessary truths. To concede it, would be to concede the knowledge of non-phenomenal entities. As mathematics presents the most abundant, signal, and unquestioned examples of necessary truths, Mr. Mill tasks his ingenuity to remove this difficulty. He goes into a minute analysis of mathematical axioms, postulates, and definitions, to prove this science purely empirical and inductive. He therefore begins by pronouncing the character of necessity, and even of peculiar certainty, (with some reservation,) attributed to mathematical truths, "an illusion." "There exist no points without magnitude; no lines without breadth, nor perfectly straight. . . . A line as defined by geometers is wholly inconceivable. We can reason about a line as if it had no breadth; because we have a power which is the foundation of all the control we can exercise over our minds; the power when a perception is present to our senses, or a conception to our intellects, of *attending* to a part of that perception or conception, instead of the whole. But we cannot conceive a line without breadth; we can form no mental picture of such a line. . . . The peculiar accuracy, supposed to be characteristic of the first principles of geometry, thus appears to be fictitious." pp. 148, 149.

We cannot but admire the boldness of a thinker who thus ventures to contradict the whole educated world in regard to subjects, all the facts pertaining to which are equally and fully before every attentive mind. It remains to be seen whether it is the boldness of superior insight or of blind desperation. When Mr. Mill says we cannot conceive of a line without breadth, this is true of lines made of material particles, however dilute. For it results from the very nature of matter as extended. But

all such lines are mere symbolic imitations of the true geometric line, designed to assist the attention and memory in holding it before the mind, in some given situation. Mr. Mill's conception of a line is not that of extension in one direction, but in three; of volume, in short, circumscribed by lines and surfaces. But with marvellous inconsistency, he tells us we can reason about a breadthless line, though it be inconceivable. How? The mind can attend to a "part of its perception or conception instead of the whole." What is this *part*? An inconceivable nonentity. How then does the mind attend to and reason about it? This imposing onset upon the certainty and necessity of mathematical truth staggers and falls at the very first move. Mr. Mill himself is obliged to have recourse to what he calls "mental pictures" in defending his own theories. What is this but the admission that mathematics are based on ideas and principles that are super-sensuous, and originate in the mind itself?

Axioms, says Mr. Mill, "are experimental truths, generalizations from observation. The proposition, Two straight lines cannot enclose a space . . . is an induction from the evidence of our senses." p. 152. To the argument that we cannot bring before our senses the whole length to which two such lines may be drawn, he answers, that the mind can frame "diagrams" within itself, "imaginary lines," which, to whatever length it extends them in thought, it sees cannot enclose a space, and that we "do not believe this truth on the ground of the imaginary intuition simply, but because we know the imaginary lines exactly resemble real ones, and that we may conclude from them to real ones, with quite as much certainty as we could conclude from one real line to another." p. 155. But, we ask, how do we know all this, if we never have seen any two actual straight lines meeting and extended illimitably? Or even if we had seen them, how could we know not only that it is true of these, but *must* be true of all other pairs of straight lines meeting each other, drawn at whatever angle, and to whatever length? Is not this character of necessity, an *a priori* truth, self-evident from the very constitution of the mind, and not derived in any manner through the senses? To this Mr. Mill replies, that the advocates of necessary truths, mean by the attribute of necessity simply, that the "opposite is not only

false, but inconceivable." Here everything depends on the definition of "inconceivable." A thing may be inconceivable *simpliciter*, or *secundum quid*. I can *conceive* or form the mental conception of the absence of a person who is present. But I cannot *conceive it to be true*, that at the moment of his presence, he is at the same time and in the same sense, absent. Again, with regard to concrete and contingent facts, I may conceive them possible on one supposition and impossible on another; because one supposition brings them athwart some necessary truth, while another does not. And the various degrees of knowledge in different persons, therefore, may make *certain contingent things* conceivably true to some minds, and the reverse to others. Thus to one who, from insufficient information, is ignorant of the rotation of the earth, and believes that it stands still, it may be inconceivable that the sun is motionless. Still further, men are very apt to call or think inconceivable, the contrary of what they firmly believe. From this ambiguity of the word "inconceivable," Mr. Mill makes a plausible argument, by citing some striking instances of things once thought inconceivable, which later scientific discovery has proved both conceivable and true. pp. 157, 158. But what of all this? Because Newton could not conceive of a force in bodies acting beyond themselves, on account of some false antecedent theory, does that go to prove that there are no necessary truths, about which there is no contingency whatever, the reverse of which no sound mind can conceive to be true under any circumstances? Is it not a necessary truth, that a proposition and its contradictory can never both be true; that no two bodies can occupy the same space at the same time; that equals of the same are equal to each other; that two straight lines cannot enclose a space; that we cannot conceive of space as non-existent, and much more of the like?

We will only add on this topic, a few instances from this book, out of many, in which he inadvertently recognizes the existence of those necessary truths which he so strenuously impugns. He says, "we do not conclude that all triangles have the property (of being equal to two right angles,) because some have, *but from the ulterior demonstrative evidence* which was the ground of our conviction in the particular instances."

p. 176. "All things which possess extension, or in other words, which fill space, are subject to geometrical laws. Possessing extension, they possess figure, possessing figure, *they must possess some figure in particular, and have all the properties which geometry assigns to that figure.*" p. 194. "The mere contemplation of a straight line shows that it *cannot* enclose a space." p. 363.

As the author denies all axioms and first principles of reason on all subjects, of course, the normal type of all reasoning, in his view, is induction; *i. e.* reasoning from particular facts to other similar facts; or inferring the existence of general laws or uniformities from finding them in all, amounting to a sufficient number of observed parallel cases. Hence the syllogism which involves the inference of the less general from the more general, plays quite a secondary part in this treatise. He, however, does not utterly discard it, like some Positivists, who would fain regenerate Logic, by destroying it. He goes through with the development of the syllogism, reproducing the substance of what is found in Whately on the subject. But in treating of its function and value, he assigns it a secondary office. It is not with him a form of reasoning, or rather the form to which all reasoning may be reduced, and according to whose rules it may thus be tested; but it is chiefly a contrivance for trying the validity of the induction expressed in the major premise. It does not, as in the received theory of it, so much represent the process by which the mind deduces the unknown from the known; it is rather a mode of showing whether that process has already been done aright by induction—according to Mr. Mill, the only process by which it can be done. Thus, as we have seen, in his view, the axiom, things equal to the same thing are equal to each other, is an induction. Taking this for the major premise, and a and b each equal c , for the minor, the conclusion $a = b$ serves, if true, to verify the major; if false, to overturn it. It is not a discovery from, but an interpretation and verification of; not a thing proved by, but one of the proofs of, the premises. Now that this is an incidental service sometimes rendered by the syllogism is certainly true. It is true that, if the conclusion has been legitimately derived from the premises,

in violation of no logical rule, then the falsity of that conclusion proves the falsity of one or both of the premises, and that we are to look there for the flaw in the argument. It is no less true that, if there have been a violation of any of the rules of the syllogism, it is unnecessary to look as far as the premises; for in this case, be they true or false, the conclusion does not flow from them. But then the fallacy of a false premise, like that of an irrelevant conclusion, is not, strictly speaking, logical; it has not occurred in the process of inferring the conclusion from the premises; but it is as the logicians justly say, a "non-logical or material fallacy." It lies either in the falsity of the premises evinced by the falsity of the conclusion; or in *ignoratio elenchi*, the irrelevance of the conclusion to the point the reasoner has undertaken to prove.

Mr. Mill, of course, repeats some of the staple objections to the syllogism, regarded as a means of eliciting truth by truly proving a conclusion from the premises, on the ground that the conclusion gives nothing not previously contained in the premises. This may impose on such as have never reflected that the whole science of Mathematics is but the logical unfolding of what was contained implicitly in a few self-evident axioms: that in the single precept of love to God and our neighbour, is contained implicitly all the law and the prophets; that men are constantly drawing false conclusions from true premises; that not a controversy occurs, in which one or the other of the controvertists does not perpetrate the fallacy of putting terms in the conclusion that are not in the premises, or of ambiguous or undistributed middle, or illicit process of the major and minor terms. It will be time enough to decry the logic which teaches how to reason accurately from generals to particulars, when we find that men are superior to all mistake in the process, or that they have no success in thus unfolding clearly and undeniably, what was before either unrecognized or disputed. One of the fundamental arguments of Mr. Mill's school may be stated thus:

Phenomena follow uniform laws of sequence;

Will acts capriciously and variably;

Therefore phenomena are not the product of will.

If we grant these premises, the conclusion does not follow. For

in the conclusion, will is distributed, *i. e.* taken for all wills in all their modes of action. In the premises it is undistributed *i. e.* taken only for some wills in some of their actings—a vice which logic technically styles *illicit process of the major*.

Moreover, even induction itself is essentially syllogistic. It has for its major premise, the intuitive conviction that like causes produce like effects in like circumstances: or, as we have seen, what Mr. Mill calls an "assumption" essentially equivalent. But call it assumption, or what we will, our inductions could never proceed a step beyond the mere phenomena we have inspected without this first principle. And the inference that the law extends at all beyond phenomena which we have witnessed, to other like phenomena, has not a whit higher certainty, than belongs to that first principle or "assumption."

Of course, Mr. Mill puts his chief strength upon developing Logic of the inductive sciences, so far as his work treats primarily of logic. This part of the work is valuable, not only for the knowledge it gives of the state of the physical science, but especially for the conditions, requisites, and criteria of sound induction which it so fully and clearly lays down. But upon this we cannot dwell.

The author's treatment of Fallacies corresponds with his treatment of the science in chief. His animus is no nowhere more apparent. Amid many acute and valuable observations, among *a priori* fallacies he notes such as these: "That matter cannot think; that space or extension is infinite; that nothing can be made out of nothing, *ex nihilo nihil fit*." p. 462. The bearing of this, and much more of the like, for which we have no space, is obvious.

Nor is it necessary to follow the author through his speculations on Ethology and Social Statics and Dynamics, in which, with far greater caution, and therefore greater plausibility than M. Comte, he finally adopts his main conclusion, and enunciates the atheistic dogma, for which he had been preparing the reader by his long and astute disquisitions. This dogma is, that "phenomena" are no more to be explained by "supernatural agencies." This is enough. It is because the book is designed as a gymnastic to prepare the mind for such principles, while it has enough that is valuable to win for it high

consideration, that we have performed the unwelcome duty of signalizing its dangerous characteristics and tendencies. It is quite time for us to understand the great features of this new philosophy, and the agencies employed for its promotion. It is little else than the sensational scepticism of Hume arrayed in the plumage of modern science, and striving with bold assumption and desperate ingenuity to turn that science into a handmaid of irreligion and atheism.

This is none the less so, although he intimates in some places that our "knowledge may be conceived as coming to us from revelation;" or that Hume's argument against miracles is good only for him who did not before the alleged miracles "believe the existence of a being or beings with supernatural power; or who believed himself to have full proof that the character of the Being whom he recognized, is inconsistent with his having seen fit to interfere on the occasion in question." But observe, he never announces his own belief in such revelation; or in any superior Being with whose character it is consistent to give it. He speaks of such belief as possible. He never implies that it is reasonable. All this can be of little account, when weighed against the positive opinions and reasonings which we have quoted from the book.

ART. V.—*Les Essais de Morale et autres ouvrages de Pierre Nicole. Paris.*

IF the "Provincial Letters" of Pascal be read and admired by us, as presenting a striking example of every kind of eloquence; as exposing the corrupt maxims of the Jesuits; as hastening their downfall and suppression, we should not forget one who contributed much to bring them into existence—Peter Nicole. He in some measure originated the work; occasionally selected the subjects, corrected the Letters from time to time, and did more than any other to bring them into public notice, and to circulate them among the people. He was one

of the most eminent of those members of Port Royal who did so much for the interests of religion and the cause of literature, who deserve our esteem and eulogy; whose works carry with them a blessing, like beneficent rivers that leave everywhere the traces of their passage. A notice of his character and writings may not be uninteresting.

Peter Nicole was born at Chartres, in 1625, of a highly respectable family. There he commenced his first studies, and made such rapid progress, that at the age of fourteen he could readily read all the Roman and Greek classics, and at that early period gave proof of an unusually refined and delicate taste for ancient literature. From Chartres he was transferred to Paris, to complete his education. There he had the opportunity of enjoying the instructions of Port Royal, and of becoming acquainted with its pious inmates, whose labours, glory, and persecutions he was soon to share. He had no sooner finished his course of philosophy, than his instructors wished to unite him to them by stronger ties, and prevailed upon him to undertake the class of Belles Lettres. Nor were they disappointed. No one among them did more than he in extending their large and luminous system of education; in preparing their Latin and Greek Grammars, and those works on Logic and Philosophy which were soon found in many schools in France, and at length diffused through all Europe. To his attractive and effective manner of instructing, his pupils have borne testimony; among whom were several who rose to eminence—Tillemont, Angran, and above all, the immortal Racine.

At the time when Nicole was instructing at Port Royal, St. Cyran, the principal and ornament of the institution, who, to superior parts and learning, added a spirit of sincere piety and devotion, was unjustly convicted of heresy, and for five years was confined in the dungeon of Vincennes. His successor was the celebrated Anthony Arnauld, who, possessed of equal, if not superior learning, was animated by the same zeal for the interests of Christianity. It was under him that the battle raged so fiercely between the Jesuits and the Jansenists. The former wished to crush him, and made every effort to expel him from the Sorbonne, the divinity college of the University of Paris. It was while Arnauld's process was pending, that the "Pro-

vincial Letters" appeared. We have said that Nicole was connected with them. He enjoyed the particular intimacy of Pascal; knew well the sublimity of his genius; and perceived how well qualified he was to engage in the discussion; to combine the closest logic with the purest elegance, and the simplicity of piety with the liveliest satire. He persuaded him to undertake the work; and every one knows how happily it was executed; how it at once arrested the public mind in favour of the Jansenists, and how it tended to make the Jesuits at first suspected, then laughed at, and at last abhorred. The manuscripts, as they were prepared, were transmitted to Port Royal, where they passed under the revision principally of Nicole. He occasionally suggested plans, supplied the author with quotations, and furnished all the materials for two or three letters. After the work was published, he did good service by translating it into pure Latin, with full and copious notes. In these notes, he justifies Pascal in the motives by which he was influenced, attests to the fidelity of the citations, brings additional testimony, and thus increases the conviction that the system of the Jesuits is founded upon false and wicked principles.

After the decease of his friend, he brought to light and refuted the base calumny, circulated by the disciples of Loyola, that Pascal on his death-bed had repented of writing his "Letters," and had recanted all that was there uttered. He collected together his scattered "Thoughts," and was the principal editor in arranging them and bringing them to the press. He also pronounced a eulogy upon him, in Latin, still read as a beautiful memorial of the tenderest friendship, and of the truth of what was said of him;—"Nicole's ardent application to polite literature enabled him to imitate the style of the best Roman authors, particularly that of Terence."

When his friend Arnauld was expelled from the Sorbonne, and compelled to live in retirement; and when the storm of persecution produced by the malice of the Jesuits was ready to burst with all its fury, Nicole had the courage to defend, by his writings, the illustrious exile with whom he had been associated for more than twelve years. He continued to defend him, until he himself, having many things to fear from the animosity of his enemies, was constrained to quit France. But in his retire-

ment he was not idle; in Chartres, Beauvais, Brussels, and Leige, he wrote several works which were valuable and useful. In 1683, he had permission to return to Paris; and while there, not long before his death, published a work that excited no little attention—“*Réfutation des principales erreurs des Quietistes.*” It appeared at the commencement of the memorable conflict between Bossuet and Fenelon. Being the first treatise on the subject which then appeared, it suggested many thoughts to Bossuet, on which he afterwards dilated and enlarged. It is an excellent work, clear in conception and solid in argument. He defines Quietism as an error arising from the exaggeration of what in itself is good, rather than from the adoption of principles intrinsically erroneous; as an abuse of lawful resignation, and useful contemplation.

The Quietist professes that he has attained such love to God as arises simply from a view of his nature and perfections; that he has no regard to future punishment or reward; that he is free from hope and fear, the great agitators of the human heart—hence the appellation which he receives. He aspires in his mind to a sublime and perpetual silence under a view of the Supreme Being; to rest in adoration of the divine essence, without an explicit act of devotion, without the exercise of faith, without the expectation of receiving good. He maintains that to be perfectly resigned to what God is and does, he must present himself to Him inert and inactive; that a formal petition for good and a formal deprecation of evil fall far below that submission which we owe to the divine will; and ill befit that abandonment of himself to it, which the soul owes to its Creator. He further maintains that his resignation is to rise to a sublime indifference to temporal and eternal things; that he is to look on both without desire, anxiety, or alarm; that if it be for God's glory, he is to offer himself as a sacrifice to reprobation in this life, and to eternal punishment in the life to come. This indifference to salvation from a supposed conformity to the will of God is regarded by the Quietist as the very highest degree of virtue, and is to be followed by the highest reward; the soul is, even in this life, to assume a kind of new existence; to be transformed into the divine essence, to be so far individualized with the Deity as to lose the

consciousness of its existence separate from him. Such views of the Quietist, clearly and impartially expressed, Nicole resists with all the convincing force of argument. He shows that such speculations are to be regarded as dangerous fanaticism; that their tendency is to draw off the faithful from vocal prayer, serious meditation, and the use of the sacraments; that they are inconsistent with a diligent attendance upon those means of grace which God has instituted, and by which we are to obtain remission of sins, the blessing of perseverance, and strength to resist temptation; that to love God without any regard to our interest and happiness, is to elevate charity at the expense of other graces, the fear of God and the hope of his favour; that it is absurd and wicked to consent for the glory of God to eternal reprobation, which consists in banishment from him, and a perfect hatred to his character; that it is unreasonable and unscriptural to suppose that it ever can be his will thus to destroy his children, or to require them to indulge such an impossible supposition.

But the finest work of Nicole, that which occupied most of his time, which has been most read, and most useful, is his *Essais de Morale*. It was commenced when he was at Port Royal, and the first volume was published in 1671; it continued to occupy his attention, in all his changes of residence, to the termination of life; was frequently republished, and every successive edition was so enlarged, as at length to form a considerable number of volumes. The work is extensive, comprehending the whole art of being virtuous and happy; the exhibition of such rules as will, if properly employed, tend to the right conduct of our moral powers and the just performance of our duty. It contains more than what its title seems to indicate—reflections on the Epistles and Gospels, theological instruction on the Sacraments, the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, the Decalogue, and several other lengthened treatises on a variety of subjects. In illustrating such different themes there is an appeal to nature and observation, to facts in ancient and in modern times, to books in various languages, to singular customs and remarkable events in all countries. In so wide an extent, a perceptible difference is to be expected—not always the same depth of judgment, solidity of reasoning, and some-

times, the occurrence of principles which, as Protestants, we cannot adopt. But upon the whole, there is a force and originality of conception, expressed in language terse and elegant, well calculated to make an impression; to teach men what they are, to lead them to observe the secret spring of their actions, and to win them to the habitual practice of virtue. There is also (what we have always observed in the writings of the Jansenists) an appeal to the Scriptures as the foundation of duty, and the test by which our actions are to be tried. The work was much admired by Boyle, and highly esteemed by Locke—an evidence that it is no ordinary book, when commended by two individuals so eminent for piety and learning, so earnest in the defence of Christianity.

Among the treatises strictly on morals, none have impressed us more strongly than two—one on “The Weakness of Man,” and the other, on “The best means of preserving Peace.” The object of the first is to prove that man is utterly incapable without divine assistance, of effecting the greatest, the noblest, and the only worthy object for which his Maker gave him a being; to show that the consciousness of his wants and his inability to satisfy them should subdue his vanity and presumption, and bring him into a state of humiliation before God. The author shows the weakness of man by exhibiting his dependence on everything around him, even objects the most contemptible; by his unhappiness and misery; by the shortness and uncertainty of his life; by his inconstancy and unfixedness; by his corruption and depravity; and by his most deplorable ignorance.

The treatise on “Preserving Peace,” is treated with great ability; the directions are judicious, and have a wide practical bearing; they apply to our daily conduct in life—to peace in our own bosoms—in our families—in the community—with our kindred—as members of the Church universal, and as part of the great human family.* After showing the necessity of this virtue,

* The author of “*Siècle de Louis XIV.*” speaks of this work as incomparable and immortal: “*Les Essais de Morale, qui sont utiles au genre humain, ne périront pas. Le chapitre sur les moyens de conserver la paix dans la société est un chef-d’œuvre auquel on ne trouve rien d’égal dans l’antiquité.*”

enforced by reason and urged by revelation, the author inquires into the causes of contention, and says:

"If we consider the rise of most of the quarrels that happen to ourselves, we shall find that they spring commonly from our indiscreet incitement of other men's passions. Justice will make us confess that it is very seldom that any one speaks ill of us without cause; or takes pleasure to abuse or offend us for naught. We ourselves always contribute to it. And though there appears no immediate cause, we shall find that we, at a distance, were the occasion. We dispose men by little indiscretions to take amiss those things which they would easily endure, were there not some former ill will of which we were the cause, which we have forgotten, and which they have remembered."

The author then proceeds to show how to prevent the bond of peace from being violently broken, or insensibly untwisted. "This," he says, "is the great means—not to give the least offence to others, or to take any offence at what they do to us. There is nothing easier than to agree on this general rule—nothing harder than to observe it in particular cases. It is one of those that are short in words, large in sense, and which comprehend under them a great number of important duties."

We have not time to recount these duties, and the directions which are given—they are such as become the prudence of the sage, the piety of the Christian, and the courtesy of the man of honour.

Many more extracts might be given, but we have room only for the conclusion.

"To conclude, let us remember that to be vexed at the mis-carriages or humours of others, is as great a piece of folly, and much of the same kind, as to be angry at bad weather; to be out of patience, because it is too hot, or too cold. Our anger is just as able to change the wind and weather, as men and their manners. All the difference is, that the weather grows not worse for our quarrelling with it; but in our conduct with men, our peevishness increases their passion; our anger raises the storm; our irritability makes them the more rough and intractable.

"'Great peace,' saith the Psalmist, 'have they who love thy

law, and nothing shall offend them.' If we really love the law of God, we shall be very cautious of offending others; we shall not provoke them with foolish disputes; and their faults will not be to us an occasion of trouble, vexation, or scandal. This rule of patience and long-suffering, which requires us to bear with them, the apostle calls the 'law of Christ.'—'Bear ye one another's burdens, and so fulfil the law of Christ.' We must acknowledge, therefore, that all our impatience, peevishness and anger, come from this source—that we do not sufficiently fulfil the law of charity; that we have some other design than that of obeying God; that we seek our satisfaction, content, and reputation among the creatures rather than in the Creator. Let us remember that the true way to establish the mind in a sure, immovable peace, is wholly to fill it with the love of God; so that it may regard his glory; continually desire to please him; and place all its happiness in obeying his will. '*Great peace have they who love thy law; and nothing shall offend them.*'"

Nicole died in 1695, after receiving the character of "one of the finest scholars, and one of the most celebrated divines in Europe."

Not long after, Lancelot, his early friend and associate, departed from the world, in Lower Brittany, whither he had been banished. They lived to witness the final destruction of those places so endeared to them; and the banishment or death of all the pious friends of their youth whom they most fondly loved. In their deaths the race of the recluses of Port Royal became extinct. But their descendants lived. It may not be uninteresting to follow them—to trace the history of the Jansenists from that period to the present time; to see the various changes through which they have passed; and to view them still existing, as a separate and distinct body.

Though at the close of the seventeenth century almost all the survivors of Port Royal had passed away, yet the order did not cease. Among those who received and upheld its doctrines was that learned and laborious body, the French Benedictines. They published a complete edition of the works of St. Augustine, employing for that purpose ancient and authoritative manuscripts. It was surprising to see how much the works of this

father had been corrupted; how the former copyists and editors, through the influence of the Jesuits, had from time to time altered passages, so as to conform to their errors, and the prejudices of the Court of Rome. It was everywhere said—"St. Augustine is now far more of a Jansenist than he was before."

An individual who was never a member of Port Royal, but who fully advocated its sentiments, and did much good in the propagation of piety in France, was Quesnel, one of the fathers of the Oratory. His "*Réflexions Morales*" found many readers; received the recommendations of several priests and bishops; and so far succeeded as to lead many hearts to respond to the Christian truth there taught. Considering the character of the work, no wonder that it fell under the displeasure of the Jesuits. Through their influence was issued the bull *Unigenitus**—condemnatory of his writings, and "all that had been written, or whatever might appear, in their defence." In this bull issued by Clement XI. in 1713, one hundred and one propositions extracted from the writings of Quesnel were condemned "as false, captious, evil sounding, offensive to pious ears, scandalous, pernicious, rash, injurious to the Church and its customs, contumacious, not against the Church merely, but also against the secular authorities; seditious, impious, blasphemous, suspected of heresy, and also savouring of heresy itself; also favouring heretics, heresies, and schism, erroneous, nearly allied to heresy often condemned; and furthermore, also heretical; and sundry heresies, especially those contained in the well known propositions of Jansenius, and that too in the sense in which they were condemned."†

* The Papal bulls and briefs take their titles from the first word, or words. Thus the bull that founded the order of the Jesuits was called "*Regimine militantis ecclesiæ*"—that which suppressed them, "*Dominus ac redemptor*"—that which revived them, "*Solicitudo omnium ecclesiarum*"—that which condemned the works of Jansenius, "*In eminenti*"—that which suppressed Port Royal, "*Vineam Domini Sabaoth*," &c.

† The following are some of the anathematized propositions, showing the implacable hatred of the Jesuits to all evangelical truth; and teaching us that it seemed as if every feeling of piety toward God, and every apprehension of his grace, were to be extinguished throughout the Papal church.

"Faith is the primary grace, and the fountain of all others.

"In vain do we cry to God, 'My Father,' unless the spirit of love be that which cries.

"God only crowns love; he who is incited by another motive acts in vain.

"Where there is not love, there is neither God, nor religion.

The bull was far from being generally received. It so directly opposed the doctrines of grace, that those who had the slightest regard for them felt themselves aggrieved, and could not submit; it was rejected by whole Roman Catholic countries; by Belgium as long as it remained under the authority of Austria; and by several bishops in France, who appealed from the decision of the Pope to the next General Council. It placed Jansenism on a new ground; for it would no longer submit to the doctrinal decision of the Popedom, assured that it directly opposed doctrines which were found in the works of Augustine. Instead, therefore, of injuring, it tended to the benefit of the Jansenists. Soon after this period, they were found in Vienna and Brussels, in Spain and Portugal, and in every part of Italy; they widely disseminated their doctrines through all Catholic Christendom, sometimes openly, oftener secretly.

But it was in Holland that they principally congregated; a Protestant country offered them a refuge and shelter, in which Arnauld, Quesnel, and others like them, oppressed and persecuted, found a quiet asylum. There, after the destruction of Port Royal, they organized themselves into a definite and distinct body, under the name of the Archiepiscopal Church at Utrecht. At the close of the seventeenth century, they numbered three hundred and thirty thousand, of whom many had emigrated from different parts of France and other places to join them. In this country the Jesuits were comparatively feeble, for they could excite no open persecution; but they used every means in their power to extirpate Jansenism; all the cunning and intrigue which they had exercised in other countries they here exerted; but they failed in getting possession of the supreme power after which they aspired. At length they formed a party, complained of the manner in which the

“ Nothing is more extensive than the Church of God; for all the elect righteous of all ages, compose it.

“ The reading of the Holy Scriptures is for all.

“ The fear of unjust excommunication ought never to hinder us from fulfilling our duty. We must go out of the Church, even when we seem to be expelled from it by the wickedness of men, when through love we are united to God, to Jesus Christ, and to the Church itself.”

ecclesiastical officers were appointed, and struggled to effect a change.

In conformity to established usage, the archbishops were elected by the Chapter of Utrecht, and confirmed by the Pope as his vicars apostolic in Holland. To this arrangement the Jesuits strongly objected; they declared that they themselves were acting as missionaries in that country, dependent only upon the Pope and the General of their order; and insisted that they should have a part in the nomination and appointment. When their request was rejected, and they were baffled in their efforts to have appointed one of their own selection, they made a violent attack upon the prelates, involved them in difficulties with the court of Rome, and at length produced a schism which has continued to this day. Whenever a vacancy occurred, the Chapter proceeded to the election in the usual way; but the Pope, instead of confirming the appointment, issued briefs of excommunication. Against these briefs they protested, appealed to a General Council, and continued, from time to time, to elect an archbishop, who was consecrated by one of their own prelates—so indispensable to the maintenance of the Church did they consider the succession. As often as these consecrations were made, there issued new denunciations from Rome. In excommunicating these bishops the Pope never denied that they had been consecrated as such, though he denied the validity of their election, and suspended them from exercising their functions; in like manner, he recognized the orders they conferred, by interdicting those who were ordained from executing any acts of their office.

We pass by the details of the history of the Jansenists for nearly a century; it consists in constant contentions with the Pope and the Jesuits; with advancing courage and principle they waged war against error, and the efforts made to destroy them; they chose and consecrated their dignitaries, notifying the Papal power, and asking for confirmation. But the confirmations were invariably refused, and sentences of excommunication at once followed every application.

The number of the Archbishops of Utrecht has not been great; we reckon seven, men of erudition and piety, from the time of the rupture with the Pope to the year 1808. In that

year Archbishop Rhin died; and just as the Chapter was proceeding to elect a successor, the minister of Louis Bonaparte interposed a prohibition, until the "organization of public worship in the kingdom." Year after year the Chapter applied in vain for permission to proceed to the election; it was evident that Louis was planning to fill the vacant sees by prelates of his own nomination. After Napoleon had incorporated Holland into his empire, the Chapter took occasion, on his visit to Utrecht in 1811, to represent their condition, and solicited him to permit the usual election; he gave an immediate and definite answer, that he intended to nominate all the bishops of Holland himself, as he had done those of France, and for this end would arrange the matter with the Papal power. At that time but one bishop was living, and he not young; if his death should occur without a new consecration, all means of filling the sees would be extinguished, except through an accommodation with the Pope—a circumstance well known to Napoleon, and for which he was probably waiting. When the French usurpation over Holland was terminated, that only surviving prelate lived; it was felt that no time should be lost in performing his episcopal functions; and after the usual election, he consecrated Van Os as archbishop, in the year 1814. On this occasion the Pope issued a new brief of excommunication.

As a specimen of these Papal briefs we present the following, issued against the Bishop of Deventer in 1825.

"To our very dear children, the Catholics residing in Holland, Leo XII. Pope, health and the apostolic benediction.

"Long has the Catholic Church been troubled by the schism of Utrecht. What is there which the supreme pontiffs, our predecessors, have not done to remedy this pernicious evil? But by the inscrutable judgment of God they have not succeeded, either by salutary counsel, or their respectful exhortations, nor yet by the threat and the application of canonical penalties, in bringing back into the way of salvation men who have been blinded, and in recalling them to the bosom of their mother, the holy Church.

"William Vet, who dares to call himself Bishop of Deventer, and who has had the hardihood to inform us of his election and consecration, in a letter which he wrote to us on the 13th

of June last, has given us a recent example of such determined obstinacy. His letter, it is true, is filled with honey, and avows respect and obedience towards us; but this same letter instructs us also how we should regard these feigned and long worn-out flatteries; for William shows himself involved in the same errors, opposed with the same obstinacy to the holy canons, and, in one word, defiled with all the pollutions with which his fellow-schismatists of Utrecht have been covered from the beginning. William, however, has not been afraid of setting them forth, as full of innocence, and exempt from wrong; and he has even pronounced eulogies on them.

“Since, therefore, William differs in nothing from those whom our predecessors, after having exhausted the resources of their paternal tenderness, rightly believed they ought to punish, we, treading in their honourable footsteps, have resolved to cause him to feel the same censures; for we would not, dearly beloved children, that any of you (in the midst of whom the schism of Utrecht insinuates itself, and lamentably devours souls,) deceived by the illusions of these impostors, should follow them as good pastors, and should receive the deceitful voice of wolves that assume sheep’s clothing, the more easily to desolate, carry off, and slay the flock.

“Thus, then, we decree, by the apostolic authority where-with we are invested, and we declare, that the election of William Vet to the see of Deventer is illicit, null, and void, and that his consecration is unlawful and sacrilegious. We excommunicate and anathematize the above named William, and all those who have taken part in his culpable election, and who have concurred by their authority, care, consent, or advice, whether in his election or his consecration.

“We decide, declare, and decree, that they are separated from the communion of the Church as schismatics, and that as such they must be avoided; and further, that the said William is suspended from the exercise of the rights and functions that belong to the order of bishops; and we interdict him, under the penalty of incurring excommunication *ipso facto*, and without any other declaration, from making the holy chrism, conferring the sacrament of confirmation, conferring orders, or doing any other acts proper to the order of bishops; further

declaring null and void, to all intents and purposes, all and singular the acts which he may have the hardihood to undertake.

“Let those who have received ecclesiastical orders from him know, that they are bound by suspension, and that they incur irregularity, should they exercise the functions of the orders which they have received.

“It is with regret and much sorrow that we lay these penalties on the guilty. O! if they were themselves struck and plunged into sorrow by our decree; if they should weep and repent, what joy should we not feel! What tears of joy would a conversion, so much desired, draw forth from our eyes! With what transport should we embrace these children returning to their father! What thanksgivings should we render to the God of mercy! We daily seek from him, in ardent prayers, that he would grant this consolation to us and to all the church. Do the same, dearly beloved children; you whose invincible faith and indestructible union with the holy apostolic see, the centre of orthodox unity, we so justly know and commend. To assist you to fulfil more willingly, more fully, and more joyfully, this duty of evangelic charity, we affectionately bestow on you the apostolic benediction.

“Given at Rome, at St. Peter’s, under the seal of the fisherman, the 25th of August, 1825, in the second year of our pontificate.”

In reply to the allegations of this brief, against the prelates of Holland, it was answered:

“With what have our predecessors been charged?

“History teaches us,

“1st. That they would not subscribe the formulary of Alexander VII. against Jansenius.

“2d. That they would not receive the constitution *Unigenitus* of Clement XI. against father Quesnel.

“3d. That they would not consent to the destruction of their church, but have perpetuated the episcopate in the United Provinces of Holland.

“This is what the brief does not express distinctly; but this is what it contains implicitly.

"The bishops of Holland have victoriously replied to these pretended complaints.

"As to the first article, they have said that it is solely through tenderness of conscience that they and their clergy have not been willing, and still are not willing, to affirm with imprecations the five propositions in the 'Augustinus' of Jansenius, Bishop of Ypres; since, after having read that work, they are not found there; and nevertheless they have always offered to condemn these five propositions, making the distinction of 'fact' and 'right.'

"As to the second article, they state that it is from attachment to the Christian faith that they have not been willing, and that they still are not willing to receive the constitution *Unigenitus*; because the one hundred and one propositions which this bull condemns as extracted from the 'Réflexions Morales' of father Quesnel, belong to the sacred deposit of the faith; and this would be compromised, were we to receive a bull which visibly condemns the faith of the Church, the language of the holy fathers, and tradition.

"As to the third article, they say that in perpetuating the episcopate in Holland, the Chapter of this country have only done, and still do, what was always done in the Church, during the first fifteen centuries, when bishops were nominated by the clergy and the people; ordained by the bishops of the ecclesiastical provinces, and instituted by the metropolitan."

When Archbishop van Santen and his suffragan bishops were excommunicated in 1826, they issued a circular—"To all the Bishops of the Catholic Church," entreating them to seek to bring the Pope to another course of action. They also addressed a "Declaration to all Catholics," lay and clerical, reciting the mode in which they had been treated, and renewing their appeal to a future General Council.* In this last document, an interesting account is given of an interview, which the Archbishop attempted, in 1828, to have with the

* "Déclaration des évêques de Holland, adressée à toute l'église Catholique, et acte d'appel des bulles d'excommunication, lancées contre eux par Léon XII., les 25 Août, 1825, et 13 Janvier, 1826." Paris, 1827.

This book contains many curious facts respecting the Jansenists. Much information on the subject is also communicated by Reuchlin and Tregelles.

nuncio who had been sent by the Pope to arrange the terms of a *concordat* with the Protestant king who then reigned over Holland and Belgium. After much correspondence he sought a personal conference with him which he could not obtain; two of his clergy however had an interview with the secretary of the nuncio, who presented the terms on which the Papal authorities would accommodate the differences. They were stronger than any that had ever before been offered, requiring implicit and unqualified submission. Every bishop and priest was required to sign the following:

"I, the undersigned, declare that I submit myself to the apostolic constitution of Pope Innocent X. dated May 31, 1653, as well as to the constitution of Pope Alexander VII. dated Oct. 16, 1656; also, to the constitution of Clement XI. which commences with these words—*Vineam Domini Sabaoth*, dated July 16th, 1705. I condemn and reject with my whole heart the five propositions extracted from the book of Cornelius Jansenius, in the sense intended by the author, the same in which the holy see has itself condemned them in the above-named constitutions. I further submit myself, without any distinction, mental qualification, or explanation, to the constitution of Clement XI. dated September 8th, 1713, beginning with the word, *Unigenitus*. I accept it purely and simply; and thereto I swear—So help me God, and this holy gospel."

The terms were of course rejected; and the Jansenist clergy plainly told the secretary, and wished him to communicate it to the nuncio, that "they had learned by instances drawn from ecclesiastical history, such as those of Popes Stephen, Sergius III., Gregory II., John XXII., and some others, how true was the testimony thus expressed by Adrian VI.—'It is certain that the Pope is fallible, even in a matter of faith, when he sustains heresy by decree or command; for many of the Popes of Rome have been heretics.'"

The conclusion of the "Declaration to all Catholics" is worthy of attention. It ends with a solemn appeal from the bulls of Pope Leo XII.; from all similar briefs, from the penal sentences thus expressed, as unlawful, unjust, null and void; they further appeal from all the acts of injustice, and from each one in particular already exercised, or yet to be exercised

towards them, to the next General Council, lawfully convened, to which they might have free access; "commending (they say) our persons, our state, and our rights to the Divine protection, to that of the universal church, and of the said General Council; and reserving to ourselves the right of renewing such an appeal, at such place and time, and before such an authority, as we shall judge to be fitting."

The state in which the Jansenists were at the time this "Declaration" was penned is their state still. The Court of Rome has not in any degree relaxed its demands; and those whom it denounces smile at their sentences of excommunication, assured that God will not ratify them in heaven. They still adhere to the "apostolic see"—their idea of visible unity is the bond which links them to a Church which disowns and repudiates the connection.

They have in Holland about thirty-seven congregations and nine thousand souls, under the care of one Archbishop, the venerable Johannes Van Santen, at an advanced age, and two suffragans. From what we learn of them, they hold the same doctrines of grace as those which their fathers maintained; which are taught in the writings of Port Royal; and which are seen in the works of St. Augustine. It is truly pleasing to view this patient and continued adherence to the truth, when so many of the Reformed Churches on the continent of Europe have taken away the essential doctrines of Christianity; and when rationalism has infected a portion even of the Church of Holland. The sight of such errors among the Protestants has no doubt led them to be satisfied with their condition, and with all their difficulties, to adhere tenaciously to the Romish Church.

One quality which has peculiarly distinguished them is an unremitting study of the Scriptures, and the high degree of reverence which they have for them. "The Jansenists of Holland," says one who visited them in 1814, "are still distinguished by their love of Biblical studies. On visiting their college at Amboersfort,* I found the Bible open on the desks

* Here is their Theological Seminary for the training of priests, over which the Archbishop presides. The students are not numerous, but pious and evangelical; constantly engaged in the study of the Scriptures and the works of Augustine—

of all the students' cells. They informed me that a considerable portion of time was devoted to its perusal every day, in all their seminaries. When the 'British and Foreign Bible Society' was instituted, it found them most efficient in receiving and disseminating the translation of their own De Sacy; and it still regards them as important auxiliaries in circulating the word of life. In this study of the Scriptures, they are now paying particular attention to the prophecies which relate to the latter day glory, and think that they have obtained much light on this subject. Their sentiments correspond with the views of those inquirers who are termed Millennarians. They believe that the coming of Elijah is the event that shall introduce the second advent of Christ; that the Saviour will personally reign here 'on the throne of his father David;' that the martyrs will literally rise from the dead before the dominion of the Messiah begins, and before the general resurrection; and that the Jews will literally see, in the city of Jerusalem, Him whom their fathers pierced."

Besides those who constitute the church of Utrecht, there are individual churches in Belgium, Germany, and France, retaining the same sentiments as those who live in Holland, animated by the same spirit, and diffusing the same light, by the circulation of the Scriptures.

Such are the people who have existed nearly two centuries, contending for the doctrines of the depravity of man, justification by faith, and the necessity of the Holy Spirit to renew; who, during all that period, have been persecuted incessantly, and often severely, but who have been noble confessors and martyrs; who have manifested consistent piety—some, eminent holiness, in circumstances apparently the most unfavourable—who, before any other united effort was made, were assiduously occupied in the dissemination of the Scriptures; who must excite the admiration and love of all the pious in every land, who impartially read their history, and know their character.

consoled by the language of this Father of the Church, and often quoting him—*"Sæpe etiam sinit Divina Providentia per nonnullas nimium turbulencias carnalium hominum seditiones, expelli de congregatione Christiana etiam bonos viros"*—*De Vera Religione*, vi. 11.

But while we thus express our admiration for the virtues and services of the Jansenists, let us be careful not to confound the distinctions between truth and error ; let us view their character with the eye of sober judgment, and examine their whole conduct with clear and unprejudiced discrimination. The Jansenists ever have been, and still are, decided Roman Catholics ; exhibiting, it is true, their religion in the most attractive aspect that it has ever assumed since the existence of the Papal dominion, but still the Romish religion. While we admire the delightful spirituality, the elevated devotion, the superior learning and ability which mark many of their writers, we must not close our eyes against the mass of errors and absurdities which sully their creed, appear at times on the pages of their works, and tend to affect the mind with superstition. There is danger, because of our admiration of their virtues, and sympathy with their sufferings, of overlooking these things, and passing them by too indulgently. It is necessary equally to balance the shades and the light, in order to vindicate the Reformers ; to justify our protestation against the errors of Rome, and to have a deeper thankfulness that we are entirely freed from its system.

The Jansenists have rejected many of the errors of the Papacy ; but they have never rejected the vain idea of union with it as essential to salvation. They have opposed many of its doctrines and observances ; but they have never renounced all its claims. After reading their history, it appears strange to us, that they have not before this seen the faith of Rome to be a corruption, and her pretensions a fable. Strange that they should so assiduously study the Scriptures, and yet regard the writings of the fathers, and the decrees of Councils, as the only legitimate interpreters of the Bible ; that they should so closely investigate the prophecies, and yet see in the book of Revelation no appearances of the origin, progress, and nature of Popery ; that they should pay such close and critical attention to the Epistle to the Romans, and not be influenced to reject those dogmas and ceremonies, of which there are there no traces—such as transubstantiation, extreme unction, the invocation of saints, auricular confession, purgatory, masses, prayers for the dead, and other doctrines and practices, which

seem to us puerile and superstitious; degrading to the understandings of men, and unworthy of the spirit and dignity of the gospel.

But let us not too severely censure those in whose bosoms the flame of genuine piety has glowed; let us not be too rigorous in condemning their apparent contradictions and inconsistencies; but let us rather bless God that he raised up and so long continued them as witnesses of the truth; that they are the salt which has preserved a corrupt Church from absolute moral putrefaction; that in their case, the cloud of Romish superstition has not precluded the cheering rays of the "Sun of righteousness;" that whatever they may be in their creed, yet in all the fundamental doctrines of religion, and in the spirit of their hearts, they are essentially of us. Their involuntary ignorance God has "winked at"—let us too be gentle in our judgment of their conduct. Let us hope that the time is coming when all the Reformed Churches around them shall exhibit an example of doctrinal purity and evangelical piety which may be safely followed; when they shall be entirely separated from a Church which has anathematized and excommunicated them; fellowship with which is a hinderance to their reception of the whole truth, and an impediment to their usefulness in the service of Christ. Several of them in France and Belgium have lately thus acted. May the time soon come when the whole community of Utrecht shall act in like manner; hear and obey the voice of their God—"Come out of her, my people, that ye be not partakers of her sins, and that ye receive not of her plagues; for her sins have reached unto heaven, and God hath remembered her iniquities."

ART. VI.—*The Gospels : with Moral Reflections on each Verse.*

By Pasquier Quesnel. With an Introductory Essay by the Rev. Daniel Wilson, D. D., Vicar of Islington; now Bishop of Calcutta. Revised by the Rev. H. A. Boardman, D. D. In two volumes. Philadelphia: Parry & McMillan, 1855. 8vo. pp. xli. 648, 646.

PROTESTANTS have never been slow in acknowledging the excellencies of good books produced by men within the pale of the Romish Church. In some of these cases, indeed, the authors have fallen under the animadversion of Popes and Councils, for the very works which edify and delight us. Jansenius, Pascal, Nicole, Arnauld, and Quesnel, have in various degrees received the affectionate praise of evangelical Christians. Our own pages, in more than one instance, have been largely occupied with the writings and fortunes of the Port Royalists; and we are glad of this new occasion to acknowledge our debt in the same quarter.*

In a former instance we drew largely on the labours of Dr. Reuchlin, to whose elaborate history of the Port Royal, the celebrated article under that rubric in the *Edinburgh Review*, by Sir John Stephen, is likewise greatly indebted. We give full notice that in what follows we have borrowed freely from the same copious magazine of recondite facts. The sources on which Reuchlin chiefly relies are indeed beyond our reach, comprising a literary history of Port Royal, by Clemencet, in manuscript, and sundry others in the Archives of Paris.

Quesnel was born at Paris, July 14, 1634. He was descended from a Scotch family of rank; and when we reckon backwards and consider the religious state of the upper class in Scotland, and their close connection with France in the days of Knox, Buchanan, and Welch, we are ready to conclude that it was the prayers and teachings of some Eunice or Lois, which resulted in the eminent piety of the young Parisian. His grandfather was a painter and his father a bookseller. After classical and theological studies at the University, he

* See *Princeton Review*, 1830, p. 170, Art. *Provincial Letters*: 1834, p. 471, *Jansenius*: 1846, p. 239, *Jennils*, and p. 252, *Pascal*: 1849, p. 467. *The Arnaulds*.

entered the Congregation of the Oratorium Jesu, or Oratoire, in 1657, and took priest's orders in 1659. Two of his brothers, Simon and William, were also Oratorians. These religious persons followed the rule of St. Augustine, but without monastic vows, and comprised some very learned men among their number, such as Malebranche, the philosopher; Morin, the linguist; and Richard Simon, the liberal critic. Young Quesnel seems to have been early led to the use of the pen, and under the generalship of St. Marthe was entrusted with the preparation of important religious writings. Thus, with Juhannet, he produced in 1677 a *Précis de Doctrine*, or theological syllabus for the Congregation. When, in 1685, the court demanded of all Oratorians subscription to the formula against Jansenism, Quesnel was found by the inquisitorial visitor, Camoin, at Orleans, whither he had retired, because in 1681 the archbishop of Paris had banished him from that diocess. The archbishop had a grudge against him, partly because Quesnel had not dedicated to him the works of St. Leo, and partly because he had declined to enter upon some controversies in which that prelate had looked for his aid. Quesnel refused signature and stated his reasons in writing, but the archbishop announced to the fathers of the Oratory that such signature was the king's express command. Meanwhile, Quesnel had sought refuge in Brussels, where he joined the great Arnould; and from this place he sent his answer of February 13, 1685. During his residence in the Spanish Netherlands he maintained perfectly amicable relations with the Oratorians of the country. In 1684, the deputies from these religious houses had attended a general convention of the order held at Paris. Conformably to views here expressed, Picquerry, superior of the Flemish houses, declared in 1687 that he would not dishonour his king by subscribing instruments proceeding from another sovereign. He complained also, that the influence of the Jesuits was impairing the strength of the Augustinian doctrine in France.

We have spoken of the edition of St. Leo's works.* It was

* S. Leonis Magni Papæ I. Opera omnia, nunc primum epistolis triginta tribusque de gratiâ Christi opusculis auctiora, secundum exactam annorum seriem accuratè ordinata, appendicibus, dissertationibus, notis, observationibusque illustrata. Accedunt S. Hilarii Arelatensis episcopi opuscula, vita et apologia. Paris, 1675. 2 vols. 4to.

one of several labours which entitled Quesnel to a place among the learned. For the basis of his text he used an old Venetian manuscript, which after being the property of Cardinal Grimani was now possessed by the Oratoire. The notes upheld the Gallican doctrines concerning church-liberties. The work appeared in two quartos in 1675, and in July 1676 was condemned by the Congregation of the Index; and this, as a French cardinal who was present says, without taking time so much as to peruse the volumes. Quesnel prepared a defence, which Arnauld persuaded him to suppress lest he should still further embitter his relations with Rome. In 1700 a second edition in folio appeared at Lyons.

But the work of which we have prefixed the title to our remarks is that by which Quesnel will be remembered. He began to prepare it at Paris, as a spiritual help to young Oratorians. At first it consisted only of devotional observations on the words of Jesus; and it was occasioned by a rule of the house according to which every inmate was obliged to digest a collection of our Lord's sayings. Father Nicholas Jourdain also published a book of the same sort, which Quesnel translated into French, at the instance of Count Brienne. The Marquis d'Aigues and some other pious persons urged him to treat the four gospels in the same manner. It appeared at Paris, in 1671, in duodecimo.* Vialart, bishop of Chalons, upon the recommendation of the marquis, read the work, and recommended it in a pastoral letter to his clergy and the Christian public. A third edition in three volumes appeared in 1679; and in 1694 there was a Latin version at Lyons. Before his retirement at Orleans, he had been advised by the celebrated Nicole, to prepare similar reflections upon the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles; and he worked at this both at Orleans and Brussels. The result was a volume of notes on the whole New Testament, printed in 1687. This, however, led to some alteration in his original *Morale*; for as the remarks on the Gospels were brief compared with those which followed, they were expanded in the following editions to a

* "Abrégé de la Morale de l'Evangile; ou Pensées chrétiennes sur le texte des quatre Evangelistes, pour en rendre la lecture et la méditation plus facile à ceux qui commencent à s'y appliquer."

proportional length, so that the entire work as re-wrought appeared in 1687 at Paris, in two duodecimo volumes, and again in 1693-1694, and repeated reprints at Paris and in Holland, till at length it filled eight volumes and contained an exhortation by the author to the study of the Scriptures. Urfe, bishop of Limoges, recommended to him the preparation of a manual upon those scraps called the "epistles" and "gospels" by Romish and other Churches; and Quesnel complying, added also reflections on the Old Testament passages used in the Missal. But as the copy of this latter part was lost between Brussels and Paris, the former was issued by itself. It is not a little significant that so many dignitaries should have approved these pious labours. We have spoken of Vialart; Noailles, his successor in the see of Chalons, was no less favourable; for when he had read the book and observed its influence among the priesthood, he also recommended it in a pastoral letter of date June 23, 1695; being the very year in which he was preferred to the archbishopric of Paris. In his new post he published, the year following, an instruction on Predestination and Grace. At this juncture appeared the fatal *Problème Ecclésiastique*, which was condemned to the flames in 1699 by a decree of parliament, as also at Rome.

The archbishop caused a theologian of learning, not connected with the author's party, to prepare for the press a corrected edition, which came out in 1699 at Paris. Though Quesnel was privy to this, he took no part in it: It ought not to be omitted that at this stage of the affair Bossuet interested himself on the side of Quesnel's writings, and defended them against opponents, in the *Justification des Réflexions*, printed in 1710. There is a current anecdote, that even his Holiness Pope Clement XI. gave the Reflections a reading, by which, as he declared, he was "singularly edified." A person of quality expressed his surprise that Père la Chaise should be found reading Quesnel; to which this wily persecutor replied, that he had done so daily for two years, and that the contents of the book made a deep impression upon him.

But this good opinion was so far from being universal, that Humbert de Precipiano, Archbishop of Mechlin, feeling disturbed by the controversies which had begun to agitate his

diocese, took advantage of an ordonnance which the Jesuits had procured to be issued by the king, and on the 30th of May, 1703, caused Quesnel to be arrested and brought to his palace at Brussels. He was thrown into three prisons, of which the last was only four feet square. One of these was so damp and noisome that hundreds of fungi started out of the mouldering walls. He lay in duress for some months before he was acquainted with the offence alleged, or had a hearing. Such were the modes of the old regime, such is the contrast with our blessed Anglo-Saxon and Protestant liberties. Trinity Sunday came round, a great day among ritualists; but he was forbidden to assist at mass, being considered as to all intents and purposes excommunicated. The reasons were, first, that he had said mass without the archbishop's leave; secondly, that he had done the like in his domestic chapel; and thirdly, that he had books in his possession which were forbidden by Rome. All his papers were attached. No doubt Monsigneur was aggrieved by one of the daring Oratorian's publications,* as well as by Arnould's book on Frequent Communion. On receiving tidings of these events, William Quesnel, at this time a priest of the Oratory, set measures on foot for his brother's enlargement. But though he hastened to Flanders, he was not permitted to see Pasquier. William, proceeding in due form of law, notified the archbishop July 6, 1703, of his *acte de recusatation*, repeating the same on August 6, and September 4; he also appealed to the king, as in his sovereign council of Brabant. All this proving fruitless, William proceeded to exchange methods of law for stratagem; and on the 13th of September attempted to promote his brother's escape from prison. In this he received valuable aid from the Marquis d'Arenberg, who at an earlier day had been rescued from great straits by William. The conduct of the hazardous undertaking was entrusted to Count Salazar, a Spaniard, to whom d'Arenberg promised his daughter in marriage if success should crown their efforts.

The roof of an inn was contiguous to the prison wall; upon this roof the Spaniard mounted, with a dexterous workman.

* "Très humble remontrance à M. l'archevêque de Malines sur son décret du 15 Janvier 1695 pour la prohibition de plusieurs livres."

The first night their operations were interrupted. The prisoner had been aroused, and trembled in every limb; he threw himself on his knees, and offered up his freedom as a sacrifice to God. But the stillness of death ensued, and he was left in uncertainty for many hours. About eleven o'clock the following night, the work was resumed, and about one, a practicable breach was effected, through which the emaciated priest thrust himself, after he had pushed through his breviary, missal, and crucifix. It must be recorded, with pain, that this good but misguided man ascribed his escape to Mary, whom he had passionately besought to help him. His absence was first remarked about two o'clock in the afternoon, when some one came to bring his dinner. The city gates were immediately closed, and remained so for three days. Although the news was conveyed to the archbishop with much precaution, by his confessor, he is said to have swooned. The French Oratorians found it necessary, in consequence of this adventure, to debar William Quesnel from residence in their communities. Pasquier lay in hiding at Brussels until October 2d. In Namur, he was arrested by Ximenes the governor, under a general order of the King of Spain, forbidding any one to pass through the place; but he remained unknown. A respectable burgher became his security, and he was let free, but was again intercepted in Holland. Here he was not so easily disentangled. In reply to the archiepiscopal warrant of caption, we find his *motif de droit* of date February 13, 1704; in which are set forth his reasons for dreading the jurisdiction of the archbishop of Mechlin, who had charged him with several crimes. What are called in French law the *raisons de suspicion et de recusation*, are the illegality of his imprisonment, since the church allows a priest to be imprisoned only in case of gross and notorious delinquencies; the archbishop is himself a party concerned; the whole proceeding is prompted and directed by the Grand Vicar, Henry Van Susteren, of Amsterdam, a pupil and tool of the Jesuits; for, adds he, "None can be the friend of the Jesuits, without being their slave." He recalls to mind in this reclamation the fact that Ernest Ruth d'Ans, the excellent canon of St. Gedula, had been pursued into exile by the Jesuit rancour, because he was Arnould's com-

panion and secretary. "And I also," says he, "had pronounced my own condemnation, if I had acknowledged this partial jurisdiction, inasmuch as for nine years it was my distinguished happiness to be the table companion of that famous doctor. So fanatical is the archbishop against Jansenism, that to be accused of it before his tribunal is the same as to be condemned. He has given the printer a dispensation to employ even festivals in printing such libels as *Le Jansenisme destructeur de toute religion*."

As might have been expected, the prelate nevertheless pronounced sentence upon the case, on November 10, 1704. Upon the invitation of Coddés, archbishop of Utrecht, a man himself compromised with Rome, Quesnel now betook himself to Holland. The truly French and equally Jansenian vivacity of his temper, under persecution, showed itself in the critiques to which he subjected the prelate's sentence.* After the death of the archbishop, in 1711, Quesnel presented a petition to the high council of Brabant, not so much that they should investigate the case, which properly belonged to the canonists, as that they should pronounce the foregoing violent proceedings against him to have been unlawful, and therefore null. But Van Susteren, in the spirit already attributed to him, prevailed on the States' council to stay this proceeding.

We must now follow our careful authorities to the contemplation of the persecuting storm, as it rises in another quarter. In 1703 and 1704, beginnings of process against the Reflections made themselves known in France. Pamphleteers denounced Quesnel as a heretic, and disturber of ecclesiastical peace. It has been observed that the propositions cited are very much the same with those condemned by the Unigenitus. M. Adry informs us, that Noailles incurred the pontifical displeasure, by maintaining episcopal rights, according to the Gallican doctrine, in a convocation of clergy in 1705. Clement XI. made the Cardinal feel this by means of briefs, addressed to the king and bishops in 1706. This emboldened the enemies of Jansenism to make a fresh assault on our author. Several French editions

* 1. "Idée générale du libelle publié en Latin sous ce titre, 'Motif de droit pour le Procureur de la cour ecclésiastique de Malines.'" 2. "Anatomie de la sentence de M. l'archevêque de Malines."

were now before the public. For six and thirty years the book had been read in France with manifest blessings. It had been translated into Latin and English. Yet at this late day a decree was procured from the Pope, dated July 13, 1708, which condemned the work in severe terms, yet without citing particular passages. This decree was replied to, the year after, in a very lively production, which was generally ascribed to Quesnel.* As to the decree itself, it could not be published in France, without royal approbation; such was the remnant of state freedom, for which the Gallican party contended. But prelates were in the meantime eagerly condemning the work; so did the bishops of Lugon, Rochelle, and Gap, in 1710 and 1711, without reference however to the Pope's doings. But the Jesuits busied themselves in various parts of the kingdom in circulating ingenious caveats against Quesnel.

All this was, however, only a preliminary laying of the train. A number of bishops were getting up a letter, subscribed by high names, and requesting of the king to interfere against Jansenism. The mine was at one time discovered before it exploded; for the rough draft of a letter, which the Abbé Bochart de Saron was carrying from Tellier to the Bishop of Clermont, fell into the very hands of those whom it was meant to destroy. The wishes of the anti-evangelical party were nevertheless conveyed to Louis XIV.; and in 1711, he wrote to the Pope, requesting from him a formal constitution, which should condemn the book, with specifications. What the see of Rome desired was now granted, namely, assurance that Louis would earnestly enforce its decision; so, in 1712, a Congregation of cardinals, prelates, and theologians was called, to sit upon the matter. Upon being informed of this summons, Quesnel lost no time in writing to the Pope; there was no reply.

The result of all was the famous bull, *Unigenitus Dei Filius*, a translation of which is found in the Appendix of the Philadelphia reprint. It is named, as is usual, from its first words, and bears date September 6, 1713. There are few

* "Entretien sur le décret de Rome contre le Nouveau Testament de Chalons, accompagné de réflexions morales."

more signal days in the history of Romish error and apostacy from truth. One hundred and one propositions alleged to be in the book were extracted and condemned, and every vindication of the same, past or present, was also condemned.

Dr. Wilson extracts an interesting passage from one of Matthew Henry's prefaces, which shows how the Protestant world regarded the constitution.

"The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ is the effectual principle of all manner of good; is necessary for every good action; for, without it, nothing is done, nay, nothing can be done. That it is the effect of a sovereign grace, and the operation of the almighty hand of God. That when God accompanies his word with the internal power of his grace, it operates in the soul the obedience it demands. That faith is the first grace, and the fountain of all others. That it is in vain for us to call God our Father, if we do not cry to him with a spirit of love. That there is no God, nor religion, where there is no charity. That the Catholic Church comprehends the angels, and all the elect and just men of the earth of all ages. That it has the Word incarnate for its Head, and all the saints for its members. That it is profitable and necessary at all times, in all places, and for all sorts of persons, to know the Holy Scriptures; and that the holy obscurity of the word of God is no reason for the laity not reading it. That the Lord's day ought to be sanctified by reading books of piety, especially the Holy Scriptures; and that to forbid Christians from reading the Scriptures, is to prohibit the use of light to the children of light." Mr. Henry adds, "Many such positions as these, which the spirit of every good Christian cannot but relish as true and good, are condemned by the Pope's bull, as impious and blasphemous. By this it appears, that popery is still the same thing that ever it was—an enemy to the knowledge of the Scriptures, and to the honour of divine grace."

To this summary we take the liberty of adding a few of the condemned propositions, which have not been made prominent by Dr. Wilson. 1. "In vain, O Lord, thou commandest, if thou thyself dost not give that which thou commandest." This will be recognized as scarcely differing from the famous saying of Augustine, which rang through the whole Pelagian cam-

paign.—10. "Grace is an operation of the almighty hand of God, which nothing can hinder or retard."—27. "Faith is the first grace and the fountain of all others."—32. "Jesus Christ gave himself up to death, that he might by his blood for ever deliver his first begotten, or the elect, out of the hand of the destroying angel."—76. "There is nothing more spacious than the Church of God, because it is composed of the elect and just of all ages."—80. "The reading of the Holy Scriptures is for everybody."

Such was Jansenism; such, in other words, was the approach to Reformed faith of a party not yet excluded from the title of catholicity, and honestly attached to the communion of Rome. Though a majority of bishops at the convocations of clergy in 1713 and 1714 agreed in approving the bull, Noailles, and a few others protested; and when after the death of the tyrant the persecuting force was somewhat remitted, it became apparent that in several universities and theological faculties it was only the arm of government which had enforced the condemnatory acts.

In Amsterdam, a city honoured beyond all others as an asylum for persecuted faith, our author passed the last fifteen years of his life, in great retirement. He commonly ventured abroad only when on Sundays and holidays he went to church or visited the clergy. His home was with good Dubois, who had been his fellow prisoner in 1708, and was now driving a little trade in books, that he might help Quesnel. For a long time Fouillou and Petitpied, refugee doctors of the Sorbonne, were also with him, assisting him in works, which their host printed. Both had been expelled from France in consequence of the *Cas de Conscience*. The bad air of Holland gave poor Fouillou a phthisic which vexed him long. At the time when they were struck by the fulmination of the Unigenitus, the three men were meditating a history of these great controversies. The two Sorbonnists wrote notes to a work on part of the subject.* In 1718 Petitpied was allowed to return to France and was reinstated in the faculty; but in 1728, after the death of

* *Histoire du Cas de Conscience par J. Louail et Francoise Marg. de Joncour*, 8 vol. in 12. Nancy, 1705—1711.

MM. de Bayeux and de Lorraine, he was put in prison. He escaped at a happy moment when his guard was playing with a cat. So in 1729 he fled once more to hospitable Holland, and was received by his brother exiles with open arms. Five years after, a certain Marchioness Vieuxbourg obtained permission from Cardinal Fleury for Petitpied to return to his native country; but his right hand was already crippled with much writing and he was preparing for his end, which took place January 7, 1747, at the age of eighty-two.* This leads one to observe the great age to which sedentary scholars and persecuted exiles sometimes drag out their threatened lives. Besides these pious companions, Quesnel enjoyed likewise the society of many travellers who sought him out for the sake of his cause and his virtues.

In the latter part of November, 1719, Quesnel was taken with an inflammation of the lungs, violent stricture of the chest and high fever, of which he died on the second day of December, at the age of eighty-five years and some months. As the termination was foreseen, he received the Romish sacraments, on the second day of his illness. In these hours we discern both the firmness of his superstitious adherence to ascetic usage, and the humble sincerity of his heart. When the officiating priest was ready, Quesnel insisted upon getting out of bed; a practice very common with moribund Catholics; notwithstanding his debility, he dressed himself, knelt while the celebrant read prayers, and received extreme unction as he lay on the foot-mat of his room. Amidst these uncommanded and unnecessary penances, we doubt not his soul was fixed on that Jesus, to exalt whom he had lived and suffered; for he was dissolved in tears, so that all present were deeply moved. When he was again put into bed, he signed a confession of his faith, in the presence of two apostolical notaries. He had done the same thing before, in his appeal to a future General Council and in his spiritual testament. In this instrument he declares it to be his purpose to die in the bosom of the Catholic Church, in which he had always lived; that he believed all the truths

† His last words were, "Ne tradas bestiis animas confitentes tibi, et animas pauperum tuorum ne obliviscaris in finem."

which she teaches and condemned all the errors which she rejects. He further acknowledges the Pope as the first Vicar of Christ, and the apostolic see as the centre of unity. "I abide," says he, "in the belief, that in my Reflections and in my other writings, I have taught nothing but what is perfectly conformable to the faith of the Church. If against my will aught that goes to the contrary has ever escaped from me, I revoke and abhor it, and submit myself beforehand to whatsoever the Church may determine respecting my writings and my person. I renew my protestations against the manifest injustice of those who have condemned me unheard. I persist in my appeal from the Pope's Constitution to a future General Council, in regard to all the matters of complaint, in which I have cried to the Church for justice; while I abhor every spirit of schism and separation." This act, like similar ones in the history of Pascal, Fénelon and others, suggests many sad reflections. Among others, it reveals the stupefying influence of Romish training on even great intellectual powers, and at the same time enhances the wisdom, faith and courage of the great Reformers. Admire and love as we may, we must still admit with sorrow that the gulf is immense between a Pascal, an Arnauld or a Quesnel, and a Luther, a Calvin or a Knox.

Fouillou with pious consideration noted the chief traits of the venerable sufferer. The Psalms were his principal consolation. Letters were written to friends, to seek their intercessions for the old man now dying. He gave his benediction to the whole family of exiles, holding out the crucifix to be kissed by them; and when the physician said that any moment might be his last, he cried, *Benedic, Domine, hoc sacrificium tuo sancto nomini præparatum*. His remains were taken to Warmond, a village near Leyden, and interred in the Van der Graast cemetery, where repose the ashes of Codde, Steenhoven, Baarchmann, Van der Croon, archbishops of Utrecht, and of other Dutch Romanists.

By those who form their judgment of Quesnel's muscle and nerve, from the "Moral Reflections," he would be judged as imperfectly as if we should conclude from Pascal's devotions, from Nicole's Treatise on Peace, or from the mighty Arnauld's logical exercises, that these men were capable only of meek sub-

mission; each of them was a mighty man of valour, and a man of war from his youth. As we shall have occasion to show in the sequel, our author wrote voluminously. When Le Tellier came into possession of his private papers, the wily courtier believed that he should now be able to ruin the officious Jansenist. Many a closet-council was held with the faithless Maintenon, once herself not far from the kingdom of God; and the great lady is said to have read passages to the king, in the evenings of several years. Shortly after his breaking prison, Quesnel addressed a keen letter to Van Susteren, the Vicar General. In this he demands restoration of his books and manuscripts, which had for the most part been perfidiously delivered to the French Jesuits. "But I doubt not," says he, "that the Jesuits, who have a bull for everything, have one for retaining other people's goods." He uses fiery scorn in treating of the treachery with which they ransacked and exposed the writings in which were recorded his family and personal affairs, and the most secret exercises of his soul before God. He reminds the Jesuits of the unparalleled treachery of their manoeuvres in regard to his friend and master, Arnauld; how they had meanly sought to make him odious with every prince and court within their reach; accusing him to the Pope of holding one opinion, and to the king, then embroiled with Innocent XI., of holding exactly the opposite.

Growing warmly vehement, he adds: "But since our friends are among our richest possessions, I have a right to demand of you the restoration of my friend, as properly my own. I speak of M. De Brigode, as you well understand. Give me back this friend then; give him back to himself, to his family, to a pious widow, whose very vitals you lacerate, renewing in her the pangs of a mother by your inhuman treatment. For six months you have kept him in prison, notwithstanding the public dissatisfaction. That you might always have in your fiery furnace the mystical number of *three* children of Israel, you have on my account, and as if to be my substitute, incarcerated one of the holiest and most laborious men of the diocese, Verschuven, vice-pastor of St. Catharine's. You have torn him from the chosen vineyard to make him rot in gaol, till he shall fall down before Nebuchadnezzar's image. Sorrow pierces my

heart, when I behold how you have wasted this part of the Lord's heritage. *Singularis ferus depastus est eam.*"

Père la Chaise, as French story abundantly relates, was one of the marvels of that age. A quarter of a century before, this creeping Jesuit had been made confessor to the king. A long step upward was taken when he advised and directed the marriage with Madame de Maintenon. In old age he had the court at his feet; and, when on his death bed, he was consulted by the old monarch about the choice of his successor. La Chaise had made great ado over a case of Quesnel's papers. Whoever came in—it was, "Voilà tous les mystères d'iniquité du père Quesnel." He cackled over the nest of memoirs, letters, sketches, and especially the "jargon," the cipher, in which were contained treasons against state and king. There is a letter of Quesnel to la Chaise, without date, in which he dares him to make public the contents of this incendiary escritoire, or else to sit down with the reputation of a quacksalver crying his wares. The use of a cipher, he says, is no certain proof of any black art; princes, and even his Holiness, keep people whose business it is to write in cipher, and to decipher what is thus written by others. The Jesuits are not wholly ignorant of the art; though, to say truth, it was condemned at Rome. And he attacks the Jesuits, in regard to the villanous disguises which they were known to have assumed in their missions.

It is agreed among most Protestants, that there have been instances of true piety among persons still remaining in connection with the Church of Rome, and maintaining many of her errors. If a catalogue were made of the exceptional names admissible to such favourable judgment, it would be found, we think, that most of the modern ones are those of Frenchmen. Few English papists, we are sure, would come into such a record; of Italians and Spaniards there would be none; and of other continental ecclesiastics, little is known among us. We do indeed suppose, that among those German scholars and poets, who in revulsion from the rationalism of Paulus, and the pantheism of Fichte and Schelling, threw themselves into the bosom of Rome, when Stolberg and his companions went over, there were some who knew the truth. We have ourselves seen spectacles in the Catholic worship of Germany which taught us that under that

horrible superstition there is much earnest and tender experience. Still the fact remains, that we look chiefly to the Church of France for instances of vital religion. The Gallican doctrine tended to liberty of investigation. The presence of the Huguenots, in high places, including some of the greatest families of the kingdom, whetted the wits of ecclesiastics as long as toleration lasted; and even after the Revocation, since the assault was kept up from the Low Countries and the Palatinate. Above all, the followers of Bains and Jansenius, and the entire reaction against the Jesuits, with such literary auxiliaries as the Racines, Boileau, and Pascal, preserved the minds of thousands in a state of wakefulness. Since the days of the old Pelagian and Semipelagian wars, we may safely say, the works of Augustine were never so studied as by Jansenius and his followers and opponents. The doctrines of predestination and unconditional election, of total depravity, of human inability, of vicarious atonement, and of justification by faith, stand out prominently in the writings of Quesnel and his friends. When the foundation of their hope is expressed, it is always discovered to be the righteousness of Christ, and not any works or observances.

And here we may take occasion to correct what is a prevalent and injurious error with regard to the purity of subjective religion as found among French Catholics. Careful distinction must be made between parties equally claimed as eminent for holy devotion; and our judgment, if pronounced with due understanding, will not award indiscriminate praise, with one hand to the upholders of sovereign grace, and with the other to the abettors of a scheme of self-righteousness and justification by means of our own merits. Ascetic devotion and mystical rapture have always existed in the Church of Rome, in connection with some of the crudest errors and foulest crimes. Protestant zealots for a sort of refined quietism have sometimes culled from surrounding impurities, phrensies and even horrors, the less loathsome parts of such experiences as those of St. Francis Borgia and St. Teresa; but equal self-annihilation and equal soaring of pure love can be found in the rhapsodies of St. Ignatius of Loyola. These are infinitely remote from the elevations of Arnauld, St. Cyran, Nicole and Ques-

nel, with whom the great procuring cause of justification, the work of Christ, is made to fill the field of vision. Such men had their raptures also, just as Welch and Rutherford and Boston had theirs; but raptures warranted by a sound and explicit theology in regard to the ground of the sinner's acceptance. As we consider it untranslatable, we must omit a paper of Pascal's, which was found after his death sewed up in his clothes, as a testimony of marvellous revelations.* The Tridentine dogma of Justification, framed as it was expressly to counteract and annul the Lutheran and Reformation tenet on that head, must, if intelligently and consistently carried out, lead to its own school of experience, a school showing no higher products in its best estate than the beautiful figments of a Sales, a Bourdaloue, or a Fénelon. For if justification is "*et sanctificatio et renovatio interioris hominis per voluntariam susceptionem gratiæ et donorum*;" then the whole regards of the soul seeking to be justified must be necessarily directed towards the bettering of its own subjective condition; a process which we observe honestly carried on by the mystical Romanists and their imitators.

These remarks seem necessary, in order to guard those readers who come fresh to these studies against the mistake of classing such piety as that of Pascal and Quesnel with the vague devotion and dangerous enthusiasm of Guion and Fénelon. For native temperament sweet beyond all words, for elegance of lettered accomplishment, for clear spiritual insight, for mastery of language, and the magic of high persuasive eloquence, as well as for self-control and resolved meekness, we may travel over the world of history and find no second Fénelon. Yet these qualities must not blind us to the enormous errors of his creed. We would draw a keen line of demarcation between him and the Jansenists; he would have drawn it himself, for when poor Quesnel was to be made an example, Fénelon joined in the persecution. This whole affair of Fénelon and the Quietists demands a careful re-investigation. The public has been accustomed to draw its information from gar-

* "*Ravissement et Profession de Foi.*" *Pensées de Pascal*, ed. Faugère, vol. i. p. 239.

bled extracts of his writings. Let us have them as they lie in his own works; and let us carefully weigh the momentous burdens which he hurls upon Calvinism and evangelical faith. As in the case of a Barclay or a Channing, let not the loveliness of the man cause us to accept his peculiarities of belief; such a method would lead us to the adoption of creeds diametrically opposite to one another; as for instance are those of Quesnel and Fénelon on the matter of Grace. If an angelic charm of person and a witchery of style never surpassed could make us Pelagians, we should surrender to the Archbishop of Cambray; but his tenets are unscriptural.

It is remarkable, in the writings of the French mystics, how little is founded on the word of God; and how fantastically the text is perverted, in a good part of the scanty citations. It is still more remarkable how seldom the person and works of the Lord Jesus Christ are brought into prominence, in the voluminous correspondence of Madame Guion and Fénelon, and in the publications of both. It is startling to find this whole school floating away in an elysian contemplation, and delicious death to self and worldly entities, in which the very notions of sinfulness and pardon seem at length to be left far behind. There is not in literary history a phenomenon more curious than the private correspondence of Madame Guion and Fénelon, in its earlier stages. We wish, for the sake of candour, that more of this had been revealed by the biographers of both. For unction and impassioned eloquence, Guion was not inferior to her spiritual son; for such she entitles Fénelon again and again. The anile dreams which she now and then announces to him, and which he humbly receives and investigates as divine messages, indicate the mighty priestess. If she had been a divinely commissioned Deborah, she could not have found a more deferential Barak.* But the complete examination of this misapprehended and entangled affair, may well occupy an entire article. Suffice it now to say, that while, as Bossuet seems to have conceded, the connection between Madame Guion and Fénelon was

* "Lettres Chrétiennes et spirituelles sur divers sujets qui regardent la vie intérieure, ou l'esprit du vrai Christianisme. Nouvelle édition, enrichie de la correspondance secrète de M. de Fénelon avec l'Auteur." A Londres, 1767, 1768. Vols. V.

above all suspicion of earthly taint, it was on her part enthusiastically absurd, and on his part weakly credulous. It would be lamentable confusion to mistake this type of religion for that of the Port Royal; even the superstitions of the latter, and they were many, are of a widely different order.*

When we say of Jeremy Taylor, of Massillon, or of Neander, that he is grossly erroneous in some of his theological opinions, we do not thereby signify his exclusion from the kingdom of grace; let the same interpretation be given to our criticism of the pure and elegant archbishop. A thorough knowledge of the scheme of free redemption as founded in God's sovereignty, would have saved him from many of his wanderings. His Latin treatise, *De Summi Pontificis Auctoritate*, impugns the Jansenists by name, in regard to the Pope's indefectibility in matters of faith; and his own submission, beautiful as it is for consistency, is a monstrous apostacy from reason and individual faith. The *Lettres Spirituelles*, matchless for the perspicuous and elegant exhibition of a certain mystical experience, teach a most unscriptural doctrine concerning perfection of holiness in this life. His letters to a Benedictine father, on Predestination, are from beginning to end a denial of the Augustinian and Pauline doctrine of decrees. In a word, while his fascinating treatises are in a certain sense spiritual, they are not in any high sense evangelical; there is much of devotion, of pure love, of rapture, and of interior death, but little of the atoning sacrifice of Christ, or of communion with him as "the Head of every man." And this resembles very closely a sort of poetical religion, which is common in German pulpits, and which is rapidly becoming familiar to us, by means of the winning and scholar-like, but vague and uncandid rhapsodies of Maurice and his school. In the same degree is it opposed to the distinct gospel utterances of Jansenists such as Quesnel.

We have been led to dwell on this contrast between two classes of amiable French Catholics, partly because we often

* A mortifying chapter in their history is the affair of the Abbé Paris; the dear good man was dead before these horrors were enacted, which are spread in the text and plates of such books as "La Vérité des Miracles opérés par l'Intercession de M. de Paris; par M. de Montgeron Conseiller au Parlement." Utrecht, 1637, quarto. This infatuation and mental *ramollissement* may be studied in connection with the modern cases of Judge Edmonds, Robert Owen, and Dr. Hare.

find them confounded by negligent students, and partly because the contrast itself is articulately set forth in the contemporary history of doctrine. We have seen how Fénelon, forgetting the wounds of persecution, joined in the clamour against Quesnel. He addressed the long-harassed old man in 1711, accusing him and his fellow Jansenists of virtual defection from Catholicity, joined to a cowardly hypocrisy. The editor of Madame Guion's correspondence grows warm beyond all quietistic decorum, in speaking of M. Phélipaux, author of the *Rélation du Quietisme*. "Observe," says he, "who this man is, who repeats all these rumours in his book. A Jansenist! In that word I have said all. *O tempora! O mores!* O inconsistency, duplicity, pharisaism, pushed beyond all that could be imagined. A Jansenist criticizes and blames the submission of M. Cambray; that is, he finds it not complete, and would have it inward as well as outward! A Jansenist! Let all the world judge. Where is shame? or how could audacity go so far? Jansenists—those who, as is universally known, not only do not submit themselves inwardly, but are outwardly indocile towards the decrees of the court of Rome; are schismatics, refuse the bulls, are constantly appealing from them as *an abuse*, stun the universe with the noise of their refusals, and are a monstrous member in the Roman Church for which they are preparing ruin and venturing at length to undermine its constitution. A Jansenist!"* The school of Quesnel had indeed given some great provocation to the school of Guion. We have often wondered that the eulogists of that amiable devotee and accomplished poet should have paraded before the world the colloquy in which she is logically torn to pieces by "the eagle of Meaux." The reader melts into commiseration at the inequality of a combat between a sensitive woman and the magnificent Bossuet. But this was a conversational defeat, not admitting of thorough attack or defence. He who would see the dogmas of the Quietists searched out to their foundation, and that foundation utterly subverted, must go to a Jansenist argument and peruse the cogent polemic of Nicole. His treatise upon Quietism was just through the press, in

* *Lettres Chrétiennes*, etc., Vol. V. Introduction, page cxxiii, cxxiv.

1695, when the old man breathed his last. The reader will find the principal points between the parties discussed in his work on Prayer.* This was he, on whom Pascal called in the hour of need, and whose subtle analysis added a new force to the links of steel which glitter in the *Provinciales*. The first, second, eighth, thirteenth, and fourteenth letters were revised by him, and of the fourth, ninth, eleventh, twelfth, sixteenth and seventeenth, he furnished the material. It was he who, lying perdu on the Rhine, and under the name of Wendrock, translated the *Provinciales* into Latin, and afterwards fortified the same with formidable notes. He is said to have got up the requisite latinity by a sedulous study of Terence. It must be owned that Nicole had not the spirit of martyrdom. As he fled from city to city in Germany and the Low Countries, wearing a variety of aliases, his timid nature led him to think himself continually pursued by the Jesuits. And when by Harlay's intercession he was permitted to return to Paris, he seldom went abroad, for fear of accidents. For a long period he made his abode in the remote suburb of St. Marcel, saying, "The enemies who menace Paris will probably enter by the gate St. Martin, and will have to traverse the whole city to reach me." This want of nerve unfitted him for oral controversy; and he used to say of one of his friends, "Tréville beats me in the chamber; but before he is down stairs I have confuted him." Yet this same shrinking creature was a Titan in written debate. Amidst some characteristic sneers, Bayle designates him as "*l'une des plus belles plumes de l'Europe*." In composition he sacrificed everything to perfect transparency of thought and words, and to perfect sequence of ratiocination. Hence he failed in panegyric, in descriptive painting, and in amplificatory eloquence. We disagree with Palissat, when he says, "The reader quits these Essays without pain, and returns to them without pleasure; for readers require to be flattered;" and we agree with two better judges, namely Sévigné and Racine; of whom one says, in her joyous way, "I read M. Nicole with a pleasure which carries me away"—"There is not a word too much or too little;" and the other classes him

* *Traité de la Prière*. Paris, 1724. Vol. II. pp. 197, et seq.

with Pascal. Dryness should not be ascribed to writings, which have so exquisite a finish. These Essays on Morals, which so fascinated Madame Sévigné and the wits, were composed during the author's closing retreat at Paris, and fill twenty-five volumes. The edge of his scalpel was turned against play-houses, and this for a time threw off Racine; but the great poet returned to the dying-bed of his master, bringing medicine (*gouttes d'Angleterre*) which revived him for a little.

The way in which these theological disputes worked themselves into the coteries of Paris may be understood from a lively piece of contemporary gossip. "Apropos of Corbinelli," writes Madame de Sévigné, in 1690, "he wrote me a very pretty note the other day, giving me an account of a conversation and a dinner at M. de Lamoignon's; the actors were the host, M. (the bishop) de Troyes, M. (the bishop) de Toulon, Father Bourdaloue (a Jesuit) his companion, Despréaux and Corbinelli. The talk was of the works of the ancients and the moderns. Boileau stood up for the ancients, making exception however in favour of a single modern writer, who as he judged, surpassed both old and new. Bourdaloue's associate, who gave attention and was near to Boileau and Corbinelli, asked what that book might be which was so marked with genius. Despréaux hesitated to name it; Corbinelli said to him, 'Sir, I conjure you to tell me it, that I may spend the night reading it.' Despréaux replied, laughing, 'Ah, sir, you have read it more than once, I am certain.' Here the Jesuit interposed with an air of disdain, *un cotal riso amaro*, and pressed him to name an author who was so marvellous. Despréaux said to him, 'Mon père, do not press me.' The father persisted. At length Despréaux took him by the arm, and clenching it strongly said, 'Mon père, vous le voulez; hé bien! morbleu, c'est Pascal.' Pascal! exclaimed the father, all red and astounded, Pascal is as fine perhaps as falsehood can be. 'Falsehood!' rejoined Despréaux, 'falsehood! know that he is as true as he is inimitable; and he has been already translated into three languages.' That, replied the father, does not make him any the more true.

"Despréaux, who was now heated, cried out like a madman,

‘What! my father, dare you deny that one of your (Jesuits) has said in print that a Christian is not bound to love God? Dare you say that this is false?’—‘Sir,’ said the father, all in a rage, ‘one must distinguish.’—‘*Distinguish*,’ answered Des-préaux, ‘*distinguish, morbleu, distinguish, distinguish* whether we are bound to love God!’ and taking Corbinelli by the arm, he retired to the other end of the room; then returning on the run, like one crazed, he would by no means go near the Jesuit, but joined a group that was still in the dining-room. Here ends my story, the curtain drops.”*

Let us be allowed, in this connection, to adduce a proof of Boileau’s love for men on both sides, by citing from his lines on Bourdaloue’s portrait, given him by Madame Lamoignon, this closing couplet:

“Enfin, après Arnauld, ce fut l’illustre en France,
Que j’admirai le plus et qui m’aima le mieux.”

The timidity of Nicole unfitted him to accompany his bolder companions to the fair conclusions of the system of grace. Jansenius was too high for his somewhat Erasmian mind. He wrote against the Calvinists, and in his later years supported a half-way doctrine of general grace, which dissatisfied his more manly acquaintances. Arnauld, in the seventh volume of his Letters, speaks sternly of it, and Quesnel complained warmly to Nicole himself of his defection. The fear of being considered Protestants at heart betrayed too many of the Jansenists into officious attacks upon Claude and other Calvinistic divines. This pusillanimity is charged upon them by the partisans of Fénélon. But our astonishment reaches its height when we find our excellent Quesnel condescending to say to his Jesuit adversaries, “I will say nothing of the intercourse which you have had with the Reformed minister Claude, the most formidable enemy of the Church in our day.”†

We have met with no account of the writings of Quesnel which seems so complete as that of Reuchlin; and to this we refer in what follows. The works are these:

1. “*Tradition de l’Eglise Romaine sur la prédestination des*

* Lettres, ed. Didot, 1844, Vol. VI. p. 96.

† Reuchlin, Gesichte von Port Royal, II. 812.

saints et sur le grace efficace." Cologne, 1687. 4 volumes, 12mo.—This is upon the Church authority concerning predestination and efficacious grace. Under the name of Germain he here gives an analysis of the Epistle to the Romans, and then the history of the Church-dogma till Trent, the dogma of Trent itself, the history of the famous *Congregatio de Auxiliis Gratiae*, a part of their original acts, and the principal canons on this head. The third volume is chiefly taken up in answering a similar catena of the Jesuit Deschamps on the other side; this book appeared at Frankfort the same year. The fourth volume of Quesnel did not come out till 1696, and then at Liège; and bibliographers will recognize a characteristic of the age, in this migration of imprints from kingdom to kingdom, which belongs to the suggestive curiosities of literature. It occurs also as a separate work, entitled, "A Defence of the Church of Rome and the Sovereign Pontiff against Melchior Leydecker, theologian of Utrecht." Leydecker is a name greatly honoured in the Reformed theology of Holland. Quesnel had another controversy with him concerning the sovereignty of kings; the volume appeared at Paris in 1704.

2. "Apologie historique des deux censures de Louvain et de Douay sur la matière de la grace." Cologne, 1688. 12mo. The pseudonym here was Gery.

3. "Coram." A publication so called from its first word; being a new edition of the Sermons of Augustine.

4. "La discipline de l'Eglise tirée du Nouveau Testament, et de quelques anciens conciles." Lyons, 2 vols. quarto, 1689.

5. "Règles de la discipline ecclésiastique, recueillis des conciles, des synodes de France et des saints pères de l'église, touchant l'état et les mœurs du clergé." This work on Church discipline and clerical morals, was originally written by Darcis, another father of the Oratoire; but the edition of 1679 is much enlarged by Quesnel.

6. "Causa Arnoldiana," 1699.—A collection of Latin pieces, in vindication of his friend and patron, Arnauld; these were almost all written by himself and Nicole.

7. "Discours historique et apologetique." This is contained in the third volume of the "Justification of M. Arnauld against the censure of 1656;" a work which appeared at Liege, in

1702. The first and second volumes are chiefly by Arnauld; the former half of the third comprises Arnauld's life, and some letters of his, and St. Cyran's.

8. "Avertissement sur deux lettres de M. Arnauld à M. Le Feron," etc. 1700.—The two letters of Arnauld were addressed to Le Feron in 1687, about a book of one Bourdaille on the Ethics of St. Augustine, and formed part of the great casuistic controversy, and is a defence of Port Royal against certain charges.

We shall throw together in the margin a description of numerous minor and fugitive writings, as diligently collected by Reuchlin.*

It is time we should say something of the reprint which has just been issued by the Philadelphia press. Clearness and beauty of typography have certainly been secured. In comparing this with Collins's three volume Glasgow edition, of 1830, which is a sightly book, we give the preference to the American copy.

As pruned of those popish errors which hung about certain parts, but which lay chiefly in unessential phrases, the "Moral Reflections" are eminently fitted to be useful in our day and country. As Doddridge said of Leighton, we may say of Quesnel, that we never read even a few pages of his writings without elevation of mind. Bishop Wilson's commendation of the work is justly cited by Dr. Boardman; we may add of another

* Letter to M. Van Susteren, Dec. 5, 1703.—"Motif de droit," 1704; already alluded to, and directed chiefly against the archbishop of Mechlin.—"A Problem, moral and canonical, proposed to M. Malo, Canon of Mechlin, and sometime official of the archbishop; to wit, which is the more probable, first, that M. de Precipiano has been for twenty years in contumacy and rebellion against the apostolic see under four popes, for being in spite of them dean and pastor of the metropolitan chapter of Besancon, or, secondly, that the apostolic see and four popes have unjustly persecuted M. de Precipiano."—"Letter to the King against the Jesuits," 1704.—"Letter to the Chancellor."—"Letter of Father Quesnel to Port Royal de la Chaise."—"Letter to an Archbishop."—"Letter of a private person to a friend."—"Letter to a friend touching what is abroad in the name of His Catholic Majesty," 1704.—"Declaration and protestation against the placard of the Archbishop of Mechlin."—"General idea of the libel of the fiscal of Mechlin," 1705.—"Letter concerning the process or *motif de droit*," 1705.—"Anatomy of the sentence of the Archbishop."—"Memoir in vindication of Father Quesnel's resort to the King," 1702.—"Father Bouhours, Jesuit, convicted of his old calumnies against the Port Royalists," 1700.—"Answer to two letters of Archbishop Fénelon," 1711.—Numerous other titles are preserved, but of publications less concerning our general subject.

Bishop Wilson, of Sodor and Man, not only that he caught much of the good Jansenist's spirit, but that he again and again borrowed from him in his well-known *Sacra Privata*, a manual of devotions, which is highly valuable when purged of those passages which inculcate the doctrine of merit.* It is not our purpose to quote from the volumes before us. They contain passages so fraught with genuine gospel truth, and such assertions of the sovereignty of the divine choice, the efficacy of grace, the inability of the sinner, the justification of the ungodly by faith, and the loveliness of the Lord Jesus Christ, as make us forget during the perusal, that the author acknowledged any allegiance to Rome. Such truth and such holiness, from whatever pen they come, should be welcome to every Christian mind.

SHORT NOTICES.

Miscellaneous Discourses and Expositions of Scripture. By George Paxton Young, A. M., one of the Professors of Theology in Knox's College, Toronto, Canada West. Edinburgh: Johnstone & Hunter. 1854. pp. 348.

WE feel a deep interest in our brethren of the Free Church in the British Provinces, and are filled with hope for their future, when we discern in them that zeal for sound education, as connected with scriptural theology, which has characterized genuine Presbyterianism in all its migrations, under Calvin, Knox, the Melvilles, and the Tennents. In 1853, the author of these discourses exchanged a pastoral charge at Hamilton for a theological chair at Toronto. The volume before us is an affectionate tribute to the people whom he left. These homiletical and expository exercitations evince sound judgment, biblical learning, and a tasteful mastery of diction, with an occasional surprise of unexpected thought. The metrical version of Habakkuk, at the close, is at once bold and successful. In speaking of this work, we may properly allude to a lecture of Professor

* We refer to the original folio edition of Bishop Wilson's works, or to some unaltered reprint, as, for instance, that of Oxford, (John Henry Parker,) 1853, 12mo.

Young's, on Sir William Hamilton's Theory of Sensitive Perception, of which the venerable philosopher says, under date of August 23, 1855: "I have seen no writing in which that doctrine is more intelligently and independently treated; and while acknowledging my personal obligations and my high estimate of the writer, I beg you will excuse me if I should take the liberty of quoting it." We shall expect to hear again from Professor Young, in matters connected with his chair.

The Contrast between Good and Bad Men, Illustrated by the Biography and Truths of the Bible. By Gardiner Spring, D. D., LL.D., Pastor of the Brick Presbyterian Church in the city of New York. In two volumes, 8vo. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1855.

The publisher of this work has done it great justice, by the very beautiful exterior in which it is produced. It closes that extensive series of works, the fruit of pastoral labours, which have during a number of years proceeded from the tried and indefatigable pen of the author. The trains of thought, with all the peculiarities of manner, which have secured for him the esteem of his own particular flock, are here presented at every opening of the page; and with the increasing probability that few more volumes can be made public, the parishioners and other numerous hearers of Dr. Spring will procure these discourses with more than usual eagerness. The plan of the series is something novel; the work exhibits a number of Scripture characters, arranged by pairs, and in contrast; and in such a way as at the same time to embody and hold out some important religious principles. Thus we have, among others, Pharaoh and Moses, Saul and Samuel, Ruth and Orpah, Daniel and Nebuchadnezzar, Judas and Peter, Paul before his conversion, and Paul after his conversion. The fifteenth chapter presents the points of contrast in a single view. Though this work bears indubitable marks of having been newly written in all its parts, it also exhibits the fruits of long reflection and careful observation of life; and we have no scruple in saying, that of all the author's productions, this pleases us most. As favourable specimens, we would select the portraiture of Noah, of Paul, and of Judas. The closing paragraphs, which have almost a valedictory sadness and earnestness, are, we think, as affecting as they are manly. Before closing this hurried notice, we must be allowed to remark, that such instances as these persuade us to believe that useful men and ministers may bring forth pleasant fruit in old age, and that there may be increase of years without senility, and length of labour without decay of power. The history of such a ministry as this, in such a city as New York, cannot be contemplated without sentiments of affectionate veneration.

The Union Bible Dictionary, for the use of Schools, Bible Classes, and Families. New edition, improved and enlarged, with entirely new engravings. American Sunday School Union, 1855. pp. 691.

It is not surprising that the Union has continued to improve its Bible Dictionary by successive editions, instead of pursuing the impolitic and unjust economy of patching the old stereotype plates. The high credit which the establishment has gained for keeping its publications even with the advance of Biblical science, and the mechanical execution and embellishments of books, required that such a standard work as the Dictionary should be often recast and new dressed. The first look at the present issue proves its entire freshness, and its superiority to its predecessors. No ordinary wood engraver either designed or cut such plates as Samson at the Mill, the Mourner in Sackcloth, the Eagle's Nest, the Jewish Table, the Vintage, or a large number that might be mentioned out of the hundreds of illustrations of ancient customs, geography, natural history, scriptural subjects, and allusions of all kinds, that are thickly interspersed through the leaves and text of this volume.

A mere compiler, with Calmet, Winer, Kitto, and other Biblical Encyclopedists in his hands, might condense an invaluable work "for the use of schools, Bible classes, and families;" but we are assured in the Preface, that whilst every advantage has been taken of the principal authors, most of the leading articles are strictly original. The size of the book shows that it has room for all the titles likely to be sought by a diligent reader of the common version of the Scriptures, and an examination of the articles gives the best evidence that they are neither meagre nor superficial. We might add, that this would be expected of an author of the accurate and laborious habits of Mr. Packard. Anything in the shape of a dictionary is generally supposed to be excluded from the catalogue of books for continuous reading, but in turning over these pages we were struck with the thought that it is not only a capital manual for reference, but would make an entertaining, and certainly an instructive volume for perusal from "Aaron" to "Zuzims."

A Complete Pronouncing Gazetteer, or Geographical Dictionary of the World, containing a Notice and the Pronunciation of the Names of nearly one hundred thousand places, &c. Edited by J. Thomas, M. D. and T. Baldwin, assisted by several other Gentlemen. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1855. pp. 2182.

It is just ten years since we commended to the notice of our readers an unpretending volume of the same description with the one before us, and expressed our firm belief that, while it

claimed to be nothing more than a beginning, it was one affording promise of an admirable ending.* This promise, we are happy to announce, is abundantly fulfilled in the present publication. Besides its geographical contents, including, as the editors affirm, twenty thousand names more than any other English Gazetteer in circulation, it presents the only full and accurate notation of the sound in every doubtful case. The principles of this notation, as expounded in the Introduction, are indicative of learning, taste, and judgment, which do honour to the country. The unwearied and conscientious labour which has been expended on the volume, equal perhaps to any in the language in the bulk of its contents, would be sufficient of itself to command the respect of every intelligent reader. But its claims to such respect are vastly higher, and will probably be valued most by the most competent judges of such matters. While the authors have availed themselves of every aid, including the Imperial Gazetteer just finished, they have spared no labour or expense in securing uniformity and accuracy even in details. Some of the arrangements of the work are new to us, and add immensely to its value as a book of ordinary reference. Such is the insertion of the ancient names of places in their proper alphabetical position, with references to the modern names and the accompanying description. Such too is the insertion of the various current modes of writing the same name with references from one to the other. Another valuable feature is the etymological vocabulary of geographical names appended to the volume. So far as our inspection has been carried, and our knowledge of the subject goes, this is decidedly the fullest and most accurate geographical dictionary in the language.

My Father's House, or the Heaven of the Bible. By James M. McDonald, D. D. 1855. 12mo. pp. 369.

It is impossible to estimate the value of a good book. We are glad to see ministers enlarge the sphere of their usefulness by resorting to the agency of the press, and scatter among those who have never seen their face such spiritual food as has proved effectual to the nourishment and strengthening of their own flocks. This might be advantageously done to a greater extent than it is. A book may be seasonable and useful though it make no positive addition to the sum of human knowledge. If it can reach the heart, though it dazzle not the understanding, if it can suggest in pleasing and attractive forms good thoughts, though not unthought before, if it can communi-

* See Biblical Repertory for October, 1845, p. 647.*

cate right impulses and promptings though drawn from familiar but unheeded truths, it is not without a mission.

The theme of this book is one of those most calculated to promote a Christian's edification and spirituality. And yet there is none upon which men have been more prone to run into wild and profitless speculation, or enthusiastic error. Those even who are in no special danger from this quarter, will be ready to welcome a competent and judicious guide for their reflections, which else might be rambling and indefinite. Dr. McDonald has aimed to preserve the proper medium between vague and pointless declamation, and a bold presumptuous intrusion into things not seen. Perhaps a chapter on the employments of heaven might have added to the completeness with which the subject is treated. This topic has not been omitted indeed; it finds its place incidentally under other heads, but it might have been of advantage to assign it the prominence of a separate discussion. But where the matter is so excellent we have no disposition to find fault. We wish the book God-speed.

Sketches of Virginia, Historical and Biographical. By William Henry Foote, D. D., Pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Romney, Virginia. Second Series. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1855. 8vo. pp. 596.

This handsome volume is a lasting monument of the diligence and research of Dr. Foote. It is a storehouse of interesting facts, especially in relation to the rise and progress of Presbyterianism in Virginia. It gives the history of congregations, of ministers, and of distinguished members connected with our Church. Davies, Mitchell, Turner, Hoge, Alexander, Rice, Hill, Speece, Baxter, are only a few of the distinguished preachers concerning whom important information is here given. Had the last century produced a Dr. Foote it had been well for the preservation of the materials for the history of Presbyterianism in this country. It is not only, however, to Presbyterians that this volume is of interest. It contains much that is important in relation to the civil and revolutionary as well as religious history of the State. It will we hope contribute not only to establish the reputation of its author, and preserve the memory of the precious dead, but also to excite others to follow the example which is set in this valuable compilation.

Sermons and Essays by the Tennents and their Contemporaries. Compiled for the Board. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Philadelphia. 1855. pp. 374.

This volume owes its existence to the late Dr. Alexander, by whom most of the discourses were selected as an Appendix

to his history of the "Log College." It contains sermons or essays from the pens of the three Tennents, Gilbert, William and John, and from Rev. John Blair, Dr. Robert Smith, and Dr. Samuel Finley. A short biographical account is given of the several authors, forming a very interesting and instructive volume.

The World's Jubilee. By Anna Silliman. New York: M. W. Dodd, Brick Church Chapel. 1856. pp. 343.

The object of this work is "to present the promise of restoration found in the Bible, and show that it teaches that the earth will not be annihilated at the final judgment, but that God designs to renew and perpetuate the world, for the glorious and everlasting kingdom of his Son, and that this new creation will be inhabited not only by the children of the resurrection, but also by men in the natural body, who will continue to live and multiply upon its surface through the everlasting ages."

Alleghan, a Poem in Nine Books. By N. M. Jordan. Cincinnati: Moore, Wilstach, Keys & Co., 25 West Fourth Street. 1856. pp. 343.

"A song of early missions, and the field
Of holy enterprise, in the dark West,
Whose ancient tribes first heard the Word of Life,
When the bold Northmen tempted ocean's breadth
And sought her peopled shores. But wicked men
Spurned the glad tidings, and treated ill
The friendly messengers."

These are the opening lines of the First Book, and will give our readers an idea of the subject and of the style of the work.

Geognosy, or the Facts and Principles of Geology against Theories. By David N. Lord. New York: Franklin Knight, 138 Nassau street. 1855. pp. 412.

Mr. Lord correctly remarks that there is a prevalent disposition among men of science, and especially among sciolists, to call in question the inspiration of the Bible. He attributes much of this disposition to the theories of geologists, who assume for our earth an antiquity inconsistent with the Mosaic record, as that record has always been understood. His object is to vindicate the Scriptures, by showing that the conclusions of geologists as to the age of our globe, are unauthorized by the facts of the case; and that the prevalent geological theories are self-contradictory, inconsistent with the laws of nature, with established facts, as well as with the word of God. His object, therefore, is elevated and holy—the vindication of the Bible: and the method by which he attempts to accomplish it, viz. the refutation of geological theories by geological facts, perfectly

legitimate. Every believer in the divine origin of the sacred writings, would rejoice in his complete success. We dissent, however, entirely from his fundamental position, and deny his right to embark the whole hopes of Christians in one boat, and make the salvation of men through Jesus Christ, depend on the success of his argument against geologists. "The question," he says, "whether the conclusion which geologists thus draw in respect to the age of the world, is legitimate, or not, is of the greatest moment. If founded on just grounds, it disproves the inspiration not only of the record in Genesis of the creation, but of the whole of the writings of Moses, and thence, as we shall show, of the Old and New Testaments, and divests Christianity itself of its title to be received as a divine institution. The whole Revelation is changed at once from a heaven-descended reality, into a fable; from the most glorious of God's works, into a device of man." p. 14. There is not a true Christian in the world, who really believes this. We have no idea that Mr. Lord himself believes it. If geologists should utterly confound him and force him to admit their doctrine as to the age of the world, he would believe in Christ and the Bible just as firmly as he does now. It would only force him to conclude that he was not an infallible interpreter; and that what some of the finest minds and most sincere Christians believe as to the consistency of the Mosaic history with the indefinite antiquity of our globe is true. The mistake which he makes, is the same as that made by men of like temper, when the Copernican system was first proposed in the seventeenth century. They then said, as Mr. Lord now says, If science is right, the Bible is a fable, and Christianity a device of man. Christians then trembled, and infidels exulted as they do now. What harm has come of it? We have no objection to Mr. Lord, or any one else, doing what he can to prove the geologists in error—we should rejoice in his success; but we think he could not do religion a worse service than by making everything depend on the issue of his attempt.

Mr. Lord is very indignant at the assumption of geologists that divines and men of letters have no right to be heard on this subject; and he has just cause for his indignation, if geologists claim their science as a monopoly in which only a certain class have a right. But if they only mean that it is well for a man not to attempt any work for which he is not duly qualified; or, to restrict the principle a little more, that it is well for a man not to write about subjects which he does not understand, we think they have common sense on their side. Mr. Lord need not assert his claim as a man of letters to be heard on questions of geology. If he makes good his claim by the

exhibition of competent knowledge and ability, all the world will admit it; if he does not, geologists will not be alone in thinking he is out of his sphere. Our position with regard to this subject is simply this: We believe the common interpretation of the Mosaic account of the creation is altogether the most natural; just as we believe that the most natural interpretation of the Bible would make it teach that the earth is the centre of our solar system. We should be glad therefore if the results of science would leave us in quiet possession of our old method of understanding the first chapter of Genesis. But we have no idea of giving up the Bible for the sake of that interpretation. If science should succeed in demonstrating that the earth is millions of ages old, then we will with the utmost alacrity believe that the days of the creation were periods of indefinite duration. We give ourselves no concern about the matter. We know the Bible is of God, and we therefore know that it will prove itself in harmony with all truth.

A Sketch of the Life and Labours of the Rev. Justin Edwards, D. D., the Evangelical Pastor, the Advocate of Temperance, the Sabbath, and the Bible. By Rev. William A. Hallock, of New York City. Published by the American Tract Society. New York: 150 Nassau street. pp. 556.

Dr. Edwards was one of the representative men of the last generation. He may be considered as a model of a New England pastor, and of the general advocate and agent of the great benevolent operations of the day. He was a man of great energy, of untiring activity, of singular wisdom and discretion, of kind feelings, and of a remarkably scriptural style of thought and preaching. His power as a preacher was over the understanding and conscience, rather than over the imagination or the feelings. He was himself an illustration of the principles laid down in his own admirable discourse on "Sacred Eloquence." The memoir of his life and labours by his early friend, the Rev. William A. Hallock, presents a very attractive exhibition of the man, the pastor, and the advocate of benevolence. It is a work from which much good may be anticipated. It can hardly fail to excite and guide young ministers in their labours and studies.

Slaveholding not Sinful: An Argument before the General Synod of the Reformed Protestant Dutch Church, October, 1855. By Samuel B. How, D. D., Pastor of the First Reformed Dutch Church, New Brunswick, N. J. New York: Printed by John A. Gray, 95 Cliff street. 1855. pp. 32.

In this discourse the usual arguments to show that slave-

holding in itself considered is not sinful, are clearly and forceably presented.

Memoirs, including Letters and Select Remains of John Urquhart, late of the University of St. Andrew's; by William Orme. With a Prefatory Notice, and Introduction, and Recommendation; by Alexander Duff, D. D., LL.D. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. 265 Chestnut street. pp. 420.

John Urquhart was born in 1808, and died in 1827, in his nineteenth year. That one so young should make such an impression on men of the standing of Drs. Chalmers and Duff, as to lead them to desire and aid in the preparation of a memoir of his life, is abundant evidence of his superior talents and attainments. The present edition was prepared by Dr. Duff at the request of Mr. James Lenox, of New York. Apart from his talents and acquirements, it was the elevation of his piety, and especially his zeal for the missionary cause, to which he had consecrated himself, that gives interest to his history. It is to this aspect of his life that Dr. Duff particularly directs the attention of the reader in his prefatory notice.

The Old and New Theology; or the Doctrinal Differences which have Agitated and Divided the Presbyterian Church. By James Wood, D. D. A new and enlarged edition. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 265 Chestnut street. pp. 262.

We do not know how students of theology, and other inquirers, can obtain in so small a compass, clear and definite views of the doctrinal differences among Presbyterians, than from this useful volume. We are glad, therefore, to find that after a third edition, it is still called for by the reading public.

The State of the Soul between Death and the Resurrection. By Rev. Phineas Blakeman, North Madison, Conn. New York: M. W. Dodd, Park Row. 1855. pp. 114. 12mo.

This little volume makes no pretensions to erudition. It is a simple exhibition, in the form of a dialogue, of the little God has seen fit to reveal in his word concerning the state of the soul between death and the resurrection.

An Essay on the Life, Character, and Writings of John B. Gibson, LL.D., lately Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. By William A. Porter. Philadelphia: T. and J. W. Johnson, Law Booksellers, 197 Chestnut street. 1855. pp. 140.

Mr. Porter began his Essay with the view of making it a contribution to the pages of a periodical; but finding his materials to accumulate on his hands, he decided on its publication in its present form. So little is known, even of distinguished jurists, outside the profession, that this exhibition of the character and services of Chief Justice Gibson, will be acceptable to the public.

The pamphlet contains much interesting matter relating to the political and judicial history of Pennsylvania during the last half century.

Prize Essays on Juvenile Delinquency. Published under the direction of the Board of Managers of the House of Refuge, Philadelphia. Philadelphia: Edward C. & John Biddle. 1855. pp. 159.

The former of these Essays is by Mr. Edward E. Hale, of Worcester, Mass.; the second, and much the longer of the two, by the Rev. T. V. Moore, D. D., of Richmond, Va., and is entitled "God's University; or, the Family considered as a Government, a School, and a Church, the divinely appointed Institute for training the Young for the Life that is, and for that which is to come." The former is entitled, "The State's Care of Children considered as a Check to Juvenile Delinquency." These titles sufficiently indicate the different points of view from which the subject is considered. No subject is of greater practical interest, and the Essays before us merit general consideration.

The Exigencies of the Church; a Tract for the Times. By a New England Pastor. Presbyterian Board of Publication.

Collections for Charitable and Religious Purposes, a Part of the Service of God, a Means of Grace, and therefore an Essential Part of Christianity. By Rev. Thomas Smyth, D. D. Third Edition. Charleston: James, Williams & Gitsinger. 1855.

Remarks on the Penal System of Pennsylvania, particularly with Reference to County Prisons. By William Parker Foulke, of Philadelphia. Philadelphia: Printed for the Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons. 1855. pp. 52.

This publication is another evidence of the enlightened and benevolent interest taken by educated men in the amendment of penal codes and institutions. The pamphlet contains a description of the York County Prison, and several plans which are worthy of attention. We give the titles of publications of this class, without attempting to specify their contents, because we hope that those who have the time to devote to this field of benevolence, will seek fuller information in the publications themselves.

Addresses Delivered at the Inauguration of Rev. Emanuel V. Gerhart, A. M., as President of Marshall and Franklin College, Lancaster, Pa., July 24, 1855. Chambersburg, Pa.: Printed by M. Kieffer & Co. pp. 31.

The Introductory Address, by Dr. Bauman, is very brief; the Inaugural Address, by the new President, occupies most of the pamphlet. It will be read with interest, as unfolding the principle on which an important literary institution is to be conducted. The theme of Mr. Gerhart's discourse is, "The

Vital Principle of College Education." By vital principle, he means, that "which determines the internal structure and government of a college; that which gives a position, and assigns relative importance to the different branches of study; that which originates the general spirit in which all subjects are investigated and taught, and proposes the ultimate end, for the attainment of which they are all pursued." Such principle is not a complete course of study; it is not thorough and complete training for the business of life; it is not moral suasion, not religious instruction, not theological science, not belief in the Bible, but positive faith in Jesus Christ. In establishing this position, he says, we must distinguish between the objective and the subjective world. By the former is meant the universe and all it contains, as distinguished from the conceptions we form of it, and from the nature of logical thinking in general. This universe is not a chaos, but is composed of innumerable systems mutually related and connected. This is nature—the creation—which of necessity implies a creator; relative implies absolute being. This is the highest conception of reason. This absolute Being is God. The universe is not an accidental arrangement; it is not a mass, in which infinite power lives and works, as the soul in the body; but it is a fixed order, established and controlled by an omnipresent divine will. Every law of life, vegetable, animal, or human, is an expression of the will of God. God is thus the last ground of the universe, and the basis of all knowledge. But Jesus Christ is the most complete, and only true revelation of God; and hence it is not God, as such, but God in Christ, who is the ultimate ground of all logical reasoning, and of all correct systems of education. All things were created by Him, and for Him; and by Him all things consist. But it is not Christ, as such, but positive faith in him, that is the vital principle of college education. The office of reason is, to develop consciousness; consciousness of self, of the objective world, and of God. The first form of activity of reason is faith. This is seen in the infant, in the boy, and in the man. All knowledge and all reasoning begins with faith. We must confide in something before we can know, learn or reason. Every science begins with something which reason accepts as true without proof. The proper object of faith, whether it springs from nature or grace, is something which lies above and beyond the comprehension of the logical understanding. When reason cannot comprehend, its higher faculty is evoked. Reason believes. It perceives the truth of an axiom, because of its intimate adaptation to the perception of a proper object, just as the eye perceives light. To believe

implicitly in the absolute ground of the objective world, God in Christ, is therefore, not inconsistent with the laws of thinking. Another characteristic of faith is that it unites the subject and the object. To believe is to receive and transform an object into a principle of actual life. Faith receives its object just as the eye receives light, or the ear the vibrations of the air. As the eye is essential to the conception of colour, so is faith, a general capacity, to the perception of the fundamental in every sphere of thought. As an organ of the spirit, it receives first truths, whether natural or supernatural, as the most real of all entities. The object and the subject thus become one. The object is in the subject, as light in the eye. This attribute of faith is power, it governs the whole life. What is true of faith in general, is specially true of Christian faith. Called into life by a direct divine agency, it possesses a depth, an intense energy and compass, far exceeding similar manifestations in any lower sphere. The germ of intellectual, moral and spiritual development, the centre around which all sound reflection revolves, the deepest inner principle, penetrating and governing all the laws of thinking; faith quickened by the Holy Ghost and assuming a new and most comprehensive form, now grasps the person of Jesus Christ, the absolute ground of the objective world; and in virtue of its mysterious power to unite object and subject, it transforms the first cause of the universe into the first and all controlling principle of individual, social, and national life. Its object being the first of all facts, that object itself becomes the germ and sap of all literature, philosophy and religion. In this way and in this sense positive faith in Christ is the vital principle of college education.

We have given this condensed view of Mr. Gerhart's discourse because of its suggestive character, and as a specimen of a mode of thinking not familiar to English readers.

The Lives of the British Historians. By Eugene Lawrence. New York: C. Scribner, 145 Nassau street. 1855. 2 vols. 12mo. pp. 395, 380.

This is a work of uncommon excellence. The idea of presenting us with a history of the British historians was a happy one. The author's style is graceful and graphic; indeed we have not recently perused anything surpassing in interest the sketches of Sir Walter Raleigh, David Hume, Edward Gibbon, and Oliver Goldsmith. The volumes, while devoted to the *Lives of the Historians*, contain a large amount of the history of their times, and form one of the best introductions to English history with which we are acquainted. We sincerely hope that the work will be favourably received, that the author may be encouraged "to continue the series down to the death of

Arnold." If we wished to interest young persons in the reading of history, it is such a work as this we would first put into their hands.

We think Mr. Scribner is worthy of special commendation for the style in which the works that bear his imprint are issued, and for the zeal with which he devotes himself to publishing the works of American writers, instead of to the republication of books which have been successful abroad.

An Inaugural Discourse. By Rev. B. M. Smith, Professor of Oriental Literature in Union Theological Seminary, Prince Edward county, Va. Delivered in the Seminary Chapel, September 12, 1855. Published by the Board of Directors. pp. 39.

Professor Smith commences his discourse with a handsome tribute to his predecessor, the late lamented Professor Sampson—in whose early death so many were disappointed. He closes with a grateful reference to the kindness and worth of the Rev. Dr. John H. Rice, the founder of the Seminary. The subject of the discourse is, "The Relation of Biblical Study to Theological Education and the work of the Ministry." This topic is rather discursively handled, with the vivacity characteristic of the author. His abilities and acquirements are well known and highly estimated in the Church, and we trust he may be eminently successful in the important field of labour on which he has entered. We think there are some opinions thrown out in this address which further experience will lead him to modify. He will find, we suspect, that there are other writers in Germany besides Tholuck and Hengstenberg, worthy of being studied, and other German works than lexicons and grammars, concordances and geographies, which may be profitably consulted.

History of Medicine, from its Origin to the Nineteenth Century; with an Appendix, containing a Philosophical and Historical Review of Medicine to the Present Time. By P. V. Renouard, M. D. Translated from the French, by Cornelius G. Comegys, M. D., Professor of the Institutes of Medicine, Miami Medical College. Cincinnati: Moore, Wiltach, Keys & Co. New York: Miller, Orton & Mulligan. Boston: Whittemore, Niles & Hall. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1856. pp. 719.

This we believe is the only extended history of medicine accessible to the English student. It traces the progress of the healing art from the origin of society to the present time; giving important notices of the most influential members of the medical profession, and expounding the various theories which have prevailed in different ages, in all departments of medical science. The author's own leading principle, which we take to be a sound one, is, "Empiricism, or the Empirical method, is alone applicable to the cultivation of medicine, and therapeutics,

not physio-pathology, the foundation on which the science rests." This is only the application of the inductive science to one department of the vast field of human knowledge, in which that method is the only safe guide. The work is handsomely printed, and will, we doubt not, be regarded by the profession as a valuable contribution to medical literature.

The Russian Empire; Its Resources, Government and Policy. By a "Looker on" from America. Cincinnati: Moore, Wiltach, Keys & Co. 1856.

This is an elaborate plea for Russia and her cause as against the Allies. As a specimen of special pleading in this behalf, it is at least respectable, and will doubtless be welcome to the Russian sympathizers, who, we are sorry to say, are not few among us, if we may judge from the tone of some of our most popular metropolitan journals. We cannot, however, believe that these reflect the predominant judgment or sympathies of the intelligent, moral, and religious portion of the American people. That whatever is anti-British is popular with the "baser sort" is undeniable. Nor is it to be denied, that many things have been done by Old England fitted to kindle bitterness and animosity in the breast of Young America. But notwithstanding all this, our prayers join those of the Missionaries in the East for the success of the Allied arms, believing as we do, that the contrary issue would be the triumph of despotism temporal and spiritual, over nascent freedom and reviving religion, in one of the most interesting and important regions of the earth.

Man-of-War Life; A Boy's Experience in the United States Navy, during a Voyage around the World, in a ship of the line. Cincinnati: Moore, Wiltach, Keys & Co. 1856.

The Merchant Vessel; A Sailor Boy's Voyages to see the World. By the author of "Man-of-War Life." Cincinnati: Moore, Wiltach, Keys & Co. 1856.

These two volumes will be read with pleasure, and not without instruction, by the young.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

ENGLAND.

E. Henderson, *The Book of the Prophet Ezekiel*, translated, with a Commentary. 8vo. pp. 219.

J. Eadie, *Commentary on the Epistle to the Colossians*. 8vo. pp. 808.

H. Howard, *The Book of Genesis according to the version of the Seventy*, translated into English, with notices of its omissions and insertions, and with notes on the passages in which it differs from our authorized translation. 8vo. pp. 288.

H. Gough, *The New Testament Quotations collated with the Scriptures of the Old Testament in the original Hebrew and the version of the LXX., and with the other Writings Apocryphal, Talmudic and Classical, cited or alleged to be so*. 8vo. pp. 338.

W. Cureton, *Spicilegium Syriacum*, containing the dialogue of Bardesan on destiny and the laws of nations, a discourse by Melito, bishop of Sardis, addressed to Marcus Aurelius; another by Ambrose, a Greek prince converted to Christianity, and a letter of Mara Bar Serapion on rules of life, with an English translation and notes.

A new work by the late bishop of Lincoln is announced, on the Church of Christ during the First Three Centuries; also Marsden's eighth and concluding part of *The History of Christian Churches and Sects from the Earliest Ages of Christianity*. Vols. 4 and 5 of Merivale's *History of the Romans under the Empire*, are to appear in January.

According to the *Athenæum* there are 20,000 subscribers for vols. 3 and 4 of Macaulay's *History of England*, which were announced for December. It is stated that the first issue will be 25,000 copies.

FRANCE.

The new edition of Calvin's *Commentaries on the New Testament* is now completed by the appearance of the fourth volume. It is accompanied by a glossary of obscure expressions and obsolete words.

A. Maury, *Researches into the Religion and Worship of the Primitive Populations of Greece.*

Orderici Vitalis Angligenæ, coenobii Uticensis monachi, historię ecclesiasticę libri tredecim.

Antiquities of the Cimmerian Bosphorus preserved in the imperial museum of the Hermitage. 2 vols. folio. pp. 182 and 620. Russian and French text, with numerous plates. Published by order of his majesty the Emperor. St. Petersburg.

Le Nord, the first Russian newspaper, was founded in 1703. Only two complete copies of the first year's impression of this journal exist, and both are in the imperial library at St. Petersburg.

The departments in France possess 338 public libraries, containing in all 3,733,439 volumes, of which 44,070 are manuscripts.

GERMANY.

The second volume of Hengstenberg's *Christology*, second edition, contains the prophets Isaiah, Zephaniah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel. It is announced upon the title page that the author reserves to himself the right of translation into English. In commenting on Ezekiel xvi. 53, he takes the ground that they who have not enjoyed the means of grace in this world, will be furnished with them after death.

H. Hupfeld, *The Psalms translated and explained.* Vol. I. 8vo. pp. 440. This volume contains 21 psalms.

B. Blaubach, *The Song of Solomon, translated and explained.* 16mo. pp. 51.

Repetitorium of the Exegesis of the Old Testament. The Hebrew Text, with a Commentary. Genesis, pp. 291. Job, pp. 159. Psalms, pp. 188. Isaiah, pp. 166.

M. Arnoldi, *Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew.* 8vo. pp. 581.

A. Bisping, *Exposition of Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians and 1 Thessalonians.* 8vo. pp. 364.

L. Reinke has published a third volume of his *Contributions to the Explanation of the Old Testament.* 8vo. pp. 406.

B. Weiss, *The Apostle Peter's System of doctrine, (Lehrbegriff.)* 8vo. pp. 444.

F. Delitzsch, *System of Biblical Psychology.* 8vo. pp. 440. This volume is an extension of a course of lectures delivered upon this subject in the Summer Semester of 1854. The discussion is conducted under the heads of Preexistence, Creation, the Fall, Man's Natural State, Regeneration, Death and the Intermediate State, the Resurrection and Consummation.

Eisenlohr, *Israel under the rule of the Kings. Part I.* 8vo. pp. 299.

E. Elster, *de medii ævi theologia exegetica.* 8vo. pp. 47.

G. Thomasius, *Christ's Person and Work. Part II.* 8vo. pp. 507.

C. Tischendorf, *Anecdota sacra et profana ex Oriente et Occidente allata.* 4to. pp. 218. An account of a number of manuscripts in various languages, together with extracts from several of them.

K. Ammer, *The Disputed Question of the Location of Paradise.* 8vo. pp. 112.

C. Ritter, *Geography. Part XVII.* This concludes the *Geography of the Peninsula of Sinai, Palestine and Syria.*

G. Seyffarth, *Corrections of Roman, Greek, Persian, Egyptian and Hebrew History, and Chronology.* 8vo. pp. 264. *Grammatica Ægyptiaca.* pp. 121. *Theological Writings of the Ancient Egyptians from the Turin Papyrus.* 8vo. pp. 120. The author of these works has, since their publication, established himself in this country, and is connected, we understand, with a literary institution in Columbus, Ohio.

C. Bunsen, *Signs of the Time, 2 Vols.* 8vo. pp. 646.

C. Prantl, *History of Logic in the West, Vol. I.* 8vo. pp. 734.

The librarian of the University of Vienna has discovered a MS. copy, supposed to date from the second half of the fifteenth century, of the *Poem of the Niebelungen.*

The total number of periodical publications in Germany, in 1854, was 2025, of which 408 were political. The number of books printed in that year exceeded 10,000. The number printed in the first half of 1855, was 3,879.

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CONTENTS OF NO. II.

APRIL, 1856.

	PAGE.
ART. I.—Kurtz's History of the Old Testament.....	173
ART. II.—Protestantism in Hungary.....	208
ART. III.—The Money of the Bible.....	238
ART. IV.—Foote's Sketches of Virginia, Second Series.....	244
ART. V.—Miracles and their Counterfeits.....	255
ART. VI.—Macaulay's History of England.....	286
ART. VII.—Memoirs of John M. Mason, D. D.....	309
ART. VIII.—The Princeton Review and Cousin's Philosophy.....	331
SHORT NOTICES.....	387

THE
PRINCETON REVIEW.

APRIL, 1856.

No. II.

ARTICLE I.—*History of the Old Covenant.* By J. H. Kurtz,
Ord. Prof. at Dorpat.* Vol. II. 1855. 8vo. pp. 563.

THE first volume of this work traced the history of Israel as a family to its close in the death of Jacob, their last common progenitor. The next period regards Israel as a nation, and, according to the epochs marked by our author, extends to the establishment of the kingdom. This period is divided into four unequal parts, severally represented by the residence in Egypt, the wanderings in the wilderness, the conquest of Canaan, and the residence in Canaan. Each of these has its own distinctly marked character and aim. First, the family was to expand to a nation and to attain a separate and independent existence. Secondly, they must receive their national form and constitution; they are not to be like other nations, but God's peculiar people. Hence he concludes a covenant with them and provides them with their code of laws. Thirdly, in order to realize the destiny thus set before them, and to develop themselves in their newly imparted character, they need to come into the possession of a suitable land. Fourthly,

* Geschichte des Alten Bundes, von Joh. Heinr. Kurtz, u. s. w. Berlin, New York und Adelaide.

this scheme thus constituted is set in actual operation. Hitherto the divine agency has stood in the foreground. Now the people are called upon to act their part, to make use of what God has imparted to them in his gifts, his revelations, his gracious leadings; to exhibit the spectacle of a nation in covenant with God, and living in subjection to his laws. But the people are unfaithful to their trust; they are perpetually forsaking the true path; and the history becomes the record of alternate acts of judgment and of grace. The people are now punished by being given into the hand of the heathen around them, now delivered by judges specially raised up on their behalf. The second of these parts, which covers the legislation of Moses, is by far the most important and the richest in the materials for its exhibition. Kurtz considers it under two divisions: 1. The historical basis of the law and the circumstances of its promulgation; 2. The subject matter of the law. This volume embraces the residence in Egypt, and the first division of the wandering in the wilderness. The contents of the Mosaic legislation reduced to systematic form are to occupy the next volume, or, as he prefers to call it, the second part of this volume.

Kurtz adopts and defends the chronology which understands Ex. xii. 40 in its most obvious sense, and makes the abode in Egypt to have been 430 years: although he seems to think it necessary to assume an error in the text, Num. xxvi. 59. Three centuries and a half of this period are passed over with the simple mention of the only fact which they presented of consequence to the sacred historian, the immense multiplication of the people. He then proceeds at once to the circumstances which paved the way for their leaving Egypt and entering upon their separate existence. The people must have amounted in the aggregate to two millions when they left Egypt, as they numbered 600,000 capable of bearing arms. These were not all sprung from the 66 lineal descendants of Jacob, who entered Egypt, but from their entire households and retinues, which no doubt amounted to several thousands. Abraham was able to summon from his household 318 men to pursue after the captors of Lot: and Jacob returning from Padan-aram had accumulated a sufficient retinue to divide them, on encounter-

ing Esau, into three bands. Their entire households were circumcised, and their condition was favourable to an easy fusion of their descendants. Even thus, however, the multiplication is unexampled: and it is necessary to have recourse in explanation, not only to the surprising fecundity of Egypt, celebrated in ancient and in modern times, but to the special operation of the divine blessing.

In Egypt also, Israel learned to exchange a nomadic for an agricultural life, and to practise the various arts which that involved, and many others, as is apparent from 1 Chron. iv. 14, 21, 28, where potters, weavers, and carpenters are mentioned, and especially from the construction of the tabernacle, which required skill in working various metals, in polishing and engraving precious stones, in weaving and embroidering costly stuffs, etc. They possessed themselves in fact of the civilization and refinement of Egypt, and God's promise to Abraham, that his seed should come out from the land of their oppressors with great substance, was fulfilled in a sense yet higher than in the gold and silver which they carried away with them. They preserved nevertheless their patriarchal form of government, and their ancestral religion and worship; although in itself a trifling fact, it is nevertheless interesting and worthy of note, how many of the proper names preserved from this period are compounded with the name of God. Yet even in religious ideas and usages it is evident that the people were not uninfluenced by the circumstances in which they were placed, partly to their injury, as is shown among other things by the affair of the golden calf; partly not, as is shown by symbols and institutions receiving the sanction of God himself, which contain elements that point to Egypt as the land of their origin. The barrier of a different nationality, language, and religion, kept them separate from the Egyptians: yet this did not wholly prevent intimacy of intercourse and even intermarriages to some extent. Lev. xxiv. 10. One of Pharaoh's daughters even was married to a man of Judah, 1 Chron. iv. 18, and, as appears from her name, was a convert to Jehovah's worship. That they constantly looked to Palestine as their future home is not only probable in itself, but receives positive confirmation from the fact recorded in Chronicles (if the passages

are correctly interpreted) that some of the people without waiting God's appointed time, sought prematurely at their own instance to take forcible possession of the promised land. 1 Chron. vii. 20—24 speaks of sons of Ephraim, who had established themselves in Canaan and made an unsuccessful predatory excursion against Gath, and of a granddaughter who built Beth-horon not very remote from Gath. Also, 1 Chron. iv. 22, some descendants of Judah made themselves masters of Moab.

The object of the residence in Egypt was thus accomplished. The servitude and the sufferings consequent upon the rise of a new dynasty, (so Exodus i. 8 is understood) effected the subjective preparation of the people for the exodus by awaking intense longings for release. Meanwhile God was training a deliverer first at the court of Pharaoh, then in the wilderness of Midian. When this training was complete and the proper time had arrived, Moses received his formal commission. God spoke to him upon Horeb, where subsequently the law was to be delivered, from the midst of a bush burning with fire but unconsumed. Upon this holy ground he is forbidden to tread with his shoes, which are designed to guard the feet from an impurity that could not there be contracted, and which moreover were themselves defiled by the common earth upon which they had trodden. Kurtz departs from the ordinary explanation of the burning bush, which refers it to Israel marvellously preserved in the furnace of affliction, and adopts that of Hoffmann. According to this, it is a symbol not of the past or present, but of the future, of the dispensation shortly to be inaugurated at that very mountain. Israel is the bush; God in his holiness is the flame that comes down into the midst of it; and it is only by a perpetual miracle that offering such fuel, as in their sinfulness they did, for this flame to fasten upon, they were not consumed. But this indwelling hallowed the bush and the very ground on which it stood. It might have been despised before in comparison with more stately trees; it might have been broken down and trampled upon with impunity; but now God is in the midst of it, and it must not be touched. It can only be approached with reverence.

The backwardness, carried to an excess, of Jethro's* son-in-law to undertake the task to which he is called, stands in striking contrast with the rash forwardness and vain self-confidence displayed by the adopted son of Pharaoh's daughter, and shows that a lesson of humility and patient waiting has been learned. It bears too, an incidental stamp of truth in its contrariety to all that is ever told of mythical heroes. God condescendingly removes, one after another, his misgivings and his objections; gives, as indicative of the character in which he was about to reveal himself, the sacred name Jehovah, not unknown indeed to the patriarchs, but the meaning of which was now to be unfolded by new and unheard of disclosures; furnishes him with miraculous signs; promises to be with his mouth; and not until he faint-heartedly declines without a remaining reason, is the Lord's anger kindled, and a peremptory command given him, to undertake the work in conjunction with his brother Aaron.

In the three miracles given to confirm his own faith and to accredit his commission to others, is found not only an evidence of supernatural power, but a farther significance; the first relating to himself, the second to the people, the last to Pharaoh. The shepherd's staff, which he held in his hand, was an emblem of the peaceful vocation which he had been hitherto pursuing. His casting it down to become a serpent, before which he flees, represents the threatening dangers in which he would be involved by laying down his present quiet occupation, for the task before him. His taking it boldly at the command of God, and its becoming once more a staff in his hand, showed that these perils might, by divine grace, be surmounted, if courageously met. This rod has now become the rod of God; not the simple shepherd's staff that it was before, but emblematic of his new vocation as shepherd, no longer of the flock of Jethro, but of the flock of God. With this rod in his hand, he shall chastise by heaven-inflicted plagues, the chastisers of God's people

* Reuel, or as it is spelled in our version, Num. x. 29, Raguel, is thought to be his proper name; and Jethro, a title of distinction equivalent to "his excellency." The apparent discrepancy of the account in Exodus with Num. x. 29, and Judges iv. 11, is explained either by making Reuel the grandfather of Zipporah, or Chobab by a different rendering of the Hebrew word, the brother-in-law of Moses.

and drive the gods of Egypt in their impotence before him. As performed subsequently in the presence of the people, the meaning of this sign was so far modified, as to represent the increase of peril and suffering, temporarily occasioned to them by the intervention of Moses, but from which they were soon to be delivered.

He next puts his hand into his bosom. The bosom is a place of protection, where the hand is warmed and cherished. Thus Israel went to Egypt to be protected under the favour of the Pharaohs. But they had been enslaved there, and treated as though they were utterly vile; this is the leprosy of the hand. But another bosom was preparing, in which it should be cleansed of its leprosy and purified to be a holy people to the Lord. As this action indicated the relation of God and his people, it was one with which Pharaoh had nothing to do, and it was not like the others exhibited before him.

The third miracle, of converting water into blood, was not to be performed until Moses reached Egypt, for its significance lay in the water being taken from the great river of that land. The source of blessing should be converted into a curse; the object of worship into loathing and aversion. This was to be performed upon a cup-full of the water as a sign to the people that God had the power; it was performed in the presence of Pharaoh, upon an immensely greater scale, on all the waters of the Nile, not as a sign but as a plague, to exhibit the reality of God's determination to smite the gods of Egypt.

Moses was the first man by whom miracles were wrought. The divine power which had in former times always been exerted independently of the agency of men, was brought down and placed in him to be exercised at his bidding, making him thus, in a sense never before exhibited, a type of Him in whom dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead bodily.

When Moses is directed to solicit for the people the liberty of three days' journey into the wilderness in order to sacrifice, it might at first thought be supposed that leave to go to Horeb was the thing intended, this having been already designated as the place where worship should be offered. But it was 140 miles from Suez, a distance which so immense a host could not possibly have traversed in that space of time. The thing asked for

could consequently only be permission to go just beyond the boundaries of the land. The request was presented in this moderated form for the purpose of showing to what lengths Pharaoh would carry his refusal. Not granting this, much less would he have granted them license to leave Egypt altogether. His refusal, which God foresaw, annulled any limitation as to distance, or any obligation to return which might have been involved in their acting upon his permission, had he given it. And when they finally left Egypt it was not under any conditions imposed upon them, but as conquerors dictating their own terms.

The request to leave the land for the purpose of worship seems in itself to have created no surprise; and it is probable from remains found in the Sinaitic peninsula, that pilgrimages of this kind were not unknown to the Egyptians. The reason assigned by Moses when subsequently making the request of Pharaoh, that if they sacrificed the abomination of the Egyptians they would be in danger of being stoned, cannot mean as it is frequently explained, that they would sacrifice animals accounted sacred in Egypt; for sacred animals could not be called an abomination, and the Egyptians themselves sacrificed the same animals that the Hebrews did. But as the Lord had not revealed what new regulations might be required in this grand national sacrifice, it could not be known how much there might be in conflict with Egyptian ideas and usages.

As Moses is now to be the champion of God's covenant with his people, his own negligence in respect to the seal of that covenant can no longer be tolerated. One of his sons, probably on account of Zipporah's opposition, had not been circumcised. For this the Lord sought to slay Moses on his way to Egypt, but on the performance of the omitted rite his life was spared, whence Zipporah called him a "husband of blood," one restored to her by means of blood.

Pharaoh refuses to let the people go, defies Jehovah, and summons to his aid not the material but the spiritual forces of his realm, the magicians clothed with the power and interpreters of the will of his gods. The contest therefore is one between Jehovah and the gods of Egypt. To the deities of heathenism Kurtz ascribes objective reality and supernatural

might: and he thinks it contrary to scriptural representations to regard them as non-existent and merely imaginary. Upon this subject he quotes with approbation the language of Crusius: "*Sacræ literæ a Mose usque ad N. T. constanter docent Deastros esse dæmones.*" Not that each heathen deity represents some particular demon, nor that every demon has his own distinct representative in the heathen mythology. But the worship paid by the heathen to their divinities does in fact pass over to a really existing, personal, supernatural power, by whom it is accepted and who enters into a real communion with the worshippers. Paul says, that the things which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils; and in thus sacrificing they have fellowship with devils, just as the Christian in partaking of the Lord's table has fellowship with him. When the same apostle speaks of an idol as nothing in the world, and when false deities are called by Hebrew words signifying non-entities and vanities, this is understood to be not a denial of the existence of such beings, but of their not being what they give themselves out to be, and what their worshippers suppose that they are. Such passages as Jer. x. 5, Ps. cxv. 4—8, are not referred to at all. The ground form of heathenism is stated to be pantheism, the forsaking of the one true and living God for the adoration of nature. The boundless variety of forms in which the powers of nature display themselves, the countless manifestations of the all-pervading Deity, lead next to polytheism. The different systems of mythology are the joint product of impressions from nature, speculative reasoning, and a lively imagination. The names and forms of the gods, with the functions and attributes ascribed to them, are in the first instance sheer figments of the imagination, having no objective existence; and the service paid them terminates on no real correspondent being. But these phantasms are taken possession of by spirits of wickedness, in whom they attain reality, and who make the scenes of this self-devised worship their special seat. And here they exhibit such powers of magic and divination as show them to be possessed of a real might, and as confirm the heathen still more in their delusion. It is equally erroneous, therefore, to regard the heathen deities as having originally and in them-

selves a distinct personal existence, and to suppose them to be, as found in the actual life of heathenism, non-existent phantoms.

With this view of the heathen deities in general, it follows of course that our author believes in the existence of supernatural magic, as a phenomenon pervading the pagan world. With this, there may be much imposture. There is also a native magical virtue resident in the human soul, which may be developed by occult arts, as in mesmerism, or by certain physical conditions inducing strange presentiments. But in addition, there is a supernatural power imparted by the spirits of darkness for the working of signs and lying wonders. This is the case with the magicians of Egypt, who wrought what they did, under demoniacal influence, as Moses acted with power given him from God. It would be expected from this that the magicians converted actual wooden rods into serpents, and that the superiority of Aaron's miracle consisted alone in his rod swallowing up theirs, annihilating thus the insignia of their office, and symbolically putting an end to their office itself. This Kurtz does not say, however: he regards it an undue pressing of the letter of the passage, to suppose the rods to have been actual rods of wood, though if that conclusion were forced upon him, he would feel no shrinking from the result. He nevertheless prefers upon the whole, the explanation which Hengstenberg and others have adopted, as illustrated by feats of snake-charmers at the present day, that the magicians who knew very well the purpose for which they were summoned, and had ample time and opportunity to make their preparations, brought with them seeming rods, which were in reality serpents stiffened by their incantations, but which resumed their life and motion on being cast to the ground. In this miracle, the victory was the greater, as it was gained on that territory in which the skill of Egyptian sorcerers chiefly lay.

The ten plagues, which with ever heightening intensity were inflicted upon the obdurate monarch, exhibit a striking relation to the natural characteristics of the land upon which they were sent. The miracle is in no case wholly dis severed from the analogy of what is proper to that region, as, for example, an irruption of polar bears, or the bursting forth of a volcano

would have been. Sceptical writers have made use of this circumstance to do away with the miraculous. They assume an extraordinary concurrence of calamities and in unwonted violence, where the calamities themselves are not unusual; the meeting at one point of what commonly do not occur in conjunction, is alone remarkable. All beyond this is figurative, or fabulous. To those who accept the historic truth of the narrative, the miraculous character of the events is too obvious to be questioned. The intensity, the extent, the multiplicity of these plagues, their coming and going at the bidding of Moses, and the marked distinction made in several of them between Egypt and Goshen, show beyond a doubt that they were sent by the immediate operation of God.

At the same time the natural features of these plagues are too obvious and too important in their design to be overlooked. One aim may have been to leave to unbelief, if it was determined at all hazards to resist the evidence of supernatural power, some shadow of a ground, to which to cling. But there were other and more direct bearings upon the issue of the conflict here carried on. Had these plagues possessed a character out of analogy with anything that ever occurred at ordinary times in Egypt, Pharaoh would have been compelled to accord to Jehovah a might and a supremacy in the land for the time being. But by using as his means of chastisement, scourges which in lighter and more restricted forms were of frequent occurrence, the Lord showed that these too were from him, that he was not temporarily but permanently God in Egypt; and not the present devastating judgments alone, but the ordinary evils which afflicted the land, were sent by him. The Egyptians also deified both the natural features and the natural products of their land: these were made to bring destruction upon their worshippers. The author of the book of Wisdom, says to this effect, (xi. 15, 16,) "For the foolish devices of their wickedness, wherewith being deceived they worshipped serpents void of reason, and vile beasts, thou didst send a multitude of unreasonable beasts upon them for vengeance; that they might know wherewithal a man sinneth, by the same also shall he be punished." Hengstenberg also makes the remark that their bearing this character is a voucher for the reality of

their occurrence, and that they were not pure inventions: as in this case the narrator would have been apt to exalt the miracle, by making it as little like natural events as possible.

The duration of these plagues cannot be certainly determined. Several writers who connect the first with an appearance that the Nile presents annually in July, assume that the whole occupied a period of nine months. According to the sacred record one week intervened between the first plague and the second. The seventh plague occurred when barley was in the ear and flax was balled, which in that climate must have been in March, about three weeks, consequently, from the time of the tenth plague, showing again about the space of a week, between each of the last four plagues. If the same interval be assumed as the average in the case of the remainder, it will yield in all nine weeks, or from about the beginning of February to the beginning of April.

The Nile, every year at the period of its inundation, assumes a reddish appearance from the earthy matter mingled with its waters. When the overflow first begins, it sweeps along great quantities of dried grass and filth of various sorts, which makes the water unfit for use. When it assumes a reddish colour, however, it is again potable; after standing for a short time in jars, it deposits its sediment and becomes as clear as at any other season. This phenomenon has been thought by many to furnish the natural basis of the miracle of Moses. But that this cannot be so, is shown by several considerations. If the duration assigned above to the plagues as a whole be correct, that will furnish an argument; for this redness of the Nile is seen, not in February but in July. This only occurs too, at the time of the annual inundation: but there is no hint of such an inundation in the narrative, while there are statements at variance with it, e. g. Pharaoh's going to the brink of the river, the Egyptians digging about the river, etc. The stinking of the river indicates stagnation, which is just the reverse of its inundation. The change was produced, not gradually but suddenly, and that, even in water already drawn and standing in their houses, in vessels of wood and stone, as well as in the river itself. The reddening of the water, in ordinary cases, so far from being deprecated, is eagerly looked for as a symptom

of potability. Kurtz suggests very plausibly, that the actual material phenomenon in this miracle, may have been the presence of immense quantities of microscopic *cryptogami* and *infusoria*, which gave the water a blood-red colour, and whose decomposition corrupted it and destroyed the fish that were in it. This explanation is based upon the scientific investigations of Ehrenberg, who found blood-like appearances in Egypt, Arabia and Siberia, resulting from this cause.

The question, whence the magicians obtained water for their enchantments, after Moses had already changed it all to blood, has sometimes been answered, by saying, that *all* is not to be taken in its most unlimited sense, or that the magicians waited till the plague had first been removed: a better explanation is, that it was the Nile, with the artificial channels and ponds, connected with it, and even water, previously drawn from it, which was the object of the plague, for the double reason of the great value of that river to Egypt, and the divine honours which were paid it. But that water from other sources was not affected, appears from the Egyptians finding it by digging about the river.

In the plague of frogs, the chief thing was its exceeding loathsomeness. There was no way of escaping the contact of these disgusting creatures. They could not set down their foot without trampling them. They filled even their chambers and beds, and ovens and kneading-troughs. The third plague was not lice, but gnats, or mosquitoes, whose stings are the complaint of every Egyptian traveller. The previous plagues had come from the Nile. This was from the land, which brought forth their food, and was also an object of worship. Hitherto, the magicians had maintained their credit. They had been able, on a small scale, to imitate the miracles of Moses, though they had thus only increased the intensity of plagues, which they could not remove. Here they give up the contest, and say to Pharaoh, "This is the finger of the gods;" which is not understood to mean what the common rendering implies, "here is an evident display of the divinity of Jehovah." If the victorious power of God were intended, the arm would be more appropriate. The finger warns, instructs. That they cannot bring forth lice, they would represent as due not

to the weakness of their gods, but to their want of will. They are indisposed to sustain Pharaoh in refusing the demand of Jehovah, and consequently by ceasing longer to lend their aid, virtually bid him to desist.

The word which describes the fourth plague is derived from a root signifying *mixture*, and probably denotes all sorts of noxious insects. The Septuagint renders it dogfly, as one of the most tormenting. Aquila and the Vulgate, every kind of flies. The Targum of Jonathan and Saadiah, various kinds of wild beasts. Jarchi, every sort of evil beasts and serpents, and scorpions. Others have supposed it to mean devastating worms and caterpillars.

The furnace from which ashes were taken to create the plague of boils, is by some thought to have been a place where Hebrews were compelled to work in metals for their Egyptian masters; and the curse proceeding from such a spot would plainly indicate the reason of its infliction. Kurtz prefers an allusion to the religious rite of purification by ashes (comp. Num. xix. 9, Heb. ix. 13,) which is based, no doubt, upon its alkaline properties. This ashes from which they expected cleansing, should prove, instead, the source of defilement and disease.

The explanation of Hengstenberg and others, is adopted, though with some hesitation, in regard to the plague of darkness, that it was a violent sirocco, lasting not for a few hours merely, but for three successive days. Laborde says of this explanation, that it is comparing the crack of a pistol to the roar of thunder.

Egypt refused to release the first-born of the Lord, and her own first-born was the forfeit. Israel was Jehovah's son, not by virtue of their creation alone, nor of their formation into a numerous people, but by that spiritual and covenant generation which made them his own, distinct from all the nations of the earth, and by which they became not his only, but his first-born son; other nations to be subsequently brought within the same gracious covenant, are the later born members of the family. This plague was in an eminent sense, a judgment upon the gods of Egypt, Ex. xii. 12, Num. xxxiii. 4. The sacred animals, kept in the temples with the greatest care, and lamented

when they died, with the wildest demonstrations of grief, belonged mainly, no doubt, perhaps exclusively to the rank of the first-born. It may be imagined what a panic would be created, when to the private grief of every household, was added the sudden and simultaneous death of all the religiously venerated animals in all the temples, and thousands more that were deemed sacred besides. The first-born of the monarch, also regarded as an incarnation of the deity, was not exempt. These were put on a precise level with ordinary men, and ordinary animals; all were indiscriminately involved in the same catastrophe. The paraphrase of Jonathan is, therefore, gratuitous and unnecessary: "Against all the idols of the Egyptians, I will execute four judgments; the molten images shall be melted, those of stone shall be broken down, those of clay shall be dashed to pieces, those of wood shall be reduced to ashes, that the Egyptians may know that I am the Lord." This was no ordinary pestilence, following perhaps, in the track of the simoom, and in which it is not to be supposed that all the first-born, nor they alone perished. The inspired narrative is not consistent with the idea of its being originated, or guided by any ordinary laws of infection; it was an immediate and miraculous infliction by the destroying angel, directed exclusively and universally, upon all the first-born. Of these, there may have been more than one in the same family: for the first-born that were slain in Egypt, like the first-born consecrated in Israel, were reckoned by the mother's side, *primogeniti sanctitudinis*, as distinguished from those by the father's side, *primogeniti hereditatis*.

The plagues thus ran their fearful round. God demonstrated his supremacy, by making the river, the land, the air, serve each in turn as ministers of his wrath; even surrounding lands were laid under contribution: Arabia sent her locusts, and the Sahara perhaps her simoom. Gods, men, beasts, plants, all were scourged. The last of these plagues, however, was the sorest of all: the others were but preliminary warnings of this, the real judgment. Ex. iv. 22, 23. But when the Lord arises to judgment, it must be executed with strict equity, and without respect of persons; and it must begin at the house of God. If there be sin in Israel, if any interruption of its covenant

relation, this sin must be put away, and the covenant relation restored, or Israel cannot be saved. Hence, before the judgment comes, the passover is instituted to secure the people's safety.

As the Lord's supper in a sense occupies the place of the passover, Romanists have argued, that the sacrificial character of the latter establishes that of the former. Some of the early Protestants took the ground in opposition, that the passover itself was not a sacrifice, but was simply commemorative and sacramental, inasmuch as *pascha* means not only a sacrifice, but a slaying for other purposes also, and there was no imposition of hands, no sprinkling of blood upon the altar, no burning of the animal, or any of its parts, upon the altar; whilst on the other hand, many of the prescriptions regarding the passover were such as had place in none of the various kinds of sacrifices. The atoning efficacy of this blood, however, which in the absence of an altar was sprinkled upon the door-posts, to shield from death all who had passed within that entrance, plainly distinguishes it as a sacrifice. That the Apostle Paul so regarded it, appears from 1 Cor. v. 7. It is called an offering, Num. ix. 7. And although in the first instance this could not be done, yet in after times it was to be slain at the place which God should choose, Deut. xvi. 5, 6; and its blood sprinkled on the altar, 2 Chron. xxx. 16. Although the imposition of hands is nowhere mentioned in connection with the slaying of the paschal lamb, its performance is unquestionably to be taken for granted. The passover was a special modification of the peace-offering, as the services of the great day of atonement were of the sin-offering. The true answer to the Romish argument is to be found in the typical character and inherent insufficiency of the passover sacrifice necessitating its constant repetition, and in the all-sufficiency of the sacrifice of Christ, which may be commemorated, but which need not and cannot be repeated.

The commands to roast (not boil, which would dissolve and disintegrate) the lamb whole, to break none of its bones, to eat it in one house, without carrying any part abroad, and to leave none till the ensuing day, were intended to give prominence to the idea of unity. The lamb was an undivided whole; so they

who partook of it were indissolubly united in communion with each other, and with God, whose guests they were, since it was his offering that lay upon the table: comp. 1 Cor. x. 17. The bitter herbs added relish to the meat, as the past servitude made the present deliverance more joyful. Leaven was forbidden, as fermenting and corrupting. Upon the first celebration of the passover, the solemnity lasted but a single day, and leaven was prohibited for that day alone: the haste and urgency with which they left Egypt, however, confined them to unleavened bread still longer, possibly until they had crossed the Red Sea, which Jewish tradition asserts to have been just seven days from the night of the passover. In later times, the commemorative celebration was expanded into seven days, during the whole of which leaven was interdicted.

That the children of Israel should, by God's command, borrow silver, gold, and raiment from the Egyptians, when they were leaving, never to return, has caused no small embarrassment among interpreters. Among the answers which have been given to the casuistical question, how this was consistent with truth and honesty, are such as these: that God, as universal proprietor, can take from one and give to another as he pleases; that Israel had a right to reprisals for the unrighteous and unrequited servitude to which they had been subjected; that they left their houses and lands in exchange; that God, as the author of the law, could dispense with it at his pleasure; that the Israelites borrowed these things with the honest intention of returning them, had not subsequent events rendered this impracticable; or that the Egyptians forfeited them by their treacherous and hostile pursuit. After all, however, the difficulty is not removed. How could the people honestly borrow, what they must have known they were never to return? But this difficulty lies only in a false translation. The Israelites were directed to solicit these things, not as a loan, but as a gift; and God gave his people favour in the sight of the Egyptians, that they lavished upon them all that they asked, without the thought or expectation of having them returned. The articles thus given, were not sacrificial vessels and priestly robes, to be used in the anticipated sacrifice, but undoubtedly jewels, and valuable articles of apparel. It was a matter of

divine decorum, that God should not lead his people out of Egypt a poor and starveling multitude, but laden with wealth and in festive array. The victory was complete, and the spoils immense.

The discussion respecting the locality of the passage of the Red Sea, as well as the geography of the various places mentioned in the journey through the wilderness, is very elaborate and thorough. Our limits admit of no more than this passing notice of what forms one of the most valuable features of the book before us.

The interesting but difficult question is here raised: to what period of Egyptian history, as this is known to us from profane sources, are the residence of Israel in Egypt, and their exodus from it, to be referred? The decision will be dependent upon the view taken of two brief extracts from Manetho, found in the treatise of Josephus against Apion. In the first, he speaks of an invasion of Egypt by a people from the East, of ignoble birth, but of great courage; who subdued the land, burned its cities, demolished its temples, and treated its inhabitants with the utmost barbarity. They made one of themselves king, by the name of Salatis, who lived at Memphis, exacted tribute of both upper and lower Egypt, and garrisoned several cities, particularly in the eastern portions of the land, as he was apprehensive of an Assyrian invasion. He fortified Avaris in the Saitic nome, east of the Bubastic channel, and garrisoned it with 240,000 men. Thither he came every summer, to provision the place, and pay his soldiers their wages, as well as to exercise them, and thereby terrify foreigners. This people, whom some regard as Arabs, were called Hyksos, or shepherd-kings; *hyk*, in the sacred dialect, meaning *king*, and *sos*, in the popular dialect, meaning *shepherd*. In another copy of Manetho, Josephus says the meaning of this word was given as captive-kings. After the Hyksos had kept possession of Egypt 511 years, the kings of the Thebais made an insurrection against them, and a long and terrible war ensued. By a king named Alisphragmuthosis, they were beaten, and shut up in Avaris. Here they were besieged by his son, Thummosis, who allowed them to capitulate, on condition of their leaving Egypt. They accordingly, with their families and effects, to the number

of 240,000, marched through the wilderness for Syria. But fearing the Assyrian power, they settled in Judea, and built a city which they called Jerusalem.

In the second passage, Manetho says that Amenophis, who was king 518 years after the departure of the shepherds, was desirous of seeing the gods. He was told that he might, if he would first rid the country of lepers and all unclean persons. This he did, sending them, to the number of 80,000, to work in the quarries east of the Nile. Subsequently he granted them the city of Avaris, which lay in ruins from the time of the shepherds. Here they appointed, as their ruler, a priest of Heliopolis, by the name of Osarsiph, subsequently called Moses, who gave them laws contrary to Egyptian usages. With 200,000 men sent to his aid by the shepherds, he made war upon Amenophis, defeated him, and ravaged Egypt for thirteen years; after which, Amenophis, and his son Rameses, returned from Ethiopia to Egypt with a large army, and drove the shepherds and the lepers out of the country into Syria.

Josephus identifies the Hyksos with the Israelites, and makes use of Manetho's account to establish against Apion the high antiquity and greatness of his nation. How he reconciles it with the Scripture narrative, he nowhere explains. The story of the lepers, which is drawn according to Manetho's own statement, not like the other from the sacred records of Egypt, but from popular tradition, he utterly discredits, as inconsistent with the former, in the origin which it assigns to the Jews.

Delitzsch adopts the identification of Josephus, and actually maintains the strange and paradoxical theory, that the Israelites really did what is ascribed to the Hyksos; that during the period over which the sacred historian passes in silence, they made themselves masters of Egypt, drove out the native princes, and held sway in the land, until they were subdued and enslaved in their turn.

Hengstenberg does not attribute the slightest weight to the testimony of Manetho. He charges him with the grossest ignorance and error on points of Egyptian mythology, geography, and language; with betraying a bias that can only have found place in the times of the Roman emperors; and with meeting no such confirmation from the monuments, as was

to be expected, if he were an honest and credible historian. Instead of being, as he has commonly been regarded, the head of the priests at Heliopolis, and preparing his history from the temple archives, by order of Ptolemy Philadelphus, B. C. 260, he considers him an intentional falsifier of much later date, in whom no confidence whatever can be reposed. The story of the Hyksos and of the lepers, he thinks to be purposely garbled accounts, caricatured from the Scripture history, in order to flatter the national vanity of the Egyptians.

Kurtz pronounces this judgment unjust, and expresses his belief that the statements of Manetho, though containing some errors, are yet in the main reliable. The Hyksos, he thinks, are evidently a different people from the Hebrews. The points insisted on by those who maintain their identity are, that they were shepherds from the East; that the name of their city, Avaris, is Hebrew; so is that of their king, Salatis, which is but a Greek form of the title applied to Joseph, Gen. xlii. 6; he is spoken of as provisioning (*σιτομετρῶν*) or measuring grain; the oppressions alleged to be practised, are but distortions of his buying up the land, &c., during the famine; they finally marched through the wilderness to Syria, and founded a city, which they called Jerusalem. On the other hand, Kurtz maintains that the account given of the Hyksos is utterly irreconcilable with the supposition of the Israelites being intended. The former came in great numbers to Egypt, as enemies and conquerors; they murder, plunder, desolate the land, and rule it for 511 years, are then subdued, and forced to retire from the country. The Hebrews come, few in number, peaceably, and by invitation, but are oppressed, maltreated, enslaved; they crave permission to leave the country, but are refused. In the intention of Manetho, the lepers are the Israelites; and what he says of them, shows how the facts have been distorted by Egyptian tradition, from which alone this is professedly drawn. They are expressly distinguished from the Hyksos, who left the country 518 years before.

Among those who give partial or entire credit to Manetho, and who think the Hyksos to have been distinct from the Israelites, there is again a diversity of views.

Lepsius dates the Hyksos invasion, B. C. 2100, during the

12th (or second Theban) dynasty. At length, B. C. 1661, the native kings who had maintained their independence in Ethiopia, and partially also in Upper Egypt, penetrated farther north, and after a war of 80 years, succeeded in the reign of Thuthmosis III. in driving the Hyksos out of the country. With them, however, the Israelites had nothing to do. They came into Egypt in the 19th dynasty. Joseph was brought there, under Sethos I., the Sesostris of the Greeks, who, according to Lepsius's assumption, reigned B. C. 1445—1394. Moses was educated at the court of his son, Ramses II., Miamun the Great (1394—1328,) and his son, Menephtes (1328—1309,) was the Pharaoh of the exodus. The abode in Egypt, instead of being 430 years, was only about 90. The absurdities which follow upon this hypothesis, and the slenderness of the grounds on which it rests, are well exposed by Kurtz. The expansion of Jacob's family to 2,000,000 of people, must then have taken place in 90 years. Within the same space of time there must have been seven generations in the family of Judah, and ten in that of Ephraim. Moses must have been born about ten years after Jacob came into Egypt, and sixty years before the death of Joseph. Whoever, in the present inextricable confusion which reigns in Egyptian chronology, makes the merely conjectural identification of a few uncertain names, a ground for introducing such havoc into a history, certified like that of Moses, would sacrifice Bancroft to Gulliver. Egyptian scholars get so in the habit of giving free play to their fancy, deducing from the monuments what results they please, and constructing facts and dates *ad libitum*, that they really seem to forget that there is such a thing as solid, well attested history, which criticism cannot explain away, and where theorizing must yield to testimony.

Saalschütz supposes that the new king, under whom the oppression of the Israelites began, was the first of the Hyksos dynasty, and that the Pharaoh who perished in the Red Sea was the last. Bunsen has not fully explained his views as to the origin and history of the Hyksos, and their relation to the Israelites. He follows an account of Julius Africanus, which makes the period of their domination to have lasted upwards of 900 years.

The view adopted by Kurtz is essentially the same with that of Bertheau, Lengerke, and Knobel. He thinks them to have been Semitic tribes, possibly driven from their original possessions in Canaan, prior to the days of Abraham, by some invasion similar to that recorded of Chedorlaomer. Thus precipitated upon Egypt, they subjugated that country. At first they may have committed great enormities, but the result followed which is usual in the case of barbarian invaders of civilized lands. The conquerors adopted the language, manners, culture, and religion of the conquered. Hence, when Joseph was brought before one of the monarchs of this dynasty, everything wore the air of a native Egyptian court, more so than in the days of Abraham, when this assimilation had but imperfectly taken place. Such an alliance as Pharaoh contemplated with Abraham could not have been thought of at the time of Joseph, when Egyptian courtiers could not even eat with Hebrew shepherds. Still, some things, even at this later period, are thought to betray that it was not a native but an adopted civilization which prevailed at court. The introduction of Joseph, a foreigner of shepherd stock, into the highest office next the king, and his intermarriage with the priestly caste; the welcome extended to his shepherd-father and brothers; the rich portion of the land assigned them, and the wealth of Pharaoh in cattle, but not in lands, till Joseph's measures procured them, are alleged as showing that they had not even yet forgotten their Hyksos predilections and habits.

The new king, who knew not Joseph, was the first of the revived native dynasty, consequent upon the expulsion of the Hyksos. The Hebrews, now grown to a mighty people, as they had been favoured by the Hyksos, naturally fell under the suspicion of being friendly to them and favourable to their return; and, which made them the more dangerous, Goshen lay in the quarter from which the Hyksos would invade Egypt, if at all. Hence the apprehension, *Exod. i. 10*, and the measures adopted to reduce their strength. That the Hebrews were not expelled along with the Hyksos as their friends and allies, was perhaps, because the native princes lacked the power, and also, that they might be retained as slaves and helots, to be employed upon the erection of the vast public structures of the

period. Kurtz is of opinion, that numbers of the lower ranks of the Hyksos population were probably retained for a similar purpose, and that they may have constituted the great mixed multitude who left Egypt with Israel, attaching themselves to them in their deliverance, as they had shared the burdens of their servitude. Even the statement, that the expelled Hyksos built Jerusalem, is put into connection with the remarkable changes of name which that place underwent, at different periods of the sacred history. In the days of Abraham, it was called Salem. - When we hear of it in the times of the Judges, its name was changed to Jebus; could the Jebusites have been a branch of the Hyksos? When Kurtz says, that the city was not called Jerusalem until its conquest by David, he forgets Josh. xviii. 28.

The period of the wilderness, which was one of instruction, trial, chastisement, and purification, falls into three divisions, each of which found the people in a distinct locality. They may be respectively described as Israel in the wilderness of Sinai, Israel in the wilderness of Paran, and Israel in the plains of Moab. To the first of these belongs the concluding of the covenant between God and the people; to the second, the consummation of the people's unbelief, and their doom to forty years' exclusion from Canaan; in the third, the new generation has reached the termination of its wanderings, and the border of the promised land.

The manna, which at the present day exudes from the Tarfah bush, in the vicinity of Sinai, offers some interesting analogies to that with which Israel was fed in the desert; but they are plainly not identical. It is not only the enormous difference in quantity, between five or six hundred pounds per annum, gathered from the entire peninsula in the most productive years, and two million of pounds per day. But the properties are so different, that they are evidently quite distinct things. The modern manna could not be beaten fine in a mortar, nor be made a substitute for bread, nor does it breed worms on being kept. It is only found during two or three months of the year, while Israel were supplied with it all the year round; and during thirty-eight years of the period that it was

furnished them, they were in parts of the desert where no Tar-fah bush now grows, and where probably none ever did grow.

That they did not subsist solely upon manna, during the entire forty years, is plain from the direct statements of the inspired record, and might, without such statement, have been inferred from the circumstances of the case. The wilderness now scantily supports less than 5,000 inhabitants, and these could not subsist, but for the aid afforded by travellers and caravans. It must in the days of Moses, however, have been better furnished with springs and oases than at present. History makes it certain, that it once contained a far more numerous population than it does now. The flocks and herds, which Israel possessed, would supply them to some extent with milk and flesh. After the sentence had been announced to them, that they were to remain in the wilderness, they would no doubt cultivate all such spots as were capable of tillage. They purchased provisions in passing along the border of Edom, and they may have done the same from trading caravans which traversed the desert.

The posture of Moses, holding in his uplifted hand the rod of God, in the battle with Amalek, is thought to represent, not the attitude of prayer, but the gesture of command; just as when, with the same rod, he divided the sea, or turned the waters into blood. The direction given to Moses, to write the doings of that day in the (not *a*) book, shows that he had either then commenced, or had in contemplation, the history which he wrote of Israel's journeyings. Jethro's visit, though paid to Moses at the mount of God, is related before mention is made of Israel's removal from Rephidim to Sinai, in order that when that is mentioned, the way may be clear to proceed at once and uninterruptedly with the divine communications there given.

Arrived at Sinai, Moses goes up into the mount to God, and the stipulations of the covenant about to be formed are given him, to be laid before the people. These terms being accepted, preparations are forthwith made for its solemnization, and for the establishment of the theocracy.* Here, at the outset of

* This technical designation of the Hebrew state is borrowed from Josephus, who first employs it, *Cont. Apion.* ii. 16. Some legislators have committed the power of

the Mosaic economy, as in the promises to Abraham, are found intimations that this temporary restriction is in order to an ultimate diffusion. The stipulation on the part of God, "Ye shall be a peculiar treasure unto me above all people, for all the earth is mine," is the farthest possible from the narrow notion of a national god, interested only in this single people, and doing what he does for their sakes alone. And the constituting Israel a kingdom of priests, indicates it as their vocation to be the mediators of mankind, and to dispense to the world the blessings of God's grace—a vocation, which not being itself an end, but only means to an end, is in its nature temporary, and must, when its aim is accomplished, cease of itself.

The fundamental law of the covenant proclaimed from Sinai, is called "the ten words;" but the precise limits of each of the commands is nowhere indicated in Scripture. Three different modes of enumeration have been proposed. According to the first, "I am the Lord thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt," is the first commandment; the prohibitions of the worship of false gods and of images, are combined to form the second; and the prohibition of coveting is the tenth. This division is found in the Targum of the Pseudo-Jonathan, is mentioned but disapproved by Origen, was accepted by the emperor Julian, George Syncellus, and Cedrenus, and is universal among the modern Jews. A sufficient proof of its incorrectness is, that the first commandment will then be no commandment at all. According to the second mode, the first commandment respects the worship of others than the true God; the second, the worship of images; the tenth, coveting. This is the division of Philo, Josephus, Origen, and the Greek fathers generally, and of the Latin fathers until the time of Augustin. It has always prevailed in the Greek Church, was adopted by Calvin and the Reformed Church, and though not accepted by the Lutheran Church, its propriety is admitted by not a few modern Lutheran theologians. The third mode, in which the prohibition of other gods, and of images, is the first

their states to monarchies, others to oligarchies, and others to the government of the masses; but our legislator had no regard to any of these forms; he ordained our government to be what may be termed a theocracy, vesting the power and authority in God.

commandment, and that of coveting forms two, the ninth and the tenth, is first found in Augustin. He was led to it by the desire to find three commandments in the first table, "quia Deus trinitas." He does not, however, consistently adhere to this division in all his writings, but in his *Epistola ad Bonifacium* and elsewhere adopts the second mode. It has sometimes been alleged that Clemens Alexandrinus favoured this last mode of division. But a simple inspection of the passage adduced in evidence is sufficient to show that there is an error in the text. The prohibition of image worship is included in the first commandment; taking God's name in vain is made the subject of the second, and the sanctification of the Sabbath the subject of the third; the fourth is omitted entirely; the injunction of obedience to parents is called the fifth, and it is expressly said that *all* coveting belongs under the tenth. Augustin found the ninth commandment in the first clause of the prohibition of coveting, as it appears in Deuteronomy, "Thou shalt not desire thy neighbour's wife." But as the form of the decalogue given in Exodus is obviously the original one uttered by the mouth of God, and engraved on the tables of stone, the Romish and Lutheran Churches assign to the ninth commandment the words "thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house," leaving the coveting of the wife, man-servant, maid-servant, etc., to constitute the tenth. It is obvious that there is no ground in reason for such a division as this; and that the distinction made by the old Lutheran divines of concupiscence into original and actual, the former without and the latter with the previous consent of the will, does not relieve the difficulty. Kurtz adopts Augustin's division, in spite of his admission that the different arrangement of the clauses in Exodus and in Deuteronomy absolutely precludes it, provided the text in Exodus is correct. Its correctness, however, he ventures to call in question, although not the semblance of any evidence of error is furnished by the manuscripts, and although it would be more reasonable to suspect an error in any other part of the Scriptures than here. The fact that the Septuagint names the wife first in Exodus, is balanced by the Samaritan placing the house first in Deuteronomy: and instead of this showing that there was any doubt about the true reading, it shows precisely the

reverse, that the text was then just as we have it now, and that the authors of these versions sought to reconcile the seeming discrepancy of the two books, and produce uniformity each in his own way. The chief motive of Kurtz in this unwarrantable assumption seems to be, that thus the ten commandments, as divided into the two tables, will exhibit the significant numbers 3 and 7. It was a motive of like character which induced Hengstenberg, who follows the Reformed Church in his numbering of the commandments, to assign five to each table, obedience to parents as the representatives of God being classed with our duties to him.

The curious fancy of Hitzig, copied without acknowledgment from a juvenile production of Goëthe's, that the tables of stone contained not the ten commandments but the series of laws, *Exod.* xxxiv. 12—26, scarcely deserves the serious refutation which Kurtz and Hengstenberg have given it.

Terrified at the voice of God, the people request that Moses may be their mediator, and further commands and directions are given to him, *Exod.* xxi.—xxiii. These he repeated to the people, and upon their solemn engagement to perform them, the covenant was ratified by sacrifice; the sprinkled blood by its atoning virtue removing the obstacle to communion, and the communion itself being set forth by seventy elders, as representatives of the entire people, going up into the mountain where God was, and there in his presence and as his guests feasting upon the flesh of the offerings.

The direction to make the altar of earth or of whole stones, is thought to signify that it should be what Mount Sinai was, in miniature. It was to be constructed of materials ready furnished from the hand of God; expending upon it the workmanship of sinful man could only pollute it. The altar was the place where God recorded his name, and where he came to bless his people. The twelve pillars surrounding it were the twelve tribes assembled around their heavenly king. The altar of burnt-offering subsequently erected for the tabernacle and the temple, was most likely composed of the same materials with that just spoken of. The frame of wood and brazen plates was merely to enclose the earth and stones, which formed the real altar.

The promise to send hornets to drive out the Canaanites, has been understood by most interpreters in a figurative sense, as designating the various inflictions which were employed for this purpose. A few, however, have understood it literally; so the Book of Wisdom, xii. 8, Theodoret, etc. Bochart, who adopted this view, brought his vast erudition to its support, and has adduced from ancient authors a multitude of passages, showing that even such diminutive creatures as frogs, mice, snakes, wasps, etc., have forced whole tribes of men to emigrate. And he finds a direct confirmation of the scriptural account, as he understands it, in a statement of Ælian, that the Phaselites, who dwelt in the vicinity of the Dead Sea, were driven from their homes by wasps.

As God was henceforth to dwell in the midst of his covenant people, a dwelling-place was needed for his reception. Moses was, therefore, called up again into the mountain, and the necessary directions given him. His forty days' absence put the constancy of the people to a test, which they were unable to bear: and God's just anger at their apostasy furnished an occasion to prove Moses' fitness for the office of mediator, with which he had recently been invested. In the language used of Aaron, Exod. xxxii. 4, commonly rendered "he fashioned it with a graving tool," Kurtz follows the translation of Jonathan and Bochart, based on a comparison of 2 Kings v. 23. They translate the verse, "And he received the ear-rings at their hand, and *bound*, or collected *them in a bag*, and made of them a molten calf."

God's refusal to go with the people, though consenting to send an angel before them, Exod. xxxiii. 2, stands in contrast with his previous promise to send the angel in whom his name was, Exod. xxxiii. 20, 21. The evident distinction here made between a created and an uncreated angel, between one whose presence was identical with that of Jehovah, and one whose presence was consistent with Jehovah's absence, is properly regarded by most interpreters as intimating that mysterious relation of Persons in the divine Being, which was subsequently unfolded in the doctrine of the Trinity. In the first volume of this work, Kurtz had maintained in the first edition, that the angel of the Lord was the uncreated Logos. In the second

edition he abandoned that ground under the leadings of Hoffmann, and assumed that a common created angel was meant. This view he endeavours to carry through this passage, in the face of what appears to us to be its obvious meaning.

The tabernacle which Moses pitched without the camp, to symbolize God's removal from the midst of it, was a provisory tabernacle made for the purpose, and designed to serve as a sanctuary, until the one which he had been directed to build should be prepared.

By the intercession of Moses, the breach between God and the people is healed: the sanctuary is then constructed and set up, the priesthood consecrated, the ceremonial service instituted, and the various regulations given which are contained in the book of Leviticus. The camp is next organized into a military host preparatory to the conquest of Canaan; the tribes are numbered, the order to be observed in marching and in encamping specified, and the signals to regulate their movements arranged.

Israel had now been at the foot of Sinai almost a year. They had been organized into the people of God, and had received his laws. It was time for them to proceed to their destination. Three days brought them into the great and terrible wilderness of Paran. From this time onward there is a constant succession of murmurings on the part of the people, and of judgments on the part of God. Their weaknesses and discontent before arriving at Sinai were borne with patience and long-suffering; but the case is altered now, and fearful penalties avenge the violated covenant. The burning at Taberah, the plague at Kibroth-hattaavah, and Miriam's leprosy at Hazeroth were followed by the sentence at Kadesh, that that whole generation should die in the wilderness. This place was probably the scene likewise of the rebellion of Korah, Dathan and Abiram. The narrative leaves the children of Israel at Kadesh, in the second year after their departure out of Egypt. When it is resumed in the first month of the fortieth year, they are again at Kadesh, Num. xx. 1. Over this interval, in which no progress was made toward realizing their mission, the sacred historian passes in silence. Kurtz supposes that the people were allowed to scatter over the wilderness and to settle in all

the oases and productive spots they could find, until near the close of their sentenced term they were summoned again to Kadesh. The stations summarily recorded in Num. xxxiii. 19—36, between Rithmah (the same with Kadesh) and Kadesh, are thought to indicate the movements not of the entire congregation, but of the head-quarters of Moses and the sanctuary, as he visited the various sections of the people to prevent their total dismemberment.

The statement in Ezekiel xx. 25, relating to this period has given no little trouble to commentators. The Lord there says: "Because they despised my statutes I gave them also statutes that were not good, and judgments whereby they should not live; and I polluted them in their own gifts, in that they caused all their first-born to pass through the fire." Not to mention the Manichees, who used this passage to justify their rejection of the Old Testament, these "statutes that were not good" have been supposed to mean commandments of men, such errors and superstitions for example, as those which fill the Talmud—laws imposed by victorious enemies into whose hands God delivered them—threatenings denounced by Moses in the name of God—the law itself as opposed to the gospel—ceremonial as opposed to moral law—heathenish and idolatrous statutes and practices to which they were given up, in punishment for their ungodliness. This last, which is the one adopted by Calvin, Vitringa, Hävernicks and others, is without doubt the correct view of the prophet's language. It finds parallels in Acts vii. 42, God gave them up to worship the hosts of heaven; Rom. i. 24, etc., God gave them up to uncleanness—to vile affections—to a reprobate mind; 2 Thess. ii. 11, for this cause God shall send them strong delusion. Kurtz adopts this view as modified but not improved by Umbreit, and supposes that the statutes referred to are the ceremonial enactments given by God himself, but which the people perverted in the performance, fulfilling them only in a sinful, heathenish manner. They perverted, for example, the law of the consecration of the first-born by making of it a command to sacrifice their children, as was done by the heathen, to Moloch. As far as this view is correct, it is already involved in that of Calvin before given: and as far as it would base itself upon the lan-

guage of the prophet that God gave these statutes, it is not true either that they were not good in the sense in which God gave them, or that they were given in punishment of the wickedness of Israel. It is not surprising that in their dispersion and separation from the sanctuary many corruptions should have found place among the people. And yet the language of Ezekiel must not be unduly pressed, as though the people had universally, or prevailingly abandoned themselves to idolatrous or anti-theocratic practices. It was sufficient that such practices did exist, although at the same time the mass of the people may have been faithful to their duty.

The difficult and much disputed passage, Amos v. 25—27, also bears upon this period. After the Lord had expressed in the previous verses his aversion to the self-righteous and hypocritical services of the people, he proceeds, "Have ye offered unto me sacrifices and offerings in the wilderness forty years, O house of Israel?" To this question Kurtz assumes not an affirmative reply, contrasting the pious past with the idolatrous present, but a negative; and this not as censuring Israel in the wilderness for offering sacrifices, not to God but to idols, but to exhibit how little consequence attaches to the outward performance compared with the inward state. When set over against the abundant and multiplied sacrifices of his own day, those which the circumstances of Israel admitted of their offering in the desert were as nothing. And yet that was a period of marked divine favour; so little does the mere quantity of external service have to do with its procurement. The next verse is then referred, not to the past, as descriptive of idolatry practised in the wilderness—nor to the future, as a punishment, "ye shall in flight before your enemies carry your miserable idols, unable to protect either themselves or you"—but to the present, as giving the reason why their multiplied sacrifices were detestable, while the meagre sacrifices of the past were accepted. It is because the abominations of idolatry co-exist with the outward pomp of God's worship. "Ye bear the tabernacle of your king, the stand of your images, the star of your god which ye have made to yourselves: therefore will I cause you to go into captivity beyond Damascus."

The translation given is no doubt the true one, saving the

tense of the first verb. But we do not see that this view of the passage, though preferred by several modern scholars, is any improvement upon the old interpretation of Stephen (Acts vii. 42, 43,) and the Seventy. There is no difficulty in admitting an extent of ungodliness in the desert, which the Pentateuch does not expressly assert but allows us to suppose. The apostasy rebuked by the prophet is not of recent origin. His cotemporaries have followed their fathers in sin, and they shall perish by a like judgment. Their fathers were prevented from entering the holy land, they shall be driven from it.

The omission to circumcise the children born in the wilderness, Josh. v. 4—9, was, in the opinion of Kurtz, due, not to a temporary suspension of the covenant during the period of the sentence, which is an explanation frequently given, but simply to the circumstances of the people; the rite could not be performed with safety when they were incessantly liable to be on the march.

We pass to what our author says respecting Balaam and his prophecies. The view taken of Balaam corresponds in the general with that of Hengstenberg in his treatise devoted to this subject. It is an attempt to mediate between the extreme views of regarding him as a prophet of the devil, an ungodly and idolatrous enchanter, and a true and real prophet of the living God, seduced to his fall by an inordinate love of wealth and honour. He is supposed to have stood upon the border line of these two antagonistic territories, with one foot as it were upon the soil of heathen magic and sorcery, and the other upon the soil of religion and true prophecy. He is a soothsayer, Josh. xiii. 22, and makes use of enchantments, Num. xxiv. 1, and yet, on the other hand, he has some correct knowledge of God, makes confession of him, inquires after and receives his will, obeys it, though but with half his heart, is possessed of a real inspiration and utters actual prophecies. This half-way character is thought to make a transition period in his history, from which he must either rise to a full declaration of himself on the side of God, or fall back to absolute heathenism. Analogies are found in the history of modern missions, as well as in the New Testament, e. g., in Simon Magus, Acts viii. 13, 21, the seven sons of Sceva, Acts xix. 13, 14, and the children of

the Pharisees casting out devils in the name of Christ. (So Matth. xii. 27 is explained, comp. Luke ix. 49.) Balaam's knowledge of God was chiefly attributable, no doubt, to the reports which had been spread of the recent displays of his power and grace in Egypt, and in the wilderness; though it need not be denied that some feeble remains of the true religion may have been preserved in the region of Abraham's ancestry. That Balaam had addicted himself to the service of this new and potent deity was the grand reason why Balak courted his services. He thought by this seer's potent incantations to withdraw from Israel, and secure for himself the aid of their God, whom he saw to be mightier than his own. Thus Pliny relates, on the authority of older writers, that it was the practice of the early Romans to solicit the gods of cities which they attacked, by the promise of equal or greater honours than they now enjoyed; and they concealed the name of the deity under whose guard Rome was placed, lest he should be enticed from them by similar means.

It is a natural sequence from the views of Kurtz already given in relation to heathenism and Egyptian sorcery, that he supposes the charms of diviners to possess a real and not a merely pretended or imaginary potency, by means of which the gods are in a measure subjected to the control of their worshippers. The deities of the heathen, though real, personal and powerful, are created beings; and as such, subject to the limitations and laws of creatures. Their priests and magicians are not only their servants, but in a sense also their lords. To them it is that they owe their credit and standing as gods: just as the priests and magicians again owe their credit and standing to the supernatural powers imparted by their deities. The gods and their worshippers stand thus to each other in a relation of mutual dependence; and the demons of heathenism are obliged for the sake of their own interest to subject themselves to the incantations employed upon them. Besides which, there may be some inherent power in these spells and enchantments, which such spirits are unable to resist.

Apart from these more doubtful notions, however, the stress laid by the sacred writers (Deut. xxiii. 5, and elsewhere) upon the benefit conferred by God in changing Balaam's anticipated

curse into a blessing, is justified by the fact that Balaam was not only a heathen diviner, but a prophet of the Lord; and it was in this latter capacity, as the organ and representative of Jehovah, that his curse was desired. A curse uttered in the name of God, and by his authority, which was what Balak wanted and Balaam hoped to effect, would have been as efficacious for evil, as the blessing he was compelled to pronounce was for good.

The speaking of Balaam's ass, Hengstenberg had endeavoured to explain away, as having taken place only in vision and in impressions supernaturally made upon the prophet's mind, without any sound audible to others proceeding from the mouth of the beast. Kurtz stands upon the only tenable ground of the literal occurrence, as it appears upon the face of the narrative, and refutes in the most ample and satisfactory way all the arguments and objections which have been alleged against it. He lays down the canon that "a dream, vision, or ecstasy is never to be assumed in the scripture history, unless it is distinctly and unequivocally indicated in the narrative."

Balaam's desire to die the death of the righteous is not thought to involve any clear knowledge on his part, of the rewards of the future state. It only designates the death of a true Israelite, as happier in his esteem than that of a heathen, which it will be, even though it be regarded less as the opening of a new life, than as the close of the present. He asks for himself a death surrounded by the tokens of the divine favour and love, with the retrospect of a happily spent life, and the prospect of continued blessings to be vouchsafed to his posterity, although, whatever views were dimly possessed of that futurity, when he should be "gathered to his fathers," need not be excluded. Num. xxiii. 23 is translated, "For there is no enchantment in Jacob and no divination in Israel; at the (proper) time, to Jacob and to Israel is told, what God performs." They do not practise arts of divination, and they do not need them. God himself reveals to them his purpose regarding the future as far as they have occasion to know it.

The most remarkable of Balaam's prophecies is the fourth and last, Num. xxiv. 15—24, in which after Balak had ordered him away in a rage, at his utterance of a three-fold blessing, he

volunteers to advertise him what should befall his people in the latter days. In v. 15, "the man whose eyes are shut," (Eng. Ver. marg. v. 3,) is thought to refer not to Balaam's failure to see the angel, on his way to Balak, nor to his previous ignorance of the future, now disclosed to him, but to the physical condition in which he received, or uttered his prophecy, with the eyes of his body closed and all disturbing sights shut out, perhaps in a swoon, or state of unconsciousness as to all external objects, but the eyes of his spirit, v. 16, open. This is put in connection likewise, with his falling into a trance, or rather to the ground, under the might of the spiritual influence which had seized upon him and overmastered his strength.

The star and the sceptre that shall rise out of Jacob and smite the corners of Moab, are in the view of Kurtz, an individual ruler. They meet a preliminary fulfilment in the person and conquests of David. But as the spirit of the prophecy requires not only the reduction or subjugation of the particular nations named, but of all in whom the hostility to Israel, which characterized them, shall be perpetuated, it must have a higher fulfilment in Christ, by whom all the foes of his people shall be finally destroyed or changed to friends. In the mind of Balaam, however, these are not accurately distinguished. It is not given to him to see them apart, and to separate what shall be done by the one from what shall be done by the other. The event, however, teaches that such a separation must be made. The view of Hengstenberg that the prophecy is generic, and intended to apply to the kingdom in Israel as such, of which David and Christ stand out as the two main representatives, the culminating points, Kurtz strenuously resists—all the more strenuously, as it would seem, because Hengstenberg has maintained it. The star of Balaam was prophetic of Christ's future coming, as the star of the wise men was symbolic of his actual appearance. "The children of Sheth," whom this star and sceptre shall destroy, are not all mankind as the descendants of the patriarch Seth; but the word is taken in its appellative sense, "children of tumult," the tumultuous foes of Israel.

Amalek is called the first of the nations, not in the sense of the oldest, nor the chief, most distinguished, most powerful, but

as the first which displayed that character in which the heathen nations are here especially contemplated—that of hostility to Israel. The Kenites are supposed not to be the same with those mentioned Gen. xv. 19, here put for the Canaanites generally, but a branch of Midian put for the whole nation. The prediction which follows, of the invasion by Assyria, of Western Asia, and the subsequent extinction of Assyria and Eber (the trans-Euphratic power) by an invasion from the West, shows what a far-sighted gaze into futurity was granted to the Mesopotamian seer. These discourses of Balaam present an insoluble puzzle to those who hope by feats of critical legerdemain to escape the admission of prophetic foresight. For though with the contempt of historical testimony belonging to this school, they could by the magic of their art transfer the composition of this passage to any point of time they choose, the trouble is, that no time can be found which will answer the conditions required. The plain references to the conquests of David would make its composition in his reign, or shortly after, very convenient. But on the one hand this is much too early, for the predicted spread of the Assyrian power will yet remain to be accounted for, and especially that precipitation of the West upon the East which could not have been conjectured even in the days of Malachi. And on the other hand, it is already too late; for “his king shall be higher than Agag,” xxiv. 7, had already lost its meaning from the days of Saul, by whom the power of Amalek was for ever broken.

The prediction, Deut. xviii. 15—19, of a prophet like unto Moses, Kurtz understands not of the prophets collectively, Christ the seal of all included (Hofmann;) nor of each of the prophets individually (Hävernicks;) nor of the ideal prophet, embracing both the imperfect and the perfect realizations, (Hengstenberg;) but specifically and solely of Christ.

The most unsatisfactory thing in the volume before us is what is said of the authorship and composition of the Pentateuch. While insisting rigidly upon its inspiration, canonicity, the authentic character and Mosaic origin of its contents, the consistent and well-ordered plan of the whole, and its forming the undoubted basis of the entire after history, literature, and religion of Israel, the ground is taken that Moses, although the

author of considerable portions of it, could not have written it all as it now stands; that its present form was attained in the lifetime of Joshua, or shortly after. It is astonishing upon what slender and precarious grounds some men can persuade themselves to dismiss, as of no account, such a unanimous and unvarying testimony as tradition gives to the authorship of the books of Moses, confirmed as it is by so many internal considerations, and sanctioned by the explicit language of our Lord himself. Our surprise is heightened in the case of Kurtz, from its opposition to his general tendencies, and even to his previously published views in relation to this very subject. He has, however, taken Delitzsch as his leader, who in his Commentary on Genesis seems to have made trial of his ingenuity to see how far he could adopt the arguments and conclusions of the "higher criticism," and yet hold fast whatever was essential to faith and orthodoxy. So far it may possibly be of use in disarming the school, whose weapons he has borrowed, by showing that even if their arguments and deductions were legitimate, faith in the Scriptures could be maintained. But as a rational account of the origin of the Pentateuch, it is no better than ingenious, we cannot even say specious, trifling.

ART. II.—*History of the Protestant Church in Hungary from the beginning of the Reformation to 1850: with special reference to Transylvania.* Translated by Rev. J. Craig, D. D., Hamburg. With an Introduction by J. H. Merle D'Aubigné, D. D., President of the Theological School of Geneva, and Vice-President of the Société Evangélique, author of "The History of the Great Reformation," &c. Boston: Phillips, Sampson and Company. New York: James C. Derby, 1854.

SINCE the noble but unsuccessful struggle of Hungary for her political independence, every item of information about her past history, or present condition, has been received with the deepest interest by the American people. All classes have asked and read and talked about Hungary.

And yet, how little has been known or thought about the religious element in Hungary! How few have asked the question, whether the Hungarians were Christian, and if so, whether Greek, Roman, or Protestant! How many have simply taken for granted, that as they were politically subject to the Emperor of Austria, so they were spiritually to the Pope of Rome! Nor has any work conveying clear and definite information on the subject been accessible to the masses of the people. The Christian community has felt that this was a lack, whose supply was most desirable.

That lack has been supplied in a very great measure by the volume whose title we have placed at the head of our article. The introduction to it is from the pen of Dr. Merle D'Aubigné. In it he informs us that in the year 1846, a number of documents relating to the history of religion in Hungary were submitted to him with the request that he would write the history of the Reformation in that country. On examining them, he found that they for the most part pertained to the period *after* the Reformation. He declined the task, for it would have interfered with his great and cherished design of writing the history of Evangelical religion, in the *first half* of the sixteenth century.

In the year 1858, the present volume appeared, and Dr. D'Aubigné felt that he could not decline the request to write an introduction. In it he speaks of the work, and of the anonymous author, in the following terms: "The work that we now offer to the public ought to be considered worthy of attention, were it only for its novelty, but more particularly so, on account of the labour that has been bestowed on its composition. The author is a man possessed of enlightened piety, sound judgment, integrity, faithfulness, and Christian wisdom, qualities well calculated to inspire perfect confidence. He has obtained his materials from the most authentic sources. Government edicts, convent protocols, visitation reports, and official correspondence, have all been consulted with scrupulous attention, as is proved by the numerous quotations which he cites. He has thus sought to place the authenticity of his book on an indisputable basis, and at the same time to render it impervious to the shafts of hostile criticism." Page 5.

This is sufficient to inspire confidence in it as a reliable historical work. It is also a work of absorbing interest; a record of faith and conflict, of political and ecclesiastical oppression, continued from generation to generation. We propose to follow the thread of the history, and glance at some of the prominent events brought to notice.

The very extensive kingdom of Hungary, for it embraces a territory of four hundred and fifty miles long, by three hundred and forty-five broad, was occupied by the Romans at the Christian era, and afterwards by various barbarous tribes. Some attempts were made to introduce Christianity about the beginning of the ninth century, by monks from England and Italy. Being ignorant of the language of the people, they were unable to instruct them thoroughly in the principles of the gospel. They endeavoured to captivate them by ceremonies, and hence accomplished but little permanent good. The idolatrous Magyars, worshippers of Mars, and of the host of heaven, shortly after came from Asia, led by Almus, and blotted out every trace of their work.

Meanwhile the gospel was introduced into neighbouring countries, and in the middle of the tenth century began to be favourably received in Hungary. The Regent, Geyza, married a Christian princess; Christian captives taken by the Hungarians became teachers of their captors; German artisans and merchants came into the country; and to crown all, the Emperor Otto sent a bishop to further the work of evangelization. Geyza received baptism, and made strong, but unsuccessful attempts to establish Christianity as the religion of the nation. His son Stephen was more successful. Many missionaries were sent through the country, and the people were enjoined under severe penalties to receive their instructions. This excited a rebellion, which resulted in the defeat of the insurgents. Stephen built many churches, established schools, and enforced the observance of the Sabbath.

These compulsory measures produced such a determined opposition to Christianity in the minds of the people, that in 1060 they called Andrew to the throne, on the express condition that he should root it out. For a season, persecution prevailed. But Andrew soon repented, and for the remainder of

his reign devoted himself to the establishment and defence of the Christian religion. In the closing part of the eleventh century, Ladislaus, during a reign of eighteen years, did much to promote religion, and to improve the social condition of the people.

It need scarcely be mentioned that the Christianity at this time enjoyed by Hungary was the corrupt form of it taught by Rome. It was Christianity without the Bible—the Christianity of a soul-destroying ecclesiastical tyranny. We now note the introduction of another, and the only true and pure form of the religion of Jesus of Nazareth, that which recognizes the word of God as supreme authority, and Christ the sole Mediator.

In the latter part of the twelfth century, Peter Waldo, fleeing from Lyons for the sake of the word of God, came to Bohemia. Of those who there gathered around him, many went into Hungary, and preached the gospel with much success. Persecution at first increased the number of converts, and they increased still more when the troubles of the country drew away the attention of the nobles from them. Besides, the Hungarian constitution did not allow of persecution to the extent that it obtained in some other countries, and many of the nobles favoured the new doctrines.

Now appeared in Bohemia two of the intrepid “Reformers before the Reformation,” John Huss and Jerome of Prague, who lifted up their voices boldly for the truth, and heroically died in attestation of it. The shedding of their blood was like the scattering of precious seed broad-cast over the land. Much of that seed fell in Hungary, where thousands of the followers of Huss settled. These were sometimes persecuted, and sometimes allowed rest, according to the temper of the reigning prince, or reasons of state that prevailed. When the Great Reformation broke out, they united in the movement; and when the day of bloody persecution came, many went from Moravia to Germany, and at Herrnhut established the Moravian church under Count Zinzendorf. Many went from Hungary to Wallachia, and there long remained separate, but at last failing to receive preachers, according to their desire, from the

Reformed Church of Transylvania, they went some to the Greek Church, some to the Roman.

In the fifteenth century, the corruptions of the Papacy had become intolerable. The bishops were ambitious lords, occupied with state affairs, intent on their own aggrandizement, and better qualified to lead armies than to feed the flock of Christ. The priests were illiterate, covetous, immoral, and rapacious. The people were ignorant, superstitious, devoted to image-worship, and with no conception of spiritual religion. All these circumstances prepared Hungary for the Reformation. The doctrines of Huss, too, had pervaded the land like leaven—the constitution guaranteed freedom, and the nobility and many of the common people detested the clergy. The writings of Luther came at once into Hungary, and as early as 1521 a condemnation of them was read from the pulpits of the principal churches. Notwithstanding this, as our author observes, “the living word, coming from hearts warmed by conviction, produced a wondrous effect, and in a short time whole parishes, villages, and towns, yes, perhaps the half of Hungary, declared for the Reformation.” Page 40.

The word of God was preached by John Henkel, the chaplain of Queen Mary, who was a sister of the emperor Charles V. There is every evidence to believe that she favoured the Reformation. Her chaplain continued to preach when others were silenced, and she carried a Latin Testament with her, which she filled with notes. Luther, on sending a translation of four psalms with one of his own hymns for her comfort, wrote, that “he has with great pleasure seen that she is a friend to the gospel.” Afterwards, when she was regent in the Netherlands, it was the constant complaint of the Popish emissaries around her, that she would not take summary measures to crush the Reformation in that country.

The Reformation spread so rapidly that Rome became greatly alarmed, and the Pope’s legate induced the young king Louis, in the year 1528, to issue an edict that “All Lutherans and those who favour them, as well as adherents to the sect, shall have their property confiscated, and themselves be punished with death, as heretics and foes of the most holy Virgin Mary.” P. 44. This edict, for reasons which we can only sur-

mise, was never strictly enforced. The Reformation received a new impulse. Many young men went to Wittemberg to pursue their studies under Luther and Melancthon, and returned zealous disseminators of their doctrines.

The devastation of Hungary by the Turks was no hinderance to the progress of these doctrines. Though a great national calamity, it resulted in the futherance of the gospel. On the 29th of August, 1526, the battle of Mohacs was fought between Louis and Soliman. The result was most disastrous to the Hungarians, for they lost their king, seven bishops, twenty-eight princes, five hundred nobles, and twenty thousand warriors. But among those who perished were many of the most bitter enemies of the Reformation. The edicts against the Protestants continued to stand, but they who had been zealous to execute them were gone; and the Turks, despising all Christianity, did not meddle with the differences between Romanist and Protestant.

Louis was succeeded by two rival kings, John Zapolya and Ferdinand of Austria, who involved Hungary in a civil war of twelve years. Both were anxious to secure the favour of the bishops, and therefore issued severe edicts against the Protestants. Ferdinand, especially, issued one, which in cruelty does not fall behind the celebrated edict of his brother, Charles V., against the Protestants in the Netherlands. Confiscation of goods, banishment and death were the penalties for heresy, according to the aggravation of the crime. Those who received heretics into their houses were to be "*ipso facto infames*," deprived of the rights of citizens, and rendered incapable of ever holding office. That these edicts were not faithfully executed must be attributed to the troublous state of the times, the insecurity of the government, and the favour with which the Reformation was regarded by many of the nobles.

The 25th of June, 1530, is described by D'Aubigné as "the greatest day of the Reformation, and one of the most glorious in the history of Christianity and of mankind." The scene that then took place is most graphically pictured by him in his history of the Reformation. On that day the Confession of Augsburg was read before the Emperor Charles V., and the

princes of the Empire, to the confusion of the Romish bishops and doctors. Many Hungarians were present, and that wonderfully clear and simple statement of evangelical doctrine was carried into Hungary, and gave a fresh impulse to the Reformation there. Men were now raised up, who were mighty in the Scriptures, burning with zeal, and valiant for the truth.

Chief among these was Matthew Devay, sometimes called the Hungarian Luther, sometimes the Apostle of Hungary. He had drunk in the doctrines of the Reformation at Wittemberg, from the teachings of Luther and Melancthon. Dwelling in Luther's house, and enjoying constant unrestricted intercourse with him, he became deeply imbued with the spirit of the intrepid Reformer, and on his return to his native country, he preached with immense power and success. Many nobles heard the truth from him, and embraced it. Whole villages renounced Popery. He was soon complained of for "turning the world upside down," and thrown into prison by King John. Being set free, he received a call to Kashaw, in Upper Hungary, where he preached the more boldly. He was now complained of before Ferdinand, who agreed with his rival John in imprisoning this heroic witness for the truth.

On regaining his liberty, he, with the countenance of the nobles, travelled from place to place preaching the gospel. He also translated the Epistles of Paul into the vernacular of his countrymen. In 1536, he went a second time to Wittemberg to consult and enjoy Christian intercourse with his revered instructors. The state of things in Hungary at that time will be best described in the words of our author:

"At Wittemberg he resided again with Luther, and was able to tell him how not only the Epistles of Paul had been given to the Hungarians, in their native language, but also how the four gospels had been published by Gabriel, of Pesth, on the 13th of July, 1536. Entire parishes had declared in favour of the Reformation, as also free cities and villages, and many even of the higher clergy had made great sacrifices by openly professing the truth. He could also tell how great the danger was to which they were still exposed. The penal laws were still in force. The bishop of Eger, Thomas Szalakazi,

had thrown Antony, a preacher of Eperjes, and Bartholemy, a chaplain, into prison. People did not know what to expect from John and Ferdinand. The latter had sent a decree to Bartfield, which was now entirely Reformed, ordering them, under pain of death and confiscation, to abolish all innovations in the mode of worship; to renounce all the heresies which a certain D. Isaiah had taught them; not to recall him, but to be reconciled to their former clergy. This order was issued in 1535, and how much attention was paid to it, we shall soon see. That faith on the Son of God, which overcometh the world, had taken root here, and it knows no fear. Strong in this faith, Devay returned from Wittemberg in the end of the year 1537." Page 64.

Protected by the powerful Count, Thomas Nadasdy, Devay now laboured "in the district between the river Raab and the Balaton lake." His former place of labour in Upper Hungary was occupied by one most worthy to take it, Stephen Szantai, whose arrest was soon demanded, and effected. But Ferdinand would not condemn him without a hearing, and therefore ordered a public discussion of the disputed points. The report of the umpires is curious, for they wished to be honest, and at the same time safe. How to accomplish both these ends was the difficulty. "They reported that all which Szantai had said was founded on the Scriptures, and what the monks had brought forward was mere fables and idle tales." But they added, "should we state this publicly, we are lost, for we should be represented as enemies to our religion; if we condemn Szantai, we act contrary to truth and justice, and would not escape divine retribution. They begged therefore, that the king would protect them from the danger on both sides." Page 66.

The bishops and monks were clamorous for the condemnation of Szantai, but as they could give no good reasons for it the king refused to yield to them. In a private audience, the preacher being asked by the king, "what is then really the doctrine which you teach?" made this noble answer. "Most gracious prince, it is no new doctrine which I have invented, but a revealed doctrine, which, by divine grace, I have discovered. It is the doctrine of the prophets and apostles, and

every one who really seeks his soul's salvation must obey this truth." Page 68.

On this the king spoke frankly and kindly, not of the falsity of the doctrines, but of the present danger of professing them; told him that it was not in his power to protect him without endangering himself; dismissed him with valuable presents, and ordered him to be escorted by night in safety to his friends.

Yet Ferdinand was far from being a decided friend of the Reformation. The reasons for this are summarily given: "His Spanish education, the first impressions of which were carefully nourished by the priests; the example of his brother the Emperor Charles; the constant friendly relation between him and the court of Rome; the moral and physical assistance which Rome gave him against the Turks, and which in his circumstances was indispensable; the falsehoods which were told of Luther; the ignorance of the word of God, which alone can make fallen man free—all these wrought together in making Ferdinand what he was." Page 99.

The unfortunate controversy in regard to the presence of Christ in the Supper, which divided the Protestant churches into Lutheran and Reformed, and which stirred up bitter strifes in Germany, also entered Hungary, in a measure, to spoil the work that was going on so prosperously. The rest that followed the civil war, increased the facilities for religious controversy. Devay adopted the views of Zuingle, to the astonishment of Luther and others. This controversy resulted in the formal adoption of the Swiss Confession by the Reformed, and the separate organization of the two bodies in 1566.

During the civil war, and also after the treaty between John and Ferdinand in 1538, Soliman was the virtual ruler of Hungary. This was not disadvantageous to the Protestants. The Turk allowed the word of God to have free course. There was constant communication with the churches of Germany. In 1541, an edition of the New Testament in the Hungarian language was published by John Sylvester.

The progress of the Reformation awakened Ferdinand to the necessity of a reform within the Romish Church. He saw

that without it, her influence would soon be gone. He instructed the deputies sent by him to the council of Trent in 1545, to propose and advocate measures to secure a reformation in morals and doctrine, and a reform of all prevailing abuses. This resulted in nothing, as the history of the proceedings of that famous council will show.

The free cities of Guns and Ordenburg were prominent centres of the Reformation. In the former, the last Roman Catholic priest left, because his flock had left him. The Diet that assembled in the latter place declared in favour of the Reformation, and the town was almost unanimous on the subject. Simon Gerengel laboured there with astonishing success. To show how extensive the change was through Hungary, it is stated that only three families of the magnates adhered to the Pope; that the nobility were nearly all Reformed, and that the people were thirty to one attached to the new doctrine.

What was to be done under these circumstances? Energetic measures were demanded by the falling Papacy. Its strong arm was called to the rescue. The Jesuits were invited to come in and work in their peculiar way for the destruction of heresy. They came and met with some success. With characteristic subtilty they aimed to obtain control over the minds of Maximilian, heir to the throne, and of his wife. With the latter they were too successful, while the former resisted their arts. These efforts only inspired the Protestants with renewed zeal, in which they were encouraged by Maximilian. He established a printing-press in Croatia, and approved of the publication of the Augsburg Confession. He permitted an edition of the New Testament in the Croatian language to be printed and dedicated to himself. The expense of this edition was borne by one whose name deserves to be remembered, John Ungnad, who also caused four thousand spelling-books to be printed and circulated among the Croatians. The Jesuits deemed it very important to have this man out of the way, and they succeeded in procuring his banishment. But during his exile at Wurtemberg he remembered Croatia, into which he sent Bibles and other religious books.

The year 1564 was a hopeful one for the friends of the Reformation, for Maximilian ascended the throne in the

room of his father. He gave orders to the archbishop "to cease to disturb the evangelical clergy, to consider the times, and to take heed that he did not destroy more than he built up." He directed that the cup should be permitted to the laity, and declared his opposition to all religious persecution. Thus far there had been no formal separation from the Church of Rome. The evangelical clergy laboured within her pale, and of course were subject to very great annoyances. But now Synods were called, and Protestant organization effected. The Swiss Confession was adopted by a synod at Debreczin, and thus, a complete separation effected, not only between the Romanists and Protestants, but also between the Reformed and Lutheran Churches. The Reformed suffered by the introduction and spread of Socinian views among them, especially in Transylvania. Consequently a new confession, called the "Confession of Czenger," was prepared and adopted, which remains the confession of the Reformed Church of Hungary. The reign of Maximilian was noted for the publication of numerous confessions from individual churches and persons.

Maximilian, though a favourer of the Reformation, never left the communion of Rome. Nor did he speak as openly and freely after he became Emperor as he had done before. Still he had many Protestants at his court, and gave them important offices. During his reign, the Psalms were translated into Hungarian verse by Starinus. He died in 1576.

The successor of Maximilian was his son Rudolph, who reigned thirty-two years, and whose policy was to throw down what his father had builded, and to pluck up what he had planted. His mother, as we have seen, was completely under the influence of the Jesuits. They obtained control of the education of the son, and it may easily be imagined what a character was formed, when it is known that when only twelve years of age, he was sent to the court of that most cruel bigot and tyrant, Philip II. of Spain. He was taught to consider him a model, and ideas of implicit submission and entire devotion to Rome were carefully inculcated by his tutors, the Spanish priests. He became like Philip, and Philip's name can be mentioned only with abhorrence. He was selfish and tyrannical, caring not for the comfort or happiness of his people. He

broke his oaths, trampled on the constitution, banished some of the Reformed clergy and men of note, and gave the Jesuits full scope. The Protestants were also weakened by internal dissensions, and the opportunity was improved by Rome in making strong efforts to bring the wandering sheep back to her fold.

The controversy between the Lutherans and the Reformed became very bitter toward the close of the sixteenth century. The Turks overran the country and laid it waste. A fearful famine prevailed, and the whole land was brought almost to the extreme of distress.

The peace of Vienna, which was ratified in 1606, was of great service to the Protestants. It set aside all decrees that had been issued against them, and guarantied the rights of conscience. But the death of Botskay, the Protestant champion, encouraged a breach of plighted faith, and the old oppressions were again attempted. At the Diet of Presburg in 1608, the Popish clergy protested against its guaranty of religious liberty to the Protestants. The archduke, Matthew, however, was firm, and so were the lay nobility. The result was a rupture with Rudolph, and finally the government of Hungary was given to Matthew, and the Protestants were fully confirmed in their religious rights. The Jesuits with all their art could not reverse this action. The Hungarians, Catholic as well as Protestant, gladly parted from Rudolph, who had made himself so odious to them.

The second period of this history embraces the century between the peace of Vienna, 1608, and the convention of Szathmar, 1711. Under the peace of Vienna the Protestants fondly anticipated the enjoyment of full religious liberty. Their rights did not now depend on the will of a king, but were guarantied by the laws of the land. Moreover, both the king and the palatine were lovers of justice. As the Protestant Church was not entirely free from the jurisdiction of the Catholic, and its members were greatly annoyed by Popish visitations, demands for priests' dues, &c., the new palatine, George Thurzo, called a Synod at Sillein, for the purpose of securing the independence of the Protestants. A church constitution was adopted, and superintendents were appointed.

Their duties and privileges, as well as those of pastors, inspectors, deacons, and schoolmasters were defined. The acts of this synod greatly enraged the high dignitaries of the Romish Church. They pronounced the anathema which awakened a bitter pamphlet controversy. Efforts were made to produce uniformity in the mode of worship among Protestants, and the Wittemberg Ceremonial and Luther's Shorter Catechism were introduced.

Rest was not long to be enjoyed under the shadow of the peace of Vienna, for Rome keeps no faith with heretics. The new ecclesiastical arrangements were ignored by the king. The newly appointed superintendents were denied the money formerly given to the Popish archdeacons, and all complaints fell on ears unwilling to hear.

In 1618, Ferdinand II. of Austria was crowned king of Hungary. He was elected by the Hungarians, for Hungary was not a hereditary possession of Austria, but an independent kingdom, in the habit of choosing the emperor of Austria as its king. It was a time of wonderful activity among the agents of the Papacy in England, France, and Spain. They did their utmost in Hungary, and Ferdinand, who had promised to protect the Protestants, became a fanatical and heartless persecutor. The Jesuits had everything their own way. They exercised their power with terrible cruelty; compelled many to join the Church of Rome; excommunicated preachers, and drove them from their flocks into exile. Churches were stolen and schools were broken up. In the midst of these proceedings Ferdinand died, leaving us as the embodiment of his spirit, the saying "I will rather have a wasted than an accursed kingdom."

These annoyances continued under his son and successor, Ferdinand III. He was greatly superior to his father in every respect, a man of vigorous mind and naturally well disposed. But he had been educated under the withering influence of Jesuitism, and how could he have the large and liberal views, that we even now vainly look for in princes trained under that system?

The bitter and persevering Lippay, archbishop of Gran, was the chief persecutor. The persecuted looked to Prince Rakot-

ry of Transylvania for help. He declared war against Ferdinand, and after a short but bloody contest, the peace of Linz was effected. This peace secured full religious liberty to the Protestants; their banished preachers were allowed to come back to their congregations, and all churches and church property that had been seized were ordered to be restored. But to pass decrees was one thing; to get them fairly and honestly carried into effect was another. With difficulty did the Protestants recover ninety churches out of four hundred, of which they had been robbed. This partial restitution was accompanied with the comforting remark, "that in time to come, not one single church more would be given up." Still, although more than three hundred churches were lost, something was gained by the adoption of several favourable articles. Some quiet was enjoyed, which was improved by the perfecting of discipline, building of churches and school-houses, and doing what seemed necessary for the internal prosperity of the Church.

The latter half of the seventeenth century is covered by the reign of Leopold I., sometimes called "the Great," and which is denominated, "the beginning of the golden age of the Jesuits on the one side, and the gradual progressive decay of the Protestant Church on the other." He was heartless, bigoted, and slavishly devoted to Rome. Some of the Romish nobles were, during his reign, guilty of the most cruel oppressions of the Protestants living on their estates. All the complaints of these suffering people were dismissed by the king as an annoyance. The Protestant deputies in the national Diet made repeated applications to the king, that the affairs of the Protestant Church might be considered. They were treated in the same heartless and contemptuous manner, until they felt that they could no longer remain in the Diet, and they accordingly withdrew.

The oppressions of the country, and the arrogance of the foreign nobles were so great, that many of the Hungarians (and chief among them were some who had been the most bitter persecutors of the Protestants,) resolved to attempt to throw off the yoke of Austria. A conspiracy was formed to poison Leopold, which was discovered; but the whole affair was adroitly turned

against the Protestants, so that every one of them was made subject to arrest as a conspirator or rebel. The truth, however, was soon learned through the seizure of some papers that were in the hands of the widow of Vesselenyi, the leader of the conspiracy. The result was the execution of a large number of nobles, both Catholic and Protestant.

Advantage was nevertheless taken of this to carry on the work of persecution, and the old system of robbery of churches and schools was practised. The Archbishop of Gran signalized himself by citing thirty-three pastors before the Vice-regal Court, to answer to the charge of having excited the people to rebellion. After a mockery of a trial, they received sentence. To avoid torture, some went into exile, and some remained at home, on condition of ceasing to exercise their ministry.

Encouraged by the result of this, the Archbishop now summoned three or four hundred more to answer for two seditious anonymous letters that had been written. Sentences of beheading, confiscation, infamy and outlawry were pronounced. The first was not executed. But these poor men were so tormented, that two hundred and sixty-six signed their resignations, and most of them went into exile. The remainder were treated with great inhumanity, until almost all had yielded, and some even entered the Roman Church.

At Leopoldstadt, the Jesuit Kellio exercised extreme cruelty toward five pastors imprisoned there. After incredible abuse and suffering, they were, in company with thirty-six from Komorn and other places, sent under an escort to Italy. Some died by the hardships of the way, and some escaped. Of the forty-one, thirty reached Naples, where they were sold for fifty Spanish piastres each, and chained to the benches of the boats with the galley-slaves. They were followed by others, who shared the same fate.

It is delightful to mark the interposition of God, in behalf of his suffering people. We have now come to a spot where we must linger a little, and see how God brought deliverance. The case of these Christian pastors, and "companions in tribulation," attracted the attention of princes, but nothing was effected. George Wetz, a wealthy citizen of Naples, and his brother Philip, alleviated their condition by visiting them twice

every week, and supplying their necessities. They also endeavoured to purchase their freedom. Appeals were made in their behalf to Switzerland, Germany, Holland, and England. Many distinguished men advocated their cause. Charles II. of England ordered contributions for their relief. The clearest proof that they were innocent of rebellion, was shown to the Prince Regent of Naples, but all in vain. And even the offer of Weltz to buy them, supported by the English ambassador, was met with the cool reply, "they are not Roman Catholics."

Here was a case that decidedly called for intervention, and it came. On the 12th of December, 1675, a Dutch fleet, under Vice-Admiral De Staen, sailed into the harbour of Naples, and the chaplain was dispatched to the prisoners to get exact information of the case, "so that the Vice-Admiral might, by divine assistance, and by the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, labour more efficiently on their behalf." He, with some other officers, waited on the Regent, and were so well received that they ventured to promise the prisoners that in three days they should be at liberty. The hope thus excited was disappointed, for the fleet was obliged to leave the harbour immediately, on account of the war with France. The heroic and Christian Admiral, De Ruyter, however, was in the neighbourhood, and he had been commanded by the States-General of Holland, to take up the case of the prisoners. He referred it to Cornelius Wandelen, the Dutch ambassador, and George Weltz, who procured a Court of Assize, which, after a thorough examination, declared that the prisoners were innocent of the crimes alleged against them, and ought to be set free. The report that the Dutch fleet was about to return home, was fast turning their joy into sorrow, when De Ruyter with full sail entered the harbour.

"On the 11th of February, 1676, the chaplain of the Dutch fleet, accompanied by several superior officers, went on board the boats; and, as in a dream, the prisoners forsook the place of their confinement, singing the 46th, the 114th, and 125th Psalms. Having reached the ship of the Vice-Admiral, he received and embraced them with unspeakable joy; and, after the tears of gratitude had freely flown, they knelt down together to thank God for their deliverance, and sung once more the

116th Psalm. Refreshed and strengthened, with hearts overflowing with gratitude, and their lips with praise to God, they spent the night on the Vice-Admiral's ship.

"The next morning they were brought before the Admiral. The veteran hero received them with every possible kindness, and exclaimed, 'that of all his victories, none had given him so much joy as the delivering these servants of Christ from their intolerable yoke.' He would not listen to their thanks, 'for,' said he, 'we are only the instruments—give all the glory to God.' The noble Admiral had clothes provided for them at his own expense, and took them with him. Of the thirty who entered the galleys, twenty-six were still remaining, and they went to Switzerland, Germany, England, and Holland, till such time as they were permitted to return to their native land." Page 263.

At this time, the Protestant Church of Hungary was in a truly sad condition. Worship could be celebrated only with the utmost privacy. The blood-hounds of Jesuitism everywhere tracked the scattered sheep. The pastors met the remnants of their flocks in woods, and dens, and caves. A little light and liberty remained at Ordenberg.

In 1681, the Diet of Ordenberg was held, at which the Protestant deputies presented a strongly written paper, setting forth the grievances of the Church, and demanding redress. This was answered by a paper from the Romanists, repeating the old story, that there was no persecution on account of religion; that rebellion only had been punished; that no churches had been seized, except such as had been originally built by the Catholics, and which the Protestants had stolen from them, than which no falsehood could be more barefaced. The Emperor, at last, urged by many Roman Catholic deputies, issued a decree granting to the Protestants some of their rights, but making no mention of restitution. Another paper was presented, in which to show their reasonableness in demanding restitution of stolen property, they stated, that since the accession of Leopold, they had lost eight hundred and eighty-eight churches, without counting chapels, and houses of prayer.

Very far were the Protestants from receiving full justice at this Diët, but they obtained some relief. The exiled pastors

were allowed to return home, and no one was to be disturbed on account of his religion. Seized churches that had not yet been consecrated to Rome, were to be restored. Obstacles in the way of the burial of the dead were removed—and encouragement was given to ask for more favours at the next Diet. They were much indebted for what they received to the lay Roman Catholic deputies, among whom they had many firm friends, while the higher clergy were their most violent oppressors.

Meagre as were the promises of this Diet, the fruits were more so. The old form of oppression was renewed, alleviated in part, by Tokely's success at the head of the rebels, to be repeated with greater severity after his defeat, so that the Protestants in their petition to the Diet of 1687, had to complain, that the "free exercise of the rites of their religion is almost universally prohibited." The old expedient of charging conspiracy and rebellion was resorted to, and many of the nobles of upper Hungary, chiefly Protestants, suffered death. When the Protestants complained to the Emperor, he coolly informed them that they had forfeited their rights entirely, because they were dissatisfied with what had been granted. So far from getting help, a new interpretation was made of the article of 1681, concerning the restitution of churches, by which they lost those which had been surrendered to them. The article provided, that all the churches taken by either side since a certain date, should be restored. Some which had been taken by the Catholics were restored to the Protestants. This was interpreted to be a seizure by the Protestants, and restitution was demanded. Here was, truly, logic invented for the occasion.

The work of proselytism and persecution was carried on with vigour and cruelty until the death of Leopold, in 1705. The constitution was trampled under foot. This independent kingdom was treated as a province of Austria. It was devastated by Turks and rebels. The Jesuits were everywhere at work. Foreign powers threatened. The kingdom was on the brink of ruin. Leopold saw it, and advised his son to conciliatory measures.

His son and successor, Joseph I., followed that advice, and

conciliatory measures were adopted during his brief reign. The Protestants gathered up the scattered remnants of their institutions, and proceeded to reorganize churches, schools, &c. Joseph, by his pacific conduct, won the hearts of many Protestants. He would not allow the clergy to play their old tricks, nor suffer the Protestant pastors to be disturbed. His death occurred in 1711, and shortly after it the peace of Szathmar was concluded.

A universal amnesty was granted, and returning prosperity was anticipated. But alas! the Jesuits and the spirit of Jesuitism were still there.

Charles VI. ascended the throne in 1712. He was decided and energetic in his efforts to stay the hand of persecution. He endeavoured to administer justice without respect of persons. This incited the priests to be crafty and vigilant in order to entangle the heretics. The pastors were closely confined to their districts. Charles did all that seemed to be in his power to protect his Protestant subjects, but he was obliged to yield by little and little, until at the close of his reign they were in no better condition than they had been under Leopold. At last it was resolved that a new Court of Commission should be established for the settling of all differences in religious matters; but the hopes raised by this were disappointed. The experiment failed. The Popish and Protestant members could not agree on the rules by which they were to be governed. They differed also in the interpretation of past decrees. Confusion was produced, and this court became an engine of oppression to the Protestant pastors. The censorship of the press was given to the Jesuits. Public preaching was forbidden, and at last the king in disgust adjourned the Commission.

A new court, consisting of twenty-two members, and called the Deputy Privy Council, was now established, and it was abused just like the Commission. The king's influence in favour of his Protestant subjects continually decreased. Wearied, he at last issued a number of resolutions by which their rights were greatly abridged. They remonstrated, and the Catholic clergy were also dissatisfied because he did not go far enough. The result was, that all the churches that had not been expressly guarantied to the Protestants were confiscated. The pastors

were driven from their homes in mid-winter by officers void of sympathy. This cruelty drew appeals from Frederick William of Prussia, and the ambassadors of England, Holland, Denmark, and Sweden. These availed not. The Jesuits were supreme. Charles had become a cipher. The Protestants were compelled to observe Romish ceremonies, and even family worship was interfered with. The sick and dying received a visit from their pastors only by special favour, while the priests exacted the usual fees.

Maria Theresa succeeded her father in 1741. The empire at this time was wasted by war. She threw herself at once on the Hungarians, who nobly rallied around her, hoping for brighter and better days. They had confidence in her gentle and humane character. The Protestants resolved to make their case known without delay, and presented a petition containing a recapitulation of the oppressions of years, with a prayer for redress and the future security of their rights. They also proposed that any difficulty that might arise should be decided by a mixed Commission, composed of an equal number of Catholics and Protestants. The petition was signed by "Her Majesty's most obedient and ever faithful subjects of the Augsburg and Helvetic Confession residing in Hungary."

By the advice of her Council, the Empress made no reply whatever to this petition. She was under the complete sway of the Jesuits, and all the hopes that had been excited by her accession vanished. The persecuting spirit was awakened, and the oppressive resolutions of her father confirmed. Protestants were virtually debarred from office, because an oath by the Virgin Mary was required. Obstacles were put in the way of young men who desired to study at foreign Universities. Candidates of theology were called home, and books and churches and school-houses were seized, and pastors and teachers were driven away. Those who went out of their own district to a distance to hear preaching, were beaten, or otherwise abused. The bishops persisted in a visitation of the Protestant churches for the regulation of their internal affairs, the examination of their pastors, &c. Many families, in which the husband and wife were one Catholic and the other Protestant, were greatly annoyed by the impudent interference of the priests in the edu-

cation of their children. Many children were abducted. Many were forcibly made Catholics by thrusting a consecrated wafer into their mouths. The pastors were closely watched, and severely punished if they stepped out of their own bounds to visit the sick and dying.

There was little encouragement to offer petitions, but what could the bleeding Church do? It was tried again, with similar results. The last step that remained was an appeal to the foreign powers which had guarantied the liberties of Hungary, and this was taken. The Dutch and Hanoverian ambassadors wrote repeatedly to the empress, and Frederick the Great, of Prussia, wrote a noble letter to Count Schaffgotsh, Cardinal and Prince Bishop of Breslau, (page 400,) in which he clearly shows that he understood the Catholic clergy to be the root of all these troubles. This letter the Cardinal, under the conviction that nothing could be done at Vienna, transmitted to the Pope, Benedict XIV. The Pope expressed his dissatisfaction with the doings of the priests, and directed the bishops in Hungary to exercise great caution.

A letter also came from the archbishop of Canterbury, signifying that the king of England had directed his ambassador to inquire into the case, and that he (the archbishop) was ready to be the advocate of his poor brethren in the faith.

Of this interference little fruit came. Those who were supposed to have applied for it were rebuked. The oppressions charged were, as usual, indignantly denied; promises were freely made, and then things went on as usual.

It was a good day for Hungary when Maria Theresa, after the death of her husband, gave her son Joseph a share in the government. He at once read the characters of the Jesuits who were about his mother, and he became the uncompromising enemy of the order. He was not able to accomplish much during her life, but he prepared the way for the sweeping reforms which he afterwards effected.

He travelled through Hungary, made himself familiar with the condition of the people, conversed with the superintendents of the Protestant Church, and by his gentle, affable manners, gained every heart. He saw that the Jesuits were at the bottom of all the troubles, and in 1770, when Choiseul, the Prime

Minister of France, contemplated a dissolution of the order, Joseph wrote to him that no reliance could be placed on his mother for "the affection for this order of monks is hereditary in the House of Hapsburg," but that if he were emperor he might be relied on for co-operation. He wrote, "Choiseul! I know these people well. I know their plans and exertions to spread darkness over the earth, and rule all Europe from Cape Finisterre to the North Sea." In a letter written to a Spanish nobleman after the suppression of the order, he says, after praising Clement XIV. for the act: "Their influence over the House of Hapsburg is too well known. Ferdinand II. and Leopold I. were their protectors and patrons even with their latest breath." In 1773 the order was suspended in Hungary.

The Protestants now began to consult about measures for the internal prosperity of their churches. They met on the Lord's day for worship; the authority of the priests over them was limited, and from time to time they were relieved by new decrees. Even lawsuits were sometimes decided in their favour, and restitution of stolen property was ordered. Their orphan children were allowed to be educated in the faith of their parents.

Maria Theresa was a woman naturally of kind and amiable disposition, but this was coated over by superstition. Conscience was perverted. The weightier matters of the law were nothing, in comparison with ceremonies and traditions. She verily thought that she was doing God service, while she oppressed his saints. Her death gave her noble and energetic son, Joseph II., an opportunity to carry out his just and liberal views.

He directed his energies to what had years before been proved an impossible thing, viz., the cleansing of that Augean stable, the Church of Rome. She cannot be reformed, for her corruptions are her life. He was supported in this by many of the higher clergy, and opposed by the whole body of monks and priests. He struck at the Papacy. He would have the Church in Hungary free from foreign influence, and subject only to her own bishops. He did not allow Papal bulls to be published in the kingdom without his sanction; and he broke up the monasteries.

He wrote the following letter to his minister at Rome:

"My Lord Cardinal—Ever since I mounted the throne, and assumed the first diadem of the world, I have made philosophy to be the lawgiver of my kingdom. It is necessary to remove out of the category of religion, some things which never belonged to it. As I hate superstition and Phariseism, I shall deliver my people from them. To this end I shall dismiss the monks, abolish their monasteries, and bring them all under subjection to the bishops of the diocese. In Rome, they will call this an aggression on the divine rights. They will cry and lament that the glory of Israel is fallen. We shall hear that I am taking away the tribunes of the people, and am drawing a line between dogma and philosophy. Bitterer still will be the rage, when they hear that I have done all this without consulting the servant of servants, and awaiting his opinion.

"We must thank him for the degradation of the human intellect. Never shall we bring these servants of the altar, voluntarily, to keep their place, and confine themselves to the preaching of the gospel; never will these children of Levi be willing to give up the monopoly of wisdom and knowledge. The monastic principle has been from the very first, directly opposed to reason; they give to the founder of their order a degree of honour approaching to divine worship; so that, in them we see the antitype of the Israelites, who went to Dan and Bethel to worship the golden calves. This false system of religion has taken possession of the mass of the people, who, while they know not God, expect all from their patron saints!

"I shall restore the rights of the bishops, and give the people, instead of the monk, the regular priest; and, instead of the legendary romance, a preached gospel. Where there is a difference of religion, there shall be a preaching of morality.

"I shall take care that my plans serve also for the future. The seminaries are the schools of my priests, where they shall come forth enlightened, and prepared to communicate knowledge to the people; and, in a period of less than a century, we shall have Christians; my people will understand their duty, and children's children shall bless us for having freed them

from a too powerful Rome, and for having shown the priests how to keep their proper place." Page 438.

In accordance with these views, he issued "the Edict of Toleration," forbidding the exclusion of Protestants from office on account of their religion, their compulsory observance of the ceremonies of Rome, and the intermeddling of priests with the internal affairs of Protestant Churches, and granting the Protestants liberty to build churches and exercise worship.

Proportionate to the joy of the Protestants, were the dissatisfaction, and even rage of the priests, who used every means to change the mind of the Emperor, but they could not. Even the Pope visited Vienna for that purpose. He was treated very politely, but accomplished nothing. Joseph signified to His Holiness, that he would be very happy to have his approval of the measures of reform, but that, if he could not have it, he was prepared to dispense with it.

The Protestants did not at once get all their rights, but they were gradually delivered from oppression. They obtained permission to print Bibles and religious books. Confiscated books were restored, and priests, and even bishops, were called to account for attempting their accustomed Jesuitical operations.

In amazement they inquired, whither these things were tending, and whether Joseph was not going to join the Protestants. The feeling was so strong, that he made a public declaration, to the effect that he intended to adhere to the Church of Rome, and wished that all his subjects were Catholics; but that he would not suffer any man to be forced contrary to the dictates of his own conscience to join *any church*; and that if a Romanist wished to join the Protestant Church, he must give six weeks' notice, which time was to be devoted to his religious instruction.

Although the Emperor desired to do justice, yet his eyes could not be everywhere. The execution of the laws was in the hands of subordinates, and the churches still suffered numerous grievances, on account of which they complained. It was not in vain. Justice was done them, and further measures were adopted to free them entirely from priestly jurisdiction and interference. In the district beyond the Danube, a new

superintendent was elected, and the Presbyterian form of Church government was revived.

Much excitement was raised by the "School Question," which is not in these latter days a new thing under the sun. The Protestants had always had their own schools, though they had been much interfered with, and often broken up during the troubles. At this time a national school system was introduced, which was applied to the Protestant schools in existence. But various practical questions arose. It was not questioned whether religious instruction should be given in them, but how, and to what extent. The Protestants were very jealous on this subject, for they felt that the system of education was closely connected with the good of the Church. It was agreed that the Protestants should retain such schools as they had in operation; that where they had none, and their children were in the other schools, the precentor should go in and instruct them in the Protestant faith, and where Protestant teachers were employed they should be paid out of the national fund. "In mixed schools, such prayers should be used as made it consistent for the children of all confessions to come and to leave at the same time." The times for communicating religious instruction were to be fixed and published; the feelings of Protestant children were to be tenderly regarded, and everything offensive to them was to be removed from the school-books.

But the Protestants, remembering the past, were suspicious; they declined to co-operate in these schools, or to send their children to them. This resulted in some modifications. Among other things, it was provided that the Scriptures should be carefully read, and parents should be held responsible for the non-attendance of their children of suitable age.

Just before his death, which occurred in 1790, advantage was taken of the weakness of Joseph's mind, and he was persuaded to revoke a few of the measures which he had introduced.

The reign of his worthy successor, Leopold II., was short. He was firm in the maintenance of the right. He early issued some resolutions which, after a warm debate, the Diet adopted by an immense majority, and recorded among the laws of the

land. These confirmed the privileges which Joseph had given to the Protestants. Then they were dependent on the good pleasure of the sovereign, now they were guarantied by the laws of the land. This was followed up by conventions of both the Lutheran and Reformed Churches to consider plans for co-operation.

Francis I., the son of Leopold, did not walk in the steps of his father. Many of the most glaring abuses of the olden time were revived. The French Revolution broke out, and it was charged to the infidel, licentious spirit engendered by Protestantism. Popery was cherished as the bulwark of the throne. The Protestants in a long petition rehearsed their grievances, supporting them by a citation of numerous particular instances of oppression. The Church also suffered from internal difficulties. She lacked well-qualified preachers and schoolmasters. The former had often more zeal than knowledge, and the latter were frequently taken from among the young and inexperienced.

All petitions for relief were disregarded. So great was the fear of conversions, that pastors were forbidden to allow any Roman Catholic to be present at worship. Children were required to be sent to the Roman Catholic schools, and seven hundred Bibles sent by the British and Foreign Bible Society were confiscated. Still some advantages were secured. A college was founded, and great sacrifices made for it. A church was formed in Pesth, and a new edition of the Bible was introduced.

The Protestants determined at last to send a deputation to the Emperor, to lay their grievances before him. It was composed of Privy Councillor Peter Balogh, general inspector of the Lutheran Church, and Count Ladislaus Telekey, of the Reformed Church. Having secured the favourable regard of the Palatine, they laid their cause before the Emperor. He received them civilly, but signified that he could not tolerate sectarians, and alleged that the Protestants in Hungary were driving the Roman Catholics out of the civil offices, which was simply a lie of the priests. When the confiscation of the Bibles was spoken of, he made the profound remark, "that too much reading in these books was dangerous to the stability of the

state." They also had an interview with Prince Metternich, who acknowledged that they had suffered great injustice, and tried to excuse the government. He went so far as to declare his opinion that Protestantism was more advantageous to rulers than Popery, and promised his endeavours that justice should be done them.

The Protestant Church not only suffered these annoyances from without, but there were unfavourable elements at work within. Distracted counsels defeated all plans that were prepared for the improvement of the schools or the advancement of the Church. Then too, the government became bankrupt—the great famine followed—and while the value of money was greatly depreciated, the cost of the necessities of life was proportionably enhanced. This was the cause of great suffering among pastors and people. Great disregard of ecclesiastical order was also manifested.

The celebration of the Jubilee of the Reformation (1817) stirred up the spirit of intolerance. Students of theology were forbidden to study at foreign Universities, and Protestant pastors were annoyed in the discharge of their duties. A deputation was sent to the Emperor, which accomplished nothing, for he could not be made to believe that their representation of the state of things was not overdrawn. He visited Hungary in 1822, and was waited on by a deputation of Protestants. He heard them kindly, expressed his disapproval of persecution, and assured them that he would attend to their matters. But he seems to have been afraid that the toleration of Protestantism would lead to the indifference on the entire subject of religion which he witnessed in Germany, and of which he frequently spoke. He was sincere, but misled and deceived.

A great advantage was secured at this time, by the opening of the Theological Institution, at Vienna, (1821.) Efforts were made to collect information about the Church, and much was done. Many valuable papers were secured. Agents at Vienna were directed to report annually what was done in ecclesiastical matters at court. This was important, for the three million Protestants had not a single organ for circulating ecclesiastical information. A normal seminary, and educa-

tional institution, were established at Oberschutzen, which are now in a prosperous condition.

The king died in 1835, and was succeeded by Ferdinand V., who followed the policy of his father, and continued Metternich in the ministry. Still, there were many Roman Catholic members of the Diet, who were firm advocates of justice to the Protestants.

Count Charles Zay, having been chosen general inspector of the Protestant churches, endeavoured to introduce some reforms. He wished to unite the German, Slavic, and Magyar elements, and effect a union of the Reformed and Lutheran Churches. But this was next to impossible, for there had always been bitter enmity between the Slaves and Magyars. This was now increased, by very injudicious attempts to encourage the study of the Magyar language, and to introduce it into the schools, church courts, &c. Some Slavic preachers with Paul Jasophy, one of the superintendents, at their head, went to Vienna to complain. This was unfortunate, for it gave the court a pretext to interfere in the internal affairs of the churches. Much ill-tempered controversy arose, and no progress was made toward a union of the Churches. The nearest approach was made by the issue of a periodical, in 1842, under the joint editorial care of one member of the Reformed Church, and one of the Lutheran. This did good service in circulating information, advocating missions, and defending sound, scriptural principles. It was suppressed after the Hungarian reverses, in 1848.

In 1843, some decided advantages were gained. A royal resolution gave equal rights and privileges to members of different Confessions, and in case of mixed marriages, allowed parents to determine in what faith their children should be educated. This satisfied neither party. The Catholic Church considered such children as her property, and denied the right of even parents to interfere with it. The Protestants dreaded the influence of the Confessional on the decisions of parents. The magnates recommended that the decision should in all cases be left with the father. The disputes arising from this prompted the Protestants to apply to the Palatine, who expressed very liberal sentiments.

In their petition, they detailed the history of their past grievances, and the bad faith with which they had been treated. The result was the passage by the Diet of an act granting them all that was demanded on the subject of mixed marriages, and exercise of worship. This being secured, the attention of the Church was called to its internal affairs. The Constitution of the Lutheran Church was revised, and schemes adopted for her prosperity. But the spirit of persecution was not yet dead. Pastor Wimmer was arrested, and tried for publishing a translation of Barth's Church History, on the ground that it represented Rome unfavourably. How could it have done otherwise, if truthful? The death of the Palatine was a great calamity to the Protestants; for, though a Catholic, he was anxious that they should enjoy their rights. His pious widow, who had been as a guardian angel to the persecuted Church, was, in violation of the will of her husband, and of the marriage contract, not allowed to remain in Hungary, but required to fix her residence at Vienna.

Glorious things now seemed at hand for Hungary. The thrones of Europe were tottering. The shock, as of an earthquake, starting from Paris, was felt in a moment at Vienna. The despots were willing to concede anything to the rising people, but it was only to gain time to mature their plans for crushing them at last. The revolution at Vienna brought the Court to terms. Long had it been attempted to make Hungary a mere province of Austria, though it was in fact an independent kingdom, with a constitution of its own, and a king constitutionally elected. But now, an independent ministry was given to Hungary, and full religious liberty was introduced. The resolutions of the Diet were all sanctioned by the king. Bathyani was made Prime Minister. Devout thanksgivings were offered in the churches. A bright day had suddenly burst on the nation.

But all was given with secret reluctance, to be withdrawn as soon as a favourable opportunity should offer; and perfidy at once laid plans to bring about such an opportunity. A serious question had now to be decided by the Church. Should she become the servant of the State; surrender her schools and institutions to the State, and derive her support from it? The

General Assembly of the Lutheran Church decided that her internal government and the schools should remain entirely under her own control, subject to the laws of the land. Though there was little harmony between the various parts of the Protestant Church, owing to difference of nationality or of faith, yet all, Saxon, Magyar, Slave, Lutheran, Calvinist, and Unitarian, agreed that the independence of the Church must be maintained. All bribes and lures in the form of endowment were therefore rejected.

This was wise and well, for trouble now came in like a flood. Jellachich, Ban of Croatia, was on the way to Pesth. The Imperial Commissioner was murdered. Kossuth was made governor, and issued his proclamation. The people were in arms. The pastors were obliged to read Kossuth's proclamation from the pulpit. For this they were reckoned traitors by Windischgratz, and tried by court-martial wherever his army was successful. They were then required to read his proclamations, for which they were punished in turn by the Revolutionists, when they got the mastery. Görgy's treachery, and Haynau's approach, soon finished the work. The prisons were filled. Vengeance was taken on the Protestant Church, as if it had been a special fomenter of rebellion. Haynau took its liberty away by a single stroke, removed its superintendents, appointed others, furnished endowments, and endeavoured, as he expressed it, "to bind the Protestant Church closer to the State."

Both the Lutheran and Calvinist Churches in Hungary were, from the first, organized on the principle of self-government. A pastor and lay-inspector presided over every local congregation, chosen by the suffrages of its members. Delegates elected by the members formed the seniorial meetings, over which a senior or dean, with a lay-inspector, presided. Above these, were the Districtual Conventions, four belonging to the Lutheran Church, and four to the Reformed, presided over by as many Superintendents. Besides these, the Lutherans, also, had a General Assembly. But, at this day, the Protestant Churches in Hungary, embracing three million of people, are virtually without self-government. Free suffrage, and independent church courts, have given way to consisto-

rial administration, by men nominated by the government. Under pretence too, of re-organizing the schools, many have been broken up, while a few have been saved by incredible sacrifices. Let us hope and pray, for God only can reach the case, that the day of deliverance for the bleeding cause of Protestantism in Hungary may speedily come.

ART. III.—*Biblische Numismatik oder Erklärung der in der heil. Schrift erwähnten alten Münzen, von D. Celestino Cavendoni. Aus dem Italienischen übersetzt und mit Zusätzen versehen, von A. von Werlhof, 1855. 8vo. pp. 163; with one plate of fac-similes.*

THIS treatise on the money of the Bible, with which we have first become acquainted in its German dress, was published in Italian at Modena in 1850, and received a prize the same year from the Academy of Inscriptions at Paris. The author is, what are not often found combined, both a theologian and a numismatologist. The translator, who is himself the author of a Handbook of Greek Numismatics, has enhanced the value of the work by occasional notes from his own observations, or those of Bœckh, and other Germans of note in this department.

The tradition which makes money to have been first coined at Ægina, by direction of Phidon, king of Argos, about the time of the founding of Rome, receives confirmation from the fact, that rude Æginetan coins have been found of a higher antiquity than any others. For this reason the preference is accorded to this, above the opposing statements that coined money was an invention of the Lydians or of the Phenicians. The earliest form of traffic was a simple barter of one article of utility for another; in the next, certain metals were taken as representatives of value, and in the form of lumps, or bars, were given and taken in exchange for wares. In the primitive mode of barter, the domestic animals, which formed the chief wealth of the patriarchs, seem to have constituted the earliest standard

of valuation. Hence, when lumps of the precious metals subsequently came into use, they were graduated in size to correspond to the value of an ox, a sheep, or some other animal. Hence the *pecunia* of the Latins derived its name from *pecus*. And the *kesita* (קֶשֶׁטָה Gen. xxxiii. 19; Job xlii. 12) of the patriarchs, which, by consent of the ancient versions, means "a lamb," must have denoted a piece of uncoined silver equal in worth to a lamb. This is sometimes incorrectly explained as a piece of money bearing the image of a lamb: the coin which gave rise to this explanation was not struck for a thousand years after the time of Jacob. So too, in the *Iliad*, which knows nothing of coined money, the tripod of Achilles was prized at twelve oxen, and a female slave at four oxen, in the games at the death of Patroclus. The precious metals seem also in Egypt to have been weighed out in portions answering to the value of an ox, a goat, or a frog; the last being esteemed for mythological reasons.

The pieces of metal used in trade were mostly in the form of plates or bars. Of this character was the wedge (Heb. *tongue*) of gold coveted by Achan. Such bars continued in use long after the introduction of coins, and a considerable quantity was found some years since at Cadriano, along with many thousand Roman *denarii*, which had been buried in the civil wars of Pompey and Cæsar. A Greek inscription of the time of Nerva mentions as a definite sum, seventy plates (πλάτη) of silver, though πλάτη may have a double sense, like the Italian *piastra*, meaning both a plate and a coin. The Egyptians seem to have preferred the form of rings. Hence possibly it may be accounted for, that the Septuagint renders the "ring of gold," Job xlii. 12, by τετραδραχμον, which is an indication that the gold rings of Egyptian trade weighed four Alexandrian, which are equivalent to eight Attic, *drachmæ*.

From its original shape, that of a bar or spit, (ὀβολός), the Greek *obolos* derived its name. Six *oboloi* made a *drachma*, δραχμή, literally a handful, as many as one can hold in the hand. That these bars were sometimes tied together in bundles of definite size, may be inferred from the history of Joseph's brethren, Gen. xlii. 35, where the LXX have δεσμὸς ἀργυρίου. For transactions of small moment, in which less ap-

prehension was entertained of error or fraud, small pieces of silver of known weight appear to have been in circulation, which were given and taken without being freshly weighed each time. Of this sort was the quarter shekel in the possession of the servant of Saul, (1 Sam. ix. 8,) and the bit of silver, *אגרת כסף*, mentioned 1 Sam. ii. 36. In matters of greater consequence, the silver and gold were weighed, and were ascertained, whether by the touchstone or by some conventional mark upon the bars, to possess the requisite purity and fineness; hence we read in the time of Abraham of "silver current with the merchant." Gen. xxiii. 16. The frauds to which this mode of trade was incident, are forbidden by Moses, (Deut. xxv. 13) and by Solomon, (Prov. xx. 10) and denounced by the prophets, (Amos viii. 5; Micah vi. 10, 11,) the having weights of different sizes, the smaller for the articles sold, the larger for the price to be received.

To prevent these frauds, which must have prevailed to a much greater extent among heathen nations than among the covenant people, coins bearing a recognized stamp, which should entitle them to public confidence, were first introduced into Greece; and thence, as it would appear, the practice was borrowed by the Persians and the Phenicians. Egypt had no native coins until the reign of the Ptolemies, and then only with Greek figures and inscriptions. The Hebrews at the time of the Babylonish captivity made use of Persian, Phenician, and Greek coins, and, at a subsequent period, had coins of their own; but prior to the captivity they continued to observe the old method of weighing the precious metals.

Abraham, who was very rich not only in cattle but in silver and gold, weighed four hundred shekels of silver as the price of the cave of Machpelah. Joseph's brethren brought back with them to Egypt the money (Heb. *silver*) found in their sacks in full weight. Gen. xliii. 21. The man who saw Absalom hanging in the oak, said to Joab, (Eng. Ver. Marg.), "Though I were to weigh upon my hand a thousand shekels of silver, yet would I not put forth my hand against the king's son." 2 Sam. xviii. 12. Isaiah speaks, (xli. 6) of men lavishing gold out of the bag and weighing silver in the balance. He asks, (lv. 2,) "Wherefore do ye weigh silver (Heb.) for that

which is not bread?" Jeremiah weighed the silver which he paid for the field in Anathoth. Jer. xxxii. 9, 10. And even after the captivity, Zechariah speaks of the ungrateful flock weighing, as the price of the good shepherd, thirty *shekels* of silver. Zech. xi. 12. When, in 2 Kings, xii. 10, the silver contributed for the repairs of the house of God is said to have been told or counted, this may be because a later writer employed a term appropriate to his own days, or the contributions may have been in pieces of silver of equal size, which only needed therefore to be counted. There is no word in the whole Old Testament answering to coin, νόμισμα, *nummus*, but simply silver and brass (or rather bronze or copper) used in the general sense of money, like the Greek ἀργύριον, and the Latin *aes*.

After the exile, the Jews were first under the dominion of Persia; then under that of Syria. It was not until the yoke of the latter was shaken off, under the conduct of the Maccabees, that any native Jewish coins were struck. Such are found, however, both of silver and bronze, bearing date from the first, second, third and fourth years of the "Redemption of Israel," or the "Freedom of Israel," B. C. 143 to 140. It is a singular circumstance, that upon coins of various denominations belonging to the first year, the name of the city is written ירושלים, and on those of the following years ירושלים; which our author undertakes to account for by the hypothesis of the dual signification of the latter; Jerusalem being regarded as consisting of two parts, the upper and the lower city. It was not until the second year, according to 1 Macc. xiii. 51, that possession was gained of the upper city, or the tower of Zion. It is well known that the shape of the Hebrew letters upon these coins is quite different from that now in use, and that it bears a striking resemblance to the Samaritan character. The same letter is found upon the coins of the Pseudo-Messiah Barcochba, as late as the reign of Hadrian, A. D. 132. Many of these are the *denarii* of Trajan recoined; upon one which once evidently bore the name of the emperor Servius Galba, the Roman letters . . . PSER . . . remain still uneffaced. The letter *Tav* upon the coins, has the form of a cross ×; which affords an illustration of Ezek. ix. 4, where the man with the

inkhorn is directed to set a mark (Heb. *tav*,) upon the foreheads of all the pious in the city.

We pass over the discussion of the various legends and figures upon these coins, noting only the fact that they never contain any representations of men or animals. We pass also the coins with Greek legends, bearing the names of different members of the Herodian family, or of the Roman emperors, or their connections, and come to the foreign coins which found circulation in Palestine. These were chiefly Persian, Greek, and Roman. The gold *darics*, *δαρεῖοι* of the Persians, are mentioned in the Old Testament under the names דָּרִיָּקוֹן & דָּרְכִּמֹן. From their bearing a figure which holds in his hands a bow and a lance, they were sometimes called by the Greeks *τοξόται*, *archers*. It was to this name and to the power of Persian gold, that Agesilaus alluded, when he said that he had been driven from Asia Minor by thirty thousand archers. The coin has the weight of two Attic *drachmæ*, or one hundred and fifty-seven and three-quarter Parisian grains, and is valued at twenty-eight and one-half francs. Mention is made of *darics* several times in the books of Ezra and Nehemiah, where the English version follows the Septuagint in translating "*drams*;" the Alexandrian *drachma* being double the Attic. An incidental proof may hence be drawn of the genuineness of these books; for had they been written in the time of the Maccabees or even as late as Alexander, the *daric* would have been superseded in common use by other coins. When (1 Chron. xxix. 7) the contributions of gold made for the temple in the days of David are partly reckoned in *drams* (*darics*), there is no implication of course of the existence of this coin, at the time referred to; but the writer, in order to be better understood, states the sum in the currency of his own times.

The Greek coins mentioned in the New Testament are the *drachma*, and its multiples the *didrachmon*, and the *stater* or *tetradrachmon*. These are thought to have been not of the Attic, but the Phœnician standard, which was somewhat inferior in weight and value. The piece of money lost by the woman in the parable, (Luke xv. 8, 9,) was a silver *drachma*, which was almost equal in value to a Roman *denarius* under Augustus, and might very well be an object of concern at that

time to a woman in humble circumstances. If, however, this be thought too small, a *drachma* of gold is supposable, whose value was twelve and a half times greater. The tribute money (Matt. xvii. 24,) was the *didrachmon*, and the piece of money found in the fish's mouth (v. 27,) was the *stater*. The *stater* exceeded the Jewish shekel somewhat in weight; but the difference was taken by the money-changers as their percentage for furnishing Jewish, in place of heathen coins, for payment into the treasury of the temple. The fifty thousand pieces of silver, the value of the books of curious arts burned by the converts at Ephesus, (Acts xix. 19,) are supposed to have been the Ephesian *drachmæ*, this being the common standard coin of that region.

When Augustus came to the empire, he ordained by the advice of Mæcenas, that the weights, measures, and coins of Rome should be adopted in all the provinces. The wide extent of their circulation is proved, not only by the statements of ancient authors, but by their being found in modern times in the most remote regions, even in India. The Roman coins mentioned in the Gospels are the silver *denarius*, and the bronze *as* and *quadrans*. The *as* derived its name, according to some authors, from *aes*, as a bronze coin; according to others, from *εἰς*, as the unit of computation; according to Cave-doni, from *assis*, a board, its original shape being that of a flat square piece of metal. It at first weighed a pound, and was synonymous with *libra* and *pondus*; but in the straitened condition of the public funds, produced by the first Punic war, it was reduced to two ounces. Further reductions were made in the second Punic war to one ounce; in the Marsian war to half an ounce; and after the time of Augustus to a quarter of an ounce, or one forty-eighth of its original weight. The *denarius* received its name from its being equivalent to ten *asses*; upon the reduction which took place in the value of the latter, in the second Punic war, however, it was fixed at sixteen times the *as*, except in the payment of soldiers. The *denarius* bore the name and title, and most commonly the head, of the reigning emperor. It was one of these that our Saviour held in his hand, when he asked his captious questioners: "Whose is this image and superscription?" Mat. xxii. 20. Two hundred *de-*

narii, it is stated, John vi. 7, would have purchased bread enough for five thousand people. According to John xii. 3-5, a pound of ointment of spikenard was worth three hundred *denarii*; a statement confirmed by Pliny, who speaks of cinnamon-ointment costing from twenty-five to three hundred *denarii*, and of the ointment of spikenard as being of about the same price. At Athens, a *cotyla* (less than a pound) of expensive oriental ointment is spoken of as worth from five hundred to one thousand *drachmæ*. Two sparrows are said (Mat. x. 29) to cost an *as*, and five (Luke xii. 6) to cost two *asses*, the price being cheapened as a larger quantity was taken. The *quadrans* or quarter *as*, is twice referred to, Mat. v. 26 (where it is paralleled to the *lepton*, Luke xii. 59) and Mark xii. 42. The widow's mite (*lepton*) is thought to be equal to the *quadrans*, not the half of it, as this latter passage is sometimes explained.

The discussion presented in this volume of the imaginary coins of the Bible (talents and minæ) and particularly that regarding the prices of various articles which are there mentioned, is very interesting, but we cannot enter upon it here.

ART. IV.—*Sketches of Virginia, Historical and Biographical.*

By the Rev. William Henry Foote, D. D., Pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Romney, Va. Second Series. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1855. Pp. 596, 8vo.

EXACTLY six years have elapsed, since we took occasion to say, that Dr. Foote had, by his first series of Sketches, made an offering of inestimable value to our Church. Not only will we not retract this judgment, but we hasten to renew it in favour of the volume before us. Of general remark there is the less left us to make, since what we had to say on the foregoing volume. The characteristics of both are the same; and we observe now, as before, the author's industrious quest of facts; his faithful, transcription of authorities; his careful preservation of minute, and often unique fragments; and his perpetual love and zeal

for our common country, and our beloved Church. If, in some instances, the accumulation of crude facts and dates constitutes rather memoirs to serve for history, than digested history itself; even this is a work which we cannot do without, and which few are both able and willing to undertake. We thank him for his pious care, and again express our gratification that opinions so favourable to Scotch Presbyterians and Virginians should proceed from a son of New England. May it be an augury of Christian alliance never to be broken.

The volume now published is very largely taken up with the churches and ministers of the Valley of Virginia. The author has not chosen to call it an Ecclesiastical History, and in this we approve his judgment. The liberty which he allows himself, permits him to divert from the highway of church affairs in numerous episodes, which we should be sorry to miss. Though most of the ground traversed in this series is altogether new, it happens, in a few instances, that the line dropped in the other volume is taken up here; but we observe no repetition. The venerable Presbytery of Hanover, of course occupies a leading place in these annals. In 1758, it included, with one exception, all the ministers south of the Potomac, in connection with the two Synods which were then united. Dr. Foote gives an account of these ministers in detail. Some of the biographies are very striking; and among these we would indicate those of Daniel Rice, James Mitchel, and James Turner. The foundation of Presbyterian churches in Kentucky and Tennessee naturally comes in for its share of notice.

The progress of religion is closely connected with the early religious life of the Rev. Mr. Mitchel, who lived to be a patriarch among the churches. He belonged to a hardy stock, and by uniting severe exercise and fresh air with ministerial work, preserved his vigour to a very advanced age. Thirty years ago, and long before we had addressed ourselves to the work of reviewing, we formed part of a cavalcade, on the return from a sacramental gathering, at which Mr. Mitchel was the chief speaker. All were mounted, and as we rode through the summer woodlands, fifteen miles, on our way to Lynchburg, the good old man, then in his eightieth year, was one of the most agile of the party, and he lived to preach the gospel fifteen years

longer. As we are happy in the belief that neither various learning nor commanding eloquence is indispensable to great usefulness in the ministry, we can readily conceive how this sound, pious, and laborious servant of God, should be a blessing to the land in which he lived. He was by some years the senior, and so the adviser, of that group of ministers who came out of the great awakening by which the close of the century was signalized; Alexander, Calhoun, Hill, Baxter, and the Lyles.

Very different was this good man's colleague, James Turner of Bedford. There is a pleasure in reflecting how many mighty preachers there have been, whose names have never become widely famous: in regard to this, much that Mr. Wirt says of the Blind Preacher might be said of Turner. He was one of the orators of nature, or yet more truly, of grace. We have often heard such accounts of him from the lips of the late Dr. Alexander as cause us to believe that, in his moments of inspiration, Mr. Turner was nowise inferior to Patrick Henry or James Waddel. Having been notorious for wild and wicked sports, such as prevail in the barbarous frontiers of new countries, he was suddenly converted, and straightway became a Boanerges. The account given by Dr. Foote is interesting throughout, but too long for insertion. We give a portion:

"In 1784, the Rev. James Mitchel became pastor of the Peaks Church. Under his ministry, Bedford enjoyed repeated revivals. In the year 1789, the Rev. Drury Lacy preached repeatedly in the congregation of Mr. Mitchel. Multitudes were attracted to the place of meeting—among them Mr. Turner. While walking around the place of worship, and standing in the shade talking with his companions, the sweet, clear-toned voice of Lacy, fresh from the excitements and religious exercises of Prince Edward, caught his ear. He could not resist its charms; drawing nearer to enjoy its music, some sentences of gospel truth arrested his mind. He drew still nearer to hear what such a man would say on religion. When the congregation was dismissed, and the inquirers were seeking instruction from the ministers, Mr. Turner with an aching heart turned homewards. Strange thoughts passed through his mind, sad feelings possessed his soul, unusual sorrows pressed on his

heart, melancholy forebodings overwhelmed him. He could neither drive these things away, nor fly from them. He was wretched and forlorn. He thought sometimes he was about to die; and sometimes that perhaps he too would become religious like the new converts he had heard of in other places. Home had no comfort for him.

"When his sufferings became intolerable, he mounted his horse to seek his mother, and ask her sympathy and advice. The arrested man thought of the instructions of his childhood, and in the time of his distress fled to his mother's bosom. With great simplicity he told her his feelings about himself, and God, and religion, and death; and inquired what he should do in his strange case. To his utter surprise, his mother, instead of expressing sympathy or giving counsel, exclaimed with tears — 'My son! this is the very thing for which I have prayed for years!' She then broke forth in ascriptions of praise and thanksgiving to Almighty God, for his wonderful mercy in bringing her son under conviction. He stood and wondered if his mother had gone crazy. Her rejoicing added to his grief. Knowing his characteristic fondness and honesty, his mother did not for a moment doubt the reality of her son's convictions; she believed the strong man armed was seized by one stronger than he; and she rejoiced in his convictions and sorrow of heart, as the forerunners of peace in believing. When her first gush of joy was passed, she gave the counsel a Christian mother might give her son. He attended preaching, sought instruction, went to prayer-meetings, prayed in private, and read the word of God. Wearisome days and sleepless nights passed before he could find rest to his soul. He could make no excuse for his sins; and saw he deserved the worst from the hands of God. In receiving mercy, if ever he did, it seemed to him some mark ought to be set upon him, in memory of the past.

"Hearing the subject of the new birth set forth, he was fully convinced of its truth and importance; and in his own case of its immediate necessity. And believing, as he afterwards related, that the new birth was attended with an agony of mind beyond anything he had felt, and that in his case particularly, it ought to be so, he stood, literally stood in the corner of the room, where the services were that evening conducted, desiring,

praying, waiting, for that untold agony of mind and body, which should precede spiritual life. He went away from the meeting alarmed, that not only had he not felt the expected agony, but had lost the distress he had been sinking under, and was becoming calm. He thought of the Lord Jesus Christ as the sinner's friend; and his soul broke forth in praise of him for his wonderful ways to the children of men. He felt he loved him; and yet could scarce believe that such a wretch as he had been, could love him, or be loved by him. He knew not what to do. But as he meditated the tide of feeling became resistless. The mouth once filled with songs of revelry, now spoke God's praise in no measured numbers; and he that had urged others, even preachers, to sin, now most earnestly exhorted them to repent and believe in Jesus." * * * *

"Mr. Turner had great power to move assemblies. He had been unequalled in producing mirth. His few efforts in the legislature led others to anticipate, what he did not think possible, success as a public speaker, on grave subjects. His exhortations in prayer meetings produced effects that revealed to himself his own powers. He preached for years to a congregation embracing many very intelligent and many shrewd people; and the influence of his oratory was neither weak nor transient, nor wanted novelty to give it effect. Impressed himself, he impressed others. His great physical strength permitted him to pour forth a current of feeling that would have destroyed a weaker body. The gentle flow of his own bosom, or the rapid torrent of his excited passion, swept his audience along with unresisted influence. He carefully studied his subjects; and sometimes made notes of thoughts and arguments, and proofs and texts, but never wrote out a sermon in full, and generally made no written preparation. The commencement of his discourse was generally in a low voice, in an easy, unpretending, conversational style and manner, without any promise. His train of thought was good, arranged in a plain, simple, common sense way, so natural the hearer would be inclined to think he would have arranged it in the same way, and that it cost no effort in the preparation, and was so plain everybody ought to see it. The outbreak of feeling was unpremeditated, and equally unexpected by himself and audience. He, in common

with the hearers, seemed confident that the subject prepared would excite him; but in what part of the sermon, or in what particular channel the torrent would run, he neither knew nor desired to know till the moment came, and then he revelled in the delicious excitement. If the inspiration did not come upon him, and the spring of feeling was not opened, he went mourning from the pulpit, but the audience always had a good sermon, one satisfactory if it were not known that he could do better. His preaching hours were generally seasons of delight; often of the highest enjoyment. On some well prepared, important subject of the gospel, his imagination taking fire, his heart melting, his tones and gestures and words were graphic; and his hearers saw and felt, and rejoiced with him."

We take it for granted that no one of our readers will expect us to follow this excellent and very copious work into its details. It would not be proper for us even to name the churches and the men, who come in for description. The very fulness prevents this; a fulness which in a memoir of this kind we highly commend. Better is it to have an occasional excess of anecdote or correspondence, than to lay down a curt and meager epitome with dissatisfaction, when we looked for knowledge. This, we say, is true of books which open the quarry of original facts; later historians may hew and polish, and build into more select and comprehensive structures. Hence, we are pleased with the ample sketches of such men as Hill, Allen, Rice, Baxter, McPheeters, and Speece. In regard to the last mentioned, we take this occasion to say, from our own recollections, and from the more valuable testimony of those whom we most revere, that he deserved all the praise which is here given. Of all the gifted and in some instances truly learned men named in Dr. Foote's volumes, there is certainly no one more admirable in his singularity than Dr. Speece. If his numerous letters could be collected, they would be as remarkable for their caligraphy as their terseness. But he was one of those great conversers who never do themselves justice with the pen. In writing he seemed always chilled and fettered by his cautious observance of classic purity and propriety in his English; in free discourse, as he rode among the mountains, or kept his companions awake all night, he was exuber-

ant, strong, and original. From the hugeness of his frame, and a certain peremptory utterance of his well-weighed periods, he was not seldom compared to Dr. Johnson. The estimate of his character by the late Dr. Alexander, is worthy of preservation.

“When I came to reside at that place (the College,) I found him there; and from this time our intercourse was constant and intimate as long as I remained in the State; and our friendship then contracted continued to be uninterrupted to the day of his death. It is probable, therefore, that no other person has had better opportunities of knowing his characteristic features than myself; and yet I find it difficult to convey to others a correct view of the subject. 1st. One of the most obvious traits of mental character at this period, was independence; by which I mean a fixed purpose to form his own opinions, and to exercise on all proper occasions, entire freedom in the expression of them. He seems very early to have determined not to permit his mind to be enslaved to any human authority, but on all subjects within his reach, to think for himself. He possessed, in an eminent degree, that moral courage or firmness of mind, which leaves a man at full liberty to examine and judge, in all matters connected with human duty or happiness. But though firm and independent, he was far from being precipitate either in forming or expressing his opinions. He knew how to exercise that species of self-denial, so difficult to most young men, of suspending his judgment on any subject, until he should have the opportunity of contemplating it in all its relations. He was ‘swift to hear and slow to speak.’ No one I believe ever heard him give a crude or hasty answer to any question which might be proposed. Careful deliberation uniformly preceded the utterance of his opinions. This unyielding independence of mind, and slow and cautious method of speaking, undoubtedly rendered his conversation at first less interesting, than that of many other persons; and his habit of honestly expressing the convictions of his own mind, prevented him from seeking to please his company by accommodating himself to their tastes and opinions. Indeed, to be perfectly candid, there was in his manners, at this period, less of the graceful and conciliatory character than was desirable.

He appeared, in fact, to be too indifferent to the opinions of others; and with exception of a small circle of intimate friends, manifested no disposition to cultivate the acquaintance, or seek the favour of men. This was undoubtedly a fault; but it was one which had a near affinity to a sterling virtue; and what is better, it was one which in after life he entirely corrected.

"2d. Another thing by which he was characterized, when I first knew him, and which had much influence on his future eminence, was his insatiable thirst for knowledge. His avidity for reading was indeed excessive. When he had got hold of a new book, or an old one, which contained matter interesting to him, scarcely anything could moderate his ardour, or recall him from his favourite pursuit. When I came to reside at Hampden Sidney, he had been there only a few months, and I was astonished to learn how extensively he had ranged over the books which belonged to the College library. And, as far as I can recollect, this thirst for knowledge was indulged at this time, without any regard to system; and often it appeared to me without any definite object. It was an appetite of the very strongest kind, and led to the indiscriminate perusal of books of almost every sort. Now, although this insatiable thirst for knowledge, and unconquerable avidity for books, would in many minds have produced very small, if any good effect, and no doubt was in some respects injurious to him; yet possessing, as he did, a mind of uncommon vigour, and a judgment remarkably sound and discriminating, that accumulation of ideas and facts, which to most men would have been a useless, unwieldy mass, was by him so digested and incorporated with his own thoughts, that it had, I doubt not, a mighty influence in elevating his mind to that commanding eminence to which it attained in his maturer years.

"3d. A third thing which at this early period was characteristic of him, and which had much influence on his capacity of being useful to his fellow-creatures in after life, was a remarkable fondness for his pen. He was, when I first knew him, in the habit of writing every day. He read and highly relished the best productions of the British Essayists; and in his composition, he would imitate the style and manner of the authors whom he chiefly admired. Addison appeared to be his favour-

ite; but his own turn of mind led him to adopt a style more sarcastic and satirical than that which is found in most of the papers of the *Spectator* or *Guardian*. These early productions of his pen were never intended for the press, and were never otherwise published than by being spoken occasionally by the students on the college stage. I may add, that his first essays in composition, though vigorous, and exuberant in matter, needed much pruning and correction.

"4th. There was yet one other trait in his mental character, which struck me as very remarkable in one of his order of intellect. He never discovered a disposition to engage in discussions of a speculative or metaphysical kind. I cannot now recollect that, on any occasion, he engaged with earnestness in controversies of this sort; and this was the more remarkable, because the persons with whom he was daily conversant, were much occupied with them. To such discussions, however, he could listen with attention; and would often show, by a short and pithy remark, that though he had no taste for these speculative and abstruse controversies, he fully understood them. Yet I am of opinion that he took less interest in metaphysical disquisitions, and read less on these points, than in any other department of Philosophy. On some accounts this was a disadvantage to him, as it rendered him less acute in minute discrimination than he otherwise might have been; but on the other hand, it is probable, that this very circumstance had some influence in preparing him to seize the great and prominent points of a subject with a larger grasp, while the minor points were disregarded as unworthy of attention.

"5th. As a teacher, he cherished a laudable ambition to know thoroughly and minutely all the branches of learning in which he professed to give instruction. His classical knowledge was accurate and highly respectable; and the ease with which he pursued mathematical reasoning gave evidence that he might have become a proficient in that department of science. At the same time, he was apt to teach, and succeeded well in training up his pupils in all their studies."

We annex an extract, for the sake of the sound instruction which it conveys, in regard to those Methodistical devices which once became matters of serious debate among Presbyte-

rians; which some warm, but injudicious men were almost ready to erect into means of grace; but which now appear in their true light to all who look back on their disastrous results.

"While 'new measures,' by their novelty and apparent success, were gaining attention and popularity, Dr. Speece called the attention of the Synod at Harrisonburg to the whole subject. Dr. Baxter said of them, 'that without having any virtue in themselves, he thought they might be advantageous; that their efficiency depended on the manner of their use; and their final advantage depended on the prudence of those who used them; and, therefore, Synod was not called to pass any sentence upon them, particularly as ill effects had not yet been seen in the Synod.' Dr. Speece, without going into an argument, expressed an opinion decisively against them all, individually and collectively, as things uncalled for, and therefore useless, if not positively harmful. 'I wish to go along with my old friends and brethren, in all things pertaining to the ministry. I want to hear the strong reasons for these measures. I wish to be convinced if possible. I dislike being left alone by my old friends.' A modified use was adopted by his brethren around; and to gratify his people who wished a trial to be made, and, if possible, to agree with those who believed in their advantage, he held a protracted meeting on the improved plan. The success was apparently complete. More than one hundred were added to the Church. The Doctor was silent about 'new measures.' After a time some ill effects began to appear; and the Doctor returned to his original position, and found his congregation ready to stand by him. Everything objectionable in the 'new measures' speedily disappeared from any part of the Valley in which they may have found a partial and temporary welcome. The thing that most deranged the gospel order of the churches, was the hasty admission of members—that is—allowing people to make profession of religion, and hold church membership on profession of religious exercises, in a short space of time—their first apparent attention to the subject—and that, too, by persons not instructed in the doctrines of the gospel. This in its consequences was found so great an evil, that all that led to it became suspicious, and was ultimately discarded. Dr. Speece

reiterated his opinion, 'that the ordinary means of grace in the church were, with God's blessing, sufficient for the conversion of sinners; and that in extraordinary cases, extraordinary means should be used with exemplary prudence; and that the greater the excitement on religious things, the greater the plainness and precision with which the doctrines of grace should be preached; and that time should be given for due reflection before a profession of faith involving church membership should be encouraged.'"

Within the bounds of Virginia, and wherever her sons have emigrated, this work cannot fail to be received with lively interest. Few of such readers will fail to derive from it some increase of knowledge with regard to their own ancestry, or the church connection of their families. Taking the three volumes together, namely, the one on North Carolina and the two on Virginia, we regard them as an invaluable contribution to American history. The tendency of every page is to promote the cause of evangelical truth, primitive order, and experimental piety; to hold up in impressive example all that was good in the faithful, devoted men, who planted the early southern churches; and to heal those gaping wounds which have again and again been laid open in our religious community by questions foreign to our tenets and testimony. We earnestly wish that the thoughts which the reverend author incidentally offers upon the domestic servitude existing in our land, might be weighed and acted on, before we be rent asunder by uncommanded prohibitions and unchristian censure.

If we must find something on which to animadvert, in the way of criticism, we would discharge that function as follows: Dr. Foote excels more in full and authentic details, than in symmetrical structure. The thread of story is too often dropped to be unexpectedly resumed. The coherence of the parts is not always sufficiently obvious. The work evinces more than an ordinary power of description and command of language; but, if we may speak our mind, it pleases us best in those parts where there is least departure from simple and common modes of representation. Deviations of this sort are indeed infrequent, but they are disagreeable; such, for example, is the obscure and artificial comparison between Baxter and

Brown. (Page 69.) Though the appearance of the volume is pleasing, there are numerous slips of the press. Among these we of course rank the strange-double adverb "illy," instead of the English "ill." But the book is one which will remain as a treasure in many a Christian household, whose thanks and prayers will be the author's recompense.

ART. V.—*Miracles and their Counterfeits.*

THE word *miracle*, considered with reference to its derivation, means simply a wonder, or wonderful work. In this, however, as in most cases, usage has modified but not destroyed the etymological meaning. According to this use, which has become universal and classic in Christendom, the strict meaning of the word has been narrowed down, to denote a single class of wonders or prodigies. This consists of supernatural works, wrought by God himself, in contravention of the laws of nature, and in attestation of the divine commission of his inspired servants, which includes, of course, the truth of their teachings. This is now the normal and proper sense of the word *miracle*. Other wonderful events and works are, indeed, often called miracles, or miraculous. But this is always understood to be mere hyperbole of speech, employed to express the speaker's sense of the greatness of the wonder; and its expressiveness depends wholly on the strict meaning of the word *miracle* being what we have indicated. In any other view, such phrases as, "I am a miracle of grace," "the miracles achieved by modern inventive genius," etc., would be void of all that now makes them forcible and felicitous.

Such being now the fixed and proper meaning of the word, it is next to be observed, that a class of events is narrated and signalized in the Scriptures, which precisely answers to this meaning, while no other word adequately indicates them. They are variously and indiscriminately denominated by words indicating some one of the constituents of a *miracle*. These

words are *σημεῖα, τέρατα, δυνάμεις*, translated in our version, "signs and wonders, and mighty deeds." 2 Cor. xii. 12. *Δυνάμεις*, however, whether used simply, or in connection with the other two, is often translated by the word *miracle*. "A man approved of God among you by *miracles*, and signs, and wonders," Acts ii. 22: "to another, the working of *miracles*," *ἐνεργήματα δυνάμεων*, 1 Cor. xii. 10. *Σημεῖα*, is sometimes so translated, as John iii. 2. "No man can do these *miracles* which thou doest, except God be with him." *Τέρατα* (wonders, prodigies) is seldom, if ever found, except in connection with *σημεῖα*; the uniform rendering of the two being "signs and wonders." These scriptural designations of these events severally shadow forth the several constituents of a *miracle*. It is 1. a wonder, surpassing the powers of man and nature; therefore, 2. rightly called a *power*, as being produced by the immediate exercise of supernatural and divine power; and, 3. a sign or token, as proving that he who works it, or by whom God works it, has this seal of a divine commission, of speaking by divine inspiration, and acting by a divine authority. In Acts ii. 22, we find a concise but beautiful and sublime summation of the various parts of the scriptural teachings relative to miracles. The scattered rays are here brought to a focus. With this grand epitome, Peter first introduces the name of Christ, in a discourse whose power was attested by thousands of converts, and which may well be studied by those who are now searching for the secret of sacred eloquence. "Ye men of Israel, hear these words; Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved of God among you, by miracles, and wonders, and signs, which God did by him in the midst of you, as ye yourselves also know."

Here it is expressly asserted, in addition to what is implied in the phrase, "miracles and signs and wonders:" 1. That they are the immediate work of God. Whatever was the connection of the man Jesus Christ with them, "God did them by him." Thus, in harmony with the current of scriptural representations, they are ascribed to the direct efficiency of God, in distinction from those events which he brings to pass by the immediate efficiency of second causes. 2. That they were enacted openly and publicly, when all had opportunity not only to wit-

ness, but to scrutinize and test them. 3. That they were such, and so wrought, that the people among whom they occurred, could not but know their existence and character—"as ye yourselves also know." They were so evident, that they might not only be known, but could not be unknown, unrecognized, or misunderstood, without sin. 4. Their purpose was to demonstrate to beholders, and all others cognizant of them, that Jesus Christ was "a man approved of God," ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀποδοδεργημένον, evinced, certified of God, by miracles, signs, and wonders wrought in the midst of them. 5. Thus miracles are important proofs for Christianity. By them an obligation was laid on the people to believe on and obey Christ, in all his teachings, claims, and requirements, as the Son of God, and promised Messiah. For he immediately proceeds to charge home upon them the guilt of crucifying one, whom God had certified by such stupendous miracles, to be, what he claimed to be, the Lord of glory. The fact that this argument was made thus fundamental and paramount in this discourse, together with the prodigious effects which ensued upon it, must be a sufficient answer to those who question the value, as evidences of Christianity, of the miracles wrought by Christ and his apostles. On these several points, however, more hereafter.

For the further determination of the ground-principles pertaining to this subject, it is to be observed with some emphasis, that in order to fulfil the foregoing conditions, miracles must be wrought by the immediate efficiency of God, and not by second causes: further, they must involve a suspension, or counteraction of second causes beyond the power of man: so they must be not merely supernatural, but contra-natural. What second causes, including creatures with the laws, forces, or powers inherent in them, can accomplish of themselves, can be no evidence of the immediate agency of God, or of any special divine interposition. No suspension, or counteraction of those laws by the natural power of creatures, e. g., of gravity, by a man uplifting a stone, can be evidence of such interference by the Almighty. Moreover that direct interposition of God, which acts not in suspending, or contravening the laws of nature, but in concurrence with those laws, is not a miracle. That the renovation of the human soul is an immediate super-

natural work of God, above the power of man, and of nature, we shall not here stop to prove. But this work, although divine, neither suspends nor counteracts any proper law, functions, or faculties of the soul. Its rational, emotional, and optative faculties exist and operate according to their own proper nature, before, during, and after regeneration. The work itself is unseen by the believer, no less than by others. It is known only in its effects; and in these much more imperfectly by others than by the subject of it, often uncertainly by himself. It manifests itself gradually, not in any interruption, but simply in the gradually developed, orderly activity of his rational nature. While then it has this element in common with miracles, that it is supernatural and divine; while it is in a high sense marvellous; while it evinces to the subject of it, however sceptical before, the truth of the gospel; while the whole body of the regenerate, in their holy profession and life, are a standing and ever growing monument of the truth and power of Christianity; yet regeneration is not a miracle in the proper and scriptural sense: it is an interposition of God, not in such a sense immediately visible, palpable, suspending and counteracting the powers of nature, that, as beheld by our very senses, it shows itself an incontestable work of God, and so a "sign to those that believe not," as well as to those that believe. A miracle is this. It is a work done before the eyes of men, so that they may know it, and innocently cannot but know it, as being what cannot be accounted for by the laws and powers of nature, or on any supposition but the immediate agency of God, exerted in overpowering those laws. So it is not merely supernatural; it is contra-natural. Ordinary events of providence are accomplished by the agency of second causes. Works of grace are supernatural, yet congruous with nature's laws.* Miracles are both supernatural and contra-natural.

* We are not unaware that there is a sense in which miracles of bodily healing may be thought by some to be included in the class of divine acts, that are congruous with nature's laws, inasmuch as they restore the body, or the organ cured, to its normal state. Yet it is not without reason that theologians have held to a clear distinction between the two. The one is a moral change, wrought by supernatural power indeed, yet in no manner interfering with the proper laws and activities of our moral nature. The other is a physical creation, which so suspends or counteracts the natural laws of our material organism, that they are estopped from produc-

If we were then to set forth the doctrine after the old method, which often has a high advantage, in sharply defining the subject-matter, and the true issues of a discussion, and view a miracle according to its material, formal, efficient, and final cause, we would say:—1. That materially considered, miracles are supernatural events. So they are distinguished from the ordinary events of providence; from all the products of occult arts, of jugglery and legerdemain; of scientific discovery and insight; of the dexterous use of laws and secrets of nature, known to the miracle-monger and hidden from others; and, finally, from all extraordinary occurrences arising by the operation of natural laws from unusual combinations of the powers of nature, in the course of divine providence. An earthquake, or a thunderstorm, occurring in the most extraordinary and unexpected manner, would, in itself, be no miracle; but, should the still sky and earth suddenly and always roar and quake at the bidding of some man, and be quiet the moment he should say, "Peace, be still," it would be a clear and incontestable miracle. 2. In its formal nature, a miracle is not only supernatural, but contra-natural. So it is distinguished from the gracious operations of the Spirit in the soul. Moreover, the formal in this case includes, 3. the efficient cause, who is God. A granite rock, although in fact the work of the Almighty, would be none the less granite, though it were made by any other being; but no conceivable wonder, nothing whatsoever, can be a miracle, unless immediately wrought of God. Were the miracles of the Scripture just what they are in other respects, but were they not wrought by God, they would not be true miracles. That he is their efficient cause, is not only true, as in respect of many other things, but enters into their essence, their formal nature, without which, whatever else they may be, they are not mira-

ing their wonted and due effect. It is true, that, if the distinction be rigorously followed up, it may appear subtle and tenuous; no more so, however, than all rigid analysis of the will ultimately becomes. As we know the will to be free, yet not independent, and still may find it difficult to explicate either of these truths in propositions which do not seem contradictory of the other, so we know that there is a difference in kind, between that divine work which restores the will to rectitude, and that which, by a mere word, makes those born deaf, dumb, or blind, instantaneously to hear, speak, and see. This is none the less so, although we may be unable to define that difference perfectly. It is still more evident that the latter fulfils the purpose or end of a miracle, while the former does not.

cles. So they are distinguished from all superhuman interruptions of the laws of nature, or quasi-miracles caused by evil spirits, if such there be, in regard to which we will yet show our opinion. 4. The final cause of miracles, the end for which they are wrought, is to furnish proof, and work the conviction, that those through whom God works them, are commissioned by him, and speak his truth. So they are distinguished from all prodigies, whether natural or supernatural, wrought in support of error, immorality, or irreligion—while those are contradicted who assert the uselessness of miracles as criteria of truth.

It is obvious that this doctrine of miracles supposes a radical distinction between God and nature; i. e., the real, separate, unconfounded existence of each. It denies Atheism, Fatalism, and Pantheism. It is also in conflict with atheistic and pantheistic theories, such as are sometimes espoused by even theistic and Christian advocates. There have been those among the best theologians, from Augustine downward, who have been jealous of representing the miracles as involving the suspension or counteraction of the laws of nature, lest they should thus seem so far to separate nature from God, as to lend some countenance to Pelagian notions of independent and self-sufficient being and power in creatures. Hence, they were inclined to construe Christ's saying, "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work," as meaning, that all the laws and processes of nature are nothing else than the immediate agency of God. Of course, this view fully carried out, would be incompatible with the definition of miracles which we have deduced from the Scriptures. It is a solecism to speak of the agency of God counteracting itself. A recent school of theistic advocates, with a wholly different aim, have more deliberately and articulately resolved nature and its laws, (save the actions of free agents,) into the immediate agency of God. They deny efficiency, whether original or derived, to everything but will. They thus aim to confute the materialistic or positive school of Atheists, who allow no knowledge of anything beyond what is given in sensation; consequently, no knowledge of any laws or causality in nature, except mere uniformities of antecedence and sequence; consequently, no knowledge of any First Cause.

The theists, to whom we refer, grant that portion of the premises which asserts our ignorance of any causality in nature or its laws. Some of them go further, and absolutely deny such causality. They then assert the common doctrine, that it is a first principle that every event must have a cause. They add, that we know from our own consciousness, that an intelligent will is a cause; and that human wills are inadequate to the creation of the universe. Thus, by asserting the universality of causation, eliminating all original and derived causality from matter, excluding the human will from acts of causation that are above its scope, the actings of the laws of nature are resolved into immediate forth-puttings of divine efficiency. So Dr. Bowen, in his argument for the existence of God, "attributes all changes that take place in the universe, except those which are caused by man, to the *immediate* action of the Deity."* The italics are his, showing that this is no random expression. Accordingly he tells us, "this doctrine places the material universe before us in a new light. The whole frame-work of what are called 'secondary causes' falls to pieces. The *laws of nature* are only a figure of speech; the powers and active inherent properties of material atoms are mere fictions. . . . There is no such thing as what we usually call the 'course of nature.'"[†]

We notice that Tulloch, in his Burnett Prize Essay in defence of Christian theism, meets the allegation that the uniformity of the laws of nature militates against the sovereign dominion and providence of God, with some expressions, which, if anything more than mere rhetorical exaggerations, assert the same thing. These laws are, according to him, "the continual going forth of the Divine Efficiency. . . . The truer view, therefore, would be to regard the whole course of Providence, the whole order of nature as special, in the sense of proceeding directly every moment from the awful abysses of creative Power. . . . To conceive of any order of events, or any facts of nature, as less directly connected than others with their Divine Author, is an absurdity. And what, save this, can be distinctively

* *The Principles of Metaphysical and Ethical Science applied to the Evidences of Religion.* By Francis Bowen, Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, &c., in Harvard College. Page 123.

[†] Id. Page 95.

meant by a General Providence, we are at a loss to imagine. Only suppose the Deity equally present in all his works, equally active in all, and Providence no longer admits of a two-fold apprehension. It is simply, in every possible mode of its conception, the agency of God; equally mediate in all cases as expressing itself by *some* means, but also in all cases equally immediate, as no less truly expressed in one class of works than in another. According to this higher and more comprehensive view, the Divine Presence lives alike in all the divine works. God is everywhere in nature.”*

That there is a sound sense in which most of the foregoing may be taken, and in which it was probably intended, we most cordially admit. But if the “Deity is equally present in all his works, and equally active;” if his agency is equally mediate and equally immediate in all; if none are “more directly connected than others with their divine Author;” if all are alike “directly” the products of “creative power,” the immediate outgoing of the divine efficiency; if they admit of no “two-fold apprehension” in their relations to his agency; then where are the second causes which this author appears elsewhere to recognize?† But whether he means to keep pace with Mr. Bowen in denying secondary causes or not, we ask, where, on the scheme of either, is the line of demarcation between the natural and supernatural? In what sense are miracles, or works of grace in the soul, supernatural? In short, if the events of the natural world are accomplished by the immediate exercise of divine efficiency to the exclusion of second causes, how are miracles or regeneration in any sense the *special* work of God? However indifferent these questions may be to a Socinian, they can scarcely be so to an evangelical theologian. Prof. Bowen indeed objects to fatalism, that it renders miracles impossible. So far as we can see, his own scheme does the same. It is not indeed incompatible with deviations from the uniform methods in which God commonly exerts his efficiency. But, according to it, such deviations are in no sense peculiarly works of God. How then are they seals of his truth, more than any extraordinary events of providence,

* *Christian Theism*. By the Rev. George Tulloch, D. D. Carter’s edition, pp. 66, 67.

† Quotation from Dr. Whewell, p. 50.

which arise from some unusual junction of the uniform laws or forces of nature? The fact is, this theory needs to be pressed but a little further, to approach a confounding or identification of God and Nature, either in the shape of Pantheism or Fatalism, schemes which above all others its abettors detest. None are more strenuous than they for free-will and proper causality in man, up to the point of the most unconditional self-determination. We have sufficiently shown Dr. Bowen's opinions about the will, in a former article.* Dr. Tulloch describes it as "a naturally undetermined source of activity," p. 263. But he very justly adds, "In our very freedom, we at the same time find our dependency." The question is, then, if free agents are causes, are they not second, derived, dependent causes? On the other hand, although thus derivative and dependent, are they not true and proper causes, having their own separate existence and activity? And if it is competent for God to create and sustain agents of this order, why not to create and sustain laws and forces in the material world, which, though upheld and guided by him, are yet distinct from him, and exert an energy distinct from his? Surely this is the scriptural doctrine. The raising of Lazarus from the dead, the creation of the world out of nothing, is there treated as a work of God, in a far more direct and emphatic sense than the sun's rising. They are no less so in the intuitive judgments of the race. Moreover, the old example of Reid is as good against this class of reasoners, as against sensational sceptics and positivists. Night always precedes day—so also does the sun's rising. The movements of a clock's machinery uniformly precede its striking twelve: so does its striking eleven. Does any one doubt in these cases which is the cause, and which is not, of the succeeding event? And is not this enough to show, not only that cause is something more than mere antecedence, but that it is found in material as well as spiritual agencies; and that whether in intelligent or unintelligent creatures, it is, though dependent and secondary, still a cause? For ourselves, we do not see how the opposite view can consistently stop short of Pantheism or Spinosism, making the only difference between God and Nature, that of *Natura naturans et natura naturata*.

* See article entitled *Logic of Religion*, July, 1855.

Other theories, militating against the possibility of miracles, require less notice. We have emphasized the foregoing, rather as a suicidal speculation advanced by their defenders. When it is claimed to be inconsistent with the immutability of God to suspend his own laws, the answer is obvious. Such interruptions of these laws were included in his eternal purpose. If it be alleged that miracles suppose his original plan so imperfect as to require to be improved upon by subsequent variations from it, and that thus his wisdom is impeached; it is a sufficient answer, that the laws of nature are the wisest provision for the ends to be accomplished by them, and their miraculous suspension or counteraction is the wisest provision for the purposes to be thus effected. To meet these and similar objections, a theory has been framed, and has gained currency with a class of Christian apologists, which verges to an extreme, the opposite of that which we have been considering. This scheme is, that miracles, though apparently interruptions of the laws of nature, are but the outworkings of these laws, either of such as we know, acting in strange and occult combinations, or of some more general law as yet hidden from us. This scheme we find sanctioned, if not adopted, as follows, in a late work. "It is no less a miracle when the lower law of nature is modified by a higher law, at the exact time at which it pleases God to make a revelation of his will, than if the nature which is known to us were modified by his immediate interference. Thus, to illustrate by the calculating engine of Mr. Babbage, it is no less a proof of knowledge and of power superior to the engine itself, to predict that a law which has held good for a million and one instances, will change at the million and second, than to be able to produce such a change, by interfering with the movements of the machine. Suppose it granted, that the standing of the sun, in the time of Joshua, was a phenomenon of a law superior to the ordinary laws of nature which are known to man, and including these laws as subordinate, still it is no less a proof of divine power, and no less an evidence of special revelation."*

* *Christian Theism: The Testimony of Reason and Revelation to the Existence and Character of the Supreme Being.* (Burnett Prize Essay.) By Robert Anchor Thompson, pp. 314-5.

This indication of supernaturalism overthrows it. There is no miraculous suspension or counteraction, but only the normal action of the laws of nature. On this supposition, a miracle can in no wise be distinguished from those events, which our ignorance disables us from accounting for, by any known laws of nature, while they are yet the product of such laws which science afterwards discovers. On this theory, the first instance of the congelation of water known to a tropical savage, the prediction of eclipses, the galvanic battery, the magnetic telegraph, for all savages, have every possible element of a veritable miracle. They are special divine interpositions to authenticate to these savages, those who employ them, as messengers from God. Nor are they less so, on this scheme, although afterwards they are discovered to be but the mere effect of natural laws, and of man's knowledge thereof. Suppose that the law should yet be discovered, which, on this theory, arrested the course of the sun, would that fact alter the nature of the event? Things are constantly occurring, inexplicable according to our present knowledge, as the products of natural laws, which are afterwards explained by a deeper knowledge of those laws. Are these miracles? Are these the seals of God's messengers and truth? And are the mighty signs and wonders which God wrought by the hands of Moses, of Christ, and his Apostles, to prove their divine commission, only what man could do with sufficient knowledge of the laws of nature, what a steamboat or hydraulic press are to the savage? Believe it who will.

But what can we know of a true miracle, more than that it is inexplicable by any human power, or any known laws of nature? And, what less than this would appear in the case of those, who ignorant that astronomy has taught men how to predict eclipses, should be told by some one who had got the secret, that they would occur on such days, hours, minutes, seconds, and find the event uniformly and precisely answerable to the prediction? Can then miracles be surely discerned as such, and how?

This is a fair question, and on any theory of miracles, an inevitable one. Not only does the question arise in consequence of our comparative ignorance of the laws of nature,

whether any inexplicable phenomenon be the work of God, or the effect of some occult natural law, or of the dexterous use by man of known or unknown powers of nature; it arises from another cause, which, to the best of our knowledge, is now considerably ignored or disbelieved among Christians; a course, whereby not only they, but the interests of truth and holiness suffer loss. We refer to the undeniable scriptural truth, that within certain limits, evil spirits, the powers of darkness, are suffered, in God's sovereign wisdom, to counterfeit miracles. However any may recoil from such a statement, it will be conceded by all with whom we now argue, that the only appeal is to the law and to the testimony. And it may here be further remarked provisionally, that should such an inquiry prove that Satan is suffered at times to simulate divine miracles, it is only what he is suffered to do with reference to every divine work in the kingdom of grace.

He becomes, when it suits his purpose, an angel of light, and his ministers, ministers of righteousness. Counterfeits here as elsewhere, serve to prove the existence of the genuine, and put it to the test, to try faith and prove sincerity. There must be heresies, that they who are approved may be made manifest.

Rev. xvi. 19, sets forth "the spirits of the devils working miracles," *σημεῖα*. Chap. xii. 9, describes "the great dragon, that old serpent, called the Devil and Satan, which deceiveth the whole world." Chap. xiii. 11-14, represents a beast, who "spake as a dragon," and "doeth great wonders, so that he maketh the fire come down from heaven on the earth in the sight of men, and deceiveth them that dwell upon the earth by means of the miracles which he had power to do in the sight of the beast." Again, we are told, chap. xix. 20, "the beast was taken, and with him the false prophet that wrought miracles before him, with which he deceived them that had the mark of the beast." So the coming of the man of sin, predicted in 2 Thess. ii., which the Church has so generally understood to be the Papal Antichrist, is declared to be "after the working of Satan with all power, and signs, and lying wonders, and with all deceivableness of unrighteousness in them that perish; because they received not the love of the truth that they might be saved." Christ forewarns us, that "there shall arise false

Christs and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders that shall deceive, if possible, the very elect." It cannot be denied that Pharaoh's magicians were enabled for a time to imitate the miracles wrought by Moses and Aaron. Their rods became serpents; the fish of the rivers died; the frogs gathered upon Egypt at their bidding.

The least that can be made of these and other concurrent scriptural representations is, that infernal spirits have the power to work pseudo-miracles, which give colour to antichristian delusion and iniquity; that these have a sufficient resemblance to true miracles to deceive those who have not received the love of the truth, but not enough to deceive the children of God. How closely they approached real miracles, as to their supernatural character; whether merely by deeper insight into the laws of nature, devils are enabled to perform what is impossible to man, in the same sense as what is possible to a Morse, or a Whitney, is impossible to the vulgar; or whether, by their superior might, they have a power that is absolutely superhuman, but under divine control, really to suspend or counteract some of the laws of nature in a degree impossible to man, is not important to determine. But can we infer anything less than that, in some cases, they exercise the latter and higher of these powers, from the actual performances which we have seen are ascribed to these fell beings? Says Chalmers, in accordance with the prevailing current of doctrine in the Church, "they on the one hand, who affirm that the bare fact of a miracle," (*i. e.* an apparent interruption of nature's laws,) "is in itself, the instant and decisive token of an immediate forth-putting by the hand of God, must explain away the feats of the Egyptian magicians in the days of Moses; must explain away the demoniacal possessions of the New Testament; must explain away certain precepts and narratives of the Old, as a certain passage, for example, in the history of Saul, and a precept too which recognizes false miracles by false prophets. Now all this has been attempted. . . . Why all this tampering with the plain and obvious literalities of Scripture? How is it possible, without giving up the authority of the record, to reduce these demoniacal possessions to diseases?" He also observes, in reference to all

this, "it certainly tends to obscure the connection between the truth of a miracle, and the truth of a doctrine which is sanctioned by it. It is on the adjustment of this question, that the English writers on miracles have expended, we think, most of their strength; and, while in Scotland, the great labour has been to dissipate the sophistries of Hume, and so to vindicate the Christian miracles as sufficiently ascertained facts—in the sister kingdom it has been, admitting them as facts, to vindicate them as real credentials from the God of Heaven, and so as competent vouchers for that system of religion with which they are associated."*

The rejection or overlooking by so many, of the fact, that quasi-miracles are sometimes wrought by infernal spirits, is due, we think, to the fact that we have been so much accustomed to study the subject of miracles in writers of the Scotch school to which Chalmers refers. Paley too, has long been the standard authority with great numbers, on the whole subject of miracles and Christian evidences. In his argument for the historic verity of the miracles, and the genuineness of the canonical books of the New Testament, in his microscopic detection of undesigned coincidences, and his masterly bringing out of facts which at once strike every man of sense as inconsistent with the hypothesis, that the sacred writings could be the product of imposture or irrational enthusiasm, he is incomparable. This sufficed to confound the sensational infidelity with which he had to deal, and which not only scouted divine miracles, but much more, all lesser supernatural agencies. Their ground was, that the scriptural miracles did not occur; that the Bible was the offspring of delusion or imposture. They did not deny, that if these miracles were wrought by Christ and his Apostles, they were a divine confirmation of their teachings and of their authentic writings. Paley's argument is, therefore, conclusive against them. It may be further observed, that Paley's mind had but one eye, far and sure-sighted as that was. That eye was the sensuous, discursive understanding; clear, solid, English sense, judgment and logic. But he had no eye for the higher intuitions, rational, moral, or spiritual; a fact nowhere

* Chalmers's *Christian Revelation*. Book ii. Chap. viii.

more painfully conspicuous than in the ground-principles of his Moral Philosophy. Hence, the self-evidencing light which the Scriptures bear, of a divine imprint and origin, and which is the great source of conviction to believers, he scarcely recognized or made account of. He, indeed, does not overlook such internal evidence, as the prophecies, the morality, the harmony of the Scriptures afford. These are adduced as subordinate and ancillary to the evidence furnished by miracles. But miracles alone were conclusive proof. He says of the first propagators of Christianity, "they had nothing else to stand upon."* Of course, this view, which makes the evidence of Christianity turn wholly on miracles, is incompatible with the supposition that there may be counterfeits of these miracles so expertly done, that they need to be in any degree discriminated by a doctrinal test; in short, that the miracle must, to a certain extent, be tested by the doctrine as well as the doctrine by the miracle. Yet, such, as we shall see, is the plain teaching of Scripture.† We have dwelt the longer on these quasi-miracles wrought by evil spirits, which on their face resemble genuine miracles, and on the causes of current scepticism relative to the subject, because we believe that it is afflicted with a false estimate of the various parts of the Christian evidences, and imperfect views of duty in regard to the whole enginery of lying wonders, which is plied from time to time against gospel truth.

However spurious miracles may counterfeit the genuine, there must be certain criteria by which the latter can be surely known, not only to be unaccountable wonders, but to be wrought of God, for both these are requisite to constitute a miracle. This must be so, both because the Scriptures teach that God's

* Paley's Evidences of Christianity. Part I. Chap. vi.

† Says Whateley, "The ultimate conclusion, that 'the Christian religion came from God,' is made to rest, (as far as the direct historical evidence is concerned, on these two premises; that a religion attested by miracles is from God; and, that the Christian religion is so attested.

"Of these two premises, it should be remarked, the minor seems to have been admitted, while the major was denied, by the unbelievers of old; whereas, at present, the case is reversed.

"Paley's argument, therefore, goes to establish the minor premises, about which alone in these days there is likely to be any question."—*Whateley's Logic*. Harper's edition. Pp. 381, 2.

miracles may be known as such, and because they would be valueless if they could not.

These criteria are two-fold :

1. Those belonging to the character of the alleged miracles themselves.

2. Those belonging to the nature of the doctrines they are offered to confirm.

I. The alleged miracles of impostors and infernal spirits always differ from true miracles in a two-fold way.

1. As to number and variety. Miracle-mongers do not usually attempt or claim to work any preternatural feats beyond some *given* single kind, or at the utmost, some two or three kinds. For the most, the workers of charms, sorceries, and conjurations, cannot perform even these, except under some peculiar circumstances, or with certain fixtures or arrangements, the failure or disturbance of any one of which instantly disables them and spoils the exhibition. With real miracles, it is otherwise. They are of vast number and variety, such, that although each, taken singly, might warrant a doubt whether it were a God-wrought miracle, or the product of some magic or diabolical art, or of some extraordinary providential concurrence of events—yet taken together, they inevitably show that they must proceed from the exuberance of creative power and wisdom. If a man give only the sign or wonder of seeming converse with departed spirits, and then only in certain magic circles connecting him with a medium or familiar spirit, we may well stand in doubt of him, or rather we should have no doubt about repudiating and denouncing him as a sorcerer.

But if, at the fiat of his word, all kinds of diseases are instantly cured, in all circumstances, without medication ; if food is created out of nothing ; if the dead are raised, if the sea is cloven asunder for his friends to pass safely, and rolls together immediately, to engulf his pursuing enemies, and if all sorts of plagues are immediately, at his command, made to sweep desolation over them ; then we cannot doubt the hand of God therein. If a person professing the gift of prophecy, or powers of knowledge beyond the reach of unassisted human faculties, should, in some single instances, or only when in some charmed circle hit the truth, we might well discredit his pretensions, or

refer his power to other agents than divine inspiration: but should he, in all circumstances, when professing to speak under inspiration, accurately disclose hidden, or foretell future events, even for centuries in advance, then we could not doubt his divine inspiration. But just this difference holds between all spurious prophets, dreamers, and wonder-workers, and the authors and miracles of the sacred Scriptures.

2. There are some of the Scripture miracles, such as raising the dead, creating things out of nothing, immediate control of the elements, which surpass all that impostors and magicians, men or devils, have ever given any plausible evidence of having enacted. These emit a radiance of divinity that cannot be mistaken, and that wholly extinguish all counter-pretensions of miracle-workers, by their overshadowing brightness. All the other miracles of Scripture are linked with these, and, therefore, in addition to the cumulative evidence arising from their number and variety, partake of the surpassing and irresistible evidences of divinity given in raising the dead, and controlling the elements at will. God so works miracles, that they overbear all competition from counterfeits. Pharaoh and his magicians were obliged to confess, "this is the finger of God." Much more than must this be incontestable, with candid minds.*

II. The other great criterion of a divine miracle, is the nature of the doctrine purporting to be attested by it. Divine truth, when once fairly before the mind, bears upon itself the self-evidence of its divinity. This is not indeed true of every

* Says Dr. Hill, a divine of eminent learning, judgment and moderation: "The power of working miracles may descend from the Almighty, through a gradation of good spirits; and he may commission evil spirits, by exercising the power given to them, to prove his people, or to execute a judicial sentence upon those who receive not the love of the truth. But both good and evil spirits are under his control; they fulfil his pleasure, and he works by them.

"This is the system which appears to be intimated in Scripture. . . . It is, indeed, very remarkable, that at the introduction of both the Jewish and Christian dispensations, there seems, according to the most natural interpretation of Scripture, to have been a certain display of the power of evil spirits; I mean in the works of the Egyptian magicians, and in the demoniacs of the New Testament. But in both cases, the display appears to have been permitted by God, that it might be made manifest that there was in nature a superior power. . . . Our faith rests upon works whose distinguishing character, and whose manifest superiority to the power of evil spirits, are calculated to remove every degree of hesitation, in applying the argument which miracles afford."—*Lectures on Divinity*. By George Hill, D. D. Carter's edition, pp. 48, 9.

portion of Scripture. But it is true of its grand distinctive announcements, in which God speaks, as man never spake, in a manner like a God, suited to our need, and worthy of all acceptance. These portions of Scripture, like the greater miracles, speak their own divinity past all dispute, and with these the rest are implicated, as parts of an organic whole, so that their inspiration stands or falls with them.

On the other hand, the doctrines supported by false miracles are invariably either frivolous, absurd, immoral, or irreligious, —at all events, anti-scriptural. The doctrines are as much below the doctrines of the Bible, as the signs and wonders are below the miracles of the Bible. No better illustration of this can be found, than in the pretended revelations of our modern spiritualists. To this test, then, must all miracle-workers and their doctrines be brought. The divinity of the Bible is established by the highest possible evidence, external and internal, miracles, prophecy, history; the vastness and duration of its effects; its adaptation to our need; and, finally, by the glorious outshining of divinity on its pages. Does the alleged miracle, however plausible, sustain or impugn the teachings of the Bible. This is the ultimate test laid down in the word itself. Every doctrine, no matter what wonders may appear to attest it, must be judged by its nature, and its fruits. False prophets, sooner or later, show their true character by the effects of their instructions. Therefore, Christ says, "By their fruits shall ye know them." But we cannot always wait for the development of fruits, before our welfare and our duty require us to discern and reject them. And the grand criterion is the doctrinal one. The command is, "Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they be of God; because many false prophets have gone out into the world. Hereby know ye the Spirit of God: Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God: and every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of God," but is antichrist. 1 John iv. 1-3. This is explicit and unmistakable.

Equally emphatic was the command under the old dispensation. Deut. xiii. 1-5: "If there arise among you a prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a sign or a wonder, and

the sign or the wonder come to pass, whereof he spake unto thee, saying, Let us go after other gods, which thou hast not known, and let us serve them; thou shalt not hearken unto the words of that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams; for the Lord your God proveth you, to know whether ye love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul. Ye shall walk after the Lord your God, and fear him, and keep his commandments, and obey his voice, and ye shall serve him and cleave unto him. And that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams, shall be put to death; because he hath spoken to turn you away from the Lord your God." This is the strongest case of an apparent miracle that can be supposed. A sign or wonder is not only given, but it comes to pass. But, if the doctrine it is offered to support be unscriptural, it is to be repudiated and denounced as the work of the devil. And it is signified to us that such signs and wonders may be given, to prove our fealty to God and his truth.

Here arises the common objection, that if this be so, miracles are nugatory as proof of the divine origin of the Scriptures. According to this, it is said, the doctrine proves the miracle, not the miracle the doctrine. It is true, the doctrine, if corrupt or plainly absurd, disproves the miracle alleged in its support. A real miracle, however, is not proved by a true doctrine. If proved at all, it is by its own independent evidence. Thus it is an additional proof in support of what has indeed other proof—proof, however, which would often not be duly regarded, unless enforced by this auxiliary evidence displayed to the senses. Besides, the miracles of Scripture are in themselves, as we have seen, distinguishable from all other signs and wonders. They are, therefore, "for a sign to those that believe not," and props to the infirmity of real believers.

Moreover, many doctrines though rational and wholesome, are not in themselves past all doubt, unless corroborated by a sign from Heaven. Such is the immortality of the soul, the resurrection of the body, eternal retributions, &c. Miracles are their appropriate confirmation. While then, a corrupt or absurd doctrine would disprove an alleged miracle, true miracles stand on their own evidence, and prove many doctrines otherwise uncertain, while they confirm all. It would then be

nearer the truth to say, not the doctrine proves the miracle, but rather its nature shows whether it is capable or not of being proved by a miracle. A doctrine obviously false, absurd, frivolous, antichristian, is incapable of being proved by miracles, with whatever signs and wonders it may be paraded before us. As to the holy truths of the gospel, they, for the most part, shine in their own light; and, at all events, no impostors, human or diabolic, will undertake by prodigies or argument, to promote faith in what promotes allegiance to God. As to matters in themselves indifferent, such as can be no test of a miracle purporting to be wrought in their support, it is incredible that holy angels should wish to deceive; or, that evil angels should be permitted by God to work any wonders in support of error, not otherwise discernible, which cannot on their face be easily discriminated from God-wrought miracles.

Here we are confronted with the whole question, as to the use and value of miracles. Under the influence of Paley, and the school he so ably represented, the value of miracles, as attestations of Christianity, was overrated. They were exalted to the rank of primary and exclusive evidences of the truth of Christianity. According to him, it "had nothing else to stand on." This is false, if there be any truth in the preceding views. It is false in fact. Not one believer in ten ever read Paley's *Evidences*, or any equivalent treatise. Their belief, that the Bible is from God, is founded on its contents. They find God speaking therein, "as never man spake," and see that its testimonies are "sure testimonies," from their very nature, "a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptance," as from God. Is it asked, how? How do they know that the material universe is the work of God? They know it from circumstances and characteristics of the visible worlds, which are unaccountable on any other hypothesis. But if,

"The spangled heavens, a shining frame,
Their Great Original proclaim;"

much more does the word of God, discover God its author. It is a thousand-fold more radiant with the beams of divinity, than the whole creation besides. God hath magnified his word above all his name, every manifestation of himself. This evi-

dence of the gospel is the fundamental ground on which the faith of believers ultimately rests, whatever auxiliary support it may receive from miracles. Of course, the theory that miracles are the only evidence of the Bible, could never stand, and was bound to be followed by a reaction.

That reaction came. And now, a numerous class undervalue them, and deny them to be of any value as proofs of Christianity; because, they say, it is sufficiently evidenced by itself, while miracles themselves must be tested by a doctrinal criterion.

This is the opposite and plausible extreme; but it is fallacious, and overlooks several important facts.

1. The Scriptures constantly assert, that the inspiration of their authors, and the truth of their teachings, were attested or confirmed by miracles, while they no less command us to reject all false teachers, by whatever signs or wonders they may be supported; assuring us, also, that the elect, the true people of God, cannot be fatally deceived, because they have an unction from the Holy One, whereby they know all things. These several facts are therefore compatible, whether we can see how or not.

2. As we have shown, the Scripture miracles surpass all other miracles, in this, that their number, variety, and character, utterly preclude the opinion, in any fair mind, that they can have been wrought by the hands of any creature, much less, by wicked men or devils. They, therefore, may serve to demonstrate that those by whom they were wrought are God-sent. They had this effect even upon the ancient magicians, and upon cavillers as well as others in Christ's time.

3. The same truth may be supported by various evidences. These may all corroborate each other, or they may be even interdependent, so that each stands or falls with the other. Or, if equally demonstrated by a plurality of separate and independent proofs, some men may be in a state of mind to be convinced by one class of evidences, others by another, others still, by their combined force. A case in court may depend on the testimony of an unimpeached witness, and on a strong chain of circumstances, neither of which alone might suffice to convict a felon. Both united may carry conviction to every juror's mind. And again, of these jurors, some may be more influenced by

the testimony of the witness; others by the net-work of corroborating circumstances. Before we can adopt the conclusion that the motions of the heavenly bodies are produced by the law of gravity, two things must appear: 1. That the law of gravity is a property of matter. 2. That the motions of the planets are precisely such as this law would produce. If either of these points fails, it weakens the other, as well as the general conclusion dependent upon both.

The application of these views to the case of miracles is obvious. A corrupt doctrine destroys a pretended miracle, just as strong counter circumstantial evidence would invalidate the testimony of a single witness. A miracle, on the other hand, is a divine attestation of a true and salutary, but uncertain or contested doctrine, like the soul's immortality, or eternal retributions. Not only so, but with regard to the Scriptures as a whole, which carry a self-evidence of divinity on their face, there is no question that multitudes are in a moral state, which disqualifies them for appreciating this evidence. Many who appreciate in some measure the prophetic evidence, and the lofty morality of the Bible, yet see not the bright radiance of divinity on its pages. Yet, those whose moral sense is thus dulled, may be alive to those stupendous miracles in which God displays himself to their very senses. Thus, a respectful and candid attention may be gained for the other and higher evidence of the truths so attested, which through divine grace will lead to its due appreciation. That miracles exerted this convictive energy at the first promulgation of the gospel, is the constant representation of the Scriptures. That this influence may have been more important then than now, when the Scriptures in their integrity and purity are accessible to all, and have so long and so widely given proof of their divine origin by their effects, is doubtless true; but that it still continues, and is of power under God to promote faith among men, is past all doubt. Miracles are proofs offered to the eye of sense, where the eye of spiritual insight is wanting, or is dim; "Wherefore tongues are for a sign, not to them which believe, but to them which believe not." 1 Cor. xiv. 22.

Moreover, true believers often find their faith wavering, and struggling with unbelief. To them even, miracles may be a

prop for this infirmity. They lean not only on the self-evidence of the word, but on the miracles which corroborate it; since God thus "confirms his word by signs following." Mark xvi. 20. Besides, the miracles narrated in Scripture form an integral part of it, and, in the description given of them, emit a divine radiance, which is a part of its self-evidencing light. As truly in the accounts given of miracles wrought, as elsewhere, does the unsophisticated reader of the Bible feel that there is that which no impostor, or evil spirit, would invent, if he could, or could if he would. The doctrines and the miracles of Scripture are given to us together, as one concrete outgoing and manifestation of divine wisdom, power, and goodness, with an "implication of doctrine in the miracle, and of miracle in the doctrine," which goes to the soul through all its avenues of access. They both fasten the obligation to believe and obey the gospel, upon all to whom it comes. "For if the word spoken by angels was steadfast, and every transgression received a just recompense of reward; how shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation; which at the first began to be spoken by the Lord, and was confirmed unto us by them that heard him; God also bearing them witness, both with signs and wonders, and with divers miracles, and gifts of the Holy Ghost, according to his own will?" Heb. ii. 2-4.

If it be objected that this is arguing in a circle, to confirm doctrine and miracle by each other, it is so in a good sense. It is not like arguing that a house is good, because it is built of good materials, and in order to prove this, arguing it to be built of good materials, because it is a good house. It is rather like showing the excellence of a man's character, by the excellence of his works, while the excellence of these is enhanced by the well-known piety and conscientiousness which prompts their performance; like the reputed veracity of a witness and the verisimilitude of what he relates, rendering each other mutual support. The parts of an arch give each other the strongest support, and form the strongest whole, when they follow each other in the line of a circle.

It may be further objected, that on this hypothesis, after all, it is left to the judgment and good pleasure of each one to decide what is immoral and absurd, or stamped with a divine im-

press, and what is not; that hence, miracles bind none to any belief which they would not adopt without them. The first answer to this is, that this difficulty applies with equal force to all moral evidence, of every description. It is possible for men to blind themselves to its existence, or its force. It is possible to refuse to retain God in our knowledge; to call good evil, and evil good; to put light for darkness, and darkness for light. Men may refuse to acknowledge the most stupendous evidence of miracles, of prophecy, of moral and divine excellence, in support of any system of doctrines. Multitudes do thus hate the light, and refuse to come to the light, because their deeds are evil. Doubtless these things ultimately fall back upon each one's moral responsibility. Every one is bound to be fair in recognizing and estimating evidence; just and true in his moral judgments. As it is possible to ignore or pervert truth and evidence, so a woe is upon those who so confound good and evil. And we are expressly assured that those who are blind to the existing evidence for the Scriptures, would be incapable of conviction by any evidence whatever—"neither would they be persuaded, though one arose from the dead." It is doubtless possible for a Socinian to reject that as absurd, and impossible to be taught in the Scriptures, which is simply unwelcome or mysterious; which has been dear to the saints of all generations, as an adorable life-giving mystery; even as the mystery of godliness, which was hid from ages and generations, but is now made manifest unto his saints. For any to reject such truths as absurd, is simply to proclaim their own hardihood of unbelief. Truth is truth, and it is evidenced by sufficient proofs, the beliefs of any or all men to the contrary notwithstanding. And if any know it not, it is because they seek it not with a right spirit, and in a right manner. They who so seek, shall assuredly find. They who do not so seek, do not deserve to find. If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God. They who desire not the knowledge of his ways, are in danger of realizing their hearts' desire, and being given over to a strong delusion that they should believe a lie.

We are of opinion, moreover, that among the most important uses of miracles, is the guarding of the doctrine of the self-

evidencing light of the Scriptures from perversion by enthusiasts, rationalists, and the advocates of intuitional theology. As counterfeit miracles are detected by the antichristian doctrines associated with them; so spurious pretensions to inward light, to inspiration, to a theology self-evidently superior to scriptural doctrine, are as summarily refuted by their want of miracles to attest them. They may indeed be refuted by reason of their manifest inherent falsity. But yet on their intrinsic merits, adversaries can dispute interminably, and make the worse appear the better reason to fallen humanity. But all these schemes want the prestige of a miraculous attestation, such as overshadows all other seeming and pretended miracles. The normal authority of the Scriptures as the objective standard of truth and rule of faith, is constantly assailed by the haters of its doctrines, who assert that these doctrines contradict our first moral intuitions. This class generally seek to attenuate the value of miracles to the lowest minimum. Thus Stuart Mill, after proving that Hume's argument against miracles is of no weight, on the supposition that God exists, and a sufficient exigency arises for his making such interposition, (and surely we need not stop to combat Hume's sophism on this subject, when the ablest writers of his own school confess it,) applauds what he calls the theory of the most advanced thinkers, viz. that "the doctrine must prove the miracles, not the miracles the doctrine."* Not exactly. They mutually prove each other. And we are persuaded that to assert less for miracles than this, is to surrender one of our strong fortresses to the enemy.

Still the question may arise, why any counterfeits of miracles were suffered at all. Why are not miracles so distinguished and contrasted with all other events, that there can be no more chance for doubt, cavil, or deception, than about a proposition in Euclid? The first answer is, that such is not the decision of Infinite Wisdom. The second is, that had God ordered this matter differently, he would have deviated from his uniform methods in evidencing moral and religious truths to men. This he does not after the fashion of mathematical demonstration:

* Mill's Logic, Harper's edition, p. 376.

but in a way that enforces conviction in every candid mind, while it gives opportunity to the perverse and unbelieving to shield their unbelief under specious pretexts. Such as hate the light can refuse to come to the light. They can hold up false miracles to screen themselves from the convictive power of true ones. In his revelations, as in all his dealings with us, God's aim is to try and prove us. Such he expressly assures us is his purpose in permitting heresies and lying wonders. "Thou shalt not hearken unto that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams, for the Lord your God proveth you, to know whether ye love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul." Deut. xiii. 3.

We thus reach the last point in this inquiry, for which all that precedes clears the way. We have found that miracles are wonders supernatural and contra-natural, and that they are wrought of God; that their use is to serve as seals of the divine commission of his messengers, and of the divine inspiration of their teachings; in all ages are evidence, though not the only or the highest evidence, that the Scriptures are the oracles of God; that there are infallible criteria by which they may be known as miracles, and distinguished from all counterfeits; that such counterfeits are perpetrated by wicked men and devils; that they may be known as such, as well by the anti-christian, immoral, false, or frivolous character of the tenets they are put forward to confirm, as by their signal inferiority to the miracles of that gospel which they are always employed directly or indirectly to impugn. The question then is, what is our duty with reference to all pretended miracles, and miracle-mongers? All are familiar with the boastful pretensions of a low species of necromancy miscalled spiritualism, and with the wide extent of the mania it has begotten. Papists are constantly parading their simulated miracles to deceive the simple and unwary. In all ages, wizards, conjurors, and sorcerers will appear, often commanding followers enough to make the occupation lucrative. What then is our duty with reference to them, so far as they come in our way?

1. In regard to all pretended or quasi-miracles which are offered in support of what is unchristian, immoral, absurd, or frivolous, our duty is plain. They are either feats of natural

magic, jugglery, and legerdemain ; or they are the works of evil spirits. In either case they are mediately or immediately works of the devil. As such, whether offered to our consideration by Jesuits, conjurors, clairvoyants, mediums, circles, wizards, fortune-tellers, or other sorcerers, our duty with regard to them is very clear and simple. It is incumbent on us to give ourselves the least possible trouble about them, except to abjure and denounce them, and to try to persuade others to do the same. We are not necessarily called upon to investigate the truth or falsity of the wonders alleged to have been wrought. And it is seldom that they are worth this degree of attention. Whether the "sign or wonder come to pass (or not) whereof they speak unto us, saying, Let us go after other gods," our duty is the same, to shun and denounce them as antichrist ; to renounce the devil and all his works.

We think a false issue is often before the minds of people on this subject, which arises from ignoring or rejecting the scriptural doctrines in regard to Satanic counterfeits of miracles. Many apparently suppose that if these performances cannot be explained by natural laws and tricks of jugglery ; if they clearly imply any preternatural agency, then there is no alternative but to regard them as wrought of God, and entitled to becoming reverence. Hence they deem it important to investigate them rigidly and seriously, and, if they cannot explain the feats by natural laws, they are sadly perplexed. But this is by no means the issue in regard to pretended miracles in behalf of frivolous, wicked, or unchristian doctrines. Whatever in them cannot be referred to man, is to be attributed to the father of lies. The supposed superhuman is at most only diabolic, to be discarded and stigmatized as such. This is most clearly taught in the Bible, and can never safely be lost sight of, in regard to this class of wonders and wonder-workers.

2. It is dangerous and sinful to participate in these pretended miraculous performances, or in any manner to countenance them, by giving them serious and respectful heed. To enact, to assist in enacting these prodigies, to consult these lying oracles, to repair to them for the purpose of acquiring knowledge not accessible by the due use of our rational faculties, or of

divine revelation, is a clear case of rebellion against, or of apostacy from that God, who hath said, "woe to the rebellious children that take counsel, but not of me; and that cover with a covering, but not of my Spirit, that they may add sin to sin;" who hath put all sorcerers out of his kingdom, and doomed them to the lake of fire, and in every form signified to us, that all who use divinations, all observers of times, enchanters, witches, charmers, consultants with familiar spirits, wizards and necromancers, are an abomination to him. *Deut. xviii. 10-12.*

And in our judgment, there is more danger, as well as sin, than is often supposed, in meddling with these things from mere curiosity. Deceit, as the Scriptures constantly indicate, is their radical characteristic. This is so great, that if it were possible, it would "seduce the very elect." Now, few can safely volunteer to put themselves under the influence of "all deceivableness of unrighteousness," of those signs and lying wonders, wherewith Satan deceiveth the world, unless in obedience to the call of duty, and guarded by the antecedent and scriptural conviction, that they are impious abominations. The state of mind which prompts such approaches to what God has condemned, to gratify a prurient curiosity, opens all its avenues to the stealthy ingress of delusion and error. Those who forsake the faculties and the revelations which God has given us for our guidance, to heed the processes or utterances of magicians and necromancers, will be quite likely to be left to the guidance of their chosen teachers. Those who give up the guidance of reason and revelation, to familiarize themselves with antics, in which all the laws of nature, God, and reason are defied, will be likely to be forsaken of their reason and their God. If they are not left to lunacy, they are likely to be "given over to a strong delusion that they should believe a lie," because they received not the love of the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness. *2 Thess. ii. 11, 12.* That those who take this course, put themselves out of the way of the divine guidance and blessing, appears not only from Scripture, but from all experience. It is notorious that lunatics by scores, and we believe hundreds, have already gone forth from the spirit-circles of our land, to insane hospitals. It is notorious that multitudes who began by amusing themselves with clairvoyant

sports, have ended in this pneumatophobia, which disowns the word of God, and looks to the thumpings of wizards and jugglers for guidance in regard to the future state. These persons are of all ranks and professions, from the drudge and the scavenger, to the judge, the senator, the scientific savant, and the professed minister of Christ. He who begins to tamper with these impostures, knows not how soon he may become their votary and victim. No degree of worldly knowledge is any security against such a catastrophe. The only maxim of duty and safety regarding these things, for ourselves, and to be impressed upon others, is, "touch not, taste not, handle not:" "have no communion with the unfruitful works of darkness, but rather reprove them." Eph. v. 11.

3. It is characteristic of this kind of conjuration and miracles, the operators of which are often not only deceivers, but deceived, that they wax and flourish in proportion to the attention and consideration they command. They wane and die out, if they pass neglected as being what, *by its very pretensions, on its face, and prior to all examination*, all good men are bound to abhor and let alone. *Spreta vilescerent*. It is with reluctance that we have given them the degree of attention requisite for setting forth, what we are sure so many have overlooked, some of the grounds on which they are entitled only to neglect and detestation. This whole thing is only a small and clumsy attempt, at what in former times was called witchcraft. A witch has been defined, by a believer in witchcraft, to be a person "that having the free use of reason, doth knowingly and willingly seek or obtain of the devil, or any other god, (we would add, or extra-mundane spirit), besides the true God Jehovah, an *ability* to do or know strange things, or things which he cannot by his own human abilities arrive unto. This person is a witch."*

The whole history of demonology and witchcraft shows that it has increased when made prominent by persecution and punishment, or otherwise, and that it has disappeared in proportion as it has been neglected and disregarded. Mather tells us, that the more witches in his day were punished and executed

* Mather's *Magnalia*, Vol. ii. p. 479.

by the civil sword, the more they increased, until "at last it was evidently seen that there must be a stop put, or the generation of the children of God would fall under that condemnation." As soon as the prosecutions stopped, the witchcraft stopped. This is the voice of history with regard to witchcraft and conjuration in all ages. We believe, that all notice taken of these "mediums," familiar spirits, and necromancers, such as implies anxiety to explain their movements, and to find the secret of them; and especially, all attempts to give them the dignity of originating in and bringing to light a new power of nature, "oddylic" or otherwise, increase rather than abate the nuisance. These things thrive on notoriety and attention, certainly in all cases of attempts which fail to detect and expose the trick, and have been so made as to imply that anything depends on success. Many who have undertaken to detect the imposture, have become its dupes. But let them be utterly abjured on this plain ground, that if mere tricks of man, they are detestable; and if too much for man, they are from Satan, and so are still more detestable. They will not long survive this treatment. The trade will soon come to an end. Those who thus contribute to abate the evil, by denouncing and shunning these pretenders and their works as conjurations of men or devils, will, we think, experience the comfort, *quoad hoc*, of a good conscience, sustained by the Bible and the God of the Bible. No wonders can compare with those that establish its divinity. Though an angel from heaven preach any other gospel, let him be accursed. Gal. i. 8.

In conclusion, it has occurred to us, that it might not be amiss to cite an extract or two from thaumaturgic history, by way of showing, that what now passes under the name of spiritualism, is closely akin to what mankind have called witchcraft. Henry More, in his *Antidote against Atheism*, tries to confute the materialists, by proving with other things, the agency of evil spirits in witchcraft and various prodigies. He says, he has been informed by eyewitnesses, of "bricks being carried round about a room without any visible hand; multitudes of stones flung down at a certain time of the day from the roof of a house, for many months together, to the amazement of the whole country; pots carried off from the fire and set on again,

nobody meddling with them; the violent flapping of a chest-cover, nobody touching it," etc., etc. *Philosophical Writings.* Page 98.

Cotton Mather gives the following proofs of demoniac agency, in a certain house in his day. "Bricks, and sticks, and stones were often by some invisible hand thrown at the house, and so were many pieces of wood; a cat was thrown at the woman of the house, and a long staff danced up and down in the chimney; and afterwards, the same long staff was hanged by a line and jumped to and fro; and when two persons laid it on the fire to burn it, it was as much as they were able to do, with their joint strength, to hold it there. An iron crook was violently by an invisible hand hurled about; and a chair flew about the room, until at last it lit on the table, where the meat stood ready to be eaten, and had spoiled all, if the people had not with much ado saved a little." *Mather's Magnalia.* Vol. ii. Page 450.

The visit of the Commissioners of the Long Parliament to Woodstock Palace, was disturbed by motions of all objects within the palace, far more unaccountable and unearthly than the foregoing. It came out, after the Restoration, that this was the trick of their own clerk, who was fully acquainted with all parts of the edifice. "Being a bold, active, spirited man, he availed himself of his local knowledge of trap-doors and private passages, so as to favour the tricks which he played off upon his masters by the aid of his fellow domestics. The Commissioners' personal reliance on him, made his task the more easy, and it was all along remarked, that trusty Giles Sharpe saw the most extraordinary sights and visions among the whole party." *Scott's Demonology and Witchcraft*, pages 315, 316; a volume in which much more of this sort may be found. Many of the most prodigious feats of our pseudo-spiritualists have at length found a similar solution. Whether they all can be brought to it or not, we deem of small moment. Our duty is the same in either case. Though his sign or wonder come to pass, we may not hearken to the prophet or dreamer, who would turn us away from the God of our fathers.

ARTICLE VI.—*The History of England, from the Accession of James II.* By Thomas Babington Macaulay. Vols. III. and IV.

THE historian of England undertakes a work at once the most difficult to execute, and the fullest of political instruction that can be chosen from the annals of modern Europe. Where monarchy is absolute, public measures centre in the prince, and his biography becomes, in the main, his nation's history. The people obey and become the executors of his designs, or resist and become the object of his arms. In either case, the path of narrative is well defined, and admits of little dispute. If a question arises as to the measures of government, it is still a question of the wisdom or rectitude of one man, and of the limited court influence to which he subjects himself. But, where the powers of government rest in the people equally, the truth of history becomes of much more difficult attainment. Conflicting local interests, opposite party feelings, and hundreds of different opinions have to be weighed, in order to ascertain the springs of public action, and to determine what proportion of each must be brought out on the canvas, and in what light and perspective they must stand, in order to the truth of the historical picture. This difficulty is greatly augmented, where, as in the case of England, the motives not only of a large body of commons have to be studied, but also the privileges of a duly recognized and powerful aristocracy, together with a monarchy, which is no mere ornamental attachment, but a real estate by law admitted as superior to law.

The British constitution is the most complicated problem in government that has ever been presented to a people for solution. It has called forth the energies of a host of great statesmen. Its difficulties have expanded and tasked their powers, and forbidden them to run into that narrow channel, which even the greatest are apt to assume, when acting only for a monarch. Many a time has it seemed on the point of turning out a failure. But if one element gave way, some other was found to sustain the weight, and furnish opportunity for recovery. Slow in its progress, it has steadily moved on towards improvement.

If no rapid step can be taken by its means, it guards most jealously against retrogression, and the secret of its permanence lies in the fact, that, with all its complications, it has risen out of the actual life of the different classes of the people, and their efforts to turn to their advantage a royalty which was once absolute. Not written on parchment, but on the hearts and memories of the nation, its historian needs to be not only a narrator of external facts, but also a keen analyst of human motives, and has often to trace great public actions up to their springs in the humble life and sufferings of the peasantry.

Assuming, as we are entitled to do, that the ultimate object of national progress is perfect equality of rights, the existence of England is the longest, the most minute, and the most circumstantial practical commentary upon the law of that progress, which has yet been presented to the modern world. Nor is it likely to reach its final volume for a long time to come. In the meanwhile, every question which can be conceived of as arising upon every step of the course, is undergoing the fullest discussion. Nothing is suffered to depend upon the arbitration of a single mind. While some, who have condemned and ridiculed her slowness, have blustered forward and stumbled, and fallen ignominiously, England continues her progress slowly but firmly, neither deterred by intimidation, nor accelerated by taunts, shrinking from neither self-exposure nor self-condemnation, in the effort to correct abuses, and secure safe footing for another step. Of course, it is not to be understood that such national conduct arises from an express and well defined national purpose to that end. It results from the resistance experienced by the liberal party from a strong body of opponents to all progress. The advocates of absolute monarchy are certainly few in that country now, but the privileges of an aristocracy are still numerously defended, and no ancient custom can be abolished, nor new one introduced, without a debate calling forth the energies of both parties. No work, therefore, can be a history of England without a true record of such agitations. Parliamentary action, in this case, occupies the place of eminence, which in France belongs to the monarch and the army. Hitherto, history has relied for its interest chiefly upon the events of war. But if the annals of England are to be

written aright, government and the discussion of all its questions must constitute the thread of narrative, while wars appear only as incidents and episodes, sometimes interrupting the solution of a question, and sometimes arising as a subordinate state of the controversy, but of importance chiefly as playing into one or other side of an argument. There is less power of popular excitement in the work of legislation than in war; but it is undoubtedly a higher sphere of effort, and a new method of historical writing and of evoking interest must be devised to meet it. This demand we think that Mr. Macaulay rightly understands and has well responded to. Never before has parliamentary business been recorded in such an animated and animating style. In his rapid summaries of conflicting arguments and motives, he skims the cream of debate, while his indirect manner avoids at once the formality of reporting actual speeches, and the responsibility of transferring feebleness and verbosity to his pages.

The only successful efforts of liberalization are those which proceed from the higher ranks of society downwards. A nobility, wresting privileges from the hands of a monarch, is the first scene in such a drama; then a middle class in conflict with an aristocracy. The last scene is one which history has seldom had to record, when the humblest people have secured an equal place. A dominant middle class is the most difficult opponent to be overcome. These positions are variously complicated, but success is not to be expected from their inversion. Every attempt at liberty, originating with the rabble, is doomed to failure. It either sinks from sheer impotency, or in a fury of enthusiasm throws itself into the arms of a master. True freedom cannot be secured otherwise, than by growing up to it according to well-established laws of nature. A nation cannot start up from its bondage and become adequate to all the work of self-government in a day, any more than a boy can become a man by merely dressing himself in the garb of his father. Both must await the course of nature and education. And no people can either secure or retain freedom in a higher degree than they are able to understand and love it. The goodness or badness of a government is not to be determined by its form alone, but by its relation to the people whom it superintends.

The only practical ground of blame, arises when the government does not keep pace with the people; and the healthiest state of things must exist where the people take the lead, and where the government follows, shaping itself to their successive wants. In this respect, no government ever has been, nor can be perfect; but the tendency of the constitution of England is, above all others of the old world, to that end. Though seldom fitting exactly, it is in continual process of approximation thereto. The early history of Rome has many features like that of England; but the Romans reached an equality of rights through a series of revolutions, while the English have a strong dislike of all such violent measures. The Roman, in his haste to be free, dashed aside every element which he felt as a check upon his freedom, forgetting that his successor might abuse what had cost him so dear; and the consequence was, that emancipation from one class of evils involved him in another. The Englishman, on the other hand, is fond of restrictions and counterbalancing influences. He no sooner conceives of attaining a privilege, than he passes in review all the risks to which it may expose him, and sets about hedging it around with limitations. His advance is therefore very cautious and very slow, and he will submit to many inconveniences, rather than hasten it; yet the history of his country for the last six hundred years abundantly attests its prudence. He can scarcely be said to have reached more than the second stage in national progress, yet recent events seem to indicate that he will not stop short of the highest.

That there is no lack of the poetic in English character, is evinced by the broadest and openest of facts, yet the people have never suffered themselves in any of their political movements to be carried away by a fancy. Flaming theories of Pantisocracy and Communist perfection have never enjoyed much favour among them. Their efforts have all along been most practically and ploddingly addressed to freedom of person, of property, and of conscience. The subject on which they have been disposed to run to the wildest extremes, and in reference to which they have been guilty of the greatest errors, is the last. Religion has always been a leading motive in English politics. Their religion lies very near the heart of that people,

taken as a whole. The only revolutions into which, since they began to act as a people, they have ever suffered themselves to be driven, have sprung from religious zeal.

Without a profound apprehension of religious motives, no man can be a true historian of England. His feelings may be impartial, but his narrative must be superficial; and his attempts at exposition of causes unintelligible, like the description of a battle by one who never experienced a spark of military ardour. Hume was an elegant narrator; but the grandest movements in his nation's history were enigmas to him. He was incapacitated to unfold their causes by the lack of a power whereby to see into them. None can more strongly represent his incompetence than he himself has done, in his closing remarks upon the death of Laud. Macaulay gives evidence of possessing a heart that beats in unison with the great natural impulses of his countrymen. His sympathies are evidently true and broad. Yet he also has failed to do justice to this great motive of Englishmen. He does not conceal nor disguise the fact of its predominating influence, nor come short in bringing out as its effects the changes which it really caused; but his delineation of the cause itself, is unfortunately, we do not say intentionally, distorted. Without adducing a single fact which cannot be well substantiated, he manifests such a proclivity to dwell upon those which go to expose pretenders to piety, and says so little about the character and vastly greater influence of the truly pious, that his reader is left under the impression, that the latter were very few, and that the former constituted the body of the nation; and that, as a general thing, piety is the offspring of either hypocrisy or fanaticism.

We are sorry to say that we cannot frame a satisfactory apology for Mr. Macaulay in this case. For one less skilled in historic art we might plead oversight, and lack of regard to proportion; but no man knows better than Mr. Macaulay, that historical truth is not attained by merely recording facts, however undisputed in themselves, but by selecting representative facts, and disposing them in such order, and giving to them such relative prominence in the narrative, as the importance of the class which they represent demands. A fact may be very interesting in itself, and very extraordinary, and calculated to

detain the attention of a reader, and yet for that very reason be unfit to appear in a just history of the period to which it belongs. The neglect of this principle is the continually recurring cause of honest misrepresentation, by ignorant or negligent writers. An historian of the United States who should spend a fourth of his work in relating the affair at Greytown, need not introduce a single doubtful particular in order to misrepresent the nation; for by such disproportion he should constitute his whole book a falsehood. It may be perfectly true that a clergyman of the Church of England, after reading the prayers for William and Mary upon a fast-day of their appointment, afterwards dined on pigeon pie, and, as he cut it open, expressed a wish that it were the heart of the usurper; and it certainly detains the attention of a reader; but is it a representative fact? Does it fairly exhibit the spirit and conduct of any number of that body, or is it a fact of only one man's indecency? If the former, then it ought to occupy a place in the narrative proportioned to the number whose conduct it represents; if the latter, it is untrue to introduce it at all. For it leads a reader to impute to a body of men a spirit, which perhaps none but that one ever entertained. Such abnormal facts suit the purposes of anecdote-mongers and romancers, but are not the proper materials of history. Some degree of disproportion may be inevitable. For narrative cannot be spread out to such length that every element can be presented in exactly its relative size, yet this must be restrained within such bounds as not to mislead. In order to get the coal stratum into a geological section at all, it may be necessary to represent it by a line thicker than its actual proportions justify; but it would be a very different thing to give it a breadth equal to the whole limestone.

Too close adherence to this rule would confine history to cold generalities; the neglect of it gives distortion and virtual untruth. Mr. Macaulay, like an artist, has chosen the more picturesque. His readers will defend his choice, except where their own particular views have suffered from it. We mean distinctly to say, that while enjoying his portraitures, we deny, in some cases, the likeness. It may be true that Penn was guilty of acts beneath his reputation, but do those alone correctly

represent his influence upon the men of his day? That certain ultraists were ridiculous, certain hypocrites criminal, and some good men inconsistent, is not to be denied; but why give to these facts such a depth and breadth of shading as to obscure the whole virtue and consistent piety of the nation? While reading his volumes, we perceive that there is a power somewhere which is controlling, and punishing the vicious politicians, and other actors who appear upon the stage, and reflection leads to the conclusion, that it must be the right-minded and religious community, but the author keeps that great power singularly in the background.

The position of England upon the map of Europe, as well as her place in its history, is full of the deepest interest. By her support and influence alone is freedom saved from extinction on that continent. But for England under the rule of Elizabeth, reacting Romanism might have crushed out the Reformation. The same England, under Cromwell, stayed the hand of oppression, and compelled the persecutor to yield up his victim. But for England, in the hands of William the Third, the absolute and intolerant despotism of Louis XIV. could scarcely have failed to extinguish the flame of liberty in Holland and Switzerland. At this moment, obliterate the constitution and religion of England, and how long would it take the masters of the continent to put out all that should remain of religious and civil liberty? We have suffered ourselves to forget the true position of that country in the course of various debates that have sprung up between us. Popular government and Protestant religion would constitute a very feeble power on the eastern side of the Atlantic, after the subtraction of the British Isles. Enmity to that great Protestant state is to the minion of despotism and advocate of Rome perfectly consistent, but in a Protestant and friend of constitutional government, is suicidal. The plain speaking, which is constantly exchanged between us, is also calculated to mislead a person who contents himself with appearances. If a native of Japan should compare for the first time the stately and complimentary style of our intercourse with other nations, together with the homely phrase and hard arguments to which we treat our Anglo-Saxon correspondent, and for which we are so often repaid in kind, he would certainly

conclude that of all nations we had the least interest in being on good terms with England. But professions of kindly feeling and of admiration, though very pleasant, doubtless, are by no means, in the intercourse of nations, to be taken as proofs of governmental sympathy, nor unmistakable guaranties of profitable international commerce. Nay, quite the reverse. How easily we throw out compliments to a merchant's goods, when we have no intention of buying. But a keen dealer will expatiate upon every fault he can detect in the article he wishes to make his own. Nations that have little to do with each other can afford to be highly complimentary, and bandy praise in the most gracious terms; for they have no dread of spoiling a bargain thereby. But where great, and varied, and far extending common interests have bound two countries together, they have something else to do, in diplomatic intercourse, and must be cautious in their compliments from respect to their profits. To honour with special attention his American visitors, and gratify them with glowing praises of the great republic, was a cheap act of the late Russian Czar. For he knew that of all countries pretending to freedom, America was the very one from whom he had least to fear. The poor ignorant population of his dominion could not, for ages, be made to comprehend the nature and working of American institutions, much less attempt the imitation of them. American liberty is far too high, and demands far too much intelligence, and is far too much out of the way of Russia, to inspire any fear in her master. A faint agitation in a little state of Germany, a rising against some single act of oppression, an outcry for some smallest and most obvious right among some of his neighbours, would inspire him with more anxiety than the gigantic progress of the United States.

The example of England is more dangerous to a Russian emperor, than that of America. For, while he has nothing to fear from his people's comprehension of American institutions, his nobility are in exactly that condition which prepares them to imitate the aristocracy of England. They are maturing fast, if not already matured, for that first step in liberalizing progress, which consists in either adding to, or substituting for, the monarchy a commonwealth of nobles. It is natural, that a

despot should hate the example which may wrest power out of his own hand, while he may be indifferent to that which can affect only his distant posterity.

The presence of England upon the edge of the European continent, is of the more value to her neighbours, that her institutions do not present a model of ideal perfection. She offers them an example which they can more readily understand, and which they may rationally hope to follow with success. Every one of their recent attempts at republican government has failed, and we may venture to say must fail, for the present. The only progress made has been attained by the limitation of existing monarchies. And if the nations will be faithful to themselves in increasing those limitations, as circumstances shall prepare them so to do, and maintain at the same time the means of public instruction, their complete emancipation must come in the end.

The fact that our commercial interests and governmental system connect us most intimately with England, is the very cause of the differences which spring up between us. But these differences, while it is highly proper, nay indispensable that we should, in them, manfully maintain our own, should never be permitted to blind our eyes to the grand and common interests from which they spring. The opposite course is not only unstatesman-like, it is unbusiness-like. We must expect to differ on many minor points, but when compared with all other nations, we are to Englishmen as brother to brother. There is a relationship between their institutions and our own, as well as kindred in our blood. There is a social, a religious, and a literary community between us which we can have with no other nation. There is a common property of honour in the lives and deeds of our forefathers. Were not Milton, and Bacon, and Shakspeare, and Spencer, were not Cranmer, and Ridley, and Latimer, the countrymen of our ancestors also? And does not England claim the literature of America, as the offspring of her own? There is a commercial profit between us, which we cannot, for the present at least, find anywhere else. Consequently, the history of England is a subject of profoundest interest to the people of the United States. And

the progress of Mr. Macaulay's work cannot be watched with more eagerness in Britain than here.

The two volumes last issued embrace the history of only eight years and nine months. But, though short, the period is of more than common importance, and constitutes a perfect drama in itself. It was rightly judged by the author, to devote so large a portion of his work to its elucidation. For to those few years does England owe the elements of more than a century and a half of her greatest prosperity. It was then that the monarchy was demonstrated to be dependent upon the popular will. For nothing but the preference of the nation had expelled one king and set up another. Limitations of the regal power, which had formerly been precarious, were then defined and settled. It was then that the House of Commons, as the representatives of the people, secured the exclusive control of all matters pertaining to the revenue. Previously, though they claimed the sole right of granting supplies, yet, once granted, the whole remained at the disposal of the crown. Now, after setting apart a definite salary for the king and his family, they reserved the rest, under their own hand, for public defence and contingencies. Army, navy, and other branches of the public service, were thus made dependent upon the yearly action of the Commons. It was then also, that in order to have a check upon the House of Commons, the duration of a parliament was limited to three years, and the great body of office-holders under the government excluded from its consultations. Then was the judiciary emancipated from its dependence upon the crown, by making the judges secure in office during good behaviour, and not removable at the pleasure of the monarch. It was then that the censorship of the press was discontinued; and the earliest steps taken towards religious toleration. Though, on this latter point, the vehement feelings prevalent in the time, permitted little more than a beginning to be made. And within the same few years, that most important agency in government, the ministry, first assumed its peculiar constitution and functions, which have since made it the truest exponent of the national purpose.

The blow struck at monopolies in the discussions arising upon the East India Company's charter, the establishment of

the Bank of England, and the renovation of the currency, were of similarly radical benefit to the interests of industry and commerce. Some of these changes were due to party measures, some to the enlightened views of the king, and others resulted from necessities of the peculiar emergency. The danger to which the new government was meanwhile exposed, from foreign as well as domestic enemies, from war and treachery, from fomentations of rebellion, and attempts at assassination, together with the prominence of the king in European affairs, gives a dramatic interest to the whole.

There was no special merit in rightly conceiving of the spirit of this period, nor of its importance; for both are obvious to the most cursory reader of English history. But Mr. Macaulay alone has apprehended its sources of graphic power, and conferred upon it all the popular attractiveness which is usually sought for in a brilliant military campaign. His method of handling the separate topics, in reference to his conception of the whole, is masterly. In the course of reading, we have often felt impelled to designate the work a great prose epic. The hero and heroine are William and Mary, in relation to whom, directly or indirectly, intimately or remotely, all the events are represented as taking place. Unity in this respect is severely and justly observed. Episodes are few, brief, and never foreign to the point. The sources of danger and anxiety are national prejudices, Jacobite machinations, and the ambition of Louis XIV. The heroic element is drawn from the loveliness of Mary, the pure moral character and enlightened statesmanship of William, and the patriotism of the English people. The plot lies between the efforts to restore James with his despotism, and those for the establishment of freedom under the government of William; and its resolution or denouement is the triumph of William in the peace of Ryswick.

Subordinate to the two great parties to which they respectively belong, are disposed the character and movements of the Irish, of the Highland and Lowland Scotch, of the Dutch, and of the larger ecclesiastical bodies then struggling for power; while from these different groups stand forth their respective leaders or victims.

The relation of the Celts, both in Scotland and Ireland, to

the Revolution and to the race by whom it was effected, is for the first time correctly laid before the public. It has been believed that the Celtic population were sincerely and intelligently attached to the house of Stuart, as if they distinctly apprehended and fully sympathized with the principles of high Toryism; and Tory writers have, of course, industriously fostered the notion. There is a life-like tone in the delineation of their motives, by Mr. Macaulay, that leaves no question of its correctness. The Irish certainly had no intention of restoring James to the throne of his fathers. Their sole object was to avail themselves of the emergency to shake off the yoke of England; and they hoped that he, being a Catholic, would make their cause his own, and found an independent monarchy in Ireland. The Scottish Gael neither knew nor cared to know the difference between Whig and Tory, his position in regard to them being dictated merely by the accidental coincidence of the interests of one or the other, with petty feuds between himself and his neighbours: as, in this country, we have seen Indians enlisted in the wars of white men.

The position, the errors, the vices, the sufferings and grievances of the Celtic Irish, have never been more truly estimated, nor more affectingly portrayed by any previous historian. That whole Irish war looks, upon these pages, like some newly discovered passage of adventure. We feel almost as if we had never read of the Boyne, or of Athlone and Limerick before. Tyrconnel, and Sarsfield, and Ginkell rise before us, in spite of Smollett, like Homeric heroes, and Schomberg, as if we had never laughed at the prosaic lines in which the

"Brave duke lost his life
In crossing over the water."

In no part of his work has Mr. Macaulay more fully vindicated the vivifying touch of genius, than in his handling of this hitherto most dully treated affair. His closing remarks upon Ireland are touchingly beautiful, and lighted up with a generous hope, which we devoutly wish may be realized.

Desperate as was the Stuart cause, when it had to rely so much upon the side action of those who had really no direct interest in it, yet had the passions and prejudices of such men

been wielded by a wise and vigorous mind, it is impossible to say that they might not have been successfully guided into the channel of Jacobite victory. It could not have required a great amount of skill to persuade Irish Catholics to sustain any measures of a Catholic prince, whom they regarded as suffering in the same cause with themselves, nor to have inspired such a people with a valour that would have been irresistible by all the forces that William commanded at the Boyne. The condition of the Celtic Irish at that time, and the particular emergency, were such as to furnish the elements of the most tremendous enthusiasm and patriotic spirit of self-sacrifice that ever drove men upon the point of the bayonet. For all that the human heart holds dearest, was, according to their views, for them, at stake. Nor could it have been difficult so to manage Highland feuds, as to enlist them in all their vehemence on either side. But James was most pitifully incompetent to every office of a king, and seemed, by a strange fatality, to attempt all that he did attempt, in precisely the way in which he ought not; and his generals, with only one or two exceptions, were as incompetent as himself.

This was most notoriously the case in Scotland. Sarsfield in some degree redeemed the character of the Irish, but in Scotland, their unqualified incapacity was demonstrated by their own admission, that the ablest among them was viscount Dundee, a man whose only claim to notice had been earned by dragooning the unarmed population of a thinly settled country, by invading worshipping assemblies, in which he did not always come off without defeat, by breaking up prayer-meetings, by visiting with troops of cavalry, now one and then another lonely cottage among the mountains, and insulting heartbroken women over the bodies of their murdered protectors, and who never commanded in anything that could be called a battle, save that of Killiecrankie, in which he fell; and even that was won not by him, in respect to either design or execution, but by Cameron of Lochiel, a man with whom the party had only a brief and indirect connection. The Jacobites of Scotland were in hopeless case, when they had nothing better to make a hero of, than such material. Perhaps the notoriety conferred by the hatred of one party, had recommended him to the honour of

the other. By an unprejudiced observer he cannot be deemed worthy of either; in himself he was merely insignificant.

James's chief expectations, however, were based upon the power, friendship and ambition of Louis XIV.; and he was mean enough to be willing to follow a foreign army to the conquest of his native land, and to hold his father's throne as the vassal of a foreign prince. Nor was that spirit peculiar to himself. Of the whole dynasty to which he belonged, it may be fairly said, that their servility to foreign powers matched their despotism at home. Nothing but the silliness of the first James, and the talents of his predecessor, rendered his reign tolerable. The first Charles has been rescued from well merited detestation, only by his execution. The best that can be said of the second of that name is, that he was a good-natured profligate. James the Second, added to the irrational obstinacy of his father almost the weakness of his grandfather; and to a profligacy only more tasteless than that of his brother, a blindness of bigotry which may be set down as all his own. It was well for England, that the reign of Anne occurred after the firm establishment of monarchical restrictions. The only one of the dynasty on whom history can dwell with pleasure, is Mary, who to a native sweetness of temper had, from devoted attachment to her husband, added much of his pure and lofty principle.

The character of James is an unpleasant subject to treat. Its delineator can scarcely get light enough upon it to bring out the features distinctly. It is one heavy, dull mass of stupidity, vindictiveness, and bigotry. Untruthfulness was the heirloom of his family. Macaulay, though skilled in historical portraiture, has failed to relieve it with one noble or interesting trait; and Hume has succeeded only by the unscrupulous use of notorious falsehood. The only element which an historian can effectively avail himself of, to this end, is the compassion which naturally attaches to the subject of adversity. We pity in affliction, him whose conduct in prosperity merited nothing but condemnation; and are disposed to confer a kind of half-praise upon even a bad man, when we find him rejecting the counsels of some who are worse; though it is but small praise to James, that he did not countenance any plan for the

assassination of William, till after the death of Mary, for he knew that it would have served him no purpose; nor, that he spurned Avaux's horrid plan for the pacification of the Protestant Irish. To be a bad man and incapable prince, it was not necessary that he should be a heartless monster. A scanty portion of common sense was needed to perceive, that to massacre all the Protestants of Ireland, was not a likely way to reach the throne of England.

The real danger to William lay not in any hold that James retained upon the hearts of his countrymen, but in the fact, that the king of France was disposed to adopt the cause of the exile, and to avail himself thereof, as a plea for a descent upon England. His fleets were hovering round the coast, and had defeated the Dutch and British off Beachy Head. He had aided the Irish both by land and sea; and a large army, under the command of James, long threatened from the coast of La Hogue; while others were directed against William's native land, and laid waste the country of his allies.

These operations, however, resulted in establishing more firmly the throne of the reigning king; for the people came to associate him with their defence, and James with the plans of their enemies; and, when success had crowned his efforts, their victorious king became to them an object of pride, as well as of love.

In this great historical epic, Louis appears in all the state and magnificent display of power which he loved, as well as in some of those human weaknesses, which his utmost art and self-apotheosis could not conceal. His hospitality to the exiled king was worthy of a great monarch; his willingness to put a creature of his own upon the throne of England, was a kingly weakness. To raise his cane to a faithful minister, when tendering advice, and break it over the shoulders of a poor waiter, for some mistake at table, with his public acts of devastating the Palatinate, and persecuting the Huguenots, go to show how little difference, after all, there really was, intrinsically, between the great monarch and the wretched rapparee, whom he despised; his appropriation of the prudent plans and brave exploits of others, was the art whereby he made himself appear divine; his preference of a safe retreat in the day of danger,

was excusable in one, who had so much more to gratify his tastes in this life than he had any reason to expect elsewhere; and his hatred to the Prince of Orange could justify itself in the fact, that the Prince was the only opponent whom he had reason to fear.

The character of William III. has suffered from the misrepresentations of a party that laboured long, and excelled in the art of unscrupulous vilification. Far above the narrow views and vindictive passions which prevailed in all parties, he was ill-understood even by his friends. The men through whom he was made acquainted with England, were, with few exceptions, not calculated to impress him with respect for those whom they represented. He shut himself up from their confidence. The sourness of the Puritans on the one hand, and the profligacy of the Cavaliers on the other; the sight of the same men who had canted, and whined, and professed piety under the Commonwealth, rushing with headlong abandonment into profanity and dissipation, when a debauched king was restored, had gone far to remove all respect for religious profession from the minds of those who enjoyed no religious experience. The various changes in the aspects of hypocrisy, called out by the different colours of successive powers, had exposed her arts and made her utterly shameless. Never before had England been cursed with such a number of mean, selfish, narrow-minded, vicious, and servile retainers of a court, as in the latter years of Charles II., and the reign of the second James. The leaders of the people, who finally removed the nuisance, had long to struggle with the remnants of that corruption within their own body, as well as from the place of its banishment; and we have reason to fear that the king never rightly appreciated the depth and breadth of the piety really existing in a land which he found thus represented at court.

It was no more than what was to be expected, that the exiled Jacobites and their friends, as well as the mercenary time-servers, who conceived of their return to power as probable, should spare no arts of defamation upon him, whom they deemed the principal obstacle in their way. On the other hand, his cold and distant attitude towards those who, changing their politics with the tide of success, still lingered near the

throne, and his withholding of confidence from even the leaders in his own elevation, kept the tongue of eulogy under restraint. He seemed determined that nothing but his work should praise him. Fortunately, the English are eminently accessible to such an argument, and more readily than most people, excuse an ungracious manner, where it is found to be only the exterior crust of a worthy nature; and such were his great and obvious services to the country, that latterly his bitterest detractors, in order to find an audience out of their own number, were compelled to moderate their abuse with certain admissions of merit.

The cause of freedom owes a larger debt to William, than to any other statesman of the remarkable century in which he lived. He certainly had less zeal for it than the leaders of the Long Parliament, and was, as a king, not disposed to yield any of his prerogatives; but his place among the powers of Europe, as the opponent of the great despot of that day, made him the champion of liberation, and his measures were safe, practical, and devised with a far-seeing wisdom. Whig liberty was only that of one party, his extended to all alike; and nothing but the barriers of party prejudices prevented it from taking a wider practical range than it actually did. In this respect, we feel constrained to differ from Mr. Macaulay, in his estimate of William's relation to England. When the historian remarks, that it is erroneous to regard him as an English statesman, there is a sense in which he is correct; but, when he goes on to assign as the reason, that we can find no principle of either Whig or Tory party, to which his most important acts can be referred, we deny the correctness of the standard. It was precisely because his measures were neither Whig nor Tory, but above and comprehensive of the interests of both, that William deserves the name of a great statesman, and a great English statesman in the highest sense in which he could be English at all. To have attached himself to Whig or Tory, or narrowed down his plans to the views of either, or even both, would have made him less a statesman without making him more English. He served higher interests of England, by consulting not only for both parties, but also for their allies, and by making their alliance felt as a blessing. It was his broad European policy,

his masterly work of defending civil and religious liberty in general, that peculiarly qualified William to be a great English statesman; for such was the true policy of England, both then and now. It was the best for her interests both at home and abroad. It was this very far-seeing and comprehensive policy which made William the best king that ever sat upon the English throne. It was thereby that he lifted his adopted country from the humiliating subserviency to France into which she had been sunk by his predecessors. It was thereby that he promoted her prosperity by removing the obstacles to her commerce, and by extending her influence among neighbouring nations. It was thereby that he repelled a dangerous enemy from her coasts, and secured for her better government at home, by extinguishing the interference with it from abroad; and it was thereby that he was enabled to alleviate the bitterness of party spirit, and counteract its most dangerous consequences.

This liberality could not fail to be astounding to the self-seeking politicians whom he found in power. Incapable of rightly apprehending it, some attempted to take advantage of what they deemed his easy indifference. The ablest of them, however, had occasion to learn that they were in the hands of a man who knew as well how to nullify their mischief, as to serve himself of their talents. When the Houses of Parliament had both failed to carry through a bill of indemnity in favour of the party who had opposed the Revolution, he assumed the initiative himself in an Act of Grace, whereby, with the exception of a few great criminals, all political offences were covered with a general oblivion. He admitted some of the most extreme Tories to his private councils. Attempts sufficiently ingenious and mean were made to abuse his generosity. Yet, not even Russell, and Godolphin, and Marlborough, could succeed in concealing their treasonable designs from his detection. Though severely truthful himself, he knew the heart of his fellow-men too well to be easily imposed upon by others. Seeing so completely through most of the characters about him, that their perfidy was harmless, he could afford to be lenient while making them undo their own plots. In this masterly attitude, he calmly served himself of men, and to a degree trusted men,

whom he knew to be well disposed to ruin him. The treason of Marlborough alone seems to have surprised him, or given him any real anxiety. That his manner was dry, hard, and distant, was not other than might have been expected of a man consciously occupying such a position.

He seems likewise to have been annoyed by the conflict of parties, and subdivisions of parties, as well as by the jealousy manifested of the favour by which he distinguished some of his own countrymen. On this latter point not much blame could be attached to either side. It was natural that the king should repose confidence in men whom he had found faithful in many years of trial, and not wrong that he should reward them for real services. It was equally natural that his people should dislike to see Dutchmen in the highest places of their country's government. Moreover, a peculiar dislike of foreigners may very reasonably exist in the English mind. Britain has had, for many ages, a difficult conflict to maintain in opposition to powerful neighbours, of governmental and religious principles most hostilely antagonist to her own, and who have, on many occasions, attempted to interfere with and crush her progress; several of them, too, of greater military resources than she could ever command.

One stain on William's fame, which even Mr. Macaulay's vindication has failed entirely to remove, is the fearful tragedy of Glencoe. It has, indeed, been shown that the act of cruelty was not designed by the king, and that of the peculiarly aggravated treachery, whereby it was accomplished, he was totally ignorant; but it cannot be disguised that it resulted from his carelessness of all Scottish affairs. A real defect in his character as a prince, was his lack of interest in the people for their own sake, and indifference to those portions of his dominions which could not contribute to the great European alliance.

Though much engaged in war, and though skilful in his greater movements, and personally brave, he lacked several important elements of a general. He had neither an accurate estimate of the physical endurance of men, nor the quick eye to detect the capabilities of ground, nor the invention fertile of expedients in the moment of emergency. But in the higher

power of grasping at a glance all the advantages to be derived from the position of affairs, resulting from a battle, he has never been surpassed. Even after a defeat, he generally withheld from his enemy all but the barren honour of the field, and sometimes secured to himself the real profits of victory. It is true that he was called upon to command armies before he had learned the art of war, and that he never had time to repair that deficiency of his education, except in the face of an enemy, and that his opponents were the greatest generals of France, such as Luxemburg and Condé; yet it is also true that his genius never developed itself in that direction, as it did otherwise. The true greatness of William lay in his capacity of comprehending human motives, of contemplating the operation of the great elements of national strength and well-being, and the links whereby the interests of nations are connected. During his reign, England was the protector of Europe. The Stuarts had sunk their country to the condition of a mere dependency of France: William, in a few years, not only raised it from that degradation, but placed it at the head of the coalition which humbled France; and that not to the wasting of its strength and neglect of future well-being; but while repairing its internal resources and building up the means of a growing prosperity for many generations.

The character of Mary is also rescued from unjust reproach, and is beautifully drawn. Her generous resignation of her right to the English crown, in favour of a husband, whom she knew to be better able to defend its honour; her tender and admiring attachment to him, her prudent government in his frequent absences, her charity and piety, and the affecting incidents attendant upon her death, are set forth with the skill of one who sympathizes truly with the more gentle and lovely in human nature.

Around these principal figures are arrayed the heads of the different departments of the public service. Caermarthen, afterwards Duke of Leeds, sickly and feeble in body, but of indomitable perseverance in business, administers the home government of England; Hamilton and Dalrymple that of Scotland; the credit of the British Navy, impaired by the dissolute Torrington, is restored by Russell and Sir Cloudesley

Shovel, and the interests of industry and commerce are promoted by the genius of Montague, Locke, and Sir Isaac Newton, while Burnet and Tillotson head the movement in the Church. The *fidus Achates* of the hero is Bentinck, Duke of Portland, the only man to whom the Prince of Orange ever opened all his heart, and who, in every emergency, proved himself fully worthy of the trust. From boyhood had Bentinck devoted himself to the person and interests of his master. He was rewarded with the highest honours in his master's gift.

On the other side, Louvois but partially fills that place in the service of Louis, made vacant by the death of Colbert, and is crushed by the harshness of his imperious sovereign. The armies of France are commanded by Turenne and Luxemburg, and Vauban, the greatest engineer of his time, constructs her defences; while Tourville leads her navy to the very coasts of England. The Jacobites are chiefly directed by French counsels. Tyrconnel, and others of the same stamp, stand forward prominently not much to their credit: and little better can be said of Sancroft, and his fellow non-jurors.

The principal scenes of action are the English and Scottish Parliaments, Highland glens, Ireland, in her length and breadth, the British channel, and the Spanish Netherlands. The decisive military actions are the Boyne and Aghrim, La Hogue and the retaking of Namur, all victories of England, and the first and last achieved under the command of the king in person; and the culminating interest in which the work closes, is the recognition of William, as king of England, and the abandonment of the cause of James, by Louis XIV., thus finally rescuing the British constitution from the interference of a despot, and confirming it in its spontaneous career of progress.

Such are the prime elements, the chief actors, and ultimate bearing of these new volumes. They not only sustain their author's reputation, but, in the eye of literary art, are superior to their predecessors, inasmuch as in point of unity of action and symmetry of parts, they constitute a complete work of themselves.

From the manner in which we find this history distributed over the period to which it pertains, the author probably does

not intend to treat the succeeding events at so great a length. Taking up Harper's octavo edition, we observe, that from the accession of James II., where he professes to enter upon the full tide of narrative, until the landing of William at Torbay, a period of four years and nine months, occupies six hundred and sixty-four pages. The three years succeeding the landing of William, employ about a thousand pages, while five hundred and eighty recount the events of the next nearly six years. Thus it would seem that the work has passed the period of its utmost expansion, and by a full detail, at this point, may afford to treat many succeeding years with the greater brevity.

Respecting the accuracy of the facts adduced, we have not, on this side of the water, complete means of judging. Moreover, we perceive by his references, that the author draws from original sources, many of them of such a nature as must be accessible to few. But his misrepresentation of the religious character of the whole country, and especially of Scotland, is a blemish which cannot escape the notice of any one who reads history with a view to tracing the causes of human action; inasmuch as it amounts to an actual ignoring of the fundamental cause which moved to the Revolution. Can Mr. Macaulay think to impose the action of hypocrites, and fanatics, and selfish politicians upon the world, as the prime source of the national changes which he records? It may be his design to bring up the matter at some future time; he may think enough written about it previously; we can only say, that in our estimation, it is a serious defect of the present volumes, that the great honest heart of the British people, with its noble and scriptural faith, and manly independence, which was the real cause of the whole movement, should be represented only by persons, and doctrines, and vices, with which it had no congeniality.

In these remarks we have had no reference to the political tactics of the different denominations. Viewed, however, in this latter relation, the period is not without its valuable lessons. From the opening of the Long Parliament, until the death of William, the great divisions of the Church in Britain had each an opportunity of manifesting the nature of its influence upon civil government. The leaders in the first resistance to monarchical assumption were Presbyterians; but, being too moder-

ate for the times, were outstripped by the Independents under Cromwell. The Independents demonstrated the utter impotency of their system to the government of a nation, and compelled their leader, in order to avoid anarchy, into absolutism. The Restoration put the Episcopalians into power, who forthwith became the most servile adulators of monarchy, and preachers of implicit obedience. James, upon his accession, more consistently than wisely, proved the merciless tyranny of Romanism. A satisfactory government was not secured until setting aside the extremes of each denomination, the great body of all united in one common effort.

We may, at the same time, be indulged in the observation, that the great national body, in that united effort, returned radically to the position of limiting the monarchy, urged by the Presbyterians before the death of Charles I.; and that the most momentous change in British constitutional history, and the most highly promotive of public well-being, was thus the carrying out of a Presbyterian purpose; and that the greatest co-operation ever extended to national progress from the throne, was given by the hand of a Presbyterian king.

There is another important lesson taught by this period of history, for which, even if for nothing else, we should rejoice at the popularity of these volumes; a lesson which it is good for us, as well as Englishmen to know, and to keep always fresh upon our memories. It teaches how great is the difficulty of retrieving freedom when once alienated. Not only the monarch and privileged few become interested in withholding it from the people, but also, all that low and numerous class of mankind, who will court and sustain power in any hand from which they can expect reward. Inheriting a free government, we do not, perhaps, duly estimate what it would cost us to regain it, should we by any negligence or error, permit it to elude our grasp. How many unsuccessful efforts have been put forth by our neighbours! The disentangling of a nation from the toils of despotism is no easy matter; and so far from being within the capacity of cannon balls and bayonets, as we have recently been informed, that war is just the most dangerous experiment in the process, victory itself being sometimes more disastrous than defeat. In the case of the United States,

the knot was cut by conditions and men, especially one man, that cannot be expected to occur again. If we cherish the boon from its intrinsic worth, we should value it more highly from the greatness of its price. On this point these volumes must constitute a lesson of ever-during value, while mankind remains the same.

ART. VII.—*Memoirs of John M. Mason, D. D., S. T. P., with Portions of his Correspondence.* By Jacob Van Vechten. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1856. Pp. 559, 8vo.

WHEN we consider that a quarter of a century has elapsed since the death of Dr. John M. Mason, we cannot but think it strange that no memoir of his life has appeared until now. During this period, a generation of clergymen, professors, and scholars, has left the world; and of these, many who occupied less of public attention while living, have been celebrated when dead. In the estimation of his admirers, Dr. Mason was inferior to no Presbyterian preacher of his time; yet now, for the first, are we enabled to bring together the details of his biography. The work has been accomplished by his son-in-law, the Rev. Dr. Van Vechten, with the aid and counsel of other surviving members of his family. While we do not conceal our persuasion that the excellent clergyman who addressed himself to this needful task, has undertaken it amidst peculiar difficulties, arising from the death of contemporaries, and the destruction of documents, we are agreeably surprised with the large amount of valuable information which he has been able to set forth. The great commanding interest of the volume before us lies, as the author obviously would have it lie, in those parts which proceeded from the pen of Dr. Mason himself. Long and much as we had heard of this remarkable man, we were not before apprized of his talent as a letter-writer. There are passages in the extensive, and certainly unequal correspondence now first gathered, which give us a far better insight into that power which held great assemblies rapt, than anything in

all his published works, if we except two or three sermons and the Farewell Address. It is here, in the confidence of friendship, that we seem to feel the heavy and almost convulsive beatings of a heart which could not be governed by common rules, and which needed great measures of grace to restrain it from intellectual pride, casual anger, and glorying in power. Here, and in some of the anecdotes, of which we wish there had been more, we comprehend why many of the discourses produced effects, as heard, which no one experiences in perusing them; how the great orator came to treat the reading of sermons with such contempt; and what his meaning was, when on being asked, when he returned from Scotland, what was the secret of Chalmers's eloquence, he replied: HIS BLOOD-EARN-ESTNESS! In the letters, we catch, by dim reflection, what his coevals discerned brightly in the original; and they constitute, in our judgment, the charm of the book.

Not a few readers will thank this volume for introducing to them the portraiture of the pure, gentle and venerable John Mason, the elder. The fragrance of his holy life still lingers in New York, and more than once have we met with aged persons who mentioned his name with love and benediction. Equally learned with his distinguished son, he was less brilliant, adventurous, and controlling; and as here represented, we suppose him to have been less ardent and impetuous, but more humble, meek, and spiritual. The picture is well given, and we dwell on it with delight.

"John Mason, the father of Dr. Mason, was of the Scotch Secession. He early exercised the functions of professor in the Seminary of that sect, at a place called Abernethy. 'In the year 1756, the Synod appointed Mr. Mason their Professor of Philosophy at Abernethy. In that office he continued four years; consequently he taught two classes, to the last of which I belonged. The first year he taught us Logic, a system of which he himself had compiled. He then gave us prelections on De Vries' Ontology and Pneumatology. The second year he gave us a sketch of Mathematics, with Moral and Natural Philosophy. His Compendium Logicæ, I believe, is the best extant. He always delivered his prelections in Latin, which language he spake with a fluency and propriety which I never

knew equalled. We always met twice a day. He began with examining us on his last prelection, and then delivered another, generally of an hour's length; so that he lectured two hours every day, unless when some of the students had an exegesis or something of that kind to deliver. We also met once a week for prayer and religious conversation, in which he excelled.'" His character has also been ably drawn by Dr. S. Miller, of Princeton, in his "Life of Dr. Rodgers:"—"Dr. Mason was a man of sound and strong mind, of extensive learning, and of unusually fervent piety. His scholarship was rare. At the age of 24 he taught Logic and Moral Philosophy, with reputation, in the Theological Seminary of the Anti-burghers, at Abernethy. His lectures were in Latin. As a preacher, he was uncommonly judicious and instructive; as a pastor, singularly faithful and diligent; as a friend and companion, he displayed an assemblage of excellencies rarely found in so great a degree in one person. Few ministers have ever lived in New York, in so high esteem, or died so generally and deeply lamented."

He was ordained in 1760, and emigrated in the following year to New York, where he became pastor of a Scotch Church in 1762. The edifice was in Cedar street, between Nassau street and Broadway. The same church, still flourishing after two removals, is now in Fourteenth street, under the care of the Rev. Dr. McElroy. Mr. Mason was a warm friend of the union of Scotch Seceders, which gave origin, in 1782, to the Associate Reformed Church. He characterized the dispute between the two classes of Seceders, as "the dry, the fruitless, the disgracing, the pernicious controversy about the burgess-oath:" it is unworthy of being explained to our readers, being, with its cognate quarrels, an opprobrium of Protestantism and Presbytery. The Synod in Scotland adopted an act erasing his name from their roll, and ordering his Presbytery to "lay him aside." Here it is proper to observe, that when attempts were made at an earlier day to unite with the Presbyterian Synod, now our General Assembly, the failure so to unite was not chargeable on Mr. Mason.* He was a strong patriot, and American Whig. By both his marriage connections he allied

himself to the Holland blood of New York, first in the Van Wyck, and then in the Van Alstyne family. The saintly Mrs. Graham often mentions him in those private papers, which belong to what we continue to regard as one of the most delightful and most edifying of religious biographies, and it is thus that she records his death in 1792:—"My dear minister's bitter draught is over. On Thursday, the 19th of this month, the Lord received his spirit, and laid his weary flesh to rest. Like his Master, he groaned, but never complained. He had a draught of his Master's cup, but the bitter ingredient—desertion—made no part of it. I had the honour to close his dear eyes, and to shut those dear lips, from whence so many precious truths have proceeded, and to mix with the ministering spirits who attended to hail the released." Mrs. Bethune, a daughter of Mrs. Graham, touches some other particulars:—"To Dr. Mason's character I cannot do justice. But though more than a half a century has elapsed, I have still a vivid recollection of his personal appearance and manner. He was of middle stature, not corpulent; black hair, and mild but penetrating black eye; of great decision, staid deportment and gentlemanly manners; very strict in family discipline, and given to hospitality. His sermons were well studied, his delivery plain and energetic, all with a view to the glory of his Master and the salvation of souls." As a specimen both of his wisdom and piety, we here insert at length, the letter which he gave to his son, when about to resort to Edinburgh for his theological training.

"TO MR. JOHN M. MASON.

"NEW YORK, April 27, 1791.

"As you are about to leave your native land for some time, and perhaps I may never see your face again in this world, a sense of duty and tender regard for you, impel me to give you a few advices, which by the blessing of God will be useful to you in future life.

"I wish you to have the air and address of a gentleman; not of an affected, but a real gentleman, in whose character, good sense, sincerity, discretion, affability, condescension, an obliging temper, and easy behaviour, are principal traits.

"Go freely into every respectable company when you can be

introduced with propriety, and esteem such an introduction into large and mixed companies a very great favour. Be modest and attentive in company. Equally avoid loquacity and silence. Beware of impertinent staring, but keep an open countenance. Do not flatly contradict any person present, nor be engaged in angry controversy. Never speak to the disadvantage of any absent person; this would be mean, ungenerous, impolite, wicked. Be very attentive to ladies, who will give a polish to your manners. Every part of your conversation towards them should be marked with the most refined delicacy. Do not repeat any little stories or anecdotes, but such as you have reason to think none present may be supposed to be acquainted with, but take notice of such as are mentioned by others, even of such as you know, without giving any hint that you have heard of them before. Respectfully turn your face to any person you speak to, or who speaks to you. Be fond of instructive conversation, but do not altogether disregard small-talk, some proportion of which is rendered necessary by the present state of society. Never give a decisive opinion about anything in the presence of your superiors, without pressing necessity; which will seldom happen. Say little about yourself, and never vex your friends with gloomy narratives about your little ailments. Be always cheerful, but be always grave. Avoid loud laughter and smile gracefully. Be careful not to hurt the feelings of any person present. If you begin to speak about anything, and the company do not take notice of you, do not make a second attempt unless you are desired.

“While in Britain, say little about your own country. Speak respectfully of the British government, avoid controversy about the late contest between Britain and the United States, and do not directly or indirectly advise mechanics or farmers to leave the British dominions.

“Accommodate yourself to the habits of people, and their way of living, in any place you may visit. Do not discover any niceness of palate, but make the best of homely fare. Plain people do not study cookery, and you will hurt them much by showing any contempt of the provision they may set before you. Be not noisy when you stop at a tavern, be polite

to the landlord and servants; a real gentleman gives little trouble; he is easily pleased.

"Carefully observe the state of society, the customs and manners, the progress or decline of religion, or of the arts and sciences, in any place to which providence may lead you. Be very curious. Study mankind wherever you go.

"I need not guard you against vulgar companions, but be very kind to pious poor people, and converse familiarly with them. Have few intimate friends, and be nice in choosing them. Draw a narrow circle enclosing some about your own age, some of middle, and some of old age, and give the preference to those who are most eminent in piety, learning, and politeness. Depend most upon the advices which are the dictates of experience.

"Have stated times for visiting your friends, unless they are in affliction. Let your complimentary visits be always affectionate and short. Never suffer your presence to be painful to any person.

"Be faithful to your friends. Be a punctual correspondent; keep secrets; be affable to all men. Be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good, praying for and seeking opportunities to promote the happiness of all who injure you.

"Never give unnecessary trouble to any family where you may lodge. Be polite to children and servants. Observe family rules, and beware of being abroad at a late hour.

"Consider manly exercise as an important duty in which you may serve God. This will contribute much to the preservation of your health, and will defend you against hypochondriac affections, which destroy the spring of animal spirits, and make one useless and ridiculous.

"These things deserve your attention, but the following advices are of much more importance:—

"Keep your eye constantly on the state of your soul, the principles which govern your conduct, and the great realities of eternity, some of which will soon be the objects of your experience. To be a Christian, and to live as a Christian, is the sum of your happiness and of your duty.

"Never neglect the reading of the Holy Scriptures in the manner to which you have been accustomed. Be attentive to

every part of your Bible, especially to the Pentateuch, the Psalms, the Proverbs of Solomon, the Prophecies of Isaiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, and Zechariah, and the books of the New Testament. Make short annotations on what you read. Mark those texts which touch your heart, and while the impressions of them are fresh, prepare schemes of discourses upon them.

“Be very attentive to the system used in the University, and while you read it, have Turretine’s *Institutions*, and the Usher, and Brown’s *Bodies of Divinity* open before you.

“Be very exact in studying the Deistical, Socinian, and Arminian Controversies. Let it be your principal care to be able to state the doctrines of religion in a simple and perspicuous manner; this you will find to be the most effectual means of enervating objections, and opposing error. Do not embarrass yourself with a great variety of systems, nor with speculations about things which cannot be understood in this world, and perhaps will remain mysteries in the world to come. Make as great progress as possible in your systematical reading during the first year after your arrival in Scotland, and review what you shall have read in the second. Study systems in a practical manner. Remember that you are deeply interested in every doctrine of Christianity, and that even Divinity will be useless to your own soul, and the souls of others, if it is considered only as an object of speculation.

“In your first year at Edinburgh, prepare twelve short, practical sermons, twenty in the second.

“Observe the method of the ablest, the most pious and accurate preachers. Write the substance of their discourses when you are at home; but beware of a servile imitation of any preacher.

“Be very intent on the study of the Hebrew language, for three or four months, and make yourself well acquainted with its grammar. When you shall be able to understand the Hebrew Scriptures with some ease, I wish you to attend as the professor directs to the Arabic, Syriac, and Chaldaic, especially the Arabic, as much at least as will enable you to make progress in the study of them, after you shall leave the University. While you are engaged in these exercises, it will be proper to read *Leusdeni Philologus*.

“Do not, however, neglect the Latin, Greek, and French languages. Be a classical critic. Read some of Plato’s works, and make notes on what you read. In a particular manner attend to the purity of your own language. Lay in a store of classical words, that you may be able to express your sentiments on any subject, and on any occasion, with propriety and ease. In order to do this, labour to have clear ideas of things. Endeavour to acquire the habit of speaking in a plain, neat, unaffected style. Avoid bombast and vulgarity. Seldom let the proud monosyllable I, have the place in your compositions or discourses. Accustom yourself to read aloud, as one of the best means to fit you for public speaking. Be accurate in all your compositions.

“Read with great care the Fathers of the first three centuries, and the Apostolical Constitutions. In these you will find many jewels, mixed with much rubbish. Observe the exposition they give of the Scriptures, and what views they had of the doctrine of the Trinity, and of the person and office of the Redeemer. Write your remarks upon them; this will save much time in the future periods of life.

“Make much use of Prideaux’s Connection. Be very exact in reading the history of the Church, till you come to the destruction of the Exarchate of Ravenna. Read with attention, but not with implicit faith, the Ecclesiastical Histories of Eusebius, Socrates, Evagrius, Mosheim, and Spanheim, to which you may add Sigonius de Regno Italix, de Occidentali Imperio, and Ockley’s History of the Saracens.

“As a relief from severe study read some books of rational amusement, and make the tour of the world, in some short and well written General Geography.

“That you may not fall into confusion, and give unnecessary fatigue to your mind, make a prudent distribution of your time. If you sleep only seven hours in one day, you will have seventeen hours for devotion, for study, and for exercise. Let me again recommend to you the strictest attention to exercise. It may sometimes be necessary to lay aside study for a week or two, and to make an excursion into the country on horseback.

“Let it be your care to acquire authority over your own

mind, that with ease you may be able to apply yourself to any branch of study.

“If God shall be pleased to put you into the ministry, prepare your discourses with great accuracy. Let this be the principal business of the morning of every day. Do not put it off till the end of the week. This would be to trifle with the gospel and the souls of men; persevere in accurate preparation till the 40th or 45th year of your age. Superficial study and writing, in youth, make a poor old man. Be not however a slave to your compositions; exercise, but do not overcharge your memory. Go to the pulpit so far possessed of your notes, as to be able to speak with dignity, propriety, and ease.

“Fill your discourses with useful matter. A multitude of words without sentiments, or with sentiments not adapted to the pulpit, insult a grave worshipping assembly. Let the peculiar doctrines of the gospel be your principal subjects. Do not however neglect morality, but see that you enforce it chiefly by arguments drawn from redeeming grace. Give faith and obedience their proper places. Reason closely, but with as little appearance of reasoning as is possible for you: give a practical turn to your arguments, and never abuse those who are of a contrary opinion.

“Have short introductions. State the sense and connection of the text with great precision. Let your method be natural, arising out of the subject. Be concise in the doctrinal part, that you may not be hurried in the application. Never depart wantonly from our translation, and if at any time you shall find it necessary to alter it, do it with great modesty, and without amusing the hearers with Latin, Greek, or Hebrew words. Do not meddle with the exposition of the Scriptures, which we commonly call lecturing, for two years at least after you have appeared in a public character. Meanwhile prepare yourself for it, by a diligent reading, and close attention to the connections of Scripture. When you begin it, select such passages as have a peculiar fitness for fixing impressions upon the consciences of the hearers. Let this be your practice for one year. After that you may expound a chapter, or a book, as you shall think will be most for edification.

“Endeavour to acquire the command of your voice. Never

speaking louder than is necessary, unless some divine impulse lay a necessity upon you. Screaming and bawling disgrace the pulpit. Despise theatrical airs. Let your actions be easy and natural. Hate affectation.

“Rise above the frowns and applause of men. Consider your hearers as your fellow-sinners, and your fellow-mortals, and realize the presence of the Searcher of hearts. Be serious and pointed, and you will command attention. Preach to yourself, and you will preach well to others.

“Often read the Epistles to Timothy and Titus. Travail as in birth till Christ be formed in souls.

“When settled in a congregation, begin your ministry with great modesty, affection and faithfulness. The first days of a man’s ministry have frequently been found to be his best days. Endeavour to grow, that your profiting may appear to all.

“Be very circumspect in your life. Let your conversation on all occasions proclaim the sincerity of your heart, and exemplify the salutary tendencies of the doctrine you deliver to others.

“Be very solemn in speaking to persons who desire baptism for their children, or admission to the Lord’s Supper; and never dispense those privileges to any, without the advice of your Session.

“Consider that faithfulness in catechizing young people, who are the hope of the Church, and visiting the poor and the afflicted, are some of the most important duties that will be incumbent upon you.

“Never attach yourself to any party in your congregation, nor suffer any differences among the people to come before the Session till every previous means of composing them shall fail. Whatever unfavourable opinion you may have of any of your hearers, keep it locked up in your own mind. If any of them shall treat you in an unbecoming manner, take no notice of it, but pray for them, and do your duty to them, as though they had not displeased you. Discourage tale-bearers, and never point your discourses at individuals.

“As the general interests of religion are much influenced by judicial proceedings, let it now be your care to prepare yourself for acting your part therein. Attend the meetings of the

General Assembly, the Commission of the Assembly, Synods, and Presbyteries of the National Church, and also the Judicatories of the Seceders, as you shall have opportunity. Consider Church discipline as an important subject of study. Buy the Acts of the General Assembly, and the Acts of the Synod of Dort; you have the Acts of the National Synod of France in the Library. When you shall be called to act as a member of a Church Judicatory, do not speak often, nor make long speeches, but be decisive when you speak. When differences happen among ministers, be a peace-maker. Never be a party-man. Durham on Scandal will contribute much to make you a good disciplinarian.

"Thus I have given you a few advices. I wish my time had permitted me to polish and extend them. Receive them as they are. They are an effusion of the heart of an affectionate parent. More will be occasionally sent to you, if life and health are preserved.

"I commend you to God, and to the word of his grace; may his good Spirit instruct you, and you will be happily directed. Your best interests are near the heart of your father,

JOHN MASON.

"Read these advices once a month, carefully preserve them as a memorial of me. They may be of use to you, even in old age. Don't be discouraged when so much work is cut out for you. Method, perseverance, due exercise, and, above all, Divine assistance, will enable you to do much more, with great ease.

J. M."

Let us return to say, that Dr. John Mitchel Mason was born in New York, on the 19th day of March, 1770. At the age of seventeen he became a communicant in his father's church. He took his first degree in Columbia College, in 1789, and immediately began to study theology with his father. In 1791, he repaired to Edinburgh, to complete his training. We are inclined to regard this as one of the great formative events of his life, especially as a preacher. Even in our own day, we have often wished that while so many resort to Germany, a few of our candidates would go to Scotland, and there catch some

of the pulpit fervour and parochial diligence, which distinguish the best ministers of the Free Church, and the United Presbyterian Church. The preaching of Dr. Mason was all his life-long Scotch, in all those qualities which so widely separate the pulpit of Scotland from that of New England. Each has its excellencies; but, as to freedom, warmth, and pathos, none will stand long in awarding his preference.

His youthful religious exercises at this period are elevated and evangelical; extracts are freely given. During his residence abroad, some of these experiences will be seen to have been remarkable for tenderness, and some even for rapture. He pursued his studies with earnestness, but was interrupted by the death of his excellent father, in the spring of 1792. "The Lord, I see"—thus he writes—"will make me serve him in his own way. By ruining my favourite schemes, he has punished me for making an idol of human preparation. By taking away my father, he has punished me for leaning too much upon a created comfort." He returned to America abruptly, leaving behind him an early reputation for genius and talent. Dr. Hunter, the Professor of Divinity, assured Dr. Hosack, that young Mason, even then, wrote with facility and force, while in extemporaneous debate he clearly outstripped all rivals. He was licensed as a probationer in October, 1792; and began to preach in the pulpit which had lately been his father's. Of this church, he soon became the pastor. In 1793, Mrs. Graham writes of him:—

"Our young Timothy, J. M., is a perfect champion for the gospel of Jesus. The Lord has well girded him and largely endowed him. He walks closely with God, and speaks and preaches like a Christian of long experience. He was ordained about two months ago in his father's church, and a few weeks after married a lady of eminent piety, and preached all day, both the Sabbath before and after. There is probably no church in New York whose discipline is as strict, nor one which has so many communicants. He is reckoned a lad of great talents and an orator; and many of even the idle and careless go to hear him. Oh, for a thankful heart!" As eloquence is not an affair of tutors and training, all great preachers evince some striking powers at the start; and Mr. Mason's

popularity was speedily attained. It is matter less of surprise than regret, that so little has been preserved which could give us any distinct notion of his manner in this early stage of his ministry. We find him early publishing sermons; and among these was one upon Missions, which fixes his place among the first advocates of this great cause in America. During the first ten years, he collected six hundred new members into his church; so that at length it was found necessary for the congregation to swarm, and form a second.

In the year 1798, Mr. Mason published his "Letters on Frequent Communion," which were directed against the burdensome sacramental services, to which the Scotch very generally adhered with as much tenacity as if they had been divine institutions. Here, as throughout life, we find his strong and adventurous mind breaking away from the scrupulosities and uncommanded customs which even Protestants may erect into a Nehushtan. Against the cry of innovation, he pithily and admirably says:—"Many consider as part of the good way, whatever is older than themselves." In reference to the routine of fasts and other continued services, which had precluded frequent communion, he thus speaks:—"One hour, one minute, of genuine humiliation before God—one tear of gracious contrition for sin—one groan unutterable of the Spirit of adoption, is of more value in his sight than the most splendid round of formalities." As to the fast and thanksgiving days, he proves that they have no warrant in Scripture; that they are contrary to the judgment of almost the whole Christian Church; and that they are attended with great and serious evils. The work shows the argumentative power and the courage which were evinced in later controversies, with an occasional declamatory tone, which savours of oral debate, and adds nothing to the permanent value of this able and unanswerable argument.

During these early years of ministry, we find Mr. Mason rendering various important services to the ecclesiastical body of which he was rapidly becoming the reputed leader. He plans a religious bookstore, and a religious newspaper. He is active in behalf of the College. He boldly writes against Jefferson, as an enemy of Christianity. Through all this bright

and important period, we feel the need of those vivid delineations, which might have been attainable thirty years ago.

The Scotch settlements greatly suffered for want of ministers, and naturally looked for supply to the mother country. In 1801, Mr. Mason was sent to Great Britain to procure a competent number of labourers. In this renewed visit, his keener observation and matured wisdom give origin to many valuable notices of Scotland and its church customs: for these we must refer to the Memoir itself. In London, he preached the celebrated sermon entitled "Messiah's Throne;" one of the few extant which give any glimpse of his astonishing powers. Seldom has any preacher more startled and fascinated the British metropolis. Of this, many testimonials remain. His letters are full of fine remark and domestic affections. "English Christianity (so he writes) is somewhat *unique*. I wish I had time to sit down and analyze it. I see in it much to admire and to love; but can observe *traits* which justify an apprehension that some of its tendencies, and those of strong operation, are not altogether auspicious. It has been my happiness to become acquainted with several of the best men, both in the Established Church, and out of it. A few days ago, I took my breakfast with good MR. NEWTON. He has one foot not more certainly in the grave, than he has the other on the threshold of heaven. This evening I go with Mr. Bethune to visit your favourite Mr. Serle.* I have received great kindness from Mr. Wilberforce, Mr. H. Thornton, and others, on whose friendship I am entitled to reckon for support in pursuing one of the ends of my visit to Great Britain. How welcome, how sweet, will be the peace of my dear family, and the sober, attentive order of my congregation! Long ago was I a Presbyterian from *principle*; and everything that I have seen since my arrival in Britain has served to strengthen my convictions. Never have I been so awfully impressed with the absolute necessity of the old-fashioned way of training up ministers in the Churches of Scotland and Holland, and of the importance of erecting, without delay, and supporting with vigour, seminaries of Theological instruction in America, as I am at this moment. It *must* be done or we are ruined.

* Author of *Horæ Solitariae*, and other works of great unction.

"This goes with our dear friends, Mr. and Mrs. Bethune. It is a mutual grief that we cannot sail together. My heart is with them, and so would be my person, if it were at all practicable. But it were foolish to hurry away at the expense of leaving business unfinished. My design and expectation are to follow in about five weeks. The dear children are constantly near my heart. O, that the gracious Providence which has hitherto watched over them, may keep them still! I commit them, with their much loved mother, to the guardian care of God my Saviour. May the light of his countenance continue to cheer you! Wherever we are, he is; and he will not leave us. He will restore me to the embraces of my precious family and affectionate friends. The month of September, I trust, will be a happy time."

Several chapters of the work are here occupied with letters of the period 1798-1804, which we will not dismember by way of unsatisfactory extract; they are more numerous than the public could expect, at this time of day. Through all these we find Mr. Mason's mind steadily bent on the grand object of his life, the establishment of a Theological Seminary. Copies of a plan for such a school were widely circulated in 1804, among ministers both at home and abroad. In the same year he received his doctorate. But the most striking event is the death of Hamilton, Dr. Mason's connection with which, as a faithful counsellor and witness for God, is too well known to need rehearsal; nor dare we garble a narrative which every reader must desire to have in its integrity.

The history of the Theological Seminary founded by Dr. Mason is interesting, not merely as belonging to his life, or as connected with the Associate Reformed Church, but as disclosing the first attempt to establish a separate school for ministerial training. It was in 1806 or 1807, that Dr. Jedediah Morse wrote to Dr. Mason:—"We seriously contemplate the establishment of a Theological Seminary at Andover, on the plan of yours." All the details of the eminent Professor's mode of instruction are valuable to those who seek the true way of preparing young men for the ministry. Dr. Mason and his biographer lay more stress than we are disposed to do upon the abuse of text-books, and the importance of fostering of

what is sometimes called independent thinking. In mathematics, astronomy, medicine, morals, and theology, we hold, as the world of scholars has held, that a good text-book is invaluable. He who excludes printed manuals, substitutes for them the oral teaching of the Professor, which is quite as subversive of original thought. Original investigation, instead of being the first, is nearer to the last attainment of the scholar. The early task of the learner, in all sciences, is not individual discovery, at first hand, but humble reception of what a series of great minds have discovered. The Newtons and La Places began with text-books. Unguarded invitation to the bold and independent method, though useful to a few, who would even do wisely without it, may be disastrous to the many, who will abuse it. The humdrum, plodding, stolid retailer, or stupid copyist—such are in every class—is not greatly helped by your exhorting him to think for himself, for he can scarcely be said to think at all. On the other hand, such men as James McChord, and John M. Duncan, need no such stimulation. The biographer's remarks on this subject are brief and moderate, and our opinion is meant to reach objections from quarters nearer home. Humility, respect for catholic opinion, subjection of mind to the findings of reformed theology, modest acquiescence in what has been ascertained, and exact acquaintance with the terms and distinctions of the best theologians, are, in our opinion, the best preparation for subsequent discovery; and equally preventive of arrogant ignorance and heretical adventure.*

That Dr. Mason was the commanding pulpit-orator of America in his day, cannot be doubted. In the first decennium of this century he was in his glory. Not only in the Middle States, but in New England, his free and dauntless manner gave entrance for a thoroughness of old-school Westminster orthodoxy, which might otherwise have been unwelcome. He electrified many assemblies by his sermon on "Messiah's Throne." The Rev. Moses Stuart, in 1808, writes from New Haven concerning it:—"Never did a sermon make such an impression here. Even our Connecticut Bishop's son declares he never heard such a sermon before." In Boston, where he thundered

* See this delicate point discussed at length in our volume for 1832; pages 171-190

against the Socinians, he was not less admired. But the united burden of parochial and professional cares was too great, and in 1810 he resigned his pastoral charge. His speech before the Presbytery on that occasion is one of the most striking reminiscences of his eloquence, and contains more of his fire and pathos than most of his printed sermons.

Among the paltry squabbling of zealots for a psalmody which admitted none but Old Testament light, and for a communion so close as to shut out the most even of Presbyterians, such a man could no more be detained than a fir-tree can be kept alive in a window flower-pot; and in the growth of his mind and opinions he shattered many old friendships and sturdy prejudices. We have heard of those who declared that he enjoyed no prosperity after he gave up Mr. Rous's Psalms for "human composures." The matter of communion is more interesting, as connected with one of his most celebrated productions. After resigning his pastoral charge, a portion of it was erected into a separate congregation, to which he preached for a time. It was difficult to find a place of assembly, and the trustees of the Cedar street Church offered the use of their edifice. Here they assembled after the dismissal of Dr. Romeyn's congregation. Between Mason and Romeyn, there was a brotherly attachment, which, in these new circumstances, extended itself to their respective churches. Christian love being stronger than Seceder-rubrics brought pastors and churches together at the Lord's table. Perhaps it occurred to them, that Christian communion on platforms and in households was a mockery, if it did not act itself out in that ordinance which is Christ's appointed expression of fellowship. But this new wine greatly marred the old bottles; and sore griefs and controversies were the result. On a motion in the Synod to censure the lax brethren, only three members took the sterner side.

We omit much that is interesting, and all that relates to Columbia College, to say, that in 1816, Dr. Mason being enfeebled in health, revisited Europe. For eleven years he had had acted as Professor, without receiving any pecuniary compensation. He had carried through the press his "Plea for Sacramental Communion on Catholic principles." He had united in forming the American Bible Society. It was time

that he should change the scene. "His farewell interview with his family, on embarking, presented a scene which was at once tender and edifying—showing a beautiful combination of domestic affection and Christian faith. He first kneeled and offered up a most humble and pathetic prayer. He then sang, with unusual force, the whole of Newton's excellent hymn, 'The Lord will provide.' After this, amidst irrepressible emotions, he embraced each one separately, with a word of comfort and counsel to each. Finally, uttering a few short, but expressive and fervent ejaculations to Heaven, in behalf of them all, he left the house—several of his children and friends accompanying him to the Battery, whence he was conveyed in a boat to the ship lying at a distance in the bay."

His return was in November, 1817. His health was still so much impaired that during the winter he was able to lecture only on Systematic Theology. Already he had begun to complain of a portentous numbness in the right arm; and in the spring he writes to Dr. Chalmers: "My health, though improved, is not confirmed. My public labours, although greatly abridged, are still equivalent to preaching four times a week. I find the pressure too heavy. It retards my recovery, and keeps me feeble." In the reply, how do we seem to be moving among great men, when such a one as Chalmers writes to such a one as Mason, of a third, who was inferior to neither: "I think the most interesting publication that has come out of late, is a sermon by *Hall, your friend*, on the death of our Princess Charlotte." Even more delightful is it, to find this great, childlike divine writing thus to his American friend: "May I crave an interest in your prayers. I trust I feel more of the exclusive importance of Christ Jesus, and my own absolute nothingness and worthlessness in the sight of God. I am quite sure that no acceptable grace can be formed in me, but through a channel by which a stream of influence might be made to pass from Christ's fulness into my empty, and guilty, and depraved soul. O! that this humility were habitual, and that I got an habitual experience of that grace which God giveth to the humble!" And not long after, Mason writes to Chalmers concerning the death of the venerable Balfour: "O! shall we be ready to take the same flight from this earthly to that heavenly sphere? I cannot

tell you how such a question weighs down my sinful heart. Were not our Lord's righteousness perfect, his grace exceedingly abundant, and his Spirit the Living One, I should lie down in despair, and die the death of the undone. Pray for me, that I may be filled with the fulness of the Saviour, and be enabled to honour his name, tasting as well as showing forth his salvation." These are pleasing glimpses into the inner life of men, who, to the world, seemed oftener great than humble.

All this was preparation for the critical event of 1820, when Dr. Mason, during his accustomed exposition, was stricken with paralysis in the pulpit. After coming to the conclusion that his preaching days were over, but before he actually resigned his charge, he received an invitation to become President of Dickinson College at Carlisle, in Pennsylvania. In December, 1821, he removed to that post. He had scarcely been fairly inducted into the academical routine, when he sustained a fracture of the thigh-bone. In 1822, during a visit to New York, he was met by the heavy tidings of the death of his daughter, Mrs. Van Vechten, still remembered as one of the loveliest women of her day. It was concerning this beautiful creature, when still a surpassing bride, that the father had written to the modest and amiable author of the biography before us:—"You must live by faith, or you will live badly. I found its blessedness in early life; and so will you. Keep close to the Lord Jesus, as the Lord your strength; and you shall sing, 'the Lord will provide.' Remember your Master. Remember the *souls* committed to your charge. A word more—**LOVE MY CATHARINE.**" It was concerning the same Catharine, when laid out for burial, that his palsied hand wrote as follows; and if there is a reader for whom these touches of nature and grace have no significance, he is not the reader of our choice:

"NEW YORK, August 9, 1822.

"MY DEAR SIR: Need I tell you that I sympathize with you? The heart of a father over his daughter responds to every moan of a husband's heart for his beloved wife. Yes, my dear sir, she is removed from both of us! But though nature grieves, grace will triumph. The eye of faith never shines with more lustre than when it is seen through nature's

sorrows. But what shall we say? It is the Lord; and shall he not do what he will with his own? Oh, she was his own past all peradventure! manifestly his own! The proof, as you know better than any other human being, was written, 'not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God; not on tables of stone, but on the fleshly tables of the heart.' If a repining or discontented thought stir in my heart, I am instantly rebuked by that prayer of our great High Priest, 'Father, I will that those whom thou hast given me, be *with me where I am*, to behold my glory.' The Lord Jesus was praying, that our dear Catharine should be with him. He was heard! Would you wish that your Lord should be refused *any* request? He knew that it would fill our hearts with anguish and our eyes with tears; yet he prayed for it. Now then we have strong claim upon his love. If any earthly event would try the quality of your religion, this will do it. O Jacob, my son, we have so much cause for thankfulness and praise, that nature's voice is almost stifled. I adore my gracious God that I had *such* a daughter to yield to his call. Do you not adore him that you had *such* a wife to give up? Our sweet Catharine is with the Resurrection and the Life. Are you sorry for that? Her conflict is over; her race is run; no more trouble now from sin or pain. Are you sorry for that? Dear Lord Jesus, our hearts bow; they kiss the rod because it is *thine*. In their desolation, they seek that repose and comfort which thou only canst bestow! May he, the Lord Jesus Christ himself, comfort and support you by his Spirit of consolation; and enable you to say, 'He hath done all things well. He hath fulfilled his word unto his servant to give that which is good.' For it stands upon eternal record, and rejoice in it, O! son of grief, that 'all things shall work together for good to them that love God.'

"Your mother is much bowed down, but she bows like a Christian. Oh, how she loved your Catharine! She is the bearer of this letter. Her heart yearns over your motherless babes. Soothe her spirit by permitting one of them to accompany her home. I wished to have seen you myself, but my broken thigh-bone could hardly stand the jolting of the stage. The paralytic affection still lurks about my frame; and I

dreaded the effect of violent agitation of mind. I submit to necessity and stay behind. Now the God of peace comfort, settle, strengthen, stablish you! make your ministry more humble, tender, and successful!—enable you to walk more closely after your Lord!—call your name ‘Barnabas, a son of consolation,’ from your abundantly comforting others with the consolation wherewith your own soul has been comforted of God.

“Yours in the bonds of nature, grace, and affection,
J. M. MASON.”

Infirmities and afflictions so thickened upon him from this time forward, that in the summer of 1824, he resigned his presidentship and returned to his native city; where after a period of retirement and decline, he peacefully breathed his last, on the morning of the Lord’s day, December 26, 1829, in the sixtieth year of his age, being three years older than his father was at the time of his death. He had lived much in threescore years, and had consumed his flaming torch with rapid combustion.

In closing this volume we can say with truth that it has been long since we read a biography with greater stir of emotions, and this more from the sayings and letters of its great subject, than from any peculiarities in the mode of treating the material. Almost every page brings before us the names of men connected with that Presbyterianism, which has since become the commanding type of American Protestant religion. Few clergymen or authors of this Church stand out, with higher relief and more vivid colours than Dr. Mason. As his was a spirit of unusual loftiness, impetuosity, and decision, it was to be expected that he should have prominent faults and violent enemies. Both parts of the statement are true, though both are thrown into perspective by the filial delicacy of the biographer. The history of all the clergy who were Dr. Mason’s contemporaries in New York, with the characteristics, the personal and social habits and the end of each—involving, as this would do, the ministerial manners and customs of the time, and the genial flow of an intercourse very unlike the starchness of New England, and too animating to be either lasting or safe—

would be a history fitted to open the fount of tears. The names of these men are fresh in our daily discourse. Among them, and over them all, as lord paramount, towered John M. Mason, a man to be feared and loved. And through all the storms and temptations of a most trying period, we do verily believe, he bore in his heart of hearts that adoring attachment to the Lord Christ which was his ruling passion. The view presented by his letters, diary, and the observations made in unobserved hours—of his faithful warnings, his parental prayers and entreaties—his words of submission and joy under affliction, and his overflowing tears both of sympathy and happiness, has done us good, and made us correct the impression derived partly from public report, and partly from the blunders of indiscriminating admirers. From none has the memory of this unapproachable man suffered more than from such of his followers as have attempted to honour him, by the rehearsal of levities and extravagancies which lost nothing by transmission, and were the blemishes of a majestic form. Especially has every imitation of his manner proved a ludicrous burlesque, especially in those who had nothing of his stature, voice, eye, presence, intellect, learning, and heart. Such is perhaps the lot of every great preacher who is boldly original.

In the preface the author informs us that it has not been thought necessary to review any of Dr. Mason's published works; and to this principle the adherence has been scrupulously close. We own our surprise at the shrinking tenderness with which the Mason-Hobart controversy is touched, especially as no single passage in Dr. Mason's life was of greater moment. For though the High-Church battle, after numerous changes of front, has been in our day shifted to an entirely different field, the tactics of these great combatants are still matter for study. It was by insufferable pretension, involving a denial of our orders and sacraments, that Dr. Mason was goaded into conflict. It is by similar pretension, in more vulgar shapes, that all Christians who hold ministerial parity are driven to the necessity of vindicating the Reformed Churches against the modern imitators of Laud. It was the fortune of Mason to find in Hobart a scholar, a gentleman, and a prelate of unblemished lawn. The abstract questions at issue,

were complicated by no ethical or financial investigations. But the denial of covenanted mercy to those who were not in fellowship with the human invention of three orders, demanded rebuke, and received it.

Again we express our high respect for the author of this long desired and welcome biography. It contains, as we have intimated, the principal facts of the history, with a rich magazine of correspondence. It is unnecessary for us to say more, in order to attract to it the attention of every reader.

ART. VIII. — *The Elements of Psychology: Including a Critical Examination of Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding, and Additional Pieces.* By Victor Cousin. Translated from the French, with an Introduction and Notes, by Caleb S. Henry, D. D. Fourth improved edition, revised according to the Author's last corrections. New York: Ivison & Phinney, 321 Broadway. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co., 111 Lake Street. Buffalo: Phinney & Co. 1856. Pp. 568.

IN 1839, there appeared in the pages of this Review, an article entitled Transcendentalism. It consisted of two parts; the one a general survey of the modern philosophy of Germany, the other, an examination of the philosophical system of Cousin. That article was reprinted in a pamphlet form in Boston, under the auspices of the late Professor Norton. It was subsequently included in a volume containing selections from the Princeton Review, published without any suggestion, or co-operation of the conductors of this Journal; and recently, the article in question has been reprinted in a handsome volume in Edinburgh, under the superintendence of the Rev. Patrick Fairbairn, D. D., of Aberdeen. Of this article, thus abundantly honoured, Caleb S. Henry, D. D., the translator of the Lectures of Cousin on Locke, which was one of the works therein reviewed, spoke with great contempt in the preface to the third edition of his translation, published in 1841. He says, "I have never

taken any public notice of it, because, for those who thoroughly understand the subject of which it treats, the article itself is its own best refutation; while to candid and sensible persons, less familiar with philosophical studies, though its numerous untruths and calculated appeals to the prejudices of the ignorant, may not be equally apparent, yet its flippancies, personalities, and bad temper, (at variance alike with the true philosophical and Christian spirit,) are sufficiently obvious to produce the reverse of the intended impression, (I may add, that from both these classes of persons, and from various quarters, I have received numerous testimonies to this effect;) and, as to the remaining portion of the public, coming within the limited sphere of the Journal in question—persons, namely, with whom ignorance of the subject and religious associations would make that Journal an authority—I certainly felt no call to argue philosophical questions before such a tribunal.

“A few words will suffice for all that is necessary to say to the reader of this volume. The article represents Cousin as a Pantheist, denying the personality of God, as denying also the essential difference between right and wrong, and as maintaining a scheme of Fatalism. I should do wrong to content myself with simply saying that these representations are totally false. Not only are they entirely destitute of just foundation, and contradictory also to the system of Cousin; but, on each and every one of these points, Cousin *strenuously maintains doctrines precisely the reverse of those imputed to him!* The statements of the article are as laughably untrue as it would be to call Athanasius an Arian, Bishop Berkeley a materialist, or Jonathan Edwards a believer in the self-determining power of the will! It seems to me, therefore, incredible that any person of ordinary good sense, assuming to pass a public judgment on such subjects, should fall into an honest misconception of Cousin's doctrines on these points. I confess I can scarcely in my own mind acquit the writer of the article of deliberately imposing on his readers representations which he knew to be not only unjustifiable as towards Cousin personally, because contradictory to his express and repeated official declarations, but also unjust in themselves, because not involved in his fundamental principles, but contrary to his principles, to

his system, and to the whole strain of his systematic teaching. This impression is rendered the more difficult to resist by the mode in which the writer has endeavoured to support his representations—his logic being of that pleasant and effectual sort sometimes called the method of proving *aliquid ex aliquo*. The only supposition upon which the writer can be freed from the imputation of deliberate bad faith, is that his predetermination to make out a case destroyed for a time his capacity to perceive anything that made against his purpose. Why he should have wished to have made out a case, is not hard to be conceived in this community, and is apparent enough from the face of the article.* “For proof of the utter falsehood of the charge of Fatalism, the reader need only turn to the tenth chapter of the present volume, and to the notes connected with the fifth chapter.”

As to the charge of denying the essential distinction between right and wrong, he says, among other things, “Cousin is one of the most decided advocates of the principles of essential and immutable morality that ever wrote: Cudworth, Butler, and Price have written nothing stronger, nothing clearer. It would not be a grosser falsehood, nor a more laughable blunder, to assert that the systems of Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham recognized disinterested virtue and the essential difference of right and wrong, than has been committed by this person in asserting that Cousin denies them.”

“So likewise with respect to the charge of Pantheism, apparently the writer of the article in question had no precise conception of the meaning of the term. Certain it is that Cousin is no Pantheist in any of the senses in which the word is ever used by persons entitled to speak on the subject.” After stating what he regards as different forms of Pantheism, he adds, “Now, Cousin not only does not teach Pantheism in either of these forms, but, on the contrary, clearly and abundantly confutes them all. He maintains the substantial existence of God and the substantial existence of the universe of

* What he means by this, we learn from a subsequent part of his remarks. He imputes to the Reviewer a desire to injure his reputation, with the view of deterring parents from sending their children to the Institution in which he was a Professor, and of inducing them to patronize the College at Princeton.

mind and matter; of God as distinct from the universe; of God as the cause and the universe as the effect; of God as superior to the universe by all the superiority of an infinite, uncreated substance and cause, over all finite and created substances and causes. Yet all that Cousin says expressly and directly on this subject, is kept out of view by the writer of the article, and some speculations respecting the relation of the creation to God, and some expressions concerning the all-pervading presence of God, are paraded as proof of Pantheism."

"I repeat, then, summarily, that the person who wrote the article in question has imputed to Cousin doctrines directly the opposite of those which he explicitly and positively teaches, doctrines which he distinctly and strenuously opposes: and the mode in which he endeavours to justify his imputations involves a perversion of thought and language scarcely less incredible. A parallel argument might be constructed to prove Cudworth an atheist, Bishop Butler an infidel, and Mr. Thomas Paine a Christian believer!"

"A professed exposition of modern German philosophy is also given in this article, putting it in as odious a light as possible, for the sake of casting accumulated odium upon Cousin, and (perhaps chiefly) upon myself. Not adopting any of those German systems, nor sympathizing with their theological spirit and tendency, I do not here feel concerned to correct the mistakes of this exposition. Besides, no thinker tolerably well-informed on the subject, needs be told what a superficial and insufficient account it is. It has every appearance of being an assemblage of scraps gathered at second and third hand from encyclopedias, reviews, and incidental notices. A moment's glance is sufficient to satisfy any competent judge that it was never formed by a discriminating philosophical mind from a careful examination of the original sources.

"These are the leading and the only material points in the article. Almost every page of it, however, abounds with particular instances of bad spirit and deficient capacity. Its arrogant and flippant personalities, its numerous perversions and blunders, both in logic and fact, taken in connection with the falsehood of its leading positions, form a combination equally pitiable and ludicrous. But I have said enough, and perhaps

more than enough, respecting an article so little entitled, either for its matter or its spirit, to the respect of any true philosopher; and whose only value to the genuine Christian, who is, at the same time, thoroughly acquainted with its subject, is in the example it furnishes, how far from truth and propriety one may be led who attempts, under the banner of religion, to excite the *odium theologicum* against another, by presuming on the ignorance and appealing to the prejudices of those whom he addresses."

All this, and much more to the same effect, was written in 1841, and is republished in 1856, the writer congratulating himself, at this late day, on his moderation. Not satisfied, however, with what he had accomplished, he adds nearly forty pages of similar matter in the preface to the recent edition of his work; and, so great is his feeling of animosity towards an article which he cannot find terms adequately to depreciate, that he has published, or at least distributed, that preface in a pamphlet form. This is certainly putting himself to a great deal of unnecessary trouble. If our article is so false, feeble, malicious, and silly, as he represents it, it does not call for such violent efforts to counteract its influence. It is strange that the writer does not see that he only makes himself ridiculous, by speaking with such contempt of a review, whose influence he finds it necessary to counteract half a generation after its publication. So far from time having moderated his irritation, the recent portion of his rejoinder is more reckless and atrocious in its abuse, than that written fourteen years ago. He charges the writer of the article in our Review, with "point-blank slander," with committing "an outrage on the decencies of any kind of public debate, such as upright and honourable men everywhere look upon with reprobation, such as they expect to see only in the lowest organs of political party rancour." In another place, he says: "That any man of ordinary capacity, and ordinary intelligence of the subject, with merely that before his eyes which the volume I put forth contained, should be able, from detached and garbled passages out of the volume translated by Mr. Linberg, to pronounce such a judgment on Cousin's views of moral distinctions; that he should be able to do it in good faith, or at least without perceiving such a contradiction between his repre-

sentation and the official systematic utterances of Cousin on the point, as ought to make an honest man pause,—this is to me inconceivable, and I frankly say I do not believe it. I think the man guilty of slander; and I think that in the clear-sighted judgment of our Lord God, there are many inmates of the state prison less morally guilty than the slanderer."

He complains that our review holds him up as "a contemptibly vainglorious meddler with matters beyond my reach; for whose guilt, indeed, the only excuse is to be found in the vanity that blinded me, and the stupidity that incapacitated me from knowing what I was doing." Such was not the impression of Dr. Henry's character, which our review of 1839 was designed to produce; but it is the impression which this rejoinder of his will not only make, but render indelible. In the conclusion of his long Preface, he says, "My main purpose has been to signalize the spirit and temper of the article in its contrast with that of Sir William Hamilton; and bad as the impression I have conveyed may be, I assure the reader it is not one half so bad as the reading of the whole article itself will produce. Something also of the character of the article, as a philosophical discussion, and of the writer's competency to engage in the criticism of such questions, I have incidentally shown; but how bad, how very bad the article is, as a whole, in these respects, I have not attempted to show. Nothing can adequately show it, but the whole article itself—nor that except to a true thinker, accurately acquainted with Cousin's system, and with the history of Philosophy in all its great systems."

As we had no hand in the article thus characterized, we may be allowed to speak of it freely. Not having looked at it since its first publication, and never having seen Dr. Henry's Preface to the third edition of his book, we were a little startled by his unmeasured contempt and reprobation. With some anxiety, therefore, we took down the review, and having reperused it, we do not hesitate to say, that we regard it in both its parts, (both in the sketch which it gives of German Philosophy, and in its examination of Cousin's system,) for scholarship and ability one of the best reviews which has ever appeared in an American periodical. The outline given of German Transcendentalism is just what it pretends to be. In the compass of

thirty pages no reasonable man would expect a thorough exposition of three or four systems of philosophy. It was not the purpose of the writer to examine the fundamental principles of any one of those systems, but his professed and real object he thoroughly accomplished. That object was to present a general view of the leading principles, and of the theological tendencies of the systems in question. This was done with a copiousness of reference to original and authentic sources of information which betrays the scholar on every page. We do not know where a better view of German Philosophy can even now be obtained in so small a compass.

It is, however, against that portion of the review which relates to Cousin's system, that Dr. Henry's denunciations are principally directed. The writer of that part of the article in question has been in his grave more than ten years. He is now publicly accused, not only of incompetency and of ridiculous blunders, but also of falsehood and slander, and pronounced worse than a felon. It is impossible to repress the indignation excited by these charges. The publicity given to them imposes a solemn obligation on the surviving friends of the writer, to vindicate his memory. So far as these charges rest on Dr. Henry's assertions, (which is their main foundation,) they may be fairly met by a counter assertion. We pronounce them, therefore, one and all, to be false. We assert that the charge of Pantheism, Fatalism, and the effectual subversion of moral distinctions made against the system as it was at that time exhibited, are fairly made out; and that the whole impression of the article is such as to commend it to the moral approbation of every competent reader.

There are two things which, in justice to all concerned, should be borne in mind. The one is, that every man who holds a false system of philosophy, must of necessity have an esoteric and exoteric faith. We can no more feel and act in opposition to the laws of our own constitution, than we can live independently of the laws of nature. If a man is theoretically an Atheist, he will still acknowledge God in his hopes and fears. If he is an Idealist, he will not the less speak and act on the assumption of the existence of matter. If he is a Fatalist, he will nevertheless take all available means to secure his

own welfare. If he denies the essential distinction between right and wrong, he will manifest in his feelings and judgments the operations of conscience. It may, therefore, be perfectly true that Cousin's system is liable to all the charges brought against it, though his ordinary language and life be governed by the principles of moral and religious truth. There is also a very great difference as to the degree in which those who advocate false doctrines reduce their theory to practice. The very same system in one man becomes the source of the grossest immoralities; while in another it is merely a theory—a field for the exercise of thought. The Hegelian Philosophy produced Heine, though Hegel himself is said to have been as pure as Plato. We take pleasure in saying that the impression produced on us by Cousin's writings, is that he is a man of refined and elevated tastes. Many of his lectures abound with noble sentiments and with correct principles. In contrast with the scoffing mockery of Voltaire, the whole spirit of Cousin appears to great advantage.

The other remark, which justice to all parties requires us to make, is, that Cousin has openly retracted some of his doctrines as leading to Fatalism; and he has endeavoured to modify others so as to obviate the objections brought against their religious tendencies. In his last work, "The True, the Beautiful, and the Good," the Preface to which is dated November, 1858, he has taken special pains to reconcile his doctrines, or at least the statement of them, with the fundamental principles of Theism. We do not think that he has succeeded. The system is essentially what it was before. It is just, however, that he should be judged by his latest utterances; and it is no less just that our review, written in 1839, should be judged by his writings as they then stood. Those familiar only with the forms of statement adopted in his last revision of the lectures just referred to, might think our former representations overstated; but, if they are compared with the whole course of his instructions, and even if judged by the extracts which Dr. Henry, in his infatuation, has just published in the Appendix to the Lectures on Locke, we are confident they will be fully sustained. We propose to endeavour to make this appear, for the purpose of vindicating the memory of a friend, whom Dr. Henry has so grossly assailed; and for the still higher purpose,

of doing what we can to set the public on its guard against the system set forth in Cousin's Lectures, with all the attractions of genius and eloquence, but which is, as we thoroughly believe, subversive of all religion. This is the more necessary, because the system is not presented in the scholastic form. It is not couched in dry technicalities. It is not buried under an uncouth nomenclature, intelligible only to the initiated. His doctrines are presented in the form of history. One principle is brought out here, another there; first in one form, then in another, surrounded with a brilliant haze, which conceals while it adorns. The writings of Kant, or Hegel, might circulate among our people for a generation, and not be read by a hundred persons, or understood by a dozen. It is very different with the popularized Germanism of Cousin. A poisonous stream may flow under ground and do little harm, but if its waters are thrown up in brilliant jets from a fountain in the midst of a populous city, they will excite general attention and be drunk by thousands. This is just the service Cousin has rendered the Pantheistic philosophy of Germany; and it is this that renders his writings so peculiarly dangerous. Many a youth, and it seems even some doctors of divinity, who would never think of sinking a shaft a thousand feet deep to reach the waters of Hegel, will drink them without knowing what they are, as they are cast up in rainbow tints by the genius of Cousin; or to use a more homely illustration, many a man, and especially many a young lady, (for we understand that Cousin's Psychology is taught to girls,) who would revolt at the clammy white of an egg, will delight in the same substance when beaten into froth, coloured and sweetened, and called by some appetizing name. Such is the transformation which the insipid albumen of German philosophy has undergone in the hands of Cousin.

The charges, against Cousin's philosophy, of Pantheism, Fatalism, and the denial of moral distinctions, we do not propose to consider separately; the first includes the others. Every pantheistic system is of necessity fatalistic, and by a like necessity, precludes the idea of sin.

Before presenting the evidence in support of this comprehensive charge of Pantheism, we wish to notice the way in which Dr. Henry has attempted to refute it. In the first place

he pronounces it ridiculous. "The statements of the article" [in which this charge of Pantheism was made] he says, "are as laughably untrue as it would be to call Athanasius an Arian, Bishop Berkeley a materialist, or Jonathan Edwards a believer in the self-determining power of the will." He says it is incredible to him that "any person of ordinary good sense" could honestly bring such an accusation against Cousin's system; that an argument equally valid might be constructed to prove Cudworth an atheist, or Bishop Butler an infidel. This, if it means anything, means that to accuse Cousin of Pantheism, was as much an unheard of folly as to accuse Athanasius of Arianism. Yet Dr. Henry, when he made that assertion, knew that the charge in question had been made publicly and earnestly in France, England, and America. Nay, he himself publishes in the Appendix to the book, in the preface to which he has the hardihood to make this assertion, Cousin's own declaration of the fact. The charge was so generally made that Cousin found it necessary to defend himself. He says, "It has found so many echoes even beyond the sensual school, that I have written a special dissertation on the Eleatic school, in which I fully explain myself, on the subject of Pantheism." Was Athanasius ever called to defend himself against the charge of Arianism? This is not all; Dr. Henry refers to some remark of Professor Hickok, in his *Rational Psychology*, on the doctrine of necessary creation, in which that distinguished writer says, that Cousin's Eclecticism is "as really fatalistic and pantheistic" as any of the systems which it has assumed to supplant.* He knew, therefore, that Dr. Hickok had pronounced this judgment, and yet he represents our lamented associate as a fool for saying the same thing! Still further, he lauds Sir William Hamilton's review of Cousin's system to the skies, and yet that first of living philosophers brings and substantiates the same charges. He does this in the cool dispassionate way in which an anatomist dissects a corpse; still he does it, and does it effectually. Dr. Henry had read Sir William Hamilton's review; he knew that he asserted that Cousin made the universe the mere phenomenon of God, and that he destroyed liberty by divorcing it from intelligence. He

* See Hickok's *Rational Psychology*, p. 71.

praises Sir William, and dedicates his book to him, and denounces our reviewer as a felon for saying in 1839 what Hamilton had already said in 1829! Worse still, if anything can be worse, he publishes in the Appendix of the very book which contains his atrocious abuse of this Journal, for saying Cousin's system is pantheistic, the clearest possible proof of the justice of the charge. He publishes the "Preface to the first edition of Philosophical Fragments," in which Cousin advances step by step through thirty odd pages of concatenated speculation until he arrives at the conclusion that "God is everything"! What is to be thought of such a man? We can think of no theory to account for such conduct. We cannot understand why a man should voluntarily build a pillory, and then place himself upon it. We have not built it. We did not even place the ladder for him to ascend. It is all Dr. Henry's own doing.

2. Dr. Henry attempts to show that the charge of Pantheism rests on a few "fervid and exaggerated expressions." "As to the expressions," he says, "relating [to the all-pervading presence and energy of God in the universe, they are the same sort of expressions as those in which all elevated meditation on the Divine Being naturally utters itself; and the charge of Pantheism would lie equally against nine-tenths of the most accredited devotional poetry, and against the Holy Scriptures themselves, which speak of God as 'all in all,' and of creatures as 'living, moving, and having their being in him.'" It might as well be said that the conclusion of a demonstration in Euclid was a rhetorical flourish. Pantheism is the conclusion arrived at by a laborious process of argument. The charge is not made to rest on casual declarations; it is founded upon his principles, his arguments, his conclusion, and the application which he makes of the conclusion thus arrived at. Dr. Henry makes no effort to meet the real grounds of the charge. There is no show of examining the principles of Cousin's system, or of proving that they do not necessarily lead to Pantheism, or that his arguments do not go to sustain that system, or that the conclusion is not actually carried out and applied. We do not suppose he is capable of any such process, but he surely ought to have attempted it, and not contented himself with assertion and abuse.

8. He places great reliance on the fact, that Cousin often and earnestly denies that he is a Pantheist. This we admit. He declares Pantheism to be Atheism. He says, "To accuse me of Pantheism, is to accuse me of confounding the First, Absolute, Infinite cause with the universe; that is to say, with the two relative and finite causes of the me, and of the not-me, of which the limits and the evident insufficiency are the foundation from which I rise to the knowledge of God," p. 446. Again, "Human nature raises its voice against Pantheism. All the talent in the world can never justify this doctrine, or reconcile it with the feelings of mankind," p. 448. He is fairly entitled to the full benefit of these denials; but what do they amount to? Simply to this, that he is not what *he calls* a Pantheist. He gives a limited definition of Pantheism which excludes his system, and then says, he is no Pantheist. This is said by the whole school. There are comparatively few German writers of repute, who admit themselves to be Pantheists; while there are multitudes, who by the common judgment of other men are justly so regarded. Cousin defines Pantheism to be the doctrine which "ascribes divinity to the All, the grand whole, considered as God, the Universe-God, of the greater part of my adversaries, of Saint Simon, for example." In this sense, there are no Pantheists, at least among philosophers. Hase says, that "The doctrine that the Universe is God, or that God and the Universe are one and the same, is properly no philosophical conception at all; even the popular religions of the East have got beyond that point."* He quotes Hegel as speaking with contempt of the notion of a Universe-God; Cousin, therefore, is not alone in his denunciations of Pantheism. With one consent the doctrine is repudiated in the form in which he presents it, by those who are really Pantheists in the true, and perhaps the worst, sense of the word. Pantheism is the doctrine which makes God the only real being of which nature and the soul are the phenomena. It denies all dualism. God and the universe are not two. They are one. The waves and the ocean are not two, they are one: but it would be absurd to say that the waves are the ocean.

* Hase's *Dogmatik*, page 118.

So these philosophers say, it is absurd to assert that the universe is God. The ocean is not exhausted in its waves; neither is God exhausted in the universe. The ocean, however, constitutes its waves, and God constitutes the universe. God is both finite and infinite. The finite (i. e., the universe) is God—but not the whole of God. It would be wrong to confound the thoughts of a man with the man himself. Yet the sum of a man's thoughts at any one time makes up his whole consciousness for that time. So it would be wrong to confound the universe with God, though the sum of things finite is for the time being the whole consciousness of God. God, in the language of Cousin, "is everything." God is man, God is nature, God is thought, God is truth, God is light, and heat, sun, moon, stars: "God is everything or nothing." Hence the famous aphorism of Hegel, ALLES WIRKLICH IST VERNUNFTIG—ALL THAT IS, IS DIVINE. Modern Pantheism, therefore, does not merge God in the universe, but it merges the universe in God. If this is Pantheism, then we presume that no competent judge will deny that Cousin is a Pantheist. Without at all questioning his sincerity, we say that his repudiation of the doctrine amounts to nothing; because what he repudiates is not what his opponents mean. He denies that the Finite is the Infinite—that the universe is God; but he does not deny that the Infinite is the Finite, that God is the universe. "All that is, is God," is Pantheism. It is the deification of man and nature while it degrades God as to his consciousness and life, for any given time, to the limits of the creature.

The universe, according to modern Pantheism, is the Son of God. All that the Bible says of the relation of the Father to the Son, is true in reference to the relation of God to the universe. The world is consubstantial and coeternal with God. It is his image, his thought, his reason, his life. It does not exhaust him, because there is a constant development of God in the world; just as the existing flora of our globe does not exhaust the principle of vegetable life. There is an indefinite succession of plants and trees, and an endless multiplication of genera and species. But there is no vegetable life without vegetable products, nor apart from them; and there is no God without the world, or out of it. Dr. Henry has produced no denial

from the pen of Cousin of the doctrine of Pantheism in its philosophical form; nor has he produced any affirmation of the opposite doctrine; except in forms of expression freely employed by the most open advocates of the systems of Schelling and Hegel. "Cousin," he says, "is no Pantheist. We have his explicit condemnation of it. He does not confound God with the universe. And to say that he is a Pantheist, in the improper sense in which the word is sometimes used; to say, that is, that he confounds the universe with God, is equally at variance with hundreds of explicit utterances of his. It would be suicidal to his system; it would be in palpable contradiction with the numerous critical confutations he has constructed against every form of resolving the universe of mind and matter into mere phenomena. It is the very scope of his philosophy to establish the objective reality and the substantial existence of the universe of mind and matter, as distinct from God." We wish this paragraph to be remembered. It brings the matter to the true issue. The question is not whether Cousin affirms or denies Pantheism. That depends on the meaning of the word. The real question is, does he reduce "the universe of mind and matter to mere phenomena." If he does not, then we concede that he is no Pantheist. If he does, then, by Dr. Henry's own showing, he is a Pantheist, and Dr. Henry stands self-convicted of the most atrocious abuse of our reviewer for calling that Pantheism which he here acknowledges to be such; self-convicted also of incapacity to understand the first principles of a system which for thirteen or fourteen years he was engaged in teaching; and self-convicted of assiduously labouring to introduce and inculcate a system utterly subversive of religion and morality. Though our responsibility in this matter is great, it is as nothing compared to his. For if we are mistaken, what harm is done? We, in common with the majority of his readers, have misconceived and misrepresented the doctrines of an illustrious man; and if convinced of our mistake, we shall be glad to make every atonement. But if Dr. Henry is mistaken, then he has been, and still is, labouring to poison the very fountain of life.

4. The great ground of Dr. Henry's confidence, the fact to which he constantly appeals in proof not only of stu-

pidity, but of wilful perversion on the part of our reviewer, is that Cousin "strenuously maintains doctrines precisely the reverse of those imputed to him." This sentence he prints in capitals to give it the greater emphasis. The proof of the assertion which it contains, he finds in the fact that Cousin discourses largely not only of God, but of his personality, and, therefore, he cannot be a Pantheist; he discourses largely of liberty and spontaneity, and, therefore, cannot be a fatalist; he writes with eloquence and pathos on morals, and, therefore, cannot deny the foundation of moral distinctions. This mode of argument seems to us to betray the most profound ignorance of the nature of the question at issue. The most notorious Pantheists do all that Cousin does. They speak largely of God, liberty and virtue. They not only teach that God is a person, but they prove it. They tell us wherein personality consists, what are its necessary conditions, and how God becomes a person. They discuss all the theories of liberty, and often decide in favour of the right one. They examine every department of natural and moral science, and write about them very much as other men. Does this prove anything? Does the fact that Berkeley wrote a treatise on "Tar-water" prove that he was not an Idealist? May not an Idealist write a dissertation on mechanics? If a Pantheist may write discourses on chemistry or astronomy, why may he not write on liberty or virtue? The controversy between Theism and Pantheism lies back of all these questions. These questions all relate to phenomena, and phenomena are admitted by both parties. The facts of consciousness are the same for both. Both therefore may examine, classify, and explain them. The properties and the laws of matter are the same for the advocates of the atomic theory, and for the advocates of the dynamic theory, as to the ultimate principle of matter. It is, therefore, perfectly consistent with the assumption that Cousin is a Pantheist, that he discusses all the phenomena of nature and of the mind; that he examines the theory of beauty, and proves that it cannot be resolved into the agreeable or the useful. With equal consistency he may discuss the facts of consciousness as they bear on the question of liberty, and show the difference between spontaneity and deliberation. So also he may, as he actually does, examine the different theories of virtue,

and prove that it is not founded on utility, or sentiment, or on the arbitrary will of God; that the Good is good in itself, and ought to be pursued whatever be the consequence; that neither regard for our own happiness, nor for the happiness of others, is the ultimate motive in doing right. We very readily acknowledge that there is much that is pure and elevating in what Cousin has written on these subjects, and that he occupies much higher grounds than the Epicureans or followers of Paley. But what does all this amount to? Just nothing at all, so far as the real point at issue is concerned. Yet it is mainly on this ground, that Dr. Henry allows himself to use the unpardonable language, in relation to the writer in this Review, which we have quoted above. As it makes no difference whether a man is a Materialist or Idealist, when he comes to discuss the phenomena of nature; so it makes no difference whether he is a Theist or a Pantheist, when he comes to discuss the phenomena of consciousness. This is not saying that there is no difference between Materialism and Idealism, or between Theism and Pantheism. It is merely saying that the difference does not appear in the discussion of phenomena. The world, as it addresses itself to the senses, is the same to the man who thinks it all matter, as it is to him who thinks it all mind, or to him who thinks it all God. The one would be just as loath to put his hand into the fire as either of the others. How futile then it is to argue that a man does not think the fire is God, because he talks and acts about it just as other men do; or that he does not think the soul God, because he discusses its phenomena just as they are discussed by others. We honestly think that Dr. Henry is the most incompetent man in this whole sphere, whom we have ever encountered, in print or out of it.

We come now to the main question: Is Cousin's philosophy pantheistical? This is the most important question in itself, and also as it concerns the reputation of our lamented friend. If an affirmative answer to this question is proved to be the correct and only one, then our friend stands acquitted, and his accuser stands condemned. It will be remembered that we do not understand by Pantheism the doctrine that the universe is God; we do not charge Cousin with holding or teaching that doctrine which he expressly repudiates. We mean by Pan-

theism the modern German doctrine, that God is the only real existence of which the universe of mind and nature is the phenomenon. That this is truly Pantheism, we have the concession of Dr. Henry himself. "Pantheism," he says, "in the strict sense of the term, is the confounding of God with the universe—denying his distinct substantial existence, and making him merely the collective ALL of things. It may be of two sorts; *material*, when the substantial existence of spiritual being is denied, and matter is made the only substance of which the collective all of the universe is composed; or *ideal*, when the substantial existence of matter is denied, and spiritual being made the only substance. Pantheism, in the less proper meaning of the word, is the confounding of the universe with God—making God the sole substantial existence, and the universe of mind and matter merely phenomena, thereby destroying human personality, freedom, &c. Now, Cousin not only does not teach Pantheism in either of these forms, but, on the contrary, clearly and abundantly exposes and confutes them all." p. xviii. That form of Pantheism, then, which makes God the only substantial existence of which the universe of mind and matter is the phenomenon, destroys human personality and freedom. The whole question, therefore, is whether Cousin teaches that mind and matter are phenomena of which God is the substance. Having reduced the controversy to this single point, we shall endeavour to show, first, that as a historical fact Cousin adopted more or less fully the modern philosophy of Germany; secondly, that modern German philosophy involves the doctrine of Pantheism in the form above stated; and thirdly, that Cousin's system, as unfolded by himself, involves the same doctrine.

The first of these points rests on the testimony of competent witnesses. In 1817—18 Cousin visited Germany. He met Hegel at Heidelberg, whom he speaks of as being at that time known only as a distinguished disciple of Schelling. In 1818 he spent a month with Schelling in Munich, and was thus, as he says, introduced to a clearer knowledge of his philosophy. In 1821, he dedicated one of his works to Schelling and Hegel, as *Amicis et Magistris, philosophiae praesentis ducibus*. In 1826, he spent some time in Berlin with Hegel and his

principal followers, and was more thoroughly indoctrinated in his system. From this time he was in correspondence with the now acknowledged head of the German school, whom he was wont to address as *Mon Maître*. In one of his letters he says to him, "*J'attends votre Encyclopédie. J'en attraperai toujours quelque chose, et tacherai d'ajuster à ma taille quelques lambeaux de vos grandes pensées.*" In another letter, he says, "*Je veux me former, Hegel; j'ai donc tant pour ma conduite, que pour ma publication d'avis austère, et je l'attends de Vous. Sous ce rapport, Vous me devez de temps en temps une lettre sérieuse.*" Again, he says, "*Parlez, parlez, mon ami, mes oreilles et mon âme Vous sont ouvertes. Si vous n'avez pas le temps de m'écrire, dictiez à d'Henning, Hotho, Michelet, Gans, Förster quelques pages Allemandes en caractères Latins; ou, comme l'Empereur Napoléon, faites rédiger Votre pensée, et corrigez en la rédaction, que Vous m'enverrez.*"

In 1833, Cousin published in the preface to the third edition of his *Philosophical Fragments*, an account of his intercourse with Schelling and Hegel, and gives in many points the preference to the former. This disconcerted the friends of Hegel, who attributed the great change in Cousin's estimate of these two great leaders, which took place between 1828 and 1833, to Hegel's having refused to review Cousin's *Fragments*, and Schelling having done him that favour. This they felt the more, because that article was made the vehicle of Schelling's first open assault against his former associate and friend. The facts above stated, however, abundantly prove that Cousin avowed himself, what every one knew he was, the disciple of the leaders of the German Pantheistic school.* They were his recognized masters.

That he became a disciple of Schelling, and enamoured of his system, is also stated by Sir William Hamilton, in his examination of Cousin's theory, originally published in the *Edinburgh Review*. Sir William Hamilton says: "If we compare the philosophy of Cousin with the philosophy of Schelling, we at once perceive that the former is a disciple, though by no means a servile disciple, of the latter. The scholar, though

* See Rosenkranz's *Leben Hegel's*, pp. 368—373.

enamoured of his master's system as a whole, is sufficiently aware of the two insuperable difficulties of that theory. He saw that if he pitched the absolute so high, it was impossible to deduce from it the relative; and he felt, probably, that the intellectual intuition—a stumbling-block to himself—would be arrant foolishness in the eyes of his countrymen. Cousin and Schelling agree that as philosophy is the science of the unconditioned, the unconditioned must be within the compass of science. They agree that the unconditioned is known, and immediately known; and they agree that intelligence, as competent to the unconditioned, is impersonal, infinite, divine. But while they coincide in the fact of the absolute, as known, they are diametrically opposed as to the mode in which they attempt to realize this knowledge; each regarding as the climax of contradiction, the manner in which the other endeavours to bring human reason and the absolute into proportion. According to Schelling, Cousin's absolute is only a relative; according to Cousin, Schelling's knowledge of the absolute is a negation of thought itself. Cousin declares the condition of all knowledge to be plurality and difference; and Schelling, that the condition, under which alone a knowledge of the absolute becomes possible, is indifference and unity. The one thus denies a notion of the absolute to consciousness; while the other affirms that consciousness is implied in every act of intelligence."*

The differences between Schelling, Hegel, and Cousin, all lie outside of the doctrine which we wish to show is common to them all. They all agree in making the Finite the phenomenon of the Infinite. They differ in their methods of arriving at the knowledge of the Infinite, and in their mode of explaining how the one passes into the other. The only object for which we cite the testimony of Sir William Hamilton is to prove that Cousin was regarded as a disciple of Schelling, and as having adopted his system as a whole, not as distinguished from that of Hegel, but as distinguished from those of Kant, and other theistical philosophers.

The difficulties attending Schelling's method, rather than

* See *Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, &c.*, by Sir William Hamilton. Harper's edition, p. 30.

dissatisfaction with his results, seem to have inclined him, for a time, to the special school of Hegel, though he appears to have subsequently returned to his first love. Michelet, (not the French historian, but the Berlin Professor,) says, "that after Cousin, subsequently to his visit to Berlin, in 1826, carried to France the principles of Hegel's doctrine, which von Henning, Hotho, and myself had systematically discussed with him, and especially after he had found such favour with the French public, by means of Hegel's views of history, the Hegelian philosophy ceased to be confined within the limits of Germany, and obtained an European reputation. This is one of the most important of the services of Cousin."* On a subsequent page, he says that Cousin had given "universality and an European reputation to the Hegelian philosophy;" and a little further on, he adds that although Cousin "took so much doctrine from Hegel, he still adhered to the stand-point of psychology, and to its method, which he had derived from the Scottish philosophy, and from the doctrines of Royer-Collard." Here again, the difference between Cousin and his German masters is confined to method, and not to results. That Cousin introduced the Hegelian philosophy into France, is the fact attested. This we consider sufficient, so far as the first point is concerned. It is indeed a matter of common fame, a fact all but universally recognized, that the wonderful success of Cousin as a public lecturer was due not more to his genius and eloquence, than to his having popularized the abstruse philosophy of Germany; for the reception of which, with its intoxicating doctrines, the youth of France were fully prepared. Nothing stood in its way; there was no reigning philosophy; the materialism of the revolutionary period had died out; the doctrines of Reid had gained but slight hold of the public mind; and, therefore, when Cousin appeared, teaching a new system, apparently original,†

* *Geschichte der Letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel.* Von Dr. Carl Ludwig Michelet, vol. ii., pp. 685, 687, and 689.

† It must strike every reader of Cousin's Lectures with surprise, that while he so frequently mentions Kant to praise and to refute him, he seldom or never says anything of Schelling or Hegel, from whom the staple of his philosophy is so largely drawn. He seems to his readers to have taken up the subject as it was left by Kant, and worked out his results without any intervening steps.

and recommended by a mode of presentation perspicuous and captivating, his success was without parallel in modern times.

If Cousin adopted the German philosophy, it becomes necessary to inquire, what that philosophy is. Cousin says, truly, that it is impossible to understand the doctrine of Plato, without understanding the systems which precede and follow it. It is no less impossible to understand Cousin without understanding something of those systems whence his own, as to all its great principles, is derived, and of which it is merely a modification. The comparative anatomist is enabled to determine the genus, the species, and often even the variety to which an animal, whether extant or fossil, belongs, from a single bone, and much more readily from the whole skeleton. This, however, could not be done without a previous knowledge of the various cognate types of animal nature. So it is easy for any reader tolerably conversant with the history of philosophy, to determine from a few pages of a writer, with what school he stands affiliated; though, without that knowledge, he would be as much in the dark as a man ignorant of anatomy in the presence of the bones of some unknown animal. We propose, therefore, to give a brief statement as perspicuous as we can make it, of the modern German philosophy, as indispensable to any proper apprehension of the true character of the system of Cousin. Strauss, the famous author of the *Life of Christ*, in the Introduction to his *Dogmatik*, says that all the modern systems of philosophy may be divided into two classes; the one, the Theistic philosophy of Leibnitz and Wolf; the other, the Pantheistic philosophy of Spinoza, Schelling and Hegel. It is not the peculiar doctrine of Spinoza, as distinguished from that of Schelling, nor the doctrine of Schelling as distinguished from that of Hegel, that we propose to endeavour to state; but the leading features of the system common to them all, which, unless we are entirely mistaken, will be found to include that of Cousin also.

The distinctive title of this system is Monism,* as distin-

* This is the most recently adopted designation. It is the Greek equivalent to the German *Alleinheitslehre*, *all-oneness*; or *Identitätslehre*, *the doctrine of Identity*, employed by Schelling. Hegel calls his system "*Absolute Idealism*," which amounts to the same thing.

guished on the one hand from Pantheism, (in one of its forms,) and on the other from Theism. It is the doctrine of one Being. God is, and beside him there is nothing. God is every thing. He is the one existence of which nature and mind are the movements; the one substance of which they are the phenomena; the absolute reason of which all things are the ideas. This is the result to which this philosophy has arrived. How has this result been reached?

The end of all philosophy is to give a rational solution of the problem of being. Whether it adopts the *a priori* method to the exclusion of the *a posteriori*; whether it starts from reason or experience, or whether it attempts to combine the two methods, the thing which philosophy proposes to do, is to explain how things are. God, nature and man, are the elements of the problem which philosophy undertakes to solve. Of the two latter, we have, by common consent, in one sense or another, immediate knowledge. But as they do not contain within themselves the solution of their own existence, we cannot stop with them. Whatever it may be called, there must be some being, either distinct from nature and mind, and the cause of them, or which includes them as the manifestations of itself.

The first point, therefore, to be determined is, what that being is; the second, in what relation he stands to the universe of nature and of mind; and the third, the consequences of the solution thus arrived at.

It is a principle of the philosophy under consideration, that intelligence implies consciousness, and that consciousness supposes a difference between the subject and object. Every act of consciousness necessarily supposes that we distinguish the self from what is not self; the ego from the non-ego. Consciousness, therefore, implies limitation. We limit ourselves by distinguishing ourselves from what is not ourselves. But limitation is, by the very force of the word, inconsistent with the Infinite. The Infinite or Absolute, (terms used as equivalent by the German school, though distinguished by Sir William Hamilton,) is the unlimited. Consciousness, therefore, cannot be predicated of the Infinite; nor can intelligence, for intelligence implies consciousness. Suppose we abstract from matter all its properties, its extension, resistance, weight, its chemical affinities, &c., what

remains? Nothing that is knowable—that is, nothing of which anything can be affirmed or denied; or suppose we abstract from mind all thought, sensation, emotion, affection, &c., and what remains? Again nothing of which anything can be affirmed or denied. So if you abstract the Finite from the Infinite, you leave nothing but a mere potentiality, a cause, power, substance,—call it what you will, it is still an unknown quantity. In order to know itself, or to be known, it must become finite. It must become objective to itself. The Infinite thus passes into the Finite, *i. e.*, into the universe of nature and mind. God has no *existence* out of the world, any more than life exists out of things living.

This determines the second point above mentioned, *viz.* the relation of the Infinite to the Finite; or, if you please, of God to the universe. It is a relation of identity. The universe is consubstantial and coeternal with God. Still, the latter is not exhausted in the former, any more than the mind is exhausted in its acts. The universe is finite, God is infinite. The universe is effect, God is cause. Nevertheless, the universe is God in the sense that it is, for the time being, the whole life, intelligence, and consciousness of God. Take from God the life, intelligence and consciousness of the universe, and you leave an unknown quantity. The universe, therefore, is the self-revelation of God, *i. e.*, the revelation of God to himself. It is the life of God. All that is in God is in the universe, not as a dead or stagnant pool, but as an ever-flowing stream. The water of a river is the river; but the water which fills its banks is not always the same water. It is constantly varying its course, its currents, its eddies, its form, its contents. Thus the universe is the ever-flowing stream of the life of God; now this, now that; now in one form, now in another; inexhaustible in its source, and endless in its flow. The universe, therefore, and all that it contains, are mere moments in the life of God. All acts are his acts, all feeling is his feeling, all thought is his thought, all consciousness is his consciousness. God is the only being, of which the universe is the manifestation; he is the only substance, of which the universe is the phenomenon.

The third point to be considered is the consequences which

flow from this theory, or the applications made of it. These reach very far.

1. As to the nature of God. Although he may be said to be a person, in so far as he comes to self consciousness, the indispensable condition of personality in man, yet he is not a person as distinguished from other persons. He comes to personality as he comes to consciousness. He is a *Werdende Persönlichkeit*, or all-comprehending person. The Finite and Infinite together constitute God, and it is only of the Infinite as realized in the Finite, we can predicate intelligence, moral excellence or knowledge. The moral excellence of God is the goodness of his creatures; his omniscience is the sum of their knowledge; his omnipotence is the causality of all that is, and that is to be, and nothing more. There is nothing in God which is not in the universe, and in its progress. God is just as much an object of knowledge as nature or the soul. We know God as fully as we know ourselves.

2. As the Infinite is the substance of which the Finite is the phenomenon; and the Infinite being spirit, and the essence of spirit being thought, the Infinite and Finite are resolved into thought. The latest designation of the system is therefore Absolute Idealism, a name chosen by Hegel himself. God and man are identical. The Infinite in becoming Finite becomes man; and as this is an eternal process, without beginning and without end, man is eternal. God is in himself, but he *exists* only in man. Nature is unconscious, it does not know itself, and therefore God is nonconscious in nature. His real existence as a conscious intelligence is in man. And as man exists in very different degrees of development, God is in some men in a much higher sense than in others; just as reason is in a higher state in a man of science than in an infant. And as spirit is only what it knows itself to be, it is only those who know themselves to be God who are really divine. It is the "Thinker" (as Dr. Henry calls him,) who, penetrating into the depths of consciousness, finds God, and is aware of the identity of divinity and humanity, who is the true God-man. This is that self-deification which the holy Neander so abhorred, and which made this whole system to him, the abomination of desolation. This is the philosophy which American divines

and professors are peddling about by the thimble-full, to boys and boarding-school girls!

8. If consciousness is necessary to intelligence, and limitation to consciousness; and if intelligence is necessary to the *existence* of spirit, then the absolute spirit must limit itself to become spirit; that is, the Infinite must pass into the Finite; the one supposes the other, they coexist, and cannot exist apart. Creation therefore is necessary. An inoperative cause is no cause. Mind without thought is no mind. God without the world is no God. It is therefore by the strictest necessity of nature that God creates, as it is by a necessity of nature that mind thinks. As, however, the mind is spontaneous, and not coerced in thinking, so God may be said to be free in creating. This, however, does not alter the case. The necessity remains absolute. If there is no world, there is no God. Hence the elder Fichte said that the doctrine of creation in time is the fundamental error of all false religions. Necessary creation is fundamental to this whole system, and necessary creation is Fatalism; for creation is a process as continuous as thought. If you choose to make a distinction between the necessity by which a heavy body falls to the ground, and the necessity by which mind thinks, you may make a distinction between the Fatalism of the Stoics and the Fatalism of this philosophy. It is a distinction without a practical difference. It is inexorable fate in both cases.

4. History is the self-evolution of God; it is a necessary process, that is, a process governed by necessary laws. As the Infinite develops itself in one form in the stars, in another form as plants, in another in sentient creatures, so he develops himself in man. Cosmology, zoology, anthropology, are only different branches of theology. The history of man is the history of God. One idea is embodied in one epoch or nation, another in another. As this self-evolution is a process, and in its ultimate nature a process of mind, and as mind is developed by the conflict of truths, (for error is only imperfect truth,) so history is carried on by conflicts. Wars are the conflict of ideas in the concrete. They are the necessary means of progress. Without discussion there would be stagnation of mind; and without war there would be a stagnation

of society. In the conflict of ideas the true and right always prevail. So in war the conqueror is always in the right. He is always more moral than the vanquished. He that is beaten ought to be beaten. It is time philosophy put its foot on the neck of philanthropy. Success is the sole criterion of the true and good. The triumph of heathenism over Christianity under the persecuting emperors; the predominance of the Arians for centuries over Trinitarians, of the Musselmans over the Christians in the East, of Romanism over Protestantism in Italy and Spain, of Atheism in France, of Rationalism in Germany, of despotism throughout Europe, is all right. The successful are always right. ALLES WIRKLICH IST VERNUNFTIG is the motto on the banner of this philosophy.

5. There is no sin. This does not mean (as poor Dr. Henry seems to think) that there is no difference between the sentiment of approbation and disapprobation, between right and wrong, or that no moral difference can be predicated of human acts. This would be as absurd as to say, there is no difference between pleasure and pain, between one sensation and another; that all things look alike, smell alike, and taste alike. Philosophers, i. e., of *φδοκοντες ειναι σοφοι*, are, according to Scripture, pre-eminently the fools of the world, (we trust they will not throw on us the responsibility of that judgment,) but they are not fools after that sort. When they say there is no sin, they mean that sin, like pain, is a form of good; it is the negative quantity in mathematics; the negative pole in magnetism. You cannot have the one without the other; there cannot be a North without a South; strength without resistance; virtue without vice. Sin is only the sweat on the brow of labour, the travail that attends the birth of virtue. Sin (may the Infinitely Holy forgive us for writing such blasphemy) is as much a form of God as virtue. Reason is reason in the vagaries of a child, and in the speculations of Plato. Water is water in the muddy pool, in Niagara, and in the ocean. God is God in the insect and in Arcturus, in Nero and in John the Apostle. If God is everything, everything is God. The sublime consolation which these philosophers offer to the sinful and the suffering is, that God is no better off than they. Their consciousness is his, i. e., it goes to make up the sum of

his experience. It is he that is struggling and suffering; it is he who is in travail from eternity to eternity. Suffering men have only to lift themselves to the height of this great argument, and recognize themselves as a moment in the life of God, a form in which the Infinite manifests itself, in order to lose the sense of their degradation and misery in the consciousness of their Godhead.

6. Philosophy is the highest form of religion. All religions are forms more or less perfect, in which certain ideas in the absolute spirit develop themselves; or rather, they are conceptions which the people form of ideas; or the forms under which phenomenal reason (reason in man) apprehends the absolute reason. There is a constant progress in this development, and therefore, the last religion is the best; this is the advantage of Christianity; it is the highest form of religion for the masses; philosophy is something higher, to which "thinkers" have attained, and they kindly offer their assistance to raise the gospel to their own level. There are different views, however, entertained by the advocates of this system, as to its relation to the gospel. Some of them regard Christianity as obsolete as heathenism; others say, it is still good enough for the people; and others, as at times Hegel himself, say that it is the absolute religion, identical with philosophy. These are, however, only different modes of stating the same thing. The Christianity which some of the school pronounce obsolete, is repudiated by those who pronounce the gospel the absolute religion; and that which the latter thus pronounce to be true, the former also receive under the name of philosophy. What Christians in all ages have regarded as the gospel of the grace of God, is spurned by all alike. The point of contact between Christianity and Monism, is assumed to be the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation. Both systems teach a triplicity in unity, and both teach that God became man. The triplicity in unity of Monism is the Infinite, the Finite, and their relation. The absolute substance is both infinite and finite, and remains one, or constitutes the unity or identity of the two other members of the formula. The Infinite, as such, is the Father; as manifested in the Finite, he is the Son; the identity of the two is the Spirit; as in the Finite, (the universe of nature and

mind,) man alone is self-conscious; it is man that is properly the second person in this philosophic Trinity, the consubstantial and coeternal Son of God. The scriptural form of the doctrine of Incarnation is defective in two points. First, in making God incarnate in an individual man, Jesus of Nazareth, instead of in the race; and, secondly, in teaching that the divine and human are two distinct natures, whereas they are one and the same; still, it is to this approximation to the truth that Christianity, according to these philosophers, owes all its power.

The Fall, in this system, is the Infinite becoming Finite; and Redemption is the return of the Finite into the Infinite. These are processes necessary and eternal. As God is the world, here is hereafter, earth is heaven. This world is no longer a vale of tears leading to a heavenly land, but it is the eternal theatre of the life of God, and the judgment is the process of history.

We give this outline of modern Pantheism, or Monism, without a line of authentication. Should any one take the trouble to point out that this or that important principle has been omitted, that Spinoza held this peculiarity, Schelling another, and Hegel another, we have only to say that we did not undertake to give the essence of a hundred volumes in half a dozen pages. We merely profess to present the outline of a system common, in all its essential features, to the Pantheistic writers of the German school. If any proposition contained in the above outline is called in question, we stand ready to sustain it by abundant citations from the accredited expounders and advocates of the doctrine, or freely to acknowledge our error. We have great confidence, however, that the view here given of this portentous system will commend itself as just to the mind of every competent reader.

We come now to the third point which we proposed to establish, viz. that Cousin's system is identical with the German doctrine which we have just unfolded. By this we do not mean that he holds every principle of German Pantheism in detail, for it would be difficult to find any two German philosophers who are so completely in accord. But we do mean that he holds the system as a system, and that he traces it out to

substantially the same results. The relation of Cousin's philosophy to that of Germany is analogous to the relation of the English alphabet to the Greek. The Greek has some letters which are not in the English, and the English has some which are not in the Greek. No one, however, can read the one after reading the other, without perceiving their substantial identity. If a country schoolmaster, or even a professor, should undertake to show that the Anglo-Saxons invented their own alphabet, that it is distinguished from the Greek, and all others, "by fundamental principles," he would do just what Dr. Henry has ventured to do, in asserting the essential difference between the Philosophy of Cousin and the Pantheism of Germany. We shall endeavour to show, first, that Cousin avows the result to which the German philosophy has arrived, *i. e.*, that he avows Monism—or that God is everything. Secondly, that his principles, as traced out by himself, lead inevitably to that conclusion; and thirdly, that he deduces from the doctrine thus consciously elaborated, substantially the same conclusions.

First: Cousin avows Monism, or that form of Pantheism which makes God everything.

We have seen that the fundamental idea of German Pantheism is triplicity in unity—the Infinite, the Finite, and their relation; God, nature, and humanity are one. This idea is presented by Cousin not merely hundreds of times, but, from the popular character of his lectures, it comes up so constantly and in such various forms as to constitute the burden of his instructions. Sometimes, it is unity, plurality, and identity; sometimes, it is substance, phenomenon, and their relation; sometimes, it is absolute cause, relative cause, and their common ground; sometimes, it is the primitive, the actual, and their identity; sometimes, it is the infinite, the finite, and their relation. In every form of language the idea is presented, affirmed, illustrated, and defended, that the sum of being is to be resolved into this unity and multiplicity. Man with him is a microcosm. What is true of reason in us, is true of eternal reason. In our consciousness, there are these three ideas, the finite, the infinite, and their identity. So there are in the eternal reason. We have in consciousness, the *ego*, the *non-ego*, and their common basis, which constitute the unity of our con-

sciousness. So in God, or the absolute reason, there are the same elements.

"Reason," he says, "in whatever way it may occupy itself, can conceive nothing, except under the condition of two ideas, which preside over the exercise of its activity: the idea of the unit and of the multiple, of the finite and of the infinite, of being and of appearing, of substance and of phenomenon, of absolute cause and of secondary causes, of the absolute and of the relative, of the necessary and of the contingent, of immensity and of space, of time and of eternity. Analysis, in bringing together all these propositions, in bringing together, for example, all these first terms identifies them; it identifies equally all the second terms, so that of all these propositions, compared and combined, it forms a single proposition, a single formula, which is the formula itself of thought, and which you can express, according to the case, by the unit and by the multiple, the absolute being and the relative being, unity, and variety, &c. Finally, the two terms of this formula, so comprehensive, do not constitute a dualism in which the first term is on one side, the second on the other, without any other relation than that of being perceived at the same time by reason. . . . These three terms are distinct, but inseparable, and constitute a triplicity and an indivisible unity. Having attained this height, we have lost sight of land, and it becomes us to see where we are."* The finite and infinite and their relation then constitute a triplicity in unity. "There are in human reason two distinct elements, with their relation: that is to say, three elements, three ideas. These three ideas are not an arbitrary product of human reason; far from that, they constitute this reason. Now that which is true in reason, humanly considered, subsists in reason considered in itself: that which is the basis of our reason is the basis of eternal reason; that is, a triplicity which resolves itself into a unity, and a unity which developes itself in triplicity. The unity of this triplicity is alone real, and at the same time, this unity would entirely perish if confined to one of the three elements which are necessary to it. They are therefore all of the same value, and constitute an in-

* *History of Modern Philosophy*, translated by O. Wight, vol. I. p. 83.

decomposable unity. What is this unity? Divine intelligence itself."*

"I have shown how variety springs from unity, the finite from the infinite, relative being from absolute being; I have shown that unity, the infinite, being in itself absolute substance, being cause also and absolute cause, could not [but] have produced variety, the finite, the relative; so that true unity and veritable infinity being given, you have already in the germ variety and the finite, that is, finite and varied causes, a world animated and full of forces, and a humanity which is itself an active and productive power."†

"The ideas of the finite, of the infinite, and of their necessary connection as cause and effect, meet in every act of intelligence, nor is it possible to separate them from each other; though distinct, they are bound together, and constitute at once a triplicity and a unity."‡

"The first term, [the Infinite] though absolute, exists not absolutely in itself, but as an absolute cause which must pass into action, and manifest itself in the second [the Finite]. The Finite cannot exist without the Infinite, and the Infinite can only be realized [*i. e.*, become real] by developing itself in the Finite."§ We could fill a volume with equally distinct avowals of the fundamental principle of modern Pantheism.

It is not, however, merely by asserting that the Infinite becomes real only in the Finite, that Cousin avows Monism. That avowal is involved in the constantly recurring statement, that God is the one absolute substance of which the universe is the phenomenon. Dr. Henry admits that this is a form of Pantheism, and that it destroys human personality and freedom; yet he himself makes his master teach this doctrine in the most explicit terms. He tells us that Cousin teaches, that "The fundamental fact of consciousness is a complex phenomenon composed of three terms; first, the *me* and the *not-me*, limited and finite; then, the idea of something different from these, the unlimited, the infinite; and third, the relation of the finite to the infinite which contains and unfolds it. These three

* History of Modern Philosophy, translated by O. Wight, vol. i. p. 88.

† Ibid. p. 158.

‡ Cousin's Psychology, by Henry, first edition, p. xviii.

§ Ibid.

terms universally and necessarily meet in every act of consciousness. We find there the consciousness of self, as distinguished from the not-self, and of both as *finite*; but at the same time, we are, and must be, conscious of something *infinite*; of something *substantial*, as that is *phenomenal*; and, finally, connecting the two terms, infinite and finite, under the principle of causality, we do and must regard the former as a cause, and consequently in its nature an infinite cause. That is God."* Can any thing be plainer? The infinite is substance, the finite, *i. e.*, the universe of nature and mind is phenomenal. It is a great trial of one's patience and meekness to see a man professing to be a teacher of philosophy, denouncing and upbraiding the *Princeton Review*, for saying that Cousin taught the doctrine, which he himself thus expressly declares he did teach.

Sir William Hamilton, whom Dr. Henry so highly lauds, and to whom he attributes so just a comprehension of Cousin's system, says, that according to that system, "In every act of consciousness, we distinguish a *self* or *ego*, and something different from self, a *non-ego*; each limited and modified by the other. These together, constitute the finite element; but at the same instant, when we are conscious of these existences, plural, relative, and contingent, we are conscious likewise of a superior unity in which these are contained, and by which they are explained; a unity, absolute as they are conditioned; *substantive as they are phenomenal*; and an infinite cause, as they are finite causes. This unity is God."†

"The great division of ideas at present established," says Cousin himself, "is the division into contingent ideas, and necessary ideas. This division, in a point of view more circumscribed, is the foundation of that which I have just presented to you, and which may be expressed under the different formulas of unity and multiplicity, of *substance and phenomenon*, of absolute causes and relative causes, of the perfect and the imperfect, of the finite and the infinite. Each of these propo-

* Cousin's *Psychology*, by Henry, first edition, p. xxi.

† *Edinburgh Review*, October 1829. See the reprint of the article in "Discussions on Philosophy and Literature." By Sir William Hamilton. Harper's edition, page 17.

sitions has two terms; the one necessary, absolute, single, essential, perfect, infinite; the other, imperfect, phenomenal, relative, multiple, finite. A wise analysis identifies all the second terms among themselves, as well as all the first terms among themselves; it identifies, on the one hand, immensity and eternity, the absolute substance and the absolute cause, the absolute perfection, and the absolute unity; and, on the other hand, the multiple, the phenomenal, the relative, the limited, the finite, the bounded, the imperfect. Behold then, all the propositions which we have enumerated reduced to a single one, as vast as reason and the possible, to the opposition of unity and plurality, of substance and phenomenon, of *being* and *appearance*, of identity and difference, &c."*

"The human race has believed with equal certainty in God and in the world. They believe in a world as a real effect, firm and enduring, which they refer to a cause, not to a cause powerless [who ever heard of a powerless cause?] and contradictory in itself, which forsaking its effect, for that very reason would destroy it, but to a cause worthy of the name, which, producing and reproducing without cessation, deposits without ever exhausting them, its force and its beauty in its work; they believe, as it were, in a *combination of phenomena which would cease to be at the moment in which the eternal substance should cease to sustain them*; they believe, as it were, in the visible manifestation of a concealed principle which speaks to them under this cover, and which they adore in nature and in consciousness. Behold in what the mass of the human race believe. The honour of true philosophy would be to collect this universal belief, and to give it a legitimate explanation."† According to this, mankind believe in an eternal substance of which all things are the phenomena—a being of which the universe is the ever-varying appearance; they believe that nature and humanity are moments in the ceaseless flow of the life of God; and it is the business of philosophy to explain and authenticate this grand conception.

We shall not multiply citations on this point. The idea that the Infinite is alone substantial and the Finite phenomenal, is

* Hist. of Philosophy. Wight, page 78.

† Ibid. p. 121.

so inwrought in Cousin's system, that it will come up at every step as we advance.

There is still another form in which Cousin gives in his adhesion to German Pantheism. So far as modern forms of thought are concerned, there are but three general systems of philosophy. The one is the Theistic, which assumes the existence of an eternal, self-conscious, extra-mundane God, existing independently of the universe, and creating it in time by the word of his power, out of nothing. The other is the doctrine that the universe is God, that God is nothing but the universe, and as the universe is finite, God is finite. This the Germans call False Pantheism. This they reject. The third system is a medium between the others, and is sometimes called by its advocates, the true Pantheism, sometimes the doctrine of Identity, sometimes Monism. Nothing is more common than to find these German philosophers repudiating Pantheism (as above explained) on the one hand, and Theism, (or the scholastic doctrine of God as they call it) on the other; and claiming to occupy the true *via media*. Cousin does precisely the same thing. "If I have not confounded," he says, "God and the world; if my God is not the Universe-God of Pantheism, neither is he, I confess, the abstraction of absolute unity, the lifeless God of the scholastic theology. As God is made known only so far as he is absolute cause, on this account, in my opinion, he cannot but produce, so that the creation ceases to be unintelligible, and God is no more without a world than a world without God."*

"Is God to be considered as a substance purely, and which is not a cause, as Spinoza will have it, or at most a cause of himself, which is not a true cause? We thus destroy his power, we destroy the possibility of humanity and that of nature; we have, like the Eleatics, the Infinite in itself, but without any relation to the Finite, the absolute without any relation to the relative, unity without diversity. On the other hand, do we plunge into the exclusive idea of the cause of the cause operative, that is, in the relative, the contingent, the multiple, and do we refuse to go beyond it? We stop,

* Cousin's Psychology, by Henry, p. 447.

then, at the form of things, and fail of their essence and of their principle. We can thus end only in a chimerical Theism, or an extravagant Theism. True Theism is not a dead religion, that forgets precisely the fundamental attribute of God, namely, the creative power, action, and what is derived from it. Pantheism is in possession of all observable and visible reality, and of its immediate laws, but it misconceives the principle even of this reality, and the first and last reason of its laws. Thus, on all sides, diverse methods, diverse systems in psychology, in logic, and in metaphysics, on all sides opposition and contradiction, error and truth, altogether. The only possible solution of these contradictions is in the harmony of contrarieties, the only means of escaping error is to accept all truths."*

We have thus shown that Cousin avows Monism, 1. By making triplicity in unity, the fundamental principle of his system as it is the fundamental principle of Monism. 2. By making the Infinite the only substance, and the Finite, *i. e.*, the universe of nature and mind, its phenomenon. 3. By rejecting Pantheism (in one of its forms) on the one hand, and Theism (in its ordinary sense) on the other, and taking a middle ground, which is, and can, under the circumstances, be no other than Monism.

The second point which we proposed to establish is, that Cousin's principles not only logically lead to this result, but that he consciously traces them out to this conclusion.

There are several causes which enhance the difficulty of getting a clear view of Cousin's system. One is, that being professor not of philosophy, but of its history, his writings are devoted rather to expounding the opinions of others than to developing his own. Another is, that as his instructions were delivered in the form of lectures, addressed to large and promiscuous audiences, they are rhetorical, repetitious, and often declamatory. Still another is, that his views are rarely presented in a concatenated form; one principle comes up here, and another there. Besides all this, his nomenclature is not fixed; he uses the same word in opposite senses, and therefore frequently affirms and denies the same proposition. Thus he sometimes says that the *ego* is a substance, and the *non-ego* is a

* Hist. of Philosophy, translated by Wight, p. 259.

substance; and, then again, he not only denies this, but argues to prove that neither the one nor the other can be substantial. Perhaps the greatest difficulty after all arises from the fact, that he was not sure of his own ground. He had not gained fully his own consent to the system which he had embraced; his better nature no doubt often revolted against it; and he had a wholesome and praiseworthy apprehension that the public mind in France was not prepared for the full development and inculcation of German Pantheism. Hence the vacillations, the saying and unsaying, the inculcations of Pantheism and the avowals of Theism, with which his writings abound.

The most connected view anywhere given by Cousin himself of his whole system, so far as we know, is to be found in the Preface to the first edition of his *Philosophical Fragments*. The greater part of that Preface, Dr. Henry has translated, and printed in the Appendix to the recent edition of Cousin's *Psychology*, pp. 406—440. We propose to analyze that exhibition of his doctrine, and to show that it is an elaborate argument in support of Monism, or of that form of Pantheism which merges the universe in God.

After proving that philosophy must be founded on observation, he says, that the facts of consciousness, though our point of departure, are not the limits of our investigations. Though we must begin with psychology, we must end with ontology.

When we inspect our consciousness, we find there three orders of facts due respectively to reason, sensibility, and the will. We have many notions which cannot be referred to sensation as their source; such, for example, as those of cause, substance, time, space, the good, the beautiful.

There is one characteristic common to the facts of reason and to those of sensibility; they are necessary; they do not depend upon the will; we do not create the phenomena either of reason or sense; they are entirely independent of our volitions. We cannot will a thing to be hard or soft, true or false, good or evil; we cannot will two and two to be six; our whole power, or causative being, is in the will; the will, therefore, is the person; reason is impersonal; it does not belong to us, nor to humanity; it is universal and necessary. Reason presents itself in our consciousness under two forms, spontaneity and

reflection. We have a spontaneous apperception of the truth, which it is the office of reflection to analyze. There can be nothing in reflection which is not in spontaneity. God, nature, and man, are all included in the spontaneous apperceptions of reason, and are therefore included in consciousness, and even in every act of consciousness. Those only, however, who have the skill, and who take the necessary trouble to analyze their consciousness, are aware of its contents.

The two laws of reason, which "are reason itself," are those of causality and substance. Every effect supposes a cause, and every quality a substance; but as these laws are not subjective, as they do not belong to us, or to reason in its reflective form as it appears in our consciousness, but are necessary and universal, we are forced, by the laws of thought, to refer them to a necessary and absolute substance; but absolute substance is of necessity One. There cannot be two Absolutes; nor can there be any substance which is not absolute; otherwise the Absolute would be limited, that is, it would not be absolute. "Relative substance contradicts the very idea of substance." Finite substances, (so called,) are therefore, phenomenal. "Unity of substance is involved in the very idea of substance." Finite reason is, therefore, a phenomenon of which the absolute reason is the substance. Such is the analysis of reason. It is resolved as it appears in our consciousness into a form of the absolute reason, that is, of God. Thus one, and that the most essential element of our being, is lost in the Infinite.

The second element in consciousness is will, or causality. To will, to cause, to exist for ourselves, are synonymous expressions. Will and person are therefore identical.

The Will presents the following elements. 1. To decide upon an act to be performed. 2. To deliberate. 3. To resolve. The first and second of these elements, however, belong to reason, and to reason in its reflective form. To conceive an end and to deliberate, involve the idea of reflection. Every voluntary act is, therefore, a reflective act; but a reflective act cannot be primitive. To will is to deliberate, and to decide on an act. This supposes the knowledge that we have the power to resolve and act; and this again supposes that we must have previously acted without deliberation. Activity which precedes

deliberation is due to spontaneity. Spontaneity and Reflection include all the forms of activity; both are causes; both Spontaneity and Will are sources of action. The Spontaneous includes all that is in the Reflective.

What then is the power which has this twofold manifestation? To answer this question we must remember, that all personal acts, whether spontaneous or voluntary, have this in common, viz., they are referred to a cause which has its point of departure in itself; that is, they are free. The true notion of liberty is that of a power which acts from its own energy. Liberty, however, is distinct from free phenomena. Liberty is not a form of activity, but activity itself. On the other hand, the Ego, or personal activity, is not activity, but merely represents it. It is "liberty in action, not liberty in power; it is a cause, but phenomenal, and not substantial; relative and not absolute." In respect to activity, therefore, we reach the substantial only, "beyond and above all phenomenal activity, in power not yet passed into action, in the undeterminate essence which is capable of self-determination; in liberty disengaged from its forms, which limit while they determine it," that is, in God.

"We have thus arrived," says Cousin, "in the analysis of the *me*, by the way of psychology still, at a new aspect of ontology, as a substantial activity, anterior and superior to all phenomenal activity, which produces all the phenomena of activity, survives them all, and renews them all, immortal and inexhaustible in the destruction of its temporary manifestations." Thus our activity, as well as our reason, is merged in God. All our acts are the acts of God. The Ego, or personal activity, is only a "temporary manifestation" of the activity of the absolute cause!

The third phenomenon of consciousness is sensation. We do not produce our own sensations, and therefore refer them to a cause out of ourselves. As our sensations are various we refer them to various causes or qualities, "for qualities are always causes." The external world is, therefore, an assemblage of causes. These causes or forces act according to law. But law supposes reason, and therefore, nature resolves itself into reason and activity. Reason and activity, however, are

the constituent elements of humanity, therefore, nature is, as Cousin expresses it, "of the same stuff with man." "There is nothing material in forces," therefore there is nothing material in nature. (Idealism.)

Let us go further. We have seen that it is a law of reason to refer every phenomenal cause and every phenomenal law, to something absolute; that is, to a substance. This absolute substance must be cause in order to be the subject of external causes, and must be intelligence in order to be the subject of laws, which, as we have seen, are forms of reason. This substance is, therefore, "the identity of intelligence and activity," that is God. The external world, then, is an assemblage of phenomenal forces and laws. These phenomenal forces and laws suppose an absolute cause and intelligence of which they are the manifestations. Thus the external world has followed reason and activity (*i. e.*, humanity) into the abyss of the Absolute.

We have now shown that Cousin by a strict process of argument merges all reason, whether spontaneous or reflective, all activity whether spontaneous or voluntary, all external nature, whether force or law, into God. The conclusion of this deduction is expressed by Cousin himself in the following words: "The God of consciousness is not an abstract God, a solitary monarch exiled beyond the limits of creation, on the desert throne of a silent Eternity, and of an absolute existence which resembles even the negation of existence. He is a God at once true and real, at once substance and cause, always substance and always cause, being substance only so far as he is cause, and cause only so far as he is substance, that is to say, being absolute cause, one and many, eternity and time, space and number, essence and life, indivisibility and totality, principle, end and centre, at the summit of Being and at its lowest degree, infinite and finite together, triple, in a word, that is to say, at the same time God, nature, and humanity. In fact if God be not everything, he is nothing!"

No sane man will now say that the charge of Monism, or modern Pantheism, is made against Cousin's system on the ground of isolated passages, or fervid expressions. It is the

doctrine which he not only avows, but which he labours to prove.

The third point which we proposed to establish is, that the doctrine thus avowed and proved is carried out by Cousin to its legitimate conclusions.

1. The first and most obvious, and perhaps the most thoroughly destructive consequence of this doctrine is the denial of the personality of God. This consequence Cousin avows, adopts and affirms. He argues it out, and attempts to establish it as the basis of a new and harmonious, comprehensive philosophy. As, however, he constantly, at the same time, professes to believe in a personal God, it is necessary to state, first, what is meant by God's being a person, in the ordinary scriptural sense of the terms; secondly, that in this sense, the only true and proper sense of the words, Cousin denies the doctrine of a personal God; and, thirdly, what it is he would substitute in its place under the same name. By a personal God, is meant by the Church and by all mankind a Being to whom we can say, Thou; a self-conscious, intelligent, and infinite Spirit, existing independently of the world, extra-mundane and eternal; a God to whom the world is not necessary, who has consciousness and intelligence independently of the world; and who, therefore, is over it as its creator, preserver, governor, and judge, to whom as a person distinct from ourselves we are responsible for our character and conduct. This doctrine which is the foundation of all religion and morality, and without which religion and morality are empty words, Monism and Cousin as its advocate deny. This is what he calls chimerical, or extravagant Theism—a scholastic God—a God on a barren throne, &c., &c.

That Cousin does deny this doctrine of a personal God is proved, first, because that denial is inseparable from the system which he labours to establish. He endeavours to prove that God is at once God, nature, and humanity; that God is man, God is nature, God is everything. If humanity is a form of God, if nature is a form of God, if God is everything, then God is not a person distinct from his creatures. Secondly, consciousness is necessary to intelligence, and intelligence to personality; but God, according to Cousin, has no consciousness,

and therefore, no intelligence or personality out of the world. "Take away," he says, "my faculties, and the consciousness that attests them to me, and I am not for myself. It is the same with God; take away nature, and the soul, and every sign of God disappears."* Take away from me my consciousness and I am not for myself; take away from God the universe, (nature and humanity,) and he is not for himself. This is one of those revealing sentences and illustrations, which are worth pages of philosophical jargon. What can be predicated of a soul without consciousness? How can such a soul think or act, or be addressed as a person? An unconscious soul is no soul, and an unconscious God is no God. If then, God comes to self-consciousness in the world; if taking away nature and the soul from him, leaves him without consciousness and intelligence, it leaves him without personality. This idea is wrought into the very substance of his system. What does he mean by triplicity in unity, and unity in triplicity, of which his writings are full, but that it is a law of rational life, the fundamental condition of reason, that in consciousness there should be the three elements, the ego, non-ego, and their relation; and that one of these cannot exist without the others; if you take away one, you destroy all; and that this is true of the absolute reason, as it is of our reason? In God there are and must be, the Finite, the Infinite, and their relation. If you take away one, you destroy all. Take away the Infinite, and the Finite is gone; take away the Finite and the Infinite is gone; that is, take away the universe and God no more exists, than a cause without effects, or a soul without consciousness or faculties, exists. The denial of the personality of God in the Theistic, sense of the terms, is, therefore, involved in the very essence of this whole system. Reason in itself is impersonal. It comes to personality only in man. The Absolute in itself is undetermined, unlimited, but consciousness is limitation; therefore, the Absolute, as such, is unconscious and impersonal. The Infinite must become Finite, in order to know itself; but self-knowledge is essential to personality; therefore, the Infinite, as such, is impersonal. If you eliminate these ideas from

* Lectures on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. Appleton's edition, p. 365.

Cousin's writings, you leave his system in the condition in which matter is left, if you take away all its properties; or mind, if you take away all its thoughts.

How then are we to understand Cousin's frequent declarations, that he believes in a personal God? Precisely as similar declarations are to be understood from the lips of Hegelians. God comes to self-consciousness in the universe and thus becomes a person. God, humanity, and nature, considered as one, is their personal God. The true doctrine "concerning God's personality," says Michelet, "is not that God is a person as distinguished from other persons, neither is he simply the universal or absolute substance. He is the eternal movement of the Absolute constantly making itself subjective, and in the subjective alone comes to objectivity or to a true existence;" that is, as Cousin expresses the same idea, the Infinite becomes real in the Finite. Michelet goes on to say, "God is the only true personal being;" and further, "as God is eternal personality, so he eternally produces his other-self, viz., nature, in order to come to self-consciousness."*

But Cousin sometimes says he believes in a personal God distinct from the world. How is this to be understood? Precisely as he believes in matter without properties, and the soul without consciousness. The soul knows itself only in its acts. But it is not exhausted in its acts. Take away its acts, and you take away self-knowledge, but you leave a potentiality of action. The soul apart from its acts and consciousness, may be said to be potentially a person, but it is a real self-conscious, intelligent person, only as active. So with God. Take away the universe, and you leave a potential, but not a real person. If there is no consciousness and no intelligence in God without the universe, then there is no personality in God apart from the world.

The fact is, the advocates of this system believe in a personal God, just as they believe in the doctrine of the Trinity. They profess to be Trinitarians. If any honest man ventures to say they do not hold the doctrine of the Trinity, some Dr. Henry starts up, and exclaims, that is "point-blank slander;" it

* *Geschichte der letzten Systeme, &c.*, vol. ii., p. 647.

is contrary to the "official utterances" of these philosophers; the slanderer is worse than a felon, &c., &c. When we ask, however, what they really mean, they say, 'We believe the Infinite is the Father, the Universe the Son, their relation is the Spirit, therefore we are Trinitarians.' So their personal God is not the God of the Bible, but a being in whom all personality centres—who is the only person, as he is the only substance, of which mind and nature are the ever-flowing phenomena. They are Theists just as they are Trinitarians. No form of Atheistic Pantheism more destructive of all religion than this ever entered the mind of man. **TO MAKE GOD EVERYTHING, IS TO MAKE HIM NOTHING.**

2. Monism unavoidably leads to the doctrine of a necessary creation; and this consequence Cousin accepts and avows in every variety of form. Dr. Henry makes him say, "Creation is comprehensible and necessary; for creation is nothing else than the necessary development of the Infinite in the Finite, of unity in variety, and that in virtue of the third element which binds the two terms together, and in which both are realized. God being substance and cause—being substance as cause and cause as substance, that is, being absolute cause as well as intelligence, cannot but manifest himself. This manifestation is creation, the development of the Infinite in the Finite, of unity in plurality. Creation is necessarily implied in the idea of God; and the world, the universe, is the necessary effect of the divine existence and manifestation."*

Sir William Hamilton says Cousin teaches, that "God, as he is a cause, is able to create; as he is an absolute cause, he cannot but create. In creating the universe he does not draw it from nothing, he draws it from himself. The creation of the universe is thus necessary; it is a manifestation of the Deity, but not the Deity absolutely in himself. It is God passing into activity, but not exhausted in the act."†

We have already quoted so many explicit declarations from Cousin himself on this point, that it is hardly necessary to multiply citations. Speaking of the relation of the Infinite

* Introduction to the First Edition, &c., xix.

† Review of Cousin, p. 16.

and the Finite, the one being necessarily implied in the other, he says, "The first term of the formula is cause also, and absolute cause; and as absolute cause cannot avoid developing itself in the second term—(*i. e.*, in) multiplicity, the finite, the relative, &c."* "As God is made known only so far as he is absolute cause, on this account, in my opinion, he cannot but produce, so that creation ceases to be unintelligible; and God is no more without a world, than a world without God. This last point has appeared to me of such great importance that I have not hesitated to express it with all the strength that I possessed."†

His familiar illustration on this subject is derived from voluntary action in man. "We create," he says, "every moment," and "divine creation is of the same nature."‡ Creation to God is, therefore, as necessary as voluntary action to man. We can no more conceive of God without creation, than of mind without thought, or of will without volition.

The Fatalistic consequences of this doctrine are too apparent to escape notice. Creation is not, according to this theory, a transient act. It is defined to be "the development of the Infinite in the Finite." This is a continued process going on perpetually in the universe of nature and mind. If, therefore, creation is necessary, this whole process of development is necessary; all the processes of nature, all the operations of mind, all the progress of history is the unfolding of God in the world. This was made so obvious, that Cousin was constrained to say: "Upon reflection, I feel that this expression (the necessity of creation) is scarcely reverential enough towards God, whose liberty it has the appearance of compromising, and I have no hesitation in retracting it; but in retracting it, I ought to explain it. It covers up no mysterious Fatalism; it expresses an idea which may be found everywhere, in the writings of the holiest doctors, as well as the greatest philosophers. God, like man, acts, and can act only in conformity with his nature, and his liberty itself is relative to his essence. Now, in God, above all, the power is adequate to the substance, and the divine power is always in act; God, there-

* *History of Philosophy*, Wight, p. 84.

† *Psychology*, p. 447.

‡ *History of Philosophy*, p. 93.

fore, is essentially active and creative. It follows from that, unless we despoil God of his nature, and of his essential perfections, we must admit that a power essentially creative could not but create, just as a power essentially intelligent could not but create intelligently, or a power essentially wise and good could not but exercise its wisdom and goodness in creating. The word *necessity*, here, expresses nothing else. It is inconceivable that from this word anybody should have been disposed to derive, and impute to me, universal Fatalism.”*

This is no retraction. It is a reassertion of the doctrine in the only sense in which it was ever understood. God being a creative power cannot but create, just as mind cannot but think. But as mind thinks spontaneously, so God creates spontaneously, not by coercion. This is precisely the doctrine of necessary creation, as taught elsewhere in his works, and which he here teaches. There is no retraction, and there can be none, for the idea is essential to the system. The Hegelians say everything which Cousin says in this recantation. “To say God created the world freely, does not mean that the necessity of creation does not exist in the divine nature; but since this necessity is in God himself, he is still free. To regard liberty in God as arbitrary, is to overlook the identity of liberty and necessity. God must create, but that must is in his will; and the continuance of the world is due to the continuance of that will. The world, therefore, as to its being is coeternal with God.”†

3. Monism denies the incomprehensibility of God. On this point Cousin says: “His incomprehensibility is for us his destruction. Incomprehensible, as a formula and in the school, he is clearly visible in the world which manifests him, for the soul which feels and possesses him. Everywhere present, he returns to himself, as it were, in the consciousness of man, of which he indirectly constitutes the mechanism and phenomenal triplicity by the reflection of his own nature, and of the substantial triplicity of which he constitutes the absolute identity.”‡ As God returns to himself in our consciousness, we

* Advertisement to *Philosophical Fragments*, third edition, in the Appendix to *Psychology*, p. 561.

† *Rosenkranz Encyclopadie*, p. 53.

‡ *Psychology*, p. 435.

know him just as we know our consciousness. As God is nature, we know him as we know nature. Besides, Cousin often says that ideas constitute the nature of God; but of ideas, he says, "They have but one characteristic, viz., to be intelligible. I add, there is nothing intelligible but ideas."* According to this system, God exists only so far as he is known. The incomprehensible is the non-existing.

Sir William Hamilton represents Cousin as teaching, that "The divine nature is essentially comprehensible. The three ideas constitute the nature of Deity; and the very nature of ideas is to be conceived. God in fact exists to us only so far as he is known."†

"Every man," says Cousin, "if he knows himself, knows all the rest, nature and God at the same time with himself. Every man believes in his own existence, every man therefore believes in the existence of the world and of God; every man thinks, every man therefore thinks God, if we may so express it; every human proposition, reflecting the consciousness, reflects the idea of Unity and of Being that is essential to consciousness; every human proposition therefore contains God [for it contains an idea]; every man who speaks, speaks of God, and every word is an act of faith and a hymn."‡

Cousin however teaches that God is incomprehensible. How is this? Precisely as the soul is incomprehensible. The soul is not exhausted by its acts, though it knows itself, and is known only in its acts. So God is not exhausted in the universe, though he knows himself, and is knowable only in the universe. As there is phenomenal power in the soul for a constant succession of acts, so there is substantial power in God for a constant succession of worlds. Still the soul *exists* only so far as it is known; and God *exists* only so far as he is known. The Infinite is real only in the Finite.

4. Intimately connected with the doctrine of necessary creation and of the comprehensibility of God, is another feature of this system. It makes history the self-development of God. History is one, and that the principal, part of the process by

* History of Philosophy, Wight, p. 25.

† Review of Cousin, p. 16.

‡ Psychology, p. 435.

which the Infinite unfolds itself in the Finite; and by which the ideas which constitute the manner of God's existence are realized. This is specially true of man. One idea is realized in one epoch, another in another. One nation brings out one thought, another a different one. Most especially is this true of the history of philosophy; which being the history of reason, is the history of God. History is determined by necessary laws. There is nothing contingent. "The dice are loaded." These ideas are reproduced by Cousin in his peculiar way. His lectures are so filled with these Hegelian principles, that the citation of particular passages is, for those who have read them, unnecessary. For those not familiar with his writings, it will suffice to point out a few significant indications of his views on this subject. If creation, as we have seen, is, according to his system, a process of development, and if creation is necessary, it involves the view of the nature of history just referred to. Apart from this general consideration, his language on this particular point is sufficiently explicit. "History reflects not only the whole movement of humanity, but as humanity is the summary of the universe, which is itself a manifestation of God, in the last resort history is nothing less than the last counter-stroke of divine action. The admirable order which reigns there is a reflection of eternal order, and its laws have for their last principle God himself. God, considered in his perpetual action upon the world and upon humanity, is Providence. It is because God or Providence is in nature, that nature has its necessary laws; it is because Providence is in humanity and in history, that history and humanity have their necessary laws. This necessity, which the vulgar accuse, which they confound with external and physical fatality, and by which they designate and disfigure the divine wisdom applied to the world, this necessity is the unanswerable demonstration of the intervention of Providence in human affairs, a demonstration of a moral government of the world. Great events are the decrees of this government, promulgated by the voice of time. History is the manifestation of God's supervision of humanity; the judgments of history are the judgments of God himself."*

* *History of Philosophy*, translated by Wight, p. 169.

"If history is the government of God made visible, everything is there in its place; and if everything is there in its place, everything is there for good, for everything arrives at an end marked by a beneficent power. Hence this historical optimism which I have the honour to profess," &c.*

"Upon what condition does Providence exist? Upon the condition, that God, without, it is true, exhausting his being, passes into the world and into humanity, and, consequently, into history, that he there deposits something of himself, that he establishes there wisdom, justice, order, an order as invariable as its author. Providence is involved in the question of the necessity of the laws of history. To deny the one is to shake the other, it is to reverse and obscure the moral and divine government of human things. If, therefore, any one should dare to give our system the name of Pantheism and of Fatalism, that is, indirectly, or rather very directly, to accuse us of Atheism, it would be necessary, in order to defend ourselves, to throw back in our turn this amiable accusation on those who make it," &c.†

"If a nation does not represent an idea, its existence is simply unintelligible." "If every nation is called to represent an idea, the events of which the life of this nation is composed, aspire to, and end at, a complete representation of this idea; whence it follows that the order in which these events follow each other is a true order of progression, &c."‡

"War has its roots in the nature of the ideas of different nations, which, being necessarily partial, exclusive, are necessarily hostile, aggressive, conquering; therefore, war is necessary. Let us see what are its effects. If war is nothing else than the violent encounter, the concussion of the exclusive ideas of different nations, in this concussion, the idea which shall be the most feeble will be destroyed by the strongest, that is, will be absorbed by it." "Again, if ideas are the prizes in war, and if that which wins is necessarily that which has the most future, it is necessary that that should win, and for this end that there should be war; unless you wish to retard

* History of Philosophy, translated by Wight, p. 160.

† Ibid. p. 164.

‡ Ibid. p. 175.

the future, to arrest civilization; unless you should wish that the human race might be immobile and stationary." "Thus a nation is progressive only on the condition of war." "A war is nothing else than the bloody exchange of ideas; a battle is nothing else than the combat of error with truth; I say with truth, because in an epoch a less error is a truth relatively to a greater error, or to an error which has served its time; victory is nothing else than the victory of the truth of to-day over the truth of yesterday, which has become the error of the following day."*

"The hazards of war and of the diverse fortunes of combats are spoken of without cessation; for my part I think there is very little chance in war; the dice are loaded, it seems, for I defy any one to cite me a single game lost by humanity." "I have proved that war and battles are, first, inevitable; secondly, beneficial. I have vindicated victory as necessary and useful; I undertake, nevertheless, to vindicate it as just in the strictest sense of the word. We usually see in success only a triumph of force, and an honourable sympathy draws us towards the vanquished: I hope I have shown that, inasmuch as there must be a vanquished party, and inasmuch as the vanquished party is always that which ought to be vanquished, to accuse the vanquisher and to take part against victory, is to take part against humanity, and to complain of civilization. It is necessary to go further, it is necessary to prove that the vanquished party deserves to be vanquished; that the vanquishing party not only serves the cause of civilization, but that it is better and more moral than the vanquished party." "Virtue and prosperity, misfortune and vice are in necessary harmony." "Feebleness is a vice, and therefore it is always punished and beaten."†

"When we speak of victims, let us understand that the sacrificer whom we accuse, is not the vanquisher, but that which has given victory to the vanquisher, that is, Providence. It is time the philosophy of history set its foot on the declamations of philanthropy. War is action on a great scale, and action is positive proof of what a nation or an individual is worth.

* *History of Philosophy*, translated by Wight, pp. 182, 183.

† *Ibid.* pp. 186, 187.

The soul passes altogether with its powers into action. Would you know what a man is worth? See him in action; so all the worth of a nation appears on the field of battle.”*

“In the last lecture I defended victory; I have now defended power; and it remains to me to defend glory. We never attend to the fact that whatever is human [permanent?] is made so by humanity, were it only in permitting it to exist; to curse power, I mean a long and durable power, is to blaspheme humanity, and to accuse glory, is simply to accuse humanity which decrees it. What is glory? The judgment of humanity upon one of its members; and humanity is always right.”†

If any one does not see how all this flows from the doctrine that God and humanity are one; that history is merely the self-development of God; we have nothing further to say; and if any one does not see that these views are to the last degree immoral; that they suppose an utter denial of moral distinctions, in the proper sense of the terms, he must have a standard of judgment peculiar to himself. To resolve all virtue into power, to make feebleness a crime, success the only criterion of goodness, the conqueror always more moral than the vanquished, is equivalent to denying that there is any real distinction between right and wrong. It is to resolve right into might, as a philosophical and moral principle. It is however, the unavoidable conclusion from the doctrine which we have been unfolding.‡ If the universe is God, manifesting himself

* History of Philosophy, translated by Wight, p. 189.

† Ibid. p. 201.

‡ Spinoza says: Quo magis unusquisque—suum esse conservare conatur et potest, eo magis virtute præditus est; contra, quatenus unusquisque—suum esse negligit, eatenus est impotens. *Ethic.* p. iv., propos. xx. In the demonstration of this twentieth proposition he makes the idea of power and that of virtue identical—See Müller's *Lehre von der Sünde*, vol. i. p. 332. In Hegel's system the principle that whatever is, is right—that everything real is God—is carried so far that even one of the most lingering of his disciples said, “Satan is, therefore he is good, in God and with God; Satan is evil, therefore he is not.” And Rosenkranz says, what we will not print in English, and hardly dare to print in German; Die dritte Consequenz endlich ist die, dass Gott der Sohn auch als identisch gesetzt ist mit dem Subject, in welchem die religiöse Vorstellung den *Ursprung* des Bösen anschaut, mit dem *Satan*, *Phosphorus*, *Lucifer*. Diese Verschmelzung begründet sich darin dass der Sohn innerhalb Gottes das Moment der Unterscheid-

to himself, evolving one form after another, the last always more perfect than those which preceded it, of course the truth of yesterday becomes the error of to-day, and the truth of to-day the error of to-morrow; everything is progress; the last is best; that which succeeds is the right. Ye murderers, who stained the Alpine snows with the blood of saints, and "rolled mother with infant down the rocks," ye were the true saints, more moral than your victims! This is the philosophy which American Christians are hiring men to teach their sons and daughters!

5. Monism destroys the idea of sin. This consequence also flows from the system of Cousin.

Sin is the want of conformity to law. Where there is no law there is no sin. There can however be no law where there is no lawgiver, and there can be no lawgiver, if God is himself the universe. If, therefore, this system excludes, as we have already shown that it does, the idea of a personal God distinct from the world, it must of necessity exclude the idea of sin. The law to which sin stands related is not the law of reason, it is not the idea of the Good, it is not expediency, it is not self-respect, it is the law of God. It arises from the very nature of a creature, that the moral law which binds the conscience should assume in consciousness the form of the will of God, that is, of a Being to whom we are responsible. None but God is above law and a law to himself. In the consciousness therefore of every human being, sin assumes the form, not merely of something hateful, or degrading, or injurious to others, but of alienation from God. It is therefore always attended, not only by a sense of demerit, but by a sense of guilt, that is, of just exposure to the wrath of God. This cannot be got rid of. We cannot throw off our allegiance to God, and substitute in his place, the True, the Beautiful, and the Good—mere ideas. We cannot place his sceptre in the

ung ist. in dem Unterschied aber, die Möglichkeit der Entgegensetzung und Entzweiung angelegt ist. Der Sohn ist der selbst-bewusste Gott. How is Cousin, or his miserable apes in this country, to escape this consequence? If God is everything, then if there be a Satan, God is Satan. Rosenkranz says, the understanding is horrified at this, because it does not recognize the intimate connection between good and evil, that evil is in good and good is in evil. Without evil there is no good. *Encyklopädie*, p. 51.

hands of reason, or clothe "being in general" with his authority. Our allegiance is to God, and if there be no God, then there can be no sin. This, any man who chooses to examine his own heart, cannot fail to discover. An Atheist may see some things are expedient and some inexpedient; some things elevating and some degrading. He may be amiable, honest, beneficent; he may recognize the rights of his fellow-men, and if he injures society, he may feel responsible to its laws; but he cannot have a sense of guilt for sins of the heart, for pride, or malice. The only idea of sin of which the Bible, the infallible interpreter of consciousness, takes any cognizance, is want of conformity to the law of God. "Against thee, thee only have I sinned," is the language in which the sense of sin everywhere expresses itself.

If this view of the nature of sin be correct, it requires no argument to show that it is excluded by this system. If God is at once God, humanity, and nature; if the reason in us is God's reason, if our intelligence is his, our activity his activity, if God is the only substance of which the universe is the phenomenon, if we are moments in the life of God, then there can be nothing in us which is not in God. Sin in this view becomes mere limitation. It is undeveloped good, just as error is partial truth. If the universe and history are the self-evolution of God, then everything is a form of God, and everything is good. But all, as remarked above, is progress. And in progress, the imperfect precedes the perfect, as infancy precedes manhood. Thus as the imperfectly true is error, and the imperfectly beautiful is the deformed, so the imperfectly good is evil—but absolutely all is good. Hegel says, even sin is something unspeakably higher than the law-abiding motion of the planets and the innocence of plants.

There is another way in which Cousin's system subverts the foundation of morality. It makes reason impersonal, and teaches that our personality resides exclusively in the will. The will however gets all its light from reason. It is necessarily determined by the intelligence; if it is not, and so far as it is not, it is irrational. We never attribute will to brutes, because they have no reason. If, therefore, our reason is not our self, volition is not self-determination. The very idea of liberty is

libentia rationalis, will determined by reason; and consequently if reason is impersonal, we have no rational liberty, and are incapable of responsible action. We presume this is what Sir William Hamilton means, when he says that Cousin's system destroys liberty by divorcing it from intelligence. Hamilton asserts that Cousin's doctrine is not only inconsistent with Theism, but with morality, which, he says, cannot be founded on "a liberty which only escapes necessity by taking refuge with chance."*

6. In relation to revealed religion we have seen that Monism subverts its very foundation. It makes reason the highest conceivable authority, and perverts the doctrines of Christianity into mere philosophical figments. All this is faithfully reproduced by Cousin.

"Philosophy," he says, "is the light of all lights, the authority of all authorities. Those who wish to impose upon philosophy and upon thought a foreign authority, do not think that of two things one must be true; either thought does not comprehend this authority, and then this authority is for it as though it were not, or it does comprehend it, forms of it an idea, accepts it for this reason, and thereby takes itself for measure, for rule, for highest authority."† Philosophy "destroys not faith; it illuminates it and promotes its growth, and raises it gently from the twilight of the symbol, to the full light of pure thought." "Happy in seeing the masses, the people, that is, nearly all, in the arms of Christianity, it is contented to offer gently its hand to Christianity, and to aid it in ascending to a higher elevation."‡ Cousin is willing to aid Jesus Christ to ascend to a higher elevation!

Reason, he says, "is the sole faculty of all knowledge, the only principle of certainty, the exclusive standard of the True and the False, of good and evil, which can alone perceive its

* Morell, a eulogist of Cousin, and a man not to be suspected of any stringent orthodoxy, says, that according to Cousin, "God is the ocean—we are but the waves; the ocean may be one individuality, and each wave another; but still they are essentially one and the same. We see not how Cousin's Theism can possibly be consistent with any idea of moral evil; neither do we see how, starting from such a dogma, he can ever vindicate and uphold his own theory of human liberty. On such Theistic principles, all sin must be simply defect, and all defect must be absolutely fatuitous."—*History of Modern Philosophy*, p. 660.

† Cousin's *History of Philosophy*, p. 26.

‡ Ibid. p. 27, 47.

own mistakes, correct itself when deceived, restore itself when in error, call itself to account, and pronounce upon itself the sentence of acquittal or of condemnation."* Man is completely his own God; he owes allegiance to nothing higher than himself. Reason in him is declared to be the eternal Logos. Cousin therefore frequently says, "humanity is inspired," "humanity is infallible." The only revelation or inspiration possible on his system is that which, in different measures, is common to all men. "What is God? I have told you, he is the first substance and the first cause of the truths which man perceives. When, therefore, man does homage to God for the truths which he is able to refer neither to the impressions which the world gives to his senses, nor to his own personality, he relates them to their true source, and the absolute affirmation of truth, inspiration, enthusiasm, is a veritable revelation. Thus in the cradle of civilization, he who possessed in a higher degree than his fellows this gift of inspiration passed for the confident and interpreter of God. He is so for others, because he is so for himself, and he is so in fact in a philosophic sense. Behold the sacred origin of prophecies, of pontificates, and of modes of worship."†

Cousin subjects the most sacred doctrines of religion to precisely the same transmutations into philosophical formulas, or "pure thought," as he calls it, as his German masters. After having expounded for the hundredth time the triplicity in unity of reason, and taught that this triplicity in unity is the basis of absolute reason, in which the Infinite, the Finite, and their relation as necessarily co-exist as the ego, the non-ego, and their relation, or common ground, in human consciousness, he asks, "Do you know what is the theory I have stated to you? It is nothing less than Christianity. The God of Christians is threefold, and at the same time one; and the accusations which would be raised against the doctrine which I teach, would extend even to the Christian Trinity."‡ He quotes from the Catechism of Meaux the definition of the Son of God: "Le Fils de Dieu est la parole intérieure de son Père, sa pensée éternellement subsistante et de même nature que lui; and from

* Psychology, p. 441.

† History of Philosophy, p. 129.

‡ Ibid. p 90.

the Catechism of Montpellier: *Le Père ne peut pas subsister un seul moment sans se connaître: et en se connaissant il produit son Fils, le Verbe éternel. Le Père et le Fils ne peuvent subsister un seul moment sans s'aimer, et en s'aimant ils produisent le Saint Esprit.*" In Cousin's system, therefore, the Finite, that is, nature and humanity, occupy the place which belongs to the eternal Son of God in the Christian Trinity. The universe is God to Cousin as truly as the Son of God is God to us. Thus he says, though the form is different, "the contents of religion and philosophy are the same."

Dorner gives the following view of Schelling's doctrine on this subject. "The Finite is the necessary form of divine manifestation. The eternal, divine Idea cannot in itself be manifest; to that end it must become finite. But as it cannot present itself in any one finite form, the divine life is manifested in a multiplicity of individuals, in historical development, in which each moment exhibits some particular aspect of the divine life, and in each of which God is as the absolute. Hence the Finite is not simply finite, but it is that in which God lives. The Finite is the necessary form of manifestation, or of God as manifest. It is God in the process of development, or the Son of God. All history thus obtains a higher significance. Humanity does not exclude divinity, but includes it, history is the birth-place of the Spirit, (*i. e.*, of God,) the theatre of Theogony. Hence the idea of God becoming man is raised to the principle of all philosophy; and since that idea is the essence of Christianity, Christianity and philosophy are reconciled. Every thing is to be explained by this idea of God becoming man."*

If $a \ b \ g \ d$ have any relation to $\alpha \ \beta \ \gamma \ \delta$, then is Cousin's philosophy a reproduction of the Pantheism of Schelling and Hegel. It is the same tune with variations. It is German in French idiom. We have shown, first, that he avows the result to which his German predecessors had arrived, *viz.* that "God is everything;" at once "God, nature, and humanity;" secondly, that he consciously and elaborately traces out his principles to that great conclusion; and thirdly, that he applies the result thus obtained to the illustration of all the great ques-

* Dorner's *Christologie*, first edition, p. 342.

tions of philosophy and history. We have made this exposition, at no small expense of time and labour, for the double purpose of vindicating the memory of a friend, whom we loved and honoured while living, and of contributing our mite to open the eyes of the Christian community to the true character of that German philosophy which is percolating by a thousand dribblets through our literature, and even our theology. Hardly a discourse on history, or on its philosophy, has come before the public of late years, which has not been more or less imbued with pantheistic principles. No inconsiderable portion of the recent expositions of the nature and doctrines of theology exhibits the same character. Unitarians now speak freely of the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation as primary truths. A certain class of our New-school brethren find no formulas so suited to express ideas borrowed from this philosophy, as the time-honoured phrases of Old-school orthodoxy. We must not allow ourselves to be deceived "by vain words." The end of these things is death. Since the world began there never appeared a more Protean, insidious, seductive, and destructive form of error, than that from which we have endeavoured to withdraw the mask.

We conclude this long review by repeating a remark already made. We have spoken of Cousin's system, not of his abiding personal convictions. We know not what they may be. We give him full credit for learning, genius, and eloquence. We acknowledge the elevated sentiments which characterize many of his writings, which are strangely at variance with the spirit and principles of other of his publications. These things do not lessen our abhorrence of his system, nor do they furnish the slightest evidence that our exhibition of that system is incorrect. Hume, in his *Treatise on Human Nature*, labours to prove that men have no souls, that "successive perceptions constitute the mind," that human identity is an imagination, that "a substance, a me, a soul," is an invention. This *Treatise* set the philosophers in commotion. Kant bent all his acumen to discover a flaw in the argument. Cousin pronounces it irresistible, assuming Locke's stand-point to be correct. This form of scepticism is known as Hume's system, the world over. No one has yet appeared simple enough to attempt to prove that

Hume never held any such doctrine, from the fact that in his *History and Essays*, and in his private conversation, he speaks perpetually of men as having souls. We hope, therefore, that no one will undertake to prove that Cousin does not teach the system which we have attributed to him, because he often speaks in the language of ordinary men. He may, and does teach, that nature and humanity are the mere phenomena of God, though he often uses language framed on the opposite hypothesis.

Of Dr. Henry we have said enough to show that he is a calumniator of the dead, and entirely incompetent to understand the first principles of a philosophy which for thirteen years he professed to teach. We hold ourselves, therefore, exonerated from the obligation to take the slightest notice of anything he may hereafter think fit to publish against the *Princeton Review*.

SHORT NOTICES.

Cyclopædia of American Literature; embracing Personal and Critical Notices of Authors, and Selections from their Writings, from the earliest period to the present day; with portraits, autographs, and other illustrations. By Evert A. Duyckinck and George L. Duyckinck. In two volumes. New York: Charles Scribner. 1855. Royal 8vo.; pp. 676, 742.

WE are safe in saying, that no more convenient, full, or elaborate work has proceeded from the American press. Every literary reader observes, on the sight of these volumes, that they fill a *lacuna* in his shelves. The authors, who are brothers, have been long known to the reading public by their redaction of the *Literary World*, a journal of bibliography and criticism, which was cleverly and liberally conducted, and is very much missed by all book-buyers. Their labours on that work fitted them in no common degree for the severe task which they afterwards imposed on themselves, and of which the fruit is before us. The work is a *Thesaurus* of whatsoever American authorship has effected, and an *Index* to our growing

literature. To say that it is faultless, would be to claim super-human excellency for its amiable and diligent editors; that they have accomplished the work as well and faithfully as any could be expected to do in a first draught, we honestly believe. Such collections, in their earlier editions, should be regarded as tentative. The authors of this attempt must expect to hear many complaints: they will thus learn more from their enemies than from their friends. As belonging to the latter class, we take the liberty of saying, that some of the brightest names in our theological literature are scarcely visible in their lists. But we know the hinderances to such a task, and repress severity of judgment. Readers and judges of varying ages, schools, temperaments, and interests, will of course differ in their estimate of particular portions. Some will find praise, where they hoped for censure; some will wonder that so many authors are named, and some that so few. Ignorant of the craft and mystery of book-making, and of the great extent to which the authors of such a work must rely on the collections and testimony of other persons, many will keenly animadvert on trifling errors, within their own circle, or censure the proportion given to this or that author, though this proportion may have depended on the more or less of extant material. Some will miss their friends, and meet with their enemies; and not a few, after reading the Preface, will be taken aback by the felicitous quotation from Cotton Mather: "Should any *Petit Monsieur*," says the funniest of Puritans, "complain, (as the captain that found not himself in the *tapestry hangings*, which exhibited the story of the Spanish invasion in 1588,) that he don't find himself mentioned in this history, the author has this apology: he has done as *well* and as *much* as he could, that whatever was worthy of a mention, might have it; and if this collection of matters be not complete, yet he supposes it may be more complete than any one else hath made. And now he hath done, he hath not pulled up the ladder after him; *others* may go on as they please with a completer composure."

The arrangement is chronological, and disposes the matter very much under three periods: the Colonial, the Revolutionary, and the Present. An attempt has been made to give even-handed justice to every part of the United States; and we observe that special pains has been taken to present with exactness the merits of Southern authorship. In our judgment no part of the work is more delightful than that which reproduces the names and history of authors in the seventeenth century, hitherto known to few but antiquaries. In this, and in other portions, the authors have rendered inestimable service to that

large class of curious and patriotic readers, whose libraries are scanty, and who have no access to the treasures of collectors. Such will peruse with high zest the account of the Virginian Sandys, first of American authors and poets; of Captaine John Smith, and Strachey his comrade; of the Harvard men, masters in prose and verse; of Eliot the apostle, whose Indian Bible is now a gem in cabinets; and of the Winthrops and Mathers. It is no part of our plan to enumerate the subjects. We commend the work as of great utility and remarkable fullness. The charge will indeed be made, that it is too full, and admits to its honours many who little deserve them. If in any instance this has occurred, which we will not deny, it must be remembered that the work is not a selection, or an award of prizes, but a Cyclopædia; and that for the authors to have sat as Aristarchuses upon all the claimants who came before them, would have been presumptuous, even if it had been possible. Notwithstanding blemishes, *quas aut incuria fudit, aut humana parum cavit natura*, we hold it to be a noble contribution to our national literature. We know not how far the blurring of numerous impressions runs through the edition, or how much woodcuts lose when subjected to the stereotyping process and the power-press, but we lament the disfiguring of several physiognomies. In particular, the likeness of the late Dr. Alexander is a dismal caricature. Before ending this notice we must observe, that the rare and often fugitive pieces which are preserved in these volumes greatly increase their value. For some of these specimens we had been searching for years.

The Prophets of the Restoration, or Haggai, Zechariah and Malachi: a new translation with notes, by the Rev. T. V. Moore, D. D., pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Richmond, Virginia. 1856. 8vo. pp. 408.

This volume forms a valuable addition to our exegetical literature. It exhibits throughout abundant evidences of the learning, sound judgment, and patient expenditure of toil, which are requisite in a good interpreter. With no straining after novelities, nor any undue affectation of originality, it presents an exposition, the result at once of independent thought and of a careful and extensive employment of the best existing aids. We know of no commentary upon this portion of Scripture, in the English language, which we can recommend as its equal in soundness, thoroughness, condensation, and the completeness of its exhibition of the latest results of critical and hermeneutical study.

The conception was in itself a happy one, of selecting and

presenting in their combination the prophets of one entire period, and especially of one so distinct and marked in its character as that succeeding the exile. The mutual relations and interdependence of the Old Testament prophets, the intimate connection between the character of their ministrations and that of the periods in which they were severally called to labour, and generally the position which each held in the grand progressive scheme of divine revelation, present questions of interest and importance, which are so frequently overlooked or undervalued, that we are particularly pleased to see the attention bestowed upon them in this volume. The outline sketch of the periodology of the subject presented in the introduction, is not only ingenious but strikingly able and well-sustained. We must dissent, however, from the classification of Jonah, Nahum, and Obadiah as prophets of the Gentiles, in distinction from the prophets of the ten tribes and of Judah. Jonah was sent on a mission of a peculiar kind to a heathen city, and so far it is in one sense correct that the sphere of activity represented in his book lay in the heathen world. But even this mission was in all probability not designed for that heathen city, so much as for Israel and for the furtherance of his prophetic work amongst them. The symbolical character of this transaction recognized in the New Testament, and apparent also from its isolation in the Old Testament, from its evanescent consequences, which no pains were taken to deepen and perpetuate, and also from the conduct of the prophet, which seems to be best explained by the assumption, that a truth was herein prophetically incorporated, for the full unfolding of which he and Israel were not yet ripe, shows that it was more for Israel's sake than that of Nineveh that he went thither preaching repentance. The prophecies of Nahum and Obadiah (the latter of whom is p. 47, referred to a date at variance with the chronological order of the minor prophets,) were also delivered, not for the sake of the heathen, but of Judah; as much so as those of Habakkuk, or Joel, or Isaiah, or Jeremiah, which have relation to foreign powers. These formed as truly a part of their ministry to Judah as any other of their instructions, teaching them that their God was the omnipotent and universal Ruler, and that he would avenge upon all foes, however numerous or powerful, the cause of his injured people. Jonah and Nahum do "stand at the beginning and close of an era in the Ninevite history;" but what is also true and of greater consequence, it is an era likewise in the history of the chosen race, defined by the first and by the last interference of this great empire in their affairs.

Nor can we see the propriety of sundering Jeremiah from the coteremporaries of his early ministry, Zephaniah and Habakkuk; especially as they will be found to stand over against, and complete each other, much in the same way as Ezekiel and Daniel do in the period following, or as the prophets of each of the kingdoms do in the period preceding, or as this volume has correctly shown to be the case, in the period of the restoration. An inadvertence in the form of statement, p. 10, explaining Daniel's lack of the prophetic office, would seem to exclude Ezekiel from it likewise.

It is possible to trace the line of connection throughout the book of Zechariah more distinctly than we find done in this exposition. The visions, for example, are treated too much in their isolation, whereas the whole are nearly related, and there is an evident progress from one to another. The first vision presents the need of divine interference with assurances that it shall be vouchsafed. In the second, this interference begins by driving away the foes of the people. The third grants to the latter, enlargement and security; the fourth, forgiveness of sins, which had both been the cause of previous troubles, and endangered their recurrence; the fifth, the positive communication of God's Spirit and grace; the sixth and seventh, the consuming and carrying away of all remaining sin, and all the unfaithful members of the theocracy. The eighth completes the cycle by returning to the point from which they had set out, and granting to the full all that had been pledged in the first vision; from the purified and divinely protected theocracy, no longer myrtles in an open bottom, but guarded by mountains of brass, go forth the executioners of judgment, to inflict just punishment on all their foes. But, as the symbolical action appended to the series further intimates, there is another future in reserve for distant nations, besides that of judgment; they shall cease their hostility to God's people, and even co-operate with them in building up and adorning his kingdom, the very thought of Haggai ii. 7, in a different form.

From want of some such distinct and comprehensive grouping, the messianic passages in the latter part of this same prophecy are allowed to have too much the appearance of being fragmentary and isolated. Chap. xi. 1-3 does not contain "the image of a storm," or a "terrific tempest," (pp. 250, 251,) but of a conflagration. The difficulty created by the word "burden," (Zech. xii. 1,) is avoided by a very simple expedient; and it is worth consideration whether the authority of the accents (urged by Michaelis) should be allowed to determine against it. The explanation of Mal. ii. 15, adopted from Fairbairn, is new to

us; but the appositeness of its sense, and its freedom from arbitrary assumptions, are so much in its favour, that we are disinclined to pronounce hastily against it, on account of some grammatical difficulties which appear to lie in its way, but which might perhaps be removed by some unessential modifications.

We have been the more free in expressing dissent in a few trifling points not affecting the general merit of the work before us, from the high estimate which we entertain, and have already expressed of it as a whole. We trust that Dr. Moore will continue his labours in a field which he has shown himself so competent to cultivate. The general good appearance of this volume is unfortunately marred by such typographical errors as shifting the first line of the comment on p. 373 to p. 371, inserting "Chapter II." on p. 134, where it does not belong, omitting a clause in Haggai i. 8, and almost uniformly misprinting the Hebrew words which are introduced.

The usual Short Notices are necessarily postponed, on account of the unexpected length of some of the articles in this number.

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Charles Hodge
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CONTENTS OF NO. III.

JULY, 1856.

	PAGE.
ART. I.—Harmonies of the Gospels	393
ART. II.—Sydney Smith as a Minister of Religion	418
ART. III.—Principles of the Philosophy of Language	444
ART. IV.—Ruskin's Lectures on Architecture and Painting	461
ART. V.—Lyall's Mental Philosophy	494
ART. VI.—Waldegrave on Millenarianism	524
ART. VII.—The General Assembly of 1856	552
SHORT NOTICES	591
LITERARY INTELLIGENCE	597

THE
PRINCETON REVIEW.

JULY, 1856.

No. III.

ART. I.—1. *Synopsis Evangelica. Ex quatuor Evangeliiis ordine chronologico concinnavit, prætexto brevi commentario illustravit, ad antiquos testes apposito apparatu critico recensuit Constantinus Tischendorf.* Lipsiæ, 1851. 8vo.

2. *Synopsis Evangeliorum Matthæi, Marci, Lucæ, cum locis qui supersunt parallelis litterarum et traditionum evangelicarum Irenæo antiquiorum. Ad Griesbachii Ordinem concinnavit, prolegomena, selectam Scripturæ varietatem, notas, indices adjecit Rudolphus Anger, Phil. et Theol. Doctor, utriusque in Acad. Lips. Professor, etc.* Lipsiæ, 1852. 8vo.

3. *A new Greek Harmony of the Four Gospels, comprising a Synopsis and a Diatessaron, together with an Introductory Treatise, and numerous tables, indexes, and diagrams, supplying the necessary proofs and explanations.* By William Stroud, M. D. London, 1853. 4to.

4. *A New Harmony and Exposition of the Gospels, consisting of a parallel and combined arrangement on a new plan, &c.* By James Strong, A. M. New York, 1852. 8vo.

5. *A Harmony of the Gospels in the Greek of the Received Text, on the plan of the author's English Harmony, with the most important various readings, &c.* By James Strong, A. M. 1854. 12mo.

6. *The Four Witnesses: being a Harmony of the Gospels on a new principle.* By Dr. Isaac Da Costa, of Amsterdam. Translated by David Dundas Scott, Esq. New York, 1855. 8vo.

THERE is something strange in the unwearied constancy with which the Church, in every age, has wrought at the great

problem of harmonizing the Gospels. While no one Harmony retains its hold upon the public mind for many generations, there is never wanting one or more possessing such an influence. To each successive age the subject seems as fresh as ever; and to some of the best cultivated minds of each, the theme is still attractive. A mere glance at the immense amount of mental labour thus expended, not only by the Tatians and Augustines, the Calvins and Oslanders, the Chemnitzes and Lightfoots, the Macknights and Newcomes, but by multitudes of later or lesser lights in harmonistic learning, is sufficient to make two impressions, which, at first sight, may seem contradictory, but which are really two aspects of the same thing. One is the grand and comforting impression of the Church's strong faith in the absolute consistency of these divine records. The other is the less agreeable impression of continued failure in one specific object usually aimed at, namely, the reduction of these four books to a single narrative, with anything like certainty as to the precise order of minute details. The fact of failure is apparent from the endless diversity of the results, all reached *secundum artem*, and all held with equal confidence. Nothing of the same kind can exceed the complacency with which each harmonist regards his own arrangement as the true one, even when it differs by a year, or two years, from the corresponding dicta of his predecessor. The reason why this vast disparity and endless contradiction need not shake the faith or trouble the composure of the mere reader or spectator, is that he can often see, from his position as such, what the harmonists themselves are blind to, namely, that one grand result of all their labours is to make it highly probable, if not to prove, that these four books were never meant to be reduced to one, but to remain for ever side by side, as four great pictures of the same great object, by four heavenly artists, with something of course common to them all, but with something peculiar to each, and no more admitting of amalgamation, than so many literal paintings upon canvas can be made more perfect by being cut to pieces and then glued together. If the mere identity of subject and of ultimate design can never make this process rational in painting, no more can the same cause have that effect in history. Every complete intellectual pro

duct has its individuality, which dies by the intrusion of a foreign element, however homogeneous and congenial it may seem. Even the oldest garment may be spoiled by patching with the newest cloth. It is this that has made paraphrase, as usually understood, to the great majority of readers, an unsatisfying mode of exposition.

But even in the case of two or more inspired writings, amalgamation is forbidden by a double law, intellectual and moral; as being inconsistent with the unity, which is essential to the effect of every rational, coherent composition; and also with the paramount authority, which gave us these books just as they are, and chose to make them four, when it might as easily have made them one. This may be misconceived as an objection to all meddling with the text of Scripture, in the way of illustration and interpretation; but the two things are entirely distinct. Let every lawful process of investigation and of exhibition be applied to Scripture; but let the Scripture itself alone. Let the Gospels be compared and explained *ad libitum*; but let them not be displaced and supplanted by another. Let each produce exactly the impression which it is intended and adapted to produce, not only by its substance, but its form, not only by its detached contents, but by their combination. We may not be able to detect or analyze the specific operation of these causes; but all reason and analogy conspire to prove that they exist and act, and that their action must be interrupted and perverted by joining together that which God has put asunder. What then, it may be asked, is the use of all this harmonistic labour, from the second to the nineteenth century? We answer, much every way—or rather, every way but one—and that the very one on which the heart of the harmonical interpreter is often set—the undesirable, impracticable, and chimerical reduction of these four inestimable gems to one bright but artificial compound. The true use of Harmonies is threefold, Exegetical, Historical, Apologetical. By mere juxtaposition, if judicious, the Gospels may be made to throw light upon each other's obscure places. By combination, not mechanical but rational, not textual but interpretative, harmonies put it in our power, not to grind, or melt, or boil four Gospels into one, but out of the four, kept apart, yet viewed together,

to extract one history for ourselves. And lastly, by the endless demonstration of the possible solutions of apparent or alleged discrepancies, even where we may not be prepared to choose among them, they reduce the general charge of falsehood or of contradiction, not only *ad absurdum*, but to a palpable impossibility. How *can* four independent narratives be false or contradictory, which it is possible to reconcile on so many distinct hypotheses? The art of the most subtle infidelity consists in hiding this convincing argument behind the alleged necessity of either giving a conclusive and exclusive answer to all captious cavils and apparent disagreements, or abandoning our faith in the history as a whole. This most important end of Gospel Harmonies has been accomplished. It has been established, beyond all reasonable doubt, that however the evangelists may differ, and however hard it may be often to explain the difference, they never, in a single instance, contradict each other. This is a grand result, well worthy of the toil bestowed upon it by Fathers and Reformers and Divines for eighteen hundred years; while, on the other hand, the minute chronology, which some of these have viewed as the great object to be aimed at, is as far from its complete solution now as in the days of Tatian or Augustine; so that the inquirer may still say to the most able harmonists, with one of Terence's dramatic characters: *Fecistis probe, incertior sum multo quam dudum!*

But why is this failure not to be regarded as a great loss and damage to the cause of truth? For the simple reason, to which many great men in this field of labour have been strangely blind, that EXACT CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER IS NOT ESSENTIAL TO THE TRUTH OF HISTORY. All history, indeed, as the science of events, and therefore implying change, must have a definite relation to time, and must, therefore, to a certain extent, be chronological. But this extent is far less than is commonly supposed, by such harmonists as Townsend, who appear to think the Life of Christ worth nothing, till the absolute or relative chronology of every minute fact is settled, and the characteristics of the several Evangelists confounded in one uninspired narrative, without defined character at all; or by such as Osiander, who chose rather to believe that some of Christ's

most unique acts were twice performed without the slightest difference of circumstances, than to admit that either of the four Evangelists had ever departed from the order of time. It is astonishing that an assumption so gratuitous, so groundless, so directly contradictory to ordinary usage, and to the general analogy of Scripture, should have been so obstinately cherished, in relation to this matter, even by some who never thought of applying it to any other. No one can deny that in the historical books of the Old Testament, events are often brought together on account of some affinity between them, or of their common relation to the author's purpose, without detracting in the least from the historical character or credit of the record. If the books of Kings and Chronicles go through with one reign, and then back to the commencement of another partially contemporaneous, why may not the Gospels do the same? If the best biographers of Washington and Bonaparte can treat their private, military, and administrative history *seriatim*, or alternately, without inaccuracy or confusion; if Mr. Prescott, in his Life of Philip the Second, can deliberately and avowedly depart from the precise order of events, so far as to treat kindred portions of the history together, not only without damage, but with great advantage to his ultimate design; why may not the four Evangelists have followed the same method, so far as to have rendered the precise determination of minute dates, and even the precise succession of minute events, not only needless but impossible? If each of the four Gospels makes precisely the impression which its writer and the Holy Spirit had in view; if all the facts designed to be perpetuated are on record, and exactly in the shape and in the order predetermined by infallible authority; if the great phases and conjunctures of the history succeed each other in an order not to be mistaken; why should I care to know which of two parables was first uttered, or which of two miracles was first wrought? If their chronological relation is explicitly recorded, or distinctly ascertainable by inference and combination, so much the better; but such cases are not here in question. If it is not so recorded or so ascertainable, why should I spend my life in reasoning or guessing to discover what, if known, however interesting or worth knowing it might be, would probably add nothing to the strength of

my impressions or the clearness of my views, and what can certainly not be essential to the end for which the history was written, or it would have been written too? These views may no doubt be perverted and abused to the exclusion of legitimate and even necessary efforts to discover what is really contained in the inspired record, although not exposed upon the surface; and the Gospel History abounds in such scarcely hidden treasures, little suspected by the superficial or the supercilious reader. Between such investigation and the vain search for minutæ of time and order, which are neither needful nor attainable, it may be sometimes hard to draw the line; but that only makes it the more necessary that it should be drawn, and that no *nugæ difficiles* should usurp the place of genuine interpretation.

These few considerations may suffice to show, that the failure of harmonical interpretation to demonstrate the precise chronological succession of the detailed facts recorded in the Gospels, detracts nothing from their credit or historical trustworthiness, nor from the value of the great negative conclusion, reached by these laborious inquirers, often as unconsciously and undesignedly as some of the old alchemists contributed to physical discoveries of later times, although they died without possession of their long sought elixir and philosopher's stone. As men of science now look back upon the toils and speculations of a Raymond Lull and a Paracelsus, so may the biblical interpreter look back upon the labours of that class of harmonists, to whom we now refer, with gratitude for what they have accomplished in the vindication and elucidation of these precious books, but with complete indifference to their speculations and their strifes about those *minima*, of which it may be said in reference to the law that should control all criticism and interpretation, *de minimis non curat lex*.

But besides these reasons for not overrating the importance of this favourite harmonic problem—the determination of the precise order in which every minute incident took place—there are positive objections of the gravest kind against the more presumptuous attempt to substitute a single compound narrative for the four distinct ones in the Canon, not merely in the way of comment, but in that of reconstruction, an error into

which few harmonists of the higher rank have fallen, but which is nevertheless so common, that the arguments against it, though already hinted at, may not without some good effect be more distinctly stated,

The first objection to this practice is, that it assumes some imperfection in the word of God; as if the work of revelation had been done only in part, and needed now to be completed; as if the four Evangelists had only left materials in a crude state, to be afterwards digested and reduced to shape by human skill and wisdom. This, though never openly avowed, and seldom consciously admitted, is really involved in every harmonistic scheme which undertakes to substitute a composite narrative of its own for the four canonical Gospels. By a composite narrative, we do not mean a paraphrase, exhibiting the substance of the four accounts in other language, but a combination of their very words into a new texture, different from any one of the Gospels, but purporting to contain them all. If this is not supposed to be a better and more perfect shape than that of the four Gospels, why attempt it? If intended merely to interpret or illustrate, why not do it by reference to the parallels, or by simple juxtaposition? Why such extreme care to retain the *ipsissima verba* of the sacred writers, and even to gather up the fragments wasted by this sacrilegious process, and preserve them in the margin? All this shows it to be not interpretation, but re-construction; not the elucidation of an old text, but the manufacture of a new one, and as such, implying that the work of the Evangelists is only half done, and requires to be finished, in order to accomplish its design. Besides the fallacy which lies at the foundation of this undertaking, in relation to what constitutes a true and perfect history, it tends necessarily to undermine the reader's reverence and faith in the completeness of the record, which the Holy Ghost has given, of the life of Christ.

Again, as history, from its very nature, is eclectic; and as every historian, inspired or uninspired, must choose his own materials; and as every intelligent historian is guided in his choice by a regard to the object that he has in view; it follows of necessity, that his omissions and exclusions are as much a part of his design, as his insertions; and that I have no more

right to put in what he has left out, than to erase what he has written; nay, that I cannot do so in the one case, any more than in the other, without thwarting his purpose and disturbing the impression which his composition was intended to produce. And if this is a wrong to any book whatever—if Boswell's Johnson has been spoiled by Croker as an intellectual production, though enriched as a mere magazine of facts*—how doubly inadmissible is such a course in reference to writings which are owned and really believed to be inspired, by the very men who thus presume to mangle them! For it is worthy of remark that this mistaken theory and practice are confined, almost exclusively, to pious writers, of the American or English school. If Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, directed by the Holy Spirit, have selected each a certain number of particulars belonging to the Life of Christ, arranged them in a certain order, and wrought them up into a certain shape, it must have been with a design to make a definite impression, perhaps inscrutable by any critical analysis, but not on that account less real, less important, or less sacred. And yet this impression must be greatly marred, if not destroyed, by the adoption of the current fallacy, that the four Evangelists were not inspired to write histories, but only to collect materials for Mr. Townsend or for Dr. Stroud.

The last objection we shall make to this pernicious mode of fusing or amalgamating, under the pretence of harmonizing, four complete productions, both divine and human, just as if they were mere fragments or bundles of anecdotes, is, that it hinders and embarrasses interpretation, by depriving the interpreter of that inestimable aid which he derives from a continued context. A collection of inscriptions—such as that which the French government has gathered from the graveyards of Numidia and Mauritania, and is now publishing in lordly style†—is harder to interpret, as a whole, than the hardest

* The Quarterly Review has very recently (January, 1856,) declared this work to be the best edited in the language, which, so far as illustrations and additions are concerned, may be true, but not in reference to the treatment of the text, and of the composition as a whole.

† Inscriptions Romaines de l'Algérie, recueillies et publiées sous les auspices de S. Exc. M. Hippolyte Fortout, Ministre de l'Instruction Publique et des Cultes. Par M. Léon Renier. Paris, 1855—56. folio.

ancient book; the book of Proverbs is more puzzling than the book of Psalms, the Psalms more puzzling even than the Prophecies, and all for the same reason, though in different degrees, that at least half the light, which an interpreter enjoys, is shed directly or reflected from the context, and that this is reduced to a *minus* in the lyric, and to a *minimum* in the aphoristic and the lapidary style. It matters little whether we can see the *nexus* in a chapter of John or not; however incoherent it may seem, we know that it is just as he composed it, and we therefore look with some degree of confidence to the surroundings of a passage for assistance in decyphering its meaning. But we cannot feel such faith in the artificial context which the harmonist has thrust in, like a wooden leg, among the mangled limbs of the Evangelists. He may have hit upon the true chronology, but he may not; and if he has, it may be at the cost of the original connection, and of the associations in the writer's mind from which it sprang at first, and of which it is still the living intellectual expression. This loss can never be made good by any possible amount of chronological precision, even though it should exceed that of an almanac.

Before concluding these remarks, we wish to say a word upon an opposite extreme, which has sometimes been engendered by reaction from the one that we have just described. We mean the flippant and contemptuous ignoring of all harmonizing methods, where there seems to be a discrepancy on the surface, and treating them not only as inadequate, and even silly, but as unmanly and dishonest. To those who are at all familiar with the history and literature of the subject, there is something quite amusing in the air with which some recent and by no means first-rate writers, try to put out of existence, by a peevish exclamation or a wave of the hand, problems and methods of solution, which have been deemed worthy of profound thought and laborious exertion, not merely now and then, or here and there, but by many of the great minds of the Christian Church, in every country and in every age.*

* Such views are less surprising on the part of German skeptics, who have no experience in the practical comparison and estimate of evidence, than in American or English Christians who have ever heard a witness cross-examined, or a complicated case summed up.

At all events, this habit of insisting upon cutting, and often with a dull knife, knots which so many strong and skilful fingers have been trying for ages to untie, ought to come, if it comes at all, from those who have acquired the right of speaking *ex cathedra*, and when urged by others, is as little entitled to consideration as the simple faith which it affects to pity, or the honest but mistaken means employed to gain an end, which it dogmatically sets aside as wholly unattainable.*

Abjuring, as we do, both these extremes; believing that the Gospels can and must be harmonized, without destroying their unity and individuality; and knowing that the product of such studies includes wheat as well as chaff; we cheerfully resume the account of contemporary harmonistic literature, which we began more than seven years ago. In the number of this journal for October, 1848, besides stating in another form some of the same views which we have now presented, and enumerating several recent German publications on the Gospel History, we recommended Dr. Robinson's Harmony as, on the whole, the best with which we were acquainted, and at the same time, as the cheapest and most readily accessible to ministers and students in this country. Repeated re-examinations of the subject, and of many later works respecting it, have only deepened our conviction, that for judgment, accuracy, caution, and exemption from vagaries and extremes, this fruit of native scholarship is still unsurpassed by any rival, foreign or indigenous. We can say this in consistency with what we have already said as to the failure of all efforts to determine the minute chronology or *ἀπολογία* of our Saviour's life; because Dr. Robinson's conclusions are collectively as probable as any others; and because, apart from this vexed question, the merits of his work enable it to stand a comparison with any that have followed it, to some of which we now ask the attention of our readers.

The works which we have chosen for this purpose may be said to represent four countries, two being natives of Germany, one of Holland, one of England, and two (by the same author)

* This fault is chargeable, in some degree, on Alford's Greek Testament (vol. 1. London, 1849,) a useful addition to our English *apparatus biblicus*, though encumbered with a vain parade of textual criticism, and often showing signs of "cramming" rather than digestion.

of America. One of the German works is by a writer, who acquired considerable reputation more than twenty years ago, by a Latin treatise on the Chronology of Acts,* which was regarded as a sort of standard until superseded and eclipsed by Wieseler.† The peculiar feature of his synopsis is not the arrangement of the text, in which he follows Griesbach, but the exhibition, in a lower margin, of quotations, references, parallels, and traditional addenda, from the Fathers of an older date than Irenæus. This description will suffice to show, that the labours of the editor, however learned, and however valuable they may be, belong rather to patristic than to harmonistic literature. They may, and no doubt will, facilitate the task of the interpreter and critic, but can scarcely be expected to throw much light on the points which are particularly interesting to the readers of a harmony. The author indeed seems to have adopted this merely as a convenient vehicle for his collections from the early Fathers, using Griesbach's well-known synoptical arrangement as a text, to which his own patristic parallels might be appended. He has probably accomplished all that he designed, but can hardly be considered as having given a new impulse or advancement to harmonical interpretation.

The name of Tischendorf has been, for some years past, becoming famous, not so much for great ability or general learning, as for strenuous devotion to a single study, and an almost preternatural fertility and diligence in making books for its promotion. As a critical editor of the Greek Testament, and a personal explorer of manuscript treasures in the East and elsewhere, he is commonly allowed the first place in contemporary literature. Although still in the prime of life, he has already published more editions of the Greek text and its Latin versions than Erasmus, Beza, and the Stephensses together. That this is not a speculation or a drudgery, but a passion, may be seen from the unabated zeal with which he can

* *De Temporibus in Actis Apostolorum ratione scripsit Rudolphus Anger*, Philos. D. AA. LL. M. in Academiâ Lipsiensi Privatim Docens. Lipsiæ, 1833. 8vo.

† *Chronologie des Apostolischen Zeitalters bis zum Tode der Apostel Paulus und Petrus*. Von Dr. Karl Wieseler, Professor der Theologie in Göttingen. 1848. 8vo.

rewrite and reprint the same text and prolegomena and annotations, under a dozen varied shapes and sizes and denominations. Of his textual labours we may take another opportunity to give a more particular account. At present, we can only say that the same one idea or ruling passion still inspires him in his Harmony or Synopsis, where a large space is allotted to another reproduction of his critical labours on the text of the Four Gospels. The harmonical arrangement varies only in a slight degree from that of Dr. Robinson; and whether this be acquiescence or coincidence, it bears a very honourable and important testimony to the labours of his learned predecessor. The arrangement and typography of this Synopsis are, as might have been expected from the author's other publications, tasteful and attractive, but without the lavish ostentation which his own wealth or the patronage of others has enabled him, in many cases, to indulge. The work before us, although neat, is wholly unpretending, and within the reach of any student, all the contents, except the text and variations, being written in Latin. Beyond this, however, it would not be just to go, in making Tischendorf's Synopsis an important contribution to the harmonizing of the Gospels.

Much more attention has been paid to the harmonical arrangement of the text by the American and English writers of a recent date. Both Dr. Stroud and Mr. Strong appear to have begun the work *de novo*, reconstructing the whole narrative on principles and methods of their own. Dr. Stroud, however, goes much further in the actual amalgamation of the Gospels into a new and compound narrative, which occupies the leading column of this splendid quarto from the press of Bagster. Besides this mixed text, he exhibits those from which it is compounded in parallel columns. The author is an English physician, previously known, both at home and on the continent, by a treatise on the Physical Cause of the Death of Christ, (London, 1847.) This special and professional inquiry seems to have directed his attention to harmonical studies. For unwearied industry and conscientious care, in the performance of his task, he is entitled to all praise, as well as for a large amount of useful information in his Introduction. We are bound to add, however, that with all the advantage of a

faultless typography and artistical arrangement of the page, the result is complicated and confusing, while the infinitesimal divisions and innumerable titles, far from aiding either eye or understanding, only serve to make confusion worse confounded. Besides these empirical objections to the aggregate result, we are constrained to reiterate our strong dissent from the theory and practice of ignoring the four Gospels, as coherent and complete books, and treating them as bundles of materials for book-making. We have no doubt that, like multitudes of similar productions, Dr. Stroud's costly volume will do good, especially in wealthy circles, where a book less showy might not find access; but we cannot conscientiously regard it as a sensible advance upon preceding harmonies and towards the ultimate solution of the great harmonic problem.

The Gospel Harmony of Mr. Strong is now before the public in two shapes. The first, exhibiting the English text, arranged upon a new plan, with accompanying maps, notes, chronological tables, and illustrative engravings, is a large and elegant octavo volume. In addition to some new and independent views, affecting the adjustment of the narrative, this work has two distinctive features of a bold and somewhat novel kind. The first is a "free version," or accompanying paraphrase, "in a straight-forward and modern style." (Preface, p. vii.); the other an original translation of "poetical strains," especially citations from the Hebrew, into English blank verse. (Preface, p. ix.) Of these we shall say nothing, but exhibit samples, taken almost *ad aperturam libri*. The dialogue between our Saviour and the thief upon the cross is paraphrased as follows:

"Then looking toward Jesus, he fervently begged, 'Master, remember me [by a participation in the reorganization of that period] when you return [after your resurrection] to establish your kingdom [by the resuscitation of saints and the renovation of Judaism!]' To this diffident appeal Jesus blandly replied, 'Yes, I assure you, that [without waiting for any future development of my mediation] *this very day* you shall share with me the immortal bliss of *Paradise* [that portion of *Hades* (i. e., the region of departed spirits beneath the earth) assigned by the Jews to the pious.]"—*Strong's Harmony and Exposition*, p. 360.

The prophecy of Micah, quoted by the chief priests and scribes, in Matt. ii. 6, is versified as follows:

"[Dark is the cloud impending o'er the land;
But gleams of happier times break through the gloom.]

Jehovah singles thee, O Bethlehem,—
 Ephrathah erst; though small thy borders seem,
 Compared with many towns of Judah's tribe,
 Yet large the honour destined thee among
 Its Principalities—of 'thousands' all.
 For out of thee will rise the Heaven-sent Prince,
 A pastoral sway to bear o'er Israel's fold."—P. 22.*

Of these "poetical strains," and this "straight-forward and modern style," as well as of the costly plates and maps, the second or Greek Harmony is wholly destitute. The taste of some, however, will be apt to regard it as a much more elegant and scholar-like performance. While the useful part of the accompanying apparatus is retained, the book attracts the eye by its accurate and neat typography, its clear symmetrical arrangement, and the proof which it affords both of scholarship in general, and of learned labour spent upon this subject in particular. The departures from preceding harmonies, in form and order, though apparently the fruit of independent speculation, and in some cases plausibly defended, are still subject to the general uncertainty, which we have represented as involving the minute chronology of this whole matter. One of the most convenient appendages of Mr. Strong's harmonical arrangement, is the clear and simple exhibition, in the margin, of the textual changes which have been *adopted* (not *suggested* merely) by the latest critics. If we do not set as much store by the grammatical notes, it may be from a want of experience in the use, to which they were particularly meant to be applied. To us, we frankly own, they seem precisely of the sort, which tempts the wish that there were either more of them or none at all.

But the grand peculiarity of Mr. Strong's Harmony, as such considered, and therefore found in both its forms, is yet to be described, and well deserves description for its novelty and ingenuity. Among the parallels, in every case where they occur, he chooses what he thinks the fullest narrative, and prints this in a large type, as the leading column. The other, or others, he displays beside it in a smaller letter. But what strikes us as a really original invention, is the introduc-

* This is the result, to which the fashionable mode of printing such quotations naturally tends. The next step, we suppose, will be to make them rhyme.

tion from the parallel columns into the main one, of such words or phrases as may serve to supplement it and complete it. This, which would otherwise be liable to all that we have said against the method of amalgamation, is redeemed from that reproach by printing these interpolations in a smaller type than the rest of the column, so that the eye can instantly detect them, and refer them to their places in the other columns. We must confess that we were greatly taken with these neat contrivances at first sight, and regarded them as sensible improvements in the method of exhibiting harmonical results, and in the means of promoting harmonical study. Closer examination has made no change in our estimate of the talent for ingenious combination and arrangement which is here displayed. We are constrained to say, however, that the more we have examined the result as embodied in this handsome volume, the more misgiving have we felt, with respect to its expediency and usefulness. The process of selection and comparison, here finished to the reader's hand, is by far the most improving and delightful part of all such studies. Even the school-boy, who requires this degree of aid, must need a *clavis* to replace his lexicon; while students of a riper age must certainly lose much, both of pleasure and improvement, by having that done for them which they can do, and would do, and ought to do themselves. Another objection to the method is, that it destroys the prestige of integrity and unity belonging to the gospels when presented side by side without admixture. There is something almost morally offensive in the sight of any human hand, however reverent or skilful, tampering with the text of these incomparable records, cutting them into shreds, or mutually patching them, as if by that means we could get a seamless fabric, woven from the top throughout. Especially is this impression made by occasional changes in the form of words and phrases thus transferred, in order to adjust the syntax, a necessity which, far from recommending the arrangement, is itself sufficient to condemn it, or at least to justify a strong predilection for the good old plan of simple tabular synopsis, which exhibits nothing but the matter to be harmonized, and leaves the reader to compare it and combine it at his own discretion.

Very different from all these is the last book named at the beginning of this article. It is not so much a Harmony as a Harmonical Commentary on the Gospels. In its original form, it was a course of popular lectures on the difference and agreement of the gospels, delivered in Holland more than fifteen years ago, and subsequently published, as an antidote to Strauss's *Life of Jesus*.* It was afterwards translated, with the author's approbation and with some modification of its form and a new title, by a Mr. Scott. This elegant volume, from the press of Ballantyne in Edinburgh, has been since put into circulation in America, at a very reasonable price, and is, we trust, already known to many of our readers. For the sake of such as have not met with it, however, we propose to give a more particular description than we could in a short notice on its first appearance.† Without repeating what we then said, that Da Costa is a Christian Jew, descended from one of the old Portuguese or Spanish families, who fled from persecution to the Netherlands some centuries ago, and is equally esteemed by those who know him, for his genius, learning, and peculiarly unjewish piety; we shall simply say, by way of introduction to what follows, that this work shows so much modest independence and originality, with such familiar knowledge of the oldest and the latest speculations, true and false, and the results of ancient and modern exegetical investigations, that we know of no contemporary writer who seems to come so near the character described in Matt. xiii. 52, a scribe disciplined into the kingdom of heaven, and like a faithful householder, bringing forth out of his treasure things both new and old.

The radical idea of the work before us is, that THE GOSPELS CAN BE HARMONIZED ONLY BY DUE REGARD TO THEIR PECULIARITIES, a principle by which it is immediately distinguished from the English schemes of fusion or amalgamation. This primary or fundamental postulate is verified by separate descrip-

* *Voorlezingen over de Verscheidenheid en de Overeenstemming der Vier Evangelien*: door Mr. Isaac da Costa. Eerste Deel, 1840. Tweede Deel, 1842. Leiden, 8vo.

† See our number for January, 1855, pp. 162, 163, where this and another of Da Costa's works are briefly noticed, with a few facts of his history.

tions of the Gospels, with their several characteristics, followed by mutual comparison or contrast, and the author's mode of solving alleged contradictions.

The first Gospel he regards as the genuine work of Levi the publican, or Matthew the apostle, written probably in Greek, and not in Hebrew, yet peculiarly oriental and judaic in its character; recording few dates and few minute details, but abounding in quotations from the prophets, as proof of the Messiahship of Jesus; often combining homogeneous matters, without regard to mere chronology, as in the parables, the sermon on the mount, our Lord's instructions to the twelve, and his predictions; *never naming the Samaritans*; peculiarly fond of the word *τότε* (*then*;) and of generic plurals (as in speaking of the thief upon the cross;) and with a strong disposition to exhibit things in pairs or couples, on which the author founds a new, but rather far-fetched explanation of the two blind men at Jericho, and the two demoniacs at Gadara, where Mark and Luke have only one.

With respect to the second Gospel, the author's views are still both "new and old." He believes it to have been written with a full knowledge of the first, and under Peter's influence, embodying many of his vivid recollections, so that words and acts, which in the other Gospels are anonymous, are here ascribed to Peter; while his vain attempt to walk upon the water is omitted. Compared with Matthew's Gospel, this has fewer incidents but more minute details, as in the account of the Transfiguration, and the miracle that followed. It omits much that was particularly interesting to Jews; the genealogies, some parables, the woes denounced upon the Scribes and Pharisees, Jerusalem, Capernaum, and other cities; it explains peculiar Jewish terms and customs, such as "corban," and washing before meat; all which shows a primary reference to gentile readers. As characteristics of the writer, he enumerates his fondness for the adverb *εὐθέως*, and for Aramean or vernacular expressions (*Talitha cumi*, *Epphatha*, *Abba*;) always accompanied by a translation; also his habit of precisely designating persons, (as in the case of Bartimeus, Abiathar, Levi, Boanerges, the father of Alexander and Rufus.) As examples of minuter strokes, not found in Matthew, he speci-

fies the mention of the hired servants at the call of James and John; the crowd being so great that they could not eat; their toiling in rowing; Christ's inviting them to come and rest; the mention of the stone at the sepulchre as great; his looking round with anger, and in general the frequent mention of our Saviour's looks and gestures, most of which we know only through this Gospel. As minute peculiarities of diction, he refers to his habitual quotation of the very words spoken; his frequent transposition of the words used by Matthew, where the words themselves are just the same; and his fondness for the combination of a cognate verb and noun (create and creation, astonish and astonishment, blaspheme and blasphemy.) He accepts the old tradition, that the writer was named Mark, but denies that it was John Mark, on the somewhat unsubstantial ground of a perceptible difference of character; while from the soldierly laconic style, the precision and rapidity like Julius Cæsar's, the fondness for recording brief and peremptory orders, the obvious reference to gentile readers, the occasional use of Latin words, and the allusion to military usages, especially the Roman watches of the night, he draws the singular conclusion, that the writer was a Roman soldier, Peter's son in the faith (1 Peter v. 18,) and therefore not improbably *the same devout soldier, who attended him from Joppa to the house of Cornelius in Cesarea.* As to the view of our Lord himself presented in this Gospel, Da Costa thinks, with many others, that it is pre-eminently that of his humanity, the Son of Man, while Matthew views him chiefly as the Son of Abraham and David, Luke and John as the Son of God. In recording the miracles, he dwells upon the instrumental or accompanying acts, the touch, the clay, the spittle, the sighing, &c., &c. As to the subject matter of this Gospel, its chief peculiarity is, that it has so little that is really peculiar to it, the facts which it records, with few exceptions, being found in the other Gospels.

The third Gospel he regards as the work of a Greek proselyte and a physician, as appears from his descriptions of disease, and of our Saviour's bloody sweat; not an eye-witness, but a regular historian, paying great attention to minute chronology, as in the case of Anna and Eneas, and others, the

duration of whose sufferings is specified, the indication of Christ's age, and of certain intervals occurring in his history; often referring to contemporary persons and events (Herod, Archelaus, Antipas, Philip, Chuza and Joanna, Pilate's massacre, the tower in Siloam;) sometimes restoring the order of time, from which Matthew had departed for the purpose of his argument, as in the Sermon on the Mount, the Lord's Prayer, the parable of the mustard-seed and leaven, the prediction of the downfall of Jerusalem; though a gentile, dwelling much upon the Jewish history and usages; often coinciding, both in sentiment and language, with Paul in his epistles; fond of exhibiting our Lord's beneficence to publicans and sinners, to Samaritans and gentiles, to women and children; dwelling much on his devotional habits and his unction with the Holy Ghost. Compared with Matthew, he exhibits many of the same facts, but with many differences, showing however an acquaintance with the older Gospel, and assuming the same knowledge in his readers. His relation to Mark is, according to Da Costa, that he often borrows the details from him, where he follows Matthew as to the main facts, evincing that he knew both, and derived from both precisely what was suited to his own specific purpose.

Besides the great distinctive features of John's Gospel, which are recognized by all, Da Costa points out his peculiar habit of interpolating parenthetical explanations in his narrative (this he spake of his body—this he spake of the Spirit—he knew what was in man—Jesus himself baptized not—this was that Mary—this was that Nicodemus—this was that Caiaphas—this he spake signifying what death he should die, &c. ;) his constant use of logical and not mere narrative connectives, (therefore, for this cause, &c. ;) his selection of incidents intrinsically grand, or connected with our Lord's discourses; the paucity but magnitude of miracles recorded; his frequent mention of the Father and the Paraclete; his disposition to record the speeches even of inferiors (John the Baptist, Nathaniel, the Jews at Capernaum, the blind man and his parents; Thomas, Mary Magdalene;) his peculiar use of the terms, Word, Light, Glory, Truth, Son, Lamb, &c.; his attention at the same time, to minutiae, (much grass—much water—other boats—barley-

loaves—such and such a day, hour, year; so much myrrh and aloes, so many fishes;) his careful record of the festivals which Christ attended; his quotation of prophecies not found in Matthew, among which are some by Christ himself.

This, says our author, is a new but not “another gospel.” By a bold musical figure, he describes it as the bass of the quartette! As to the other books, John must have known them, and indeed he may be said to combine Matthew, Mark, Luke, Paul, and Peter, all in one. He is at once prophetic, historical, doctrinal, and practical. He gives no list of the Apostles, but he speaks of “the twelve;” he gives no genealogy or record of Christ’s birth and education, but he tells us that men called him “Jesus of Nazareth, the son of Joseph;” he repeats none of the parables recorded by the others, but abounds in parabolic illustrations of the same kind, (the Good Shepherd, the lost sheep, the vine, the harvest;) he records no case of dispossession, but he tells us of Christ’s saying, “Now shall the prince of this world be cast out;” he omits our Lord’s prediction of the downfall of Jerusalem, but records that of Caiaphas. He explains what Matthew, Mark and Luke left unexplained, as when he tells us that Christ spake of his body, and accounts for the great concourse between Jerusalem and Bethany, by relating the raising of Lazarus, thus explaining Luke’s allusion to his mighty works, and Matthew’s record of the question, Who is this?

Among his singularities of language is the double Amen, found exclusively in John, which most regard as a real habit of our Lord, but Lightfoot as a mere repetition of the writer, and Da Costa, somewhat mystically, as the echo of Christ’s word in the soul of the beloved disciple. He describes, as the grand distinctive feature of this Gospel, its combination of extremes, of grandeur and minuteness, of the Jewish and the Christian, of divine and human.

In determining the author he adopts the old view, but presented in a new light, that although he never names himself, but John here always means the Baptist, every reader feels that the mysterious nameless figure which appears in the first chapter, passing from the school of John to that of Christ, who leaned upon his bosom at the Supper, and followed him on

his arrest, who knew the High Priest, and brought Peter into his palace, who stood beneath the cross and was entrusted with the mother of his Lord, who saw his side pierced, and ran before Peter to the sepulchre, who first knew Jesus on the lake, and of whom that mysterious rumour went abroad, that he was not to die—must be one of the twelve—must be one of the three—and as no one could be less like Peter—and as James died too soon to be the author of this Gospel—the unanimous tradition of the ancient church is true, that it was written, in his old age, by the last survivor of the twelve, John the son of Zebedee, the disciple whom Jesus loved and yet rebuked, the Son of Thunder, the perpetual associate of Peter in the Acts, and with him a pillar of the Church at Jerusalem long after Paul's conversion.

After giving some account of the modern neological reaction against this Gospel, represented by the "Probabilia" of Bretschneider, and the counter-reaction in its favour, represented by Bretschneider's recantation; and after showing how many of the traits peculiar to this one of the four Gospels may be also traced in the Epistles and Apocalypse, Da Costa takes the only miracle recorded by all four Evangelists, the feeding of the five thousand, and employs it to illustrate their peculiarities. He then repeats this process on a larger scale, filling more than a hundred pages (of the English volume) with a thorough analytical comparison of our Saviour's passion, as recorded in the different Gospels. This, though not so satisfactory to general readers, on account of its descending into such detail, is of the highest value to the critical inquirer; even its failures and its over-refinements being not only interesting but instructive. Into this of course we cannot enter further, as it does not admit of either abstract or abridgment, but must hasten to present some of the general conclusions which the author draws from these distinctions and comparisons.

His grand result is, HARMONY NOT UNISON, perfect accordance in design and substance, with the utmost individuality of character and form.

The author's mind, prolific in analogies, exhausts itself in efforts to illustrate this idea, by architectural and musical comparisons which, like most others, do not always run upon all

fours. Some of his distinctions, if not altogether just, are striking and suggestive; as that Matthew presents Christ as a king and prophet, Luke as a king and priest; Matthew writes as a Jew for Jews, Mark as a Roman for Romans, Luke as a Greek for Greeks, John as a Cosmopolite for Jews and Christians.

The chronological relation of the Gospels is presented in a manner equally original, whatever may be thought of its ratiocination. He who writes always as a Jew, an eye-witness, an apostle, building on the Old Testament, combining things that are alike, and drawing gigantic outlines—must be first in time. He who follows the first closely, often using the same words, but omitting, transposing, and particularly filling up the outline with details—must be the second. He who takes outlines from the first, and details from the second, but enriches both with fresh additions, and professes to write *ἔσῃς*—must be third. He who repeats little from the other three, but is ever presupposing their existence, yet continually adding what is found in none of them—must be the fourth. This mutual relation he illustrates and confirms by Old Testament analogies, or rather by the uniform organic progress, which he thinks may be traced alike in nature, providence, and revelation. As the Prophecies are, so to speak, evolved out of the Pentateuch and one another; as the New Testament thus grows out of the Old, and each successive part from that before it; so Matthew's argument, though it maintains its place, gives birth to Mark's description, and both to Luke's history, and all to John's *θεολογία*—the infancy, youth, manhood, and old age of one and the same revelation—or, to change the figure, as our author sometimes does without sufficient notice, a quaternion of evangelists, the two apostles marching outside, to cover, as it were, the apostolicals, though clothed at the same time, with the authority of Paul and Peter. Whatever may be thought of these particular distinctions and analogies, it must be owned that the ingenious author has established his right to ask the triumphant question at the close, Can all this be the work of chance or human contrivance?

In accordance with his fundamental principle, he holds that these four views of Christ were necessary to produce the

requisite effect; that none of them could have been spared; that though the inspiration of the authors was the same, their human gifts were different; that each Gospel is perfect in its kind, but not complete by itself, like the members of the body; that each answers its own purpose, but not God's, which requires and comprehends them all. If we had only Matthew's outline record of some facts, it would be perfect as an outline, yet not all we need. One side of a building may be perfect in design and execution; yet it cannot be the whole, or any other side but itself.

As to apparent or alleged discrepancies, our author holds that they are aggravated, not relieved, by fusion and assimilation; that the actual diversities are not to be ignored or even extenuated, but allowed to give the key (another musical allusion) to the entire harmony, so that the more differences we find, the more distinctly will the Gospels stand forth in their individuality; and yet these differences, far from being contradictions, will be found to be the necessary elements and indispensable conditions of the highest unity. However transcendental this may seem in form, we do believe that it embodies an intelligible and important truth, the same that was propounded at the outset of this abstract, as the radical idea of Da Costa's work.

We shall close our crude account of this extraordinary book with the author's own summary harmonic rules, or rather pregnant statements of the consequences flowing from the previous discussion. He concludes then, that the earlier Evangelists were well known to the later, and were used by them, but independently, or only in dependence on the Holy Ghost, whose will was not that they should use precisely the same matter, still less the same manner, but that each should choose from the common material, with a view to his own specific task and calling; that they consequently might, or rather must, differ widely in selection, arrangement and expression; Matthew combines like with like; Mark frequently, by transposition, makes it chronological; Luke gives it a historical construction; to which John adheres, except for cause, in what is common to them both. As a general thing, Matthew abounds in topics and in words, Mark and Luke in more minute details, while

John is full in both respects, yet different from all. In speaking of the same thing, Matthew sometimes has the plural, Mark and Luke the singular, the former being more generic and collective in his thoughts and words, the others more specific and individual. Even where John is like the others in his general mode or manner, as in local description or exact specifications of time and number, the details are for the most part peculiar to himself. In recording speeches, all convey the true sense; but Mark and Luke more generally give the precise words, Matthew the substance, sometimes with ideas that were not expressed though really implied, and John with the echo or reflection of the language from his own soul.

In giving an idea of Da Costa's singular production, we have chosen to retain, as far as possible, his own arrangement and peculiar form, although the one is often desultory and the other odd. But the very fact that these peculiarities are so much out of keeping with the old fashioned harmonistic methods of the English school, may lead to wholesome action and reaction, between systems so antipodal in form, though really concurring in the same essential views of inspiration, and of Christ himself. We should not have thought our author's speculations, striking and ingenious as they are, entitled to be brought before our readers at such length, if they were not imbued, and we may say instinct, with vital Christianity, with clear and large views of the most important doctrines, and with pure affections corresponding to them.

In parting from the books which have detained us so long, it is pleasing to reflect, that every one of them is likely to be useful, in its way, and to a certain class of readers. We are glad to think that Anger will lead some German students of the Gospels to compare them with the Fathers of the first two centuries, not only for their own improvement, but for that of others, and not only in the way of illustration, but of critical authentication. We are glad that such a name as that of Tischendorf is here pledged to the possibility of harmonizing all the Gospels, and not merely three of them, which is the *maximum* conceded by the modern German theory and practice. We are also glad that a synopsis so coincident with that adopted by our own best harmonists, is thus put into German circula-

tion with a needless but respectable endorsement. We are glad that many buyers of fine books in England will be led, perhaps insensibly, by Dr. Stroud, to learn far more than they would otherwise have known, about the Life of Christ, not only in its outlines but in its details. We rejoice that our Methodist brethren, of whom we are informed, though not by himself, that Mr. Strong is one, have so intelligent and accurate a writer of their own, on this important and delightful part of sacred learning. And lastly, we congratulate ourselves and others, that such principles and sentiments as those of Da Costa—leaving out of view particular exceptions—are in active circulation through so wide a sphere, in Holland, Britain, and America.

To ministers and students of our own Church we recommend as helps in this most interesting study, the Greek text of Robinson and Scott's English version of Da Costa. We have not compared the same parts of the latter work in Dutch and English; but our strong impression is that the translation is a good one, and its beautiful typography is not the least of its attractions. We have only one defect, or rather one excess, to criticize, which might be deemed too small for notice, but for its doing great injustice to the author's judgment and good taste, merely to gratify a freak of his translator. When we first cast our eye upon the English volume, we were struck with the multitude of *Saints* scattered over the surface. Not knowing this to be a Low Dutch fashion, we regretted that the author, however great a stickler he might be for this saintly etiquette, had not sought or seized a dispensation from the rule, if only to save space and spare the reader's eyes. On coming to a sight of the original, we found, to our surprise and indignation, that this host of saints was introduced by the translator, who might almost seem from this officious act to be a convert from dissent to churchmanship, as scarcely any other would have thought of overloading and defacing such a book, in such a way, lest either of the four Evangelists should once appear without a handle to his name; although it might be hard to say why such a deprivation would be more unjust to them than to the Saints of the Old Testament, to whom even Puseyites and Papists do not scruple to refer, as plain Noah, Moses, David, and Elijah. Against this absurd exaggeration of a harmless though unmean-

ing practice, and especially this vast multiplication of words, without the addition of a single new idea, we appeal not to Scripture or sectarian distinctions, but to taste and common sense. Many a reader, we have no doubt, though accustomed and attached to such formalities in other cases, will consider their use here a work of supererogation, and perhaps be ready to say:

“Is it a custom?—Ay, marry, is it.
But to my mind, though I am native here
And to the manner born, it is a custom
More honoured in the breach than the observance.”

ART. II.—*A Memoir of the Rev. Sydney Smith, by his Daughter, Lady Holland. With a Selection from his Letters. Edited by Mrs. Austin. In two volumes. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1855.*

It is not without design that we have delayed to notice this Memoir. Other reviews have considered its subject as a critic, a reformer, a politician, and a wit. We design to consider him as a *minister of religion*; for in this relation he was truly a remarkable man. In thus viewing him, we shall examine his religious writings, as well as observe him in his biography and letters.

Sydney Smith was born at Woodford, in Essex, 1771; received his early education at Winchester, and then went to New College, Oxford; where nothing special is recorded of him, except that he obtained first a scholarship, and then a professorship yielding about a hundred pounds a year. After this, he deliberately resolved to enter the church. When Dr. Johnson, in his time of need, was offered a good living, if he should enter into orders, he declined it, saying: “I have not the requisites; and I cannot, in my conscience, *shear* the sheep which I am unable to *feed*.” But Sydney Smith had no difficulty in answering the Bishop, that he was “inwardly moved by the Holy Ghost to take upon him this office and ministration, to serve God for the promoting of his glory, and the

edifying of his people;" and to believe, according to the Liturgical service, that it is an office that requires us "never to cease from our labour, care, and diligence, till we have done all that lieth in us, according to our bounden duty, towards all such as are committed to our care, in order to bring them to a ripeness and perfection of stature in Christ Jesus."

His first scene of ministration was the parish of Netherhaven, near Amesbury, a village consisting of a few scattered farms and cottages. It is often no disadvantage for a young clergyman to be called to labour at first in a small and obscure parish, where the mind and heart can be well disciplined. Even if no field of extensive usefulness be at once offered, he can remain quiet, trimming his secret lamp, which may one day shed its light far and wide. Some of the most eminent ministers in the church of God have been thus trained. Bishop Wilson, the excellent and devout Bishop of Sodor and Man, after his ordination, was appointed to a small curacy, where he lived in great retirement; where his annual stipend was but thirty pounds; but where he was eminently fitted for the conspicuous station in the church which he ultimately occupied. It was so with Hooker, who was at first settled in a poor and thinly populated parish, containing less than two hundred inhabitants. And Doddridge used often to remark, how grateful he was that he was thus early called to such a situation, and how it prepared him for extensive usefulness in a higher sphere.

Did Sydney Smith feel and act thus? Did he, according to his ordination vow, regard his office as one of high responsibility? He found his parishioners ignorant, unrefined, and miserable. Did he, feeling the value of their souls, strive to enlighten, and refine, and make them happy? Did he instruct the illiterate, reprove the wicked, exhort the negligent, alarm the presumptuous, strengthen the weak, visit the sick, comfort the afflicted, and reclaim the wandering? If he had acted thus, "the wilderness," in a moral sense, "would have been glad, and the desert would have rejoiced, and blossomed as the rose." But instead of this, he complained of want of society, of books, of food, of everything; and, at the end of two years, resigned his living. After this, he departed with the eldest son of the squire to whom he was tutor, and engaged to go with him to

the University of Weimar, in Saxony; but in consequence of the disturbances in Germany, occasioned by the war, he went to Edinburgh. He arrived at that city in 1797, with his pupil, Beach, and remained there about five or six years; associated with politicians and men of science, attended the medical lectures at the University, and, as a Dissenter, preached occasionally for Bishop Sanford, in the Episcopal chapel. He was not, however, much known as a clergyman, but distinguished as uniting with Jeffrey and others in the establishment of the *Edinburgh Review*, and appreciated for his talents—especially for his wit and satire.

We are not of those who believe that satire in itself is wrong, or inconsistent with love to God or man. If not wantonly indulged; if restrained within due bounds, it may be not only harmless, but useful. We have in Scripture striking examples of it—in Elijah's address to the prophets of Baal, (1 Kings xviii. 27;) in the exposure of idolatry in Isaiah, (Is. xlv. 9, &c.) in the irony of Paul to the Corinthians, (1 Cor. iv. 8; 2 Cor. xi. 19.) Its good effects have often been seen. Evils and follies once prevalent have ceased to exist, because they have become so ridiculous as to excite shame. By this means, Cervantes did real service to his country; Erasmus furthered the Reformation; and even the profane Lucian, "though his heart did not mean so," advanced the cause of Christianity by the happy application of his wit to the follies of Paganism.

But against whom and what did Sydney Smith exercise his wit and sarcasm? Evidently, though not professedly, against that religion of which he was the minister, and which, on the day of his ordination, he had vowed to advance; evidently against the true friends and advocates of divine truth.

At this time a change, which had begun, was advancing in the Church of England, in favour of evangelical religion. A life-giving spirit was everywhere springing up. Instead of the secularity which characterized the clergy, and made them satisfied, if they only regularly received their tithes, and a drowsy indifference among the people, if they only were christened, confirmed, and received the sacrament, many of the former were beginning to learn the true nature of the ministerial office, and to feel that its grand design was to save souls; and many

of the latter were enlightened to see that true religion was more than a decent attention to external rites and ceremonies; that it consisted in supremely loving God, delighting in his precepts, living a life of faith upon his Son, giving up all for Christ, labouring after conformity to his image, and striving for the advancement of his cause. Imbibing this spirit, the friends of religion, individually, and by means of concentrated action of various societies and associations, everywhere spread abroad evangelical truth, and endeavoured to give vitality to a dead church, and purity to a corrupt world. Against an ardent and persevering zeal, in propagating such principles, violent opposition was to be expected. Under the banner of this opposition, Sydney Smith ranged himself; and by one peculiarity, not doctrinal discussion, but bitter sarcasm, he stood in the very front rank.

The first production on this subject which he issued, was an article in the *Edinburgh Review*, on "*Methodism*;" by which was meant evangelical religion; or, to use his own definition—"We use the term to designate the Calvinistic and Arminian Methodists and the *evangelical* of the 'Church of England—these three classes of fanatics—not troubling ourselves to point out the finer shades and nice discriminations of lunacy, but treating them all as in one general conspiracy against common sense, and rational, orthodox Christianity."

In the discussion of this subject, the author is careful to tell us that he is no infidel: "It has been our good fortune to be acquainted with many truly religious persons, both in the Presbyterian and Episcopalian churches; and from their manly, rational, and serious characters, our conceptions of true practical piety have been formed." The religion which he professes, and of which he is the minister, is Christianity shorn of its beams, and deprived of all those peculiar qualities which the hand of God has stamped upon it; a religion which lets conscience sleep, while the heart is unchanged, and by which a man is lulled into a state of complete self-complacency; a Christianity, if it deserve the name, which has in it nothing worthy of its Author; nothing great or noble, nothing spiritual or holy, nothing raised above the world; nothing, in short, which puts to shame the claims of a Pagan philosophy. Possessing

such a religion, not of divine, but of human workmanship, why should he flee to infidelity, and deny the authenticity of the Scriptures? Why should he not love, and defend, and worship it?

He shows the sentiments of the evangelical party by quoting largely from their organs, or monthly magazines; endeavours to prove that their "religion is not the religion which is established by law, and encouraged by national provision;" and promises to present their "opinions and habits as objects of curiosity and importance." What are these opinions? They are the simple and fundamental doctrines of the special providence of God, the corruption of man, the necessity of faith in the Redeemer, the importance of holiness, the inefficacy of preaching and the sacraments, without the influences of the Holy Spirit. These doctrines, expressed sometimes in narratives, sometimes by notices, and sometimes by essays, are held up to ridicule, and regarded as the very cant of fanaticism. Take the following, which expresses his views of religion, sneers at divine grace, and conveys a personal sarcasm: "We had hitherto supposed that the disciples of the established churches in England and Scotland had been Christians; and that after baptism, duly performed by the appointed ministers, and participation in the customary worship of these two churches, Christianity was the religion of which they were to be considered members. We see, however, in these publications, men of twenty and thirty years of age first called to the knowledge of Christ, under a sermon by the Rev. Mr. Venn; or first admitted into the church, under a sermon by the Rev. Mr. Romaine. The apparent admission turns out to have been a mere mockery, and the pseudo-christian to have had no religion at all, till the business was really and effectually done under these sermons by Mr. Venn and Mr. Romaine." That which gives joy to angels seems to him the source of sacrilegious mockery. For instance, a letter from a pious chaplain of a man-of-war, found in the *Evangelical Magazine*: "Off Cadiz, Nov. 25, 1806. My dear friend,—I have only time to tell you that the work of God seems to prosper. Many are under convictions; and some, I trust, are converted. I preach every night, and am obliged to have a private meeting afterwards, with those

who wish to speak about their souls. Capt. — raises no objection. I have nearly a hundred hearers every night at six o'clock. Pray for us." And another letter from the sailing-master of his majesty's ship *Tonnant*: "It is with satisfaction that I can now inform you, that God has deigned, in a yet greater degree, to own the weak efforts of his servant, to turn many from Satan to himself. Many are called here, as is plain to be seen, by their pensive looks and deep sighs. Our thirteen are now increased to upwards of thirty." Nothing seems to provoke the defender of "rational and orthodox religion" more than the following facts: "We must remember that the Evangelicals have found a powerful party in the House of Commons, who, by the neutrality which they affect, and partly adhere to, are courted both by ministers and the opposition; that they have gained complete possession of the India-house; and, under the pretence, or perhaps with the serious intention of educating young people for India, (as much as they dare, without provoking attention,) in their own particular tenets."

The gross misrepresentations which he gives of the whole evangelical party are too numerous to be repeated. He says, "they lay very little stress upon practical righteousness; they say a great deal about faith, and very little about works; what are commonly called the mysterious parts of religion are brought into the foreground, much more than the doctrines which lead to practice." They are always gloomy and unhappy: "Ennui, wretchedness, groans, and sighs, are the offerings which these unhappy men make to a Deity who has covered the earth with gay colours, and scented it with rich perfumes, They hate pleasure and amusements. No theatre, no cards, no dancing, no punchinello, no dancing-dogs, no blind fiddlers. All the amusements of the rich and of the poor must disappear, wherever these gloomy people get a footing." It is a religion which leads to insanity: "There is not a mad-house in England, where a considerable part of the patients have not been driven to insanity by the extravagance of these people. We cannot enter such places, without seeing a number of honest artisans, covered with blankets, and calling themselves angels and apostles, who, if they had remained contented with the instruction of men of learning and education, would have been

sound masters of their own trade, sober Christians, and useful members of society."

We have observed a remarkable coincidence between the language of Chief Justice Jeffreys, at the trial of Baxter, and that of the reviewer in this article. The judge cried out, "These fellows have appropriated God to themselves: '*Lord, we are thy people, thy peculiar people, thy dear people!*'" "And then," the historian adds, "he snorted, and squeaked through his nose, and clenched his hands, and lifted up his eyes, mimicking their manner, and running on furiously, as he said they used to preach and pray." Sydney Smith says, "They consider themselves as constituting a chosen and separate people, living in a land of atheists and voluptuaries. The expressions by which they designate their own sects, are, the *dear people*, the *elect*, the *people of God*. The rest of mankind are carnal people, and the people of this world. The children of Israel were not more separated, through the favour of God, from the Egyptians, than they are, in their own estimation, from the rest of mankind."

Throughout the whole article, everything valuable in the Christian religion is made the subject of sport, with an asperity worthy of Voltaire. Evangelical truth had before this been opposed, and at that time was impugned with violence and misrepresentation; but it had never been held up to such contempt, (particularly by a professed Christian,) and by invective so bitter. Compared with it, Lavington's "Comparison between Popery and Methodism" is lenient; and Swift's Treatise on the "Operations of the Spirit" is but little worse.

Who were the men thus held up to scorn, and exposed to the most unsparing sarcasm? They were some of the best ministers of the Church of England, who adhered to its Articles and constitution: such men as Romaine, the Milners, Venn, Cecil, Newton, Scott, Porteus, Goode, Cadogan, Simeon, and a host of others like them; and laymen, like Wilberforce, Teignmouth, Cowper, Thornton, Mrs. More, and numerous others of a kindred spirit. These he stigmatizes; and some of them personally, as Methodists, enthusiasts, fanatics, and schismatics, because they make a distinction between nominal and real religion; because they speak of Christian experience as applicable to the exercises

of the pious mind; because they are ready to inquire into attainments in humility, faith, hope, and love, as the fruit and graces of the Holy Spirit. Let any unprejudiced man read the Scripture, however slightly, and compare with it this article, and he must be convinced that the author was not a secret and concealed, but an open and avowed, enemy of the religion of the Bible.

The next article that appeared on religion, from the same pen, and in the same Review, was on the subject of "*Missions in India.*"

For many years this subject had excited public attention. Long before this period, societies had been formed for the propagation of the Gospel in that interesting land. The "Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge" had employed men from other countries, particularly from Denmark and Germany, to labour in that field; and the names of Ziegenbalg, and Grundler, and afterwards of Swartz and Gerické, are familiar to all who are in any degree acquainted with the peninsula of India. The work, however, was much retarded by the want of more labourers. At length several Dissenting bodies co-operated in the great undertaking, and in a little time outstripped the elder society. The "London Missionary Society," composed of various Christian denominations, was instituted, and sent its missionaries to India, as well as to other parts of the world; and the evangelical portion of the National Church, rejoicing in their zeal, and vigour, and self-devotion, longed to imitate them, and to unite in heart, if not in form, in illuminating the dark corners of the earth. Above all, the Baptist missions had displayed a zeal worthy of such a cause; they bore an honourable testimony for the faith of Jesus, and not without success; they saw several poor and ignorant idolaters "turned from dead works to serve the living God," and the light of revelation rising upon many who were groping in the "region and shadow of death." The father of this mission, at Serampore, was the venerable Dr. Carey. He, and those who were associated with him—Ward, Marshman, and others—encountered many difficulties; but these difficulties tended only to animate their vigilance, and awaken their zeal.

The time when Sydney Smith wrote on this subject, was an interesting period. The British acquisition of power in India had been so rapid and extensive, that nearly sixty millions of inhabitants had submitted to its control. It was a period when Christians felt that this immense population had a claim on their justice and benevolence; that they owed them instruction and protection; that they were bound to dispel the gross delusions of their religion, and to correct the flagrant enormities of their conduct, by imparting, in a greater degree than they had done, the truth of Christianity. It was a period when the subject of the renewal of the charter of the East India Company was shortly to come before Parliament; and when there was a general anxiety that in the new charter a clause should be introduced, authorizing a wide dissemination of Christian principles, and the removal of many long-existing obstacles. It was a period when Corrie, and Thomason, and Henry Martyn were in the field; when the venerable Buchanan was exciting attention by his "Christian Researches in Asia," his "Star in the East," and his "Apology for promoting Christianity in India."

But while the friends of the Redeemer were cherishing this missionary zeal; while they felt that "necessity was laid upon them" to send the Gospel to that great Indian empire which Providence had put into their hands; while the diffusion of the Scriptures and their translation into so many of the languages of the East were preparing the way for the living voice of the preacher; while so many degraded Pagans were ready to "cast their idols to the moles and the bats," so many dark understandings waiting to be enlightened, so many aching hearts longing to be comforted, there sprung up a most violent and pertinacious opposition. For a long time a strong and deep-rooted prejudice had prevailed against missions, which was at length succeeded by a still, but virulent hostility. At last came an explosion of temper which had long been secretly at work; and the Rev. Sydney Smith, for himself and others, felt that it should no longer be in a state of compression and confinement. He had the ambition to lead the van in this anti-missionary crusade, and make a fierce assault against all that is doing for the object in Church and state. Though he pro-

fesses not to be an infidel, yet he unites with those who regard the effort of introducing Christianity into India as visionary and romantic; who stigmatize the "Researches" of Buchanan as an imposition on the public, and a libel on India; and who esteem the mode proposed as calculated to remove the event to a great distance. To this mode he objects, "because," as he says, "the evangelical party have got possession of the Eastern empire. Under the auspices of the college at Fort William, the Scriptures are in a course of translation into the languages of almost the whole continent of Oriental India; and we perceive that in aid of this object, the Bible Society has voted a very magnificent subscription. The three principal chaplains of our Indian settlements are (as might be expected) of principles exactly corresponding with the enthusiasm of their employers at home; and their zeal upon the subject of religion has shone and burnt with the most exemplary fury." This work being under the direction of the evangelical portion of the Church cannot of course be properly conducted. The author says: "This is the great evil; if the management were in the hands of men who were as discreet and wise in their devotion as they are in matters of temporal welfare, the desire of putting an end to missions might be premature and indecorous. But the misfortune is, the men who wield the instrument, ought not, in common sense and propriety, to be trusted with it for a single instant. Upon this subject they are quite insane and ungovernable; they would deliberately, piously and conscientiously expose our whole Eastern empire to destruction for the sake of converting half a dozen Brahmans, who, after stuffing themselves with rum and rice, and borrowing money from the natives, would run away, and cover the Gospel and its professors with every species of impious ridicule and abuse."

It would seem that in the estimation of the reviewer, the Hindoos do not need conversion. He says—"They are a civilized and moral people; and after all that has been said of their vices, we believe that a Hindoo is more mild and sober than most Europeans, and as honest and chaste." He sums up his sentiments on this whole subject in the following manner:—"We see not the slightest prospect of success; we see much danger in making the attempt; and we doubt if the conversion

of the Hindoos would ever be more than nominal. If it is a duty of general benevolence to convert the heathen, it is less a duty to convert them than any other people, because they are a people highly civilized, and because you must infallibly subject them to infamy, and present degradation. The instruments employed for these purposes, are calculated to bring ridicule and disgrace upon the gospel; and in the discretion of those at home, whom we consider as their patrons, we have not the smallest reliance; but on the contrary, we are convinced they would behold the loss of our Indian empire, not with the humility of men convinced of erroneous views and projects, but with the pride, the exultation, and the alacrity of martyrs."

While the author thus argues with those of his own church, and severely denounces them, he treats with perfect levity and buffoonery the whole Baptist mission at Serampore. A most furious and unmeasured attack he makes upon the excellent Dr. Carey—a man so faithful in sustaining the mission in Bengal, so distinguished as an Oriental scholar; so eminent for the many versions of the Scriptures which he had made; so beloved for his humble, benevolent, and self-denied piety. To bring this venerable man into contempt, he quotes from his journal, when he first went to India, in 1793, such parts as he judged the most intolerable religious cant. And what are they? Such things as no true Christian can condemn, but such as Sydney Smith was incapable of appreciating; most repugnant to his taste and revolting to his principles.—"1793: *June* 16—Lord's day—A little recovered from my sickness—met for prayer and exhortation in my cabin—had a dispute with a French deist." "— 30: Lord's day—A pleasant and profitable day; our congregation composed of ten persons." "*July* 7.—Another pleasant and profitable Sabbath—our congregation increased one—had much sweet enjoyment with God." "*Jan.* 25.—Lord's day.—Found much pleasure in reading Edwards's sermon on the 'justice of God in the perdition of sinners.'" "*April* 6.—Had some sweetness to-day; especially in reading Edwards's sermons." "*June* 8.—This evening reached Bowles, where we lay to for the Sabbath—felt thankful that God had preserved us." "— 16.—To-day I

preached twice at Malda, where Mr. Thomas met me—had much enjoyment, and though our congregation did not exceed sixteen, yet the pleasure I felt in having my tongue once more at liberty, I can hardly describe—was enabled to be faithful, and felt great affection for immortal souls.” “1796. *Feb.* 6.—I am now in my study; and it is a sweet place, because of the presence of God with the vilest of men. The work to which God has set his hands will infallibly prosper.” These ravings of fanaticism proved Dr. Carey wholly unfit to be a missionary in India! With the same personal rancour he assails Ward, one of the most able of the Eastern missionaries, who did so much by his writings in enlightening the public mind on the absurdities and horrors of Paganism; who was so commended for his elaborate “View of the history, literature, and religion of the Hindoos.” Nor do the venerable Danish and German missionaries escape his gross ribaldry; men who had spent their lives, not in the pursuit of gain, or in commercial enterprises, but in removing the ignorance, profligacy, and misery of the heathen; in making them happy in this world and in the world to come. The ridicule poured out upon all these men is like treating with scorn the first heralds of the cross, and their immediate successors, the confessors and martyrs. Shall they be revered and preserved in grateful remembrance, because they encountered the fiercest opposition in spreading the gospel among the nations; and shall those who imitate them, and have a congenial spirit, be held up to derision? Yet Sydney Smith was capable of this.

The whole article can excite no other emotions but those of indignation and disgust. Robert Hall is not too severe in speaking of it—“It is impossible to read the strictures of the Edinburgh Review on Missions, in an article which appeared under that title, without surprise that such sentiments could find admission in a work which possesses such just claims to literary mind. The anonymous writer of the article alluded to, with the levity of a buffoon, joined to a heart of iron and a face of brass, has more than insinuated that the Christianity attempted to be promoted in India, by the missionaries at Serampore, would, were it adopted, prove a serious injury to the natives, and that they are much happier and more virtuous

under their present institutions. The system of religion, be it remembered, which these men have attempted to introduce, and which this *Christian* reviewer loads with abuse, is precisely the same in its doctrinal articles with that of the Church of England, to which he has subscribed, *ex animo* no doubt, his unfeigned assent and consent. It may be hoped, that at a time when the Church of England is evincing a spirit of moderation and forbearance, and can boast of so many prelates and dignitaries distinguished for their piety and learning, no clergyman for the future will be allowed to degrade himself in a similar manner, without the most indignant rebuke. It may possibly gratify certain spirits to see the Dissenters and 'Methodists' vilified and abused; but they will do well to remember that the indulgence of a profane and scoffing humour must be ultimately injurious, not only to Christianity, but to any Christian community whatever; and that to stab religion through the sides of fanaticism is a stale artifice of infidels, by which the simplest can no longer be deceived."

Among those who entered the lists of controversy on this subject, and who replied to this article in stern and lofty rebuke, was the Rev. John Styles, an eminent non-conformist, a man of talent and usefulness, the author of several works that had received attention; of an admirable "Life of Brainerd," of an "Essay on Animal Creation;" of "Pulpit Studies and Aids to preaching;" and of an excellent work on the stage, which ranks with the treatises of Collier, Law, and Witherspoon, and which Foster commends and quotes in the *Eclectic Review*. A notice of him by Sydney Smith occupied another article in the *Edinburgh Review*. It was written to ridicule rather than to convince, and contains no argument, but only a bitter sarcasm against a good man and his associates. He repeats what he had uttered in his former articles respecting missions and the evangelical party; and says that the Methodists (using the term in the same extensive sense as before) are "vermin" that should not complain of the means employed to destroy them. "It is scarcely possible to reduce their drunken declamations to a point, to grasp the wriggling lubricity of these cunning animals, and to fix them in one position. They must, however, all be caught, killed, and cracked, in the manner and by the

instruments which are found most efficacious for their destruction; and the more they cry out, the greater plainly is the skill used against them." And again: "Undoubtedly the distinction of mankind into godly and ungodly—if by godly is really meant those who apply religion to the extinction of bad passions—would be highly desirable. But when by that word is only intended a sect more desirous of possessing the appellation than of deserving it—when under that term are comprehended thousands of canting hypocrites and raving enthusiasts—men despicable from their ignorance, and formidable from their madness—the distinction may hereafter prove to be truly terrific; and a dynasty of fools may again sweep away both Church and State in one hideous ruin. There may be, at present, some very respectable men at the head of these maniacs, who would insanify them with some degree of prudence, and keep them only half mad, if they could. But this wont do; Bedlam will break loose, and overpower the keepers. If the choice rested with us, we should say—Give us back our wolves again—our Danish invaders—curse us with any evil, but the evil of a canting, deluded, and Methodistical populace. Wherever it extends its baneful influence, the character of the English is constantly changed by it. Boldness and rough honesty are broken down into meanness, prevarication and fraud."

On the subject of the introduction of Christianity into India, he repeats what he had before affirmed, but only with more violence. The following is a specimen. "It is not Christianity which is introduced there, but the debased mummery and nonsense of Methodists, which have little more to do with the Christian religion than it has to do with the religion of China. We send men of the highest character for the administration of justice and the regulation of trade; why then are common sense and decency to be forgotten in religion alone, and so foolish a set of men allowed to engage themselves in this occupation, that the natives almost instinctively duck and pelt them? Our charge is, that they want sense, conduct, and sound religion, and that if they are not watched, the throat of every European in India will be cut. But these pious gentlemen care nothing about the loss of the country. The plan it seems is this:—we are to educate India in Christianity, as a parent does his child,

and when it is perfect in its catechism, then to pack up, quit it entirely, and leave it to its own management. This is the evangelical project for separating a colony from the parent country. They see nothing of the bloodshed, and massacres, and devastations, nor of the speeches in Parliament, squandered millions, fruitless expeditions, jobs and pensions with which the loss of our Indian possessions would necessarily be accompanied; nor will they see that these consequences could arise from the *attempt*, and not from the completion of their scheme of conversion. We should be swept from the peninsula by Pagan zealots; and should lose, among other things, all chance of ever really converting them." We can conceive of nothing more groundless, calumnious, and false, than the whole of this article.

Not only against the Evangelical Magazine does he vent his spleen, but also against all the other organs of evangelic truth. He says, "the Eclectic Review is understood to be carried on upon Methodistical principles." Of the Christian Observer—a work established by the evangelical members of the Church of England, of which Zachary Macaulay was the first editor, whose pages were enriched by the contributions of Lord Teignmouth, Wilberforce, Thornton, Stephen, Babington, Heber, and others of like talents, education and piety—he thus speaks: "We cannot conclude without the most pointed reprobation of the low mischief of the Christian Observer; a publication which appears to have no other method of discussing a subject fairly open to discussion, than that of accusing their antagonists of infidelity. No art can be more unmanly, or, if its consequences are foreseen, more wicked. If this publication had been the work of a single individual, we might have passed it over in silent disgust, but as it is the organ of a great political religious party in this country, we think it right to notice the very unworthy manner in which they are attempting to extend their influence. For ourselves, if there were a fair prospect of carrying the gospel into regions where it was before unknown—if such a prospect did not expose the best possessions of the country to extreme danger; and if it was in the hands of men who were discreet as well as devout, we should esteem it a scheme of true piety, benevolence and

wisdom; but the baseness and malignity of fanaticism shall never prevent us from attacking its arrogance, its ignorance, and its activity."

The next article on the subject of evangelical religion from the same pen, was a review of Mrs. More's "*Cœlebs in Search of a Wife.*"

This work, from the pen of so popular a writer, was received at once with universal interest; it was regarded by the friends of religion as calculated to be useful; to remove from many minds prejudices against real piety; to present an inviting exhibition of Christian life and doctrine to persons of imagination and taste, of a certain rank and culture, who would not be disposed to seek them in more serious works. But this very circumstance, that an evangelical spirit is diffused through it, and is calculated to impress like an interesting picture, leads the reviewer to oppose it, and to display his usual bitterness. Mr. and Mrs Stanley, Lucilla, and the rest are "the children of the tabernacle," "uniformly paltry and narrow; always trembling at the idea of being entertained, and thinking no Christian safe who is not dull."

In this manner, he speaks of the object of the work, and the manner in which it is executed:—"The exaltation of what the authoress deems to be the religious, and the depreciation of what she considers to be the worldly character, and the influence of both upon matrimonial happiness, form the subject of this novel—rather of this *dramatic sermon*. The machinery upon which the subject of the discourse is suspended is of the slightest and most artificial texture, bearing every mark of haste, and possessing not the slightest claim to merit. Events there are none, and scarcely a character of any interest. The book is intended to convey religious advice; and no more labour appears to have been bestowed upon the story than was merely sufficient to throw it out of the dry didactic form."

More than once he misrepresents the meaning of the authoress, to introduce a low jest, which degenerates into mere farce, and much of which is too indecent to be quoted. Among other "methodistical" sentiments, the reviewer is particularly severe against Mrs. More for speaking of the dangerous tendency of dramatic entertainments. He says:—"The finest

exhibitions of talent and the most successful moral lessons at the theatre are interdicted. There is something in the word *playhouse* which seems to be so closely connected in the minds of these people with sin and Satan, that it stands in their vocabulary for every species of abomination." But he not only tolerates the theatre as an innocent amusement, but *recommends* it as one of the best means of continuing virtuous, and reforming the vicious. He adds:—"Where is every feeling more roused in favour of virtue than at a good play? Where is goodness so feelingly, so enthusiastically learned? What so solemn, as to see the excellent passions of the human heart called forth by a great actor, animated by a great poet? What wretched infatuation to interdict such amusements as these! What a blessing that mankind can be allured from sensual gratifications, and find relaxation and pleasure in such pursuits!"

If we were not acquainted with the sentiments and language of Sydney Smith, we should think it incredible that a professed advocate of religion and morals, a minister of the Christian religion, should in this manner undertake the defence of the stage; virtually, to regard it as one of our best institutions, and to esteem it a powerful means for the promotion of virtue; virtually to desire its continuance; and so declare that its cessation would be a great moral evil. By Christians of all ages, and of every denomination, it has been acknowledged that the theatre is calculated to corrupt the morals, to instil dangerous and corrupt maxims, to root out of the heart every religious principle, by its immodest allusions, coarse profaneness, and shameless blasphemies. Yet here a minister of religion asks, "Where is goodness so feelingly, so enthusiastically learned?" Why this ardent attachment to the theatre? A reason may be found. Because he would there be freed from the sight of those religious fanatics and madmen, who it is certain, would not be present; because he would enjoy perfect immunity from Puritanism, cant, and rank Methodism; because, if he did find them there, he would discover them on the stage exposed to ridicule and contempt—a subject with which he was intimately familiar; in the exhibition of which he would be an admirable critic.

These were the last articles on this subject which Sydney Smith published in the *Edinburgh Review*. We acknowledge that the satire is keen, and the sarcasm bitter, but against what are they levelled? Not against the follies and vices of mankind; not against what deserves our contempt and abhorrence, but against virtue, and truth, and religion: against some of the best men that England has produced, whose personal character they misrepresent, and whose individual reputation they endeavour to destroy. Such criticisms are little to be distinguished from scandal and defamation, and what aggravates the offence is, that the author never, in any degree, regretted it. When, in 1840, thirty years afterwards, he consented to publish his contributions in volumes, these articles he would not omit; he said, "I see very little in my *Review* to alter or repent of; what I thought evil then, I think evil now."

These thirty years were pregnant with changes in the religious and moral condition of society which must have presented to him many points of inquiry. He had seen India in a different aspect from what it was when he assailed its missions;—schools, colleges, ministers of different denominations everywhere multiplied. He had seen prejudices giving way, and all Christendom united in this hallowed enterprise. He had ceased to hear apologies for heathenism, the sickly whinnings once uttered over the injuries of a meek and innocent idolatry; the false alarms of danger incurred by the entrance of Christians into the East, and base and unfounded charges on the missionaries as the authors of revolt. He had seen silenced the tongue of calumny against the Baptist mission, and justice done to Carey, and Ward, and Marshman. He had seen those whom he had stigmatized as evangelical, and branded by the odious name of fanatics, passing away. He had read, or might have read, the memoirs of Buchanan, Henry Martyn, of Thomas Scott, of Wilberforce, of Hannah More, and others like them. He had seen the evangelical spirit spreading in the army, in the navy, in the House of Parliament, in the ministry, from the Archbishop of Canterbury, to the humblest curate; and yet no sensation of regret is felt for his conduct; he "wrote no line which he wished now to blot:" he could say "*I see very little in my Review to alter or repent of.*" This

raises to its utmost height the enormity of his conduct, and compels us to say with Robert Hall (in the passage already quoted) "such a writer has the levity of a buffoon, a heart of iron, and a face of brass."

At the time these Reviews appeared, Sydney Smith was residing in London. He preached for a time at the Foundling Hospital, and was morning preacher at Fitzroy chapel. Little, however, is said in his Memoirs of the effect of his preaching. It would be almost folly to suppose that its design was to make men religious, to lead them to exercise "repentance towards God and faith in the Lord Jesus Christ:" this would be the height of Methodism—to preach about faith, and atonement, and grace, would be most intolerable cant. About this time he published two volumes of sermons. We find in them a marked absence of discussion on all the essential features of the gospel, so that they have little or no claim to be denominated *Christian*, supposing Christianity to be, to proclaim salvation to perishing sinners, through faith in Christ, and by the regeneration of the Holy Spirit. 'Tis true he exhorts his hearers not to be openly immoral and vicious, and yet as earnestly exhorts them not to be Puritans, or Methodists, or Meetingers; to avoid the cant of Deism as they would that of Evangelicalism. To show his utter ignorance of Scripture, it would be amusing, if treating on any other subject, to see his continued misquotations. The apostle's language, "pray without ceasing," is quoted as "praying in every season;" the touching prayer of our Saviour, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do," as "Lord, forgive them;" the declaration of John the Baptist, "Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand," is that of an apostle; the caution of Solomon, "be not righteous over much," as that of St. Paul; and the words of Simeon, "Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace," as the words of the Psalmist!

However dull and frigid he may be on other topics, in his sermons, yet when Methodism is his theme, he always kindles, and has abundant fire and warmth. Never do we see the love of Christ inspiring the heart of Paul with more energy than does this subject the soul of Sydney Smith. If the apostle introduces his loved topic at all seasons, so, this defender of

"rational religion," embraces every opportunity of bringing into notice his favourite theme. Besides having a whole sermon on the subject, he seeks for every occasion to inveigh against it as the great prevailing evil of the age. So concerned is he for his country, that in his "Sermon on the Duties of the Queen," he cautions her against it:—"It will be a sad vexation to all loyal hearts and to all rationally pious minds, if our sovereign should fall into the common error of mistaking fanaticism for religion, and in this way, flinging an air of discredit upon real devotion. It is, I am afraid, unquestionably the fault of the age; her youth and her sex do not make it more improbable, and the warmest efforts of that description of persons will not be wanting to gain over a convert so illustrious and so important. Should this take place, the consequences will be serious and distressing; the land will be inundated with hypocrisy; absurdity will be heaped upon absurdity; there will be a race of folly and extravagance for royal favour, and he who is farthest removed from reason, will make the nearest approach to distinction."

In his posthumous sermons, in which there is much larceny from others, particularly from Barrow, he uses great caution in avoiding an expression that savours of such cant; and to effect his object, changes words and phrases; substitutes for the "practice of piety," our "holy religion," and for the words "righteous," "holy," "godly," puts in their place, "the moral fitness of things," "the virtues and sanctions of Christianity."

But it was not so much as a preacher or writer of sermons that Sydney Smith was so distinguished, when he went from Edinburgh to London, and made the latter city his residence. It was rather as a friend and jovial companion of politicians and men of literature, who admired his wit and sought his society; who were pleased with his constitutional and excessive gayety of spirits; and yet not displeased with his views of religion. Among these men, his reputation spread widely; he was elected a member of one of their clubs, and was generally present at their convivial meetings. In these circles, he was pre-eminent; in the Memoir, much is said of the powers of his humour and sarcasm; very much told of that infectious wit which was perfectly irresistible; which forced peals of laughter

from every guest, and "set the table in a roar." We are informed how, on one of these festive occasions, he personated before a young Scotchman, *Sir Sydney Smith* (for as such he had been introduced to him,) how he assumed the military character, performed the part of Acre to perfection, fought all his battles over again, and showed how he charged the Turks, to the complete and permanent deception of the Highland ensign. We are told how he denied that he was the author of "the letters of Peter Plymley," and how he reported that Dugald Stewart was the author, or generally supposed to be so. On these occasions the "evangelicals" would be a fine subject of satire, and no doubt, were often held up to ridicule, to the amusement of his companions. And judging from some of his letters, we should think, in order to embellish his speech, and give a high relish to a story, that he would, Swift-like, occasionally utter a profane expression.

He was, in time, elevated to the Johnson Club, so called, because it was instituted by Dr. Johnson and his friends. Here too, he speedily arose to the first rank, and was distinguished for his mirth; and at times so excessively jovial that if he who had originally formed the company, and whose name it bears, had come to the light of day, he would have again said, with strong emotion—"This merriment of parsons is most disgusting." But to all such things Sydney Smith was perfectly indifferent; he would eat and drink, talk and jest, go into such company and visit such places as he pleased, without any of the restraints of his clerical profession. He held in this respect all the independence of Swift. Of the latter person his biographer says—"He could not forbear indulging the peculiarity of his humour, when an opportunity occurred, whatever might be the impropriety of the time and place. Upon his coming to Laracor, he gave public notice that he would read prayers on Wednesday and Friday, which had not been the custom, and accordingly the bell was rung, and he ascended the desk. But, having sat some time, with no other auditor than his clerk Roger, he began, 'Dearly beloved Roger, the Scripture moveth you and me in sundry places;' and so proceeded to the end of the service. Of the same kind was his race with Dr. Raymond, vicar of Trim, soon after he

was made dean of St. Patrick's. Swift had dined one Sunday with Raymond, and when the bells had done ringing for evening prayers, he said, 'Raymond, I bet you a crown that I will begin prayers before you this afternoon.' The wager was accepted, and immediately they both ran as fast as they could, to the church. Raymond, the nimbler of the two, arrived first at the door, and when he entered the church, walked decently towards the reading-desk. Swift never slackened his pace, but running up the aisle, left Raymond behind him; and stepping into the desk, and without putting on the surplice, or opening the book, began the service in an audible voice." Sydney Smith, in like manner, for the sake of a good jest, would sacrifice everything, lay aside his clerical character, and renounce all personal dignity. The Memoir is full of instances—one is sufficient. When, on one occasion, an extraordinary good story was told him, he wished to monopolize it, and offered to the narrator five shillings for the exclusive right of it for a week. The bargain was struck, and the money paid down; and for a week, he laughed most heartily himself, and made others laugh, almost to exhaustion. From the same love of merriment, he chose as his text for his farewell sermon at Berkley Fitzroy chapel, "thou shalt not commit adultery;" seeming to adopt the suggestion of another facetious prebendary, Sterne, who advises a clergyman, when at a loss for a text that suited a sermon, to select the 9th verse of the second chapter of Acts: "Parthians, and Medes, and Elamites, and the dwellers in Mesopotamia, and in Judea, and Cappadocia, in Pontus, and Asia."

We shall not follow the subject of the Memoir into his political career, nor speak of his political writings, nor consider his political speeches. The time at length arrived, when the party which he had long advocated came into power; then he looked for his reward for having fought the good fight, and anticipated an increase of happiness, according to his frequent declaration—"I am happier for every new guinea which I gain." For his services, he was rewarded with the living of Foston-le-Clary, afterwards exchanged for Combe Florey, near Taunton—then appointed to the Prebendal stall of Bristol; and at length, through the influence of Lord Grey, made resi-

duary Canon of St. Paul's Cathedral. He was not, however, satisfied with these preferments, and aimed at a bishopric. His biographer thus speaks of it:—"I know that he felt deeply, to the hour of his death, that those by whose side he had fought for fifty years so bravely and honestly in their adversity, and with the most unblemished reputation as a clergyman, should in their prosperity, never have offered a bishopric, that which they were bestowing on many, only known at that time, according to public report, for their mediocrity, or unpopularity."

Swift (for we are compelled, in spite of ourselves, to turn continually from the Canon of St. Paul's to the Dean of St. Patrick's,) in like manner, sought and expected an Episcopate in England—"but," says his biographer, "archbishop Sharpe having represented him to her Majesty as a man whose Christianity was very questionable, and being supported in this by a very great lady, it was given to another." Such, it seems, was the reason why the honour was not bestowed on the other expectant. His warmest political friends thought it would be carrying the jest too far, to make Sydney Smith a bishop. He defends himself against the charges, by the following letter to Lord Russell: "I defy — to quote one single passage of my writing, contrary to the doctrines of the Church. I defy him to mention a single action of my life which he can call immoral. The only thing he could charge me with, would be high spirits and much innocent nonsense. I am distinguished as a preacher, and sedulous as a parochial clergyman. His real charge against me is, that I am a high-spirited, honest, uncompromising man, whom he and all the bench of bishops could not turn upon vital questions; this is the reason why, as far as depends upon others, I am not a bishop."

Resigning himself to his fate, and professing to "have lost all wish to become a bishop," he confined himself to St. Paul's, where he was required to "do duty" for three months in the year; and where he preached some excellent sermons, the most of which, it appears, were not of his own composition. For one that was much admired, he was indebted to our country, as he tells us in a letter to Lady Grey:—"I think Channing an admirable writer. Yet admirable as his sermon on

war is, I have the vanity to think my own equally good; and you will be the more inclined to agree with me in this comparison, when I tell you that I preached in St. Paul's the identical sermon which Lord Grey so much admired. I thought I could not write anything half so good; so I preached Channing."

It is wonderful that he should have condescended to own that any good could proceed from us, and to acknowledge his obligations. For, as a country, we have been honoured by incurring the severest vituperation of one who loaded with calumny some of the best men and women that ever lived. It was Sydney Smith that said, "Literature the Americans have none—no native literature, we mean; it is all imported. They had a Franklin, indeed; and may afford to live for half a century on his fame. There is, or was, a Mr. Dwight, who wrote some poems, and his baptismal name was Timothy. There is also a small account of Virginia by Jefferson, and an Epic by Joel Barlow; and some pieces of pleasantry by Mr. Irving. But why should the Americans write books, when a six weeks' passage brings them in their own tongue, our sense, science and genius, in bales and hogsheads. They have made no approaches to the heroic, either in their morality or their character. Since the period of their separation from us, a far greater proportion of their statesmen, artists, and political writers have been foreigners, than ever occurred before in the history of any civilized and educated people. During the years of their independence, they have done absolutely nothing for the sciences, for the arts, for literature, or even for the statesman-like studies of politics, or political economy. In the four quarters of the globe, who reads an American book?" At a later period, he says: "There appears not at this moment in America one man of any considerable talents." Afterwards he adds, "Mrs. Trollope's picture of American manners is excellent—why should they not be ridiculed?" This is but a small specimen of his obloquy and abuse.

His petition to the American Congress respecting the repudiation of some of the States, and the letters that followed, are well known. He had invested money in the Pennsylvania State funds; and because the interest was not regularly paid,

he embraced the opportunity of publishing his disappointment and spite; of declaring—"I meddle in these matters, because I hate fraud, pity the misery it has occasioned, and mourn over the hatred it has excited against free institutions." Such opprobrious epithets as he was accustomed to use to others, he pours out most copiously against the inhabitants of Pennsylvania; he abuses them for their dishonesty, calls them "men who prefer any load of infamy, however great, to any pressure of taxation, however light," and tells them that their "government is unstable, in the very foundations of social life."

From the "Letters and Correspondence," we see in him no little excitement on the subject. Writing to his friends, he says:—"I hope you were pleased with my attack upon the Americans—they really deserved it—it is a monstrous and increasing *villany*. Fancy a meeting in Philadelphia, convened by public advertisement, where they came to resolutions that the debt was too great for the people to pay; that the people could not pay it, and ought not to pay it. It is a fortunate thing for the world that the separate American States are making such progress in dishonesty, and are absolutely refusing to pay their debts. They would soon have been too formidable if they had added the moral of good faith to their physical strength. I verily believe they are cracking; for a nation cannot exist in such a state of morals. There is nothing in the crimes of kings worse than this villany of democracy." After all this, there was no occasion for him to say—"I envy Lord Byron for his skill in satirical nomenclature."

In following Sydney Smith through the evening of his days, we hoped that we should at last see some of that seriousness and sobriety which become the man of years, the professed Christian, and the minister of religion. But he had such a dread of gravity, and such a horror of solemnity, that he would not yield, but fought against them most vigorously, even when life was closing and the grave opening. At the age of seventy-two he writes to a friend—"I am learning to sing some of Moore's songs, which I think I shall do to great perfection"—no doubt some of those convivial songs which would lead him to drive away melancholy. It was probably suggested by a visit which the poet had made to him a few

weeks before; for he says—"We have had little Tommy Moore here, who seemed to be very much pleased with his visit; he talked and sung in his peculiar fashion, like any nightingale of the 'Flower Valley,' to the delight of us all." After the death of Sydney Smith, this poet was applied to, to write the memoir of his friend, but his serious and sudden illness prevented. It was truly unfortunate that the design was not executed. It would have been peculiarly fitting for two such intimate friends to be thus associated; for the minister of religion, to whom Byron dedicated some stanzas in his "Don Juan," to have his life written by Thomas Moore.

But little is said of his death, nothing of his feelings, in view of the past, or hope of the future. It was to be expected that these things would be hurried over. One last saying, however, is striking, uttered when he must have known that there was no hope of recovery—"I feel so weak, both in body and mind, that I verily believe that if the knife were put into my hand, I should not have strength or energy enough to stick it into a Dissenter." There is "a ruling passion strong in death;" there are exceptions to the remark of Young,

"Men may live fools; but fools they cannot die."

Though Sydney Smith was through life an enemy of evangelical religion, and a very unsuitable man for the clerical profession, there is much to admire in the manly perseverance with which he laboured in an obscure parish, for the improvement of the people according to his own standard of religion. He was a disappointed man, more to be pitied than either admired or imitated.

ART. III.—*Principles of the Philosophy of Language.*

THE application of inductive analysis to language has been too long and too greatly neglected. That the phenomena of human speech are among the most interesting which experience offers for investigation, is shown sufficiently by the unwearied attempts of philologists, puerile and unphilosophic though they be. Such efforts are of very old date. At no period in man's progress could the inquiry perhaps be void of interest:—Whence originated the representative or suggestive power of the terms which he employs? That a science which has to be reduced to practice should stretch its roots far back into antiquity, is not always an advantage. Practical rules which become current and gain authority, retard the improvement of principles. The philosophy of language has, from obvious circumstances, rested longer under this retarding influence than any other branch of inquiry.

That instances or phenomena are to be classified, so that inductions be founded on analogies pervading groups, is the indispensable requisite of all sound inductive reasoning. An exposition serving for one instance, must serve for all analogous instances. It is on the more general forms of phenomena, and not on the special or less general, that trustworthy expositions are to be founded. In classifications, moreover, groups of equal rank ought to be distinguished by differences of equal value; and every real analogy should have its due weight in determining the character and the boundaries of the groups which are formed.

These are simple and obvious rules; but scarcely a chapter of a book on philology or grammar can be found in which they are philosophically carried out. Grave and important discussions are, to some extent, influenced by this neglect. Take for instance, the meaning assigned to *αἰών* when it is represented as a compound of *αἰ* and the participle *ών*. This, it has been presumed, renders it equivalent to the English word *eternity*. The exposition, however, is founded on the special

nominative form of the participle, neglecting the more general form containing τ , as in *δύτα*; and is, moreover, inconsistent with other analogies. So we have Niebuhr assigning *provincia* as a form of *proventus*; and Smith coinciding with G. C. Lewis, in deducing it from *providentia*. Jachel strives to connect the language of the ancient Roman tribes with that of Germany, through such fancies as that *magistratus* is the combination *machste rath*. Here the analogy to supinal substantives, such as *ploratus*, *fletus*, *tractus*, &c., is overlooked. So when βασιλεύς is made a compound of βᾶσις and λεώς or λαός, its relationship to ἄλλεός, φονεύς, &c., is neglected. Similar instances might be multiplied to any extent. It may be apprehended that a great deal of this puerile and arbitrary dependence on similarities in sound is due to the evil example and authority of Aristotle, or of works ascribed to him. Curious instances occur in the treatise *Περὶ τοῦ κόσμου*.

Whether we deal with the formation of words, or with the character and effect of the variations which they undergo, our object ought to be to reach the great forms of mental conception, under the influence of which these constituents of speech originated. These ideas when unfolded ought to be the foundation of all practice in using or imparting a language; and it is through analogies or dissimilarities in this respect, that the relationships of tongues are best traced or established. Vocal similarities, or resemblances among words, serve to indicate only subordinate relations between subdivisions of great forms of language. We become conscious in seeking to acquire a new tongue, that while the memory is more easily charged with the words, the great struggle in the mind is to modify its conceptions of things and their relations into the new forms required by the idioms of the language. Their older forms of thought may be retained by a people, which has admitted of an entire change in the words of its language; and the relationships of languages, when correctly treated, will afford sure indications of relationships of races, inasmuch as these underlying and permanent ideas may bring into connection dialects which show outwardly, or in their vocal elements, no sign of affinity.

Presuming that language is the produce of the human facul-

ties, or assuming the parallel case, that men without a language had to form one for themselves, it is obvious that there are but two sources from which sounds could be derived capable of being immediately intelligible. One would be found in the natural sounds indicating our emotions or efforts, and the other would be by imitation of the sounds produced by external objects. Nothing merely conventional could be admitted; for means of communication must precede all conventions. Words or their elements derived from the natural signs of emotion may be expected to bear, in all languages, a great degree of resemblance. Those derived from the other source would necessarily vary in different regions, and under the different relations men might bear to external objects. The modes of working up these elements into expanded forms of speech might establish still more notable discrepancies. —

It seems an indispensable condition of the expansion of a language, that it take place by combination of elements. The written language of China is an instance of this. The principles on which combination takes place cannot differ absolutely in different languages. They can only differ relatively in the extent to which they are separately carried out. The elements may, when included in combinations, retain conspicuously their original character, or they may be greatly modified by contraction. There may be more or less of generalizing power in the minds of those who form these combinations. When the habits of generalization are weak, combinations will be to a greater extent fortuitous, or will resemble clauses of sentences descriptive of objects. This will constitute the agglutinate form of speech, the elements generally remaining recognizable. Where habits of generalization have become strong, elements expressive of notions of a high degree of generality, serve as the constituents of a multitude of terms; and, by extensive modification and union, form the terminations pervading extensive classes of words. This circumstance characterizes the more perfect forms of the Japetian or Indo-Germanic group of tongues.

We may assume that modifications of the idea expressed by a term could be indicated only by attaching to the term some element significant of the additional conception which gives

form to the modification in thought. This seems a necessity in regard to language. It is difficult to reconcile with this, that process of internal development by which terms are formed in the Semitic tongues. A normal instance of this is found in the introduction of *ʾ* as the consonantal variation forming the Hiphil or causal conjugation of the verb. We cannot readily conceive how the mark of causality, which must originally have been an independent vocal mark of the idea, could have had its place anywhere else than either preceding or following the representative of the idea which it modified. Nor could *ʾ* represent any sound, which, by the nature of our organs, would tend to displace others, and attain a place *among* them, rather than *beside* them. This process of internal development might incline us to the supposition, that the roots were a sort of binary compounds, of which the constituent elements were at one time separately significant, and that the representative of the modifying idea had slipped in between them, before they ultimately coalesced into one word.

The monosyllabic or biliteral roots of the Japetic family of languages may be considered as consisting normally of two consonants with a pause between them, represented by a short vowel. From this circumstance follows the important rule, that radical syllables are short as to their quantity. The corollary from this, that combination is the sole cause of lengthened syllables, whether these include combinations of vowels or combinations of consonants, is of great value in analyzing the vocables of the classical languages.

Combinations of consonants which may be entitled "consonant diphthongs" afford instances seeming, at first sight, to conform to the principle of "internal development" already noticed. They are, however, to be explained in a different mode. The consonants concerned in forming these diphthongs are those, the utterance of which suits our organs better in one order than in the opposite order. We have, for example, *frangere* for *fragnere*, *cumbere* for *cubnere*, *muliebre* for *mulierbe*. Thus we may trace *provincia* to *vic* of *vicis* or *invicem*, which would give the word its natural signification of a *deputyship*. It then, as is common in similar cases, came to mean the region over which a deputed authority was exercised. It is clear that

there must be a natural necessity for such changes among letters, and that the practice will extend no further than the natural necessity leads. Nothing of the kind could ever happen through any conventional arrangement among those who used a language in its formative condition. Thus in combining the word representing an action with the pronoun or mark of personality, to constitute the inflections of a verb, the process of combination could consist of nothing else than the juxtaposition of the two vocal elements. If in special instances there were consonants thus brought together, of which the sounds in their natural positions presented a difficulty in enunciation, provision would, in these instances, be made for this difficulty by such natural changes of position as have been mentioned above. It is a universal rule that consonants influence consonants, so that by such natural proceedings they change places, combine, or disappear. But on no principle can the idea be sustained, that men agreed universally, or were led by any circumstance, when nature did not require it, to introduce sounds arbitrarily among the combining elements. Hence *o*, *e*, and *i* cannot have, in Greek and Latin inflections, the office which some grammars assign to them, of being merely a sort of vocal copulæ between the elements. What might be necessary between *carp* and *mus*, would not be required between *al* and *mus*, or between *reg* and *mus*, since we have the forms *culmen*, *tegmen*, &c. Had the conventional purpose of forming this connection been contemplated, therefore, it would have been found that no such element was necessary in these instances. When the verbal root ended in a vowel, that radical vowel sound would have been deemed sufficient for the purpose of connection. In instances of the latter class, however, we find that such is not the fact, for the radical vowel is invariably lengthened, as in *pārāmus*, *pārēmus*, &c. We thus learn that those which have been reckoned to be connecting vowels merely, are essential constituents of the pronominal affixes; or that these elements, in such instances, began with vowels, and had the forms *imus*, *itis*, &c.

The period in its history at which writing has been applied to a language, has a very great influence on the form which it subsequently retains. Processes of combination or contraction are thereafter retarded or prevented. In Latin in its

best days, there was a tendency towards the forms found in the French of the present era, as when *carpsērunt* became *carpsēre*, and *audivisse* became *audisse*. It was only when set free from the influence of letters by becoming the neglected *patois* of Gaul, that the statelier Latin yielded to this tendency, and as French subsequently offered its modified forms again to the retarding or conservative effect of letters. The process which dismissed the sound of *nt* in *carpsērunt*, also obliterated the sound of *er* in *carpsit* for *carp-ser-it*, and gave origin to such forms as *carpsisti*, *carpsisse*, &c. This last is composed of the elements *cap-r-ver-ere*. Such is the fashion the word would have had, when, after slight modifications of the original elements, the process of combination was about to commence. Had the root been of a different form, as *nē*, the corresponding inflection would have been *nē-ver-ere* becoming *nēvisse*.

Tracing the original forms of such variations leads to the conclusion, that analogous modifications of dissimilar ideas are expressed by attaching to dissimilar roots the same super-induced elements. We see thus that in the classical tongues there can be but one mode of declension in regard to substantives, and one mode of conjugation in regard to verbs. It may happen that an element may be of a composite form, so that in the use of it, one portion may gain supremacy over another. These portions may also differ in different instances. Thus the composite indication of plurality which we find in *children*, or in the Dutch *kinderen*, may be represented by its terminating portion alone, as in *oxen*, in many such forms in the Teutonic languages, in the *um* of the Latin plural genitive, or the *un* of the plural third persons of verbs. Again, *er* the initiatory portion of *eren*, is the common plural termination in the Scandinavian dialects, and appears in the *es* of *boxes*, &c., as well as in the common forms of plurals in the classical tongues. Most modifications of the sort which produce varieties of inflection, arise from the circumstance that consonants combine with consonants, and vowels with vowels. The most normal forms will be found when the elements are such as to bring a consonant and a vowel into juxtaposition, so that no combination takes place. In treating such subjects in

grammar, therefore, sound philosophy would require that the best normal example be exhibited as the paradigm; and that the rules, under which variations, through combining of letters, take place, be expounded. By such a mode of proceeding mysteries are made to vanish, great laws of thought become the foundation of our proceedings, and the eminent advantage is gained, that the learner is habituated to precise logical analysis and correct classification.

Analysis correctly applied to the forms of human speech brings to light certain great laws, some of which are common to all of them, and others are peculiar to specific families of tongues.

Of those laws which are universal, that which offers itself most conspicuously, is the mental principle creating the arrangements called concords. To secure attention, or produce effect by means of speech, we *reiterate* expressions or signs of thought. When ideas are only accessory to others of a more prominent character, it may be requisite to repeat often the signs of such ideas, in order that the mind may note them with sufficient attention. These accessory ideas are expressed by terminations indicating varied relations among things, or between things and actions or qualities. The repetition of these signs of relation is the origin of grammatical concords. That such a sign be attached to a single term in a series, is all that is indispensably necessary. But precision or distinctness is sought by attaching them to several. Few instances of this practice occur in the English of our day. The indication of plurality is in fact the only one that is repeated, and this only in pronouns and a few verbs. We have for instance, *those books*, and *we are*, with a few such like, in which a plural character appears in both words. The practice prevails extensively in the classical tongues, signs of plurality being found in substantives, adjectives, and verbs. Signs of personality and of gender are similarly distributed to different orders of words. In the Semitic tongues the verb assumes a distinction of gender. There are evidently no marks of relation which may not be subjected to the same law. American dialects have extended it to the indication of objectiveness, having affixed the sign of it not only to the real or substantive object, as in the English *who-m*, or Latin *qu-em*, but having attached it to the verb also,

so as to give it an accusative form, in correspondence with that of the substantive. In the widely extended Zambezan language of Africa the practice of repetition impresses a very remarkable character on the constituents of a clause. The subject word is signalized by a sort of defining or individualizing prefix. This prefix influences verbs, adjectives, and words expressive of relation, so that their initial syllable assumes a conformity with that of the subject word so modified. There is thus produced an extensive, soft, and monotonous system of alliterations, which has given to these dialects the designation of Alliterative. Inasmuch as the prefix changes its form in correspondence with the initial sounds of different subject words, and these variations are copied in the other terms, it will happen that the substitution of a different subject word only, may alter the commencing syllables of every other in a clause. Verbal inflections of common forms are in these dialects peculiarly numerous. By this practice of bringing these inflections under the influence of the subject word, they are augmented in number about sevenfold. Hence the whole variations of a verb constitute a system of inflection extensive, complex, and regular to an unexampled degree.

It is not to be inferred from incidents of this kind that any deep far-reaching philosophy has presided over the formation of such languages, or that when possessed by a barbarous people, these tongues indicate their descent and subsequent degradation from a nation of higher civilization or intellectual rank. The principle involved in their arrangement is among the simplest and most easily applied of all ever put to use by man in speech. Repetition is a provision to meet dulness of apprehension. The extent to which it is carried will correspond to the apathy of mind which it has to overcome. To be systematic is rendered necessary by the same feeble character of understanding. High intelligence disdains such artifices; and the language of enlightened men tends to efface them as cumbrous and unnecessary. It is not complexity or systematic exuberance of inflection, but it is copiousness and variety of independent terms, expressive of multiplied ideas, which characterizes the speech of an enlightened and intelligent people.

Such has been the process followed in respect to those modern languages of ours, which Latham has termed *Aptotic*, from their having dismissed the case inflections of the Latin or older Teutonic, from which they have sprung. In respect, however, to the principle above enunciated, there has been a sort of oscillation, in correspondence with the intellectual condition of the nations using them. In the French language, for example, in substituting for the Latin expression *reginæ dedit*, the expression *il donna à la reine*, the latter must have had the form *ille donavit ad illam reginam*, indicating by its multiplied repetitions of idea, the apathetic mind of the barbarian.

To ascertain the meaning and influence of all such signs of relation is the proper foundation for syntax. To point them out as ascertained by analysis, to define their effect, and to require that they be used with a strict regard to congruity, is equivalent to the whole system of syntactic rules. This is much simpler, as well as more satisfactory, than those modes of proceeding which assign to certain words the power of *governing* other words. Definitions of forms express at once the rules and the reasons of the rules.

The laws of thought peculiar to specific forms of language, will offer us contrasts and not analogies. These laws present two points of peculiar interest, which serve readily to classify languages in virtue of contrasts easily ascertained. These two points are gender and tense.

Systems of gender as found in languages are based on two very different ideas. Gender *may* be the distinction of sex. This is its constituent idea in the Semitic tongues. All things whatsoever, expressed by names, have been considered as being subjects capable of action. As thus personified they fall, on account of analogies of character, into the two divisions of males and females. The form of gender in these languages is therefore *sexual*. Again: all things may be considered as composing the two classes of—1st. Living, subjective, and capable of action; 2d. Dead, objective, and incapable of action. This appears to have been the original constituent idea of gender in the Japetic tongues. There the distinction is *logical*, and may be expressed by the terms *personal*, and *non-personal*

or *neuter*. This explains the reason why in such languages words of the personal class have both a nominative and an accusative, as *scrobs* and *scrobem*, while the neuter having been conceived incapable of being subjects, though in certain cases necessarily used as such, have no inflections of this kind, but in these two cases present the radical theme; as in *vās, rete,* &c. It has happened that in many examples of languages of this order, the personal class of words has been divided sexually. In regard to many of them an affix, marking the sex as feminine, has been attached to the theme in the form of *a* normally, but sometimes *e* or *í*, as in the themes *fama, fide, nutric*. A portion of the class bears on it the marks of personality alone, as in *avis avem, or ales alitem*. The whole of these have their sexual distinction of gender determined only by analogies, as in the Semitic tongues. These circumstances, along with the nature of the feminine affix, seem to indicate that the sexual distinction has been borrowed by the Japetian from the Semitic family of languages. That in French, and some other such tongues, the genders should appear to have relapsed exclusively to the sexual form, is due to merely vocal changes, and the consequent assimilation of forms. This was previously occurring in Latin, when *illus* became *ille*, and *illum* became *illud*, both in French assuming the form *le*. The mode of determining the genders of substantives in those derived languages thus becomes easy; the general rule being, that Latin feminines remain feminine, and all others are masculine. In applying the rule, however, care must be taken that corresponding terms are selected for comparison; thus *fontaine* does not correspond to *fons* in Latin, but to *fontana*, and so forth. Considerable allowance must also be made for the perversities of grammarians, who have been led astray by similarities of shape and sound.

Trusting to the principle already announced, that ultimate relationships among languages are to be traced by means of the great laws of thought engrossed in their variations we affiliate the Hottentot or Gaorepine tongues of South Africa, the Galla of the interior, and the Abyssinian dialects on the mountains with the old Coptic of the valley of the Nile. The form of gender is sexual and conspicuously so. In this respect

the links at the extremities of the chain offer the closest analogies. The affixes for distinction of gender in the Coptic are *f* masc. *s* fem. In the Namageva they are *ô* masc. and *s* fem. The analogies are less close in those which are geographically intermediate. Two causes of very different character have acted to preserve this similarity; there being in the one case the treasuring up of an early normal form in the unread hieroglyphics of deserted temples, and in the other, the solitary wanderings of small hordes, throughout the deserts of South Africa. Closeness of resemblance will not always prove a sure guide as to the era at which dialects became disconnected from the main stem.

In the classical tongues *s* is the mark of personality. The use of it in Latin is confined to the nominative cases singular and plural. This, to a great extent, is the case in Greek also as far as respects the singular number. An exception to this as a general rule, occurs in that language by the extension of this mark of personality over all the cases of feminine participles. Taking *λεγοντ* as the theme, the feminine nominative would normally be *λεγοντσα*, now found in the form *λέγουσα* retained as a theme universally, so that the *σ* appears in all the cases. The participles of a corresponding order in Latin do not admit the sexual distinction at all. But in the perfect passive participles we have a feminine form constituted by means of the characteristic affix *a*. Inasmuch, however, as the idea of *female* includes that of personality or subjectiveness, the *s*, which is the characteristic sign of this idea, has been thought to be unnecessary, and is therefore absent from all such adjectives, and from substantives of an analogous form. In the perfect active participles in Greek, the *σ* has disappeared in form, but remains present in effect, *τετυπχοτσα* in the modified form *τετυφυῖα*, remaining permanently in all the feminine cases. An extensive class of Greek substantives such as *φιλία*, *γῆ*, &c., follows the analogy of similar words in Latin, by making the feminine *a* to include the idea of personality. The effect of *s*, the personal mark, having been present in Latin plural nominatives appears in the lengthening of the preceding vowel, as in *corbēs*, or in the older form *corbeis*.

The Greek in this, as in many other instances, is less observant of normal forms. A similar influence of the *s* in both languages accounts for the lengthened vowels in singular nominatives.

In these nominatives the influence of the *s* has given occasion to great variations of form. This case is, therefore, less than any other, suited for being the representative of the substantive. The empirical rules which make gender to be dependent on the form of this case, ought to be got rid of. The ideas on this subject offered above, afford the true solution of such difficulties. All things properly objective, i. e., such as are prepared for use, or are analogous to instruments requiring an agent, are neuter. The remainder become separable into two classes; one of which contains the feminine mark in the forms *a*, *e*, or *i*. The others are chiefly masculines. The feminines are separated from the mass of them, by analogies of character. No great trouble will be found in developing these positions correctly. We thus get insight also into the thoughts, practices, and arts, of early life. We learn that *siler*, *cicer*, *ador*, &c., being neuters, were put to use. This is the reason that *selino*, *aconito*, *ligno*, &c., are neuter, while *pino*, *trunco*, &c., are not neuter, and bear the personal *s* in the nominative. It may be conjectured that instruments which have a personal form, as *gladius*, *malleus*, *fibula*, &c., were introduced at a later date, or were first seen rendered effective by foreign hands, and so fell into the class of agents; while those of a more normal form, as *tribulo*, *poculo*, *rutro*, &c., having in the nominative the terminating accent *m*, are probably of older date, or were invented in the form they bore, by those who contrived names for them according to modes indicative of instrumentality.

Tense is only in a partial sense the distinction of time. Two ideas which are perfectly distinct have become, to a detrimental degree, jumbled together in our common dealings with this subject. One of these ideas is *time*, simply in its three modes of *present*, *future*, and *past*. As to this idea, no other than these three conditions can be admitted. All presumptions of subdivision, modification, or complexity in regard to them, or to their qualifications of action, are to be dismissed as

foreign to the simplicity of the idea. Action or condition, however, as expressed by the theme of a verb, is susceptible of modifications almost indefinite in number, and conceivable altogether independently of these modes of time, or as capable of occurring in any one of them. Of these modifications of action or condition, that which especially requires attention, is the difference between the continuous, prolonged, or repeated, and the completed or terminated. Both of these may occur under all the three modes of time. The ideas involved in these two modes of action or condition are therefore totally independent of the modes of time, as present, future and past. Without a clear understanding of this, no accurate conception can exist of the structure of the verb in the Japetian tongues.

There is a similarity in the ideas expressed by the terms "past as to time," and "finished as to continuance." But these ideas are not the same. An action past as to time admits of no other mode of time; but an action terminated in regard to continuance, admits of all the three modes of time. The terminating may be *at this time*, *after this time*, or *before this time*. Throughout the Japetian family of languages, action terminated is indicated by the introduction of a special element, which forms with the root of the verb, a new theme, common to a set of tenses formed by incorporating with this theme marks of the modes of time. This series is, as to some paradigms, complete in the Greek language. The tenses are there known by the fantastic names of *perfect*, *paulo post futurum*, and *pluperfect*. Had common sense had any sway in these matters, they would have been entitled *present perfect*, *future perfect*, and *past perfect*. The element employed for this purpose in Latin has been of the form *sver*, the *sv* having been represented by a single consonant, probably the digamma, and now modified into *s* in *carpser*, *u* in *coluer*, and *v* in *poliver*. The Latin is defective as to the future time of this order of tenses. In the other series of tenses, in which this element *sver* does not appear, the three modes of time are conspicuous. In the Indicative mode, the future time is marked by *ēb*, sometimes shortened into *ē*. The difficulty which the mind would have in expressing the idea of futurity as a constituent of action, appears in the very varied signification of the elements

which in different languages have been employed for forming such inflections, and the curious artifices by which they have been rendered suitable for the purpose. Inasmuch as the affix for the past time form, in the class of tenses now under consideration, is *ēba*, of which the *a* is the specific mark of past time elsewhere, the signification of *ēb* must have been such as could, without inconsistency, appear in both times. It may be conjectured that in the *ē* there is included a formative element of very extensive use in the language, of which the signification is variously, *do*, *make*, or *become*, and that the *b* is analogous to *υ* in the Greek terminations *υμ* and *εα*, and may indicate prolongation or continuance. This suits the signification of *carpebat*, *monebat*, &c. That the simpler form *monebit* should have its characteristic meaning, would require an effort of the mind, not without example in other cases, in virtue of which a portion of a complex idea is thrown into obscurity or dismissed. That which needs to be eliminated in this instance is the idea of *commencement* to the continuance. Thus the idea of futurity becomes evolved from that of prolongation of action or condition. There appears to be a similar relation between *ε* and *εα* of the Greek futures and aorists, the elements in both tongues being probably of the same origin.

This distinction between action continuing and action completed, as the origin of two series of verbal inflections, seems inherent in all the Japetian tongues, and has adhered steadfastly to them through all their variations. To its results there may be advisably given the designation, submode—the one series with its three times constituting the Imperfect submode, and the other the Perfect submode. *Have*, or an analogous word, corresponds in the modern languages of Europe, to *ver* in Latin. Instances similar to those more modern idioms were however not altogether unknown in that language in its classical form.

The influence which the meaning of the root of a verb, in itself, may have over these variations, is of great interest and importance. The distinction intended to be represented by these two submodes, may be found inherent in these roots, so as to separate them into two corresponding divisions. Some

actions are in their nature terminated, abrupt, and incapable of prolongation, as *knock, leap, throw, &c.* Others must occupy continuous time, as *sing, trust, run, &c.* Among the latter will be verbs indicating emotion, condition, and change of condition. In regard to the former class, or those which do not admit of prolongation, an idea may be introduced somewhat analogous, which is the notion of *repetition*. It thus must necessarily occur, that many expressions become synonymous, so that portions of one series disappear, as being replaced and excluded by portions of another series; while it may also have happened that some which might have been formed would be found to be superfluous, and therefore never appeared in use.

In the classical tongues, three elements are conspicuous for the effect they have had in originating such forms. One of these is *n*, or *ν*, which appears to indicate *continuance*. It may form a complete conjugation, as we have from the themes *jung, cing*, and a few others; or, from portions of such conjugations being found to be superfluous, it may appear only in the Imperfect submodes, as in *lin, age, &c.*, and *cern*, from the roots *li* or *le*, and *cre* or *cere*; and so in others. Another element used with a similar effect, is *t* or *τ*. This occurs in a considerable number of Greek verbs, forming themes for the Imperfect submodes alone, as in *τυπτ, &c.* It is probably the origin of prolonged vowels in some Latin roots, as *scrib, rēp, &c.* In that tongue it forms, with the addition of *a*, a set of conjugational forms, indicating generally repetition of action, such as come from the themes *tracta, agita*, and such like. One or other of these two elements probably gave origin to the numerous instances of prolonged syllables which occur in Imperfect submodes in Greek, such as *στέλλω, πειθω, &c.* In this language it not unfrequently happens that both the radical and the prolonged forms of the past time remain in use, the more radical one getting the title of second aorist.

The third of these elements is compound, appearing under the form *sc*. This seems to have the sense of *becoming*, or *growing*. It occurs in both classical tongues. The sense includes in it necessarily the idea of *continuity*, or is opposed to that of *completion*. It is therefore excluded from tenses of the Perfect submode.

We see, therefore, that with the exception of *t*, when it assumes the form *ita*, these three elements are more appropriate to forms of the Imperfect submode, than to those of the other: *n* is the only one of them which we find with certainty extending over both submodes; and this will happen only when the verbal action is such, that the idea of prolongation is implied in it.

An easy and obvious development of these considerations accounts for the anomalies of classical conjugations; so as to substitute order for confusion, in respect to such instances as *cerno*, *posco*, *λαμβάνω*, *ὄννησκω*, &c.

Traces of formations similar to some of those now noticed are found in the Teutonic branches of the Japetian language. We have instances in our own. *Bring* and *think* contain the element *n*, which is not found in the past time forms. The general occurrence of diphthongs and longer or more open vowels in the present time forms of our Saxon verbs, shows the influence of a similar source of modification to that exhibited by *βαλλω*, *φαίνω*, *tollo*, *fido*, &c., in the classical languages. These effects are to be carefully distinguished from those ascribed to "internal developments" in the Semitic tongues.

If we examine the nature and relations of those verbal inflections which in tongues of the Semitic type have been denominated tenses, we shall find little or no analogy to the arrangements described above. The two forms known under this title have somewhat of the character of the Japetian submodes, inasmuch as their signification in no way involves the time-point of an action. They do not, however, as the others do, contain a reference to the character of the action in respect to its duration. We must, in considering them, dismiss the presumption that either can arbitrarily be changed in signification into the other, by the use of the connective conjunction. This is inconsistent with intelligibility in speech. The necessity of introducing such an idea to explain presumed anomalies, shows that there is in this inflection no reference to the modes of time in their relation to the narrator. The relation is evidently that of action to action, in respect of *order* or *succession*. The first action of a series, considered as existent simply, is announced by the radical form called the *perfect*. Other actions

of the same series are announced by the derivative form called the *future*, as being *subsequent* to the commencing one. The connective particle has, from its nature, an analogous signification; or *sequence* may have been the original idea whence its connective force arose. Thus, when prefixed to a *future* form, it reinforces the idea of the sequence of an action depending for its time-point on the initial one of the series, being an instance of the common principle of the repetition of signs. When attached to a *perfect* form, it may introduce the first of a new series, as the sequence of something in a series previously commenced, the time-point being determined by other words. It is easy to see how the notion of futurity simply might arise out of the idea of succession thus expressed by the form called the *future*. Attention to the relation of these two forms in the Hebrew, will determine more accurately the commencement and termination of narratives in the Old Testament.

All circumstances show that the Semitic form of speech is that of a people of high poetic and spiritual intelligence, while the Japetian is characterized by a more exact and logical character of mind. One result of this is the absence, in the older Hebrew, of the logical copula of an argumentative or descriptive clause. This is generally known in the Japetian tongues by the designation of the substantive verb. That which has been presumed to correspond to this verb, has in Hebrew the form הָיָה. Attention to its effect in a clause will show, that it indicates a change of circumstances in regard to some preceding condition. Thus it is fairly enough represented by the terms "came to pass;" and is correctly rendered in the clause, "man *has become* as one of us." We ought therefore to have the renderings, "Now the serpent *became* more cunning than any beast of the field, &c." And after the magnificent announcement, "In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth,"—which means that there was a material system created and existing, then follows the commencement of a different narrative as a sequel to this, in the words, "and the earth *became* without form, and void." The introduction of the substantive verb into language, as in the expression, "darkness *was* upon the face of the deep"—in which the Hebrew had to be satisfied with the mere juxtaposition of sub-

ject and attribute, without any copula, is perhaps the highest effort of logical generalization expressed in the elements of speech.

The great ideas by which the Semitic and Japetian tongues are distinguished, fit them for being a sort of poles, in regard to glossology, to which others may be referred. In respect to voices and conjugations, the mental efforts embodied in all languages appear to be nearly the same. In tongues of very barbarous people they are abundant and complex, conformably to principles already illustrated.

The considerations presented in the preceding pages are offered with something of a conviction that advantage may perhaps be derived from them, in disentangling the anomalies of language, in rendering classifications of them more precise, and in presenting, by their application to individual instances, a more interesting and instructive exhibition of their principles to those who deal with them as teachers or as pupils.

ART. IV.—*Lectures on Architecture and Painting*, delivered at Edinburgh, in November, 1853. By John Ruskin, Author of the "Stones of Venice," "Seven Lamps of Architecture," "Modern Painters," etc.

It is very curious to observe the difference between the kind of architectural criticism which is now prevalent, and that of the school which it has displaced, the school of which Reynolds and Burke are the chief exponents for Englishmen. It is generally true, including all schools, that in no department of criticism has more useless speculation been indulged, and that no subject has had to bear so much from its friends, as that of architecture. In no part of the whole field of æsthetical criticism, is the mind so exposed to fanciful views, and to be carried away by special theories and particular hypotheses, as in that portion of the field in which the buildings stand. This is principally due to the circumstance that the building itself is a field so large that the attention is the more easily abstracted to particular parts, which are then taken for the whole. The reader has need to be more carefully on his guard

against a too ready acquiescence in the judgment of the last book, or the last article, on architecture, than upon any other of the fine arts. Then, again, this form of art labours under still another disadvantage, inasmuch as its productions are more obviously exposed to general remark, and to the foolish disposition in people to make smart speeches. Anybody in a company of sight-seers is competent to the immediate criticism of a building, when perhaps no one of them would dare to say a word concerning a new painting or a new poem. We venture to affirm, that a collection of the remarks which have been made, upon almost any given building in the world, would transcend, in absurdity and frivolousness, any collection that could be brought from any other quarter, if not from all other quarters put together. And yet the world is at least as full of bad painting and poetry, as of bad architecture. But it seems to be considered a special mark of perspicacity in the individual, if he shall be able to make a certain kind of disparaging remark about a building; a kind of remark which, by common consent, shows most talent when it takes on the specific form of detecting points of resemblance between the building and objects of common life. And it is plain enough that in the various and constantly changing aspects of its parts, a large building offers a fruitful field to a fancy of any ordinary brilliancy, in its search after such resemblances. Having thus made out that the building bears the appearance of a steam-tug, or a man-of-war, a giant or a giraffe, as to its general features, and in the next place, as it respects details, having fastened a cocked hat, or a demijohn upon some of its pinnacles, and traced the pompion or the dutch-oven in some of its interior forms, the building is criticised, and the critic looks for his reward. Nor is this kind of thing, foolish as it is, a matter of no moment to architecture. We have known the praiseworthy labours of excellent builders scandalized in the eyes and to the judgment of many persons, through the opprobrium brought about the building, in consequence of these undeserved speeches.

Works that have cost the degree of thought and toil which a large building costs, should meet with serious and manly treatment, however severely we may feel constrained to pass judgment upon the actual mistakes made in them. Every new

building becomes a proper subject of general criticism ; but it will never operate to the encouragement of architects and workmen, nor help forward the improvement in style, nor mend the manners of the people, to make use of ridicule, where knowledge, good sense, and kindness can alone be of service. One good reason why a thing is wrong in a building, is worth more to the builder and more to society, than all the criticism in the way of wit and ridicule, with which modern books especially, and articles are so painfully loaded. It is, in itself considered, neither for nor against the forms of a building, to find resemblances to other objects in their contours, any more than it is for or against the lines of the human figure to find them copied in jugs and pitchers ; on the contrary, seeing that the lines with which we are most familiar are the most beautiful, it ought decidedly to condemn any building, to have its forms altogether anomalous. The mind that is intent upon so doing, may as readily associate a carrot with the head of the Apollo, as a decanter with the finials of Henry VII. chapel.

A redeeming trait in Mr. Ruskin's writings on architecture is their benevolent consideration for the common workmen as it respects the moral influence of their work upon themselves ; an aspect of the subject, little regarded heretofore, though plainly one of great importance ; and yet at the same time, no writer with whom we are acquainted has suffered himself to injure the noble art he, in many respects, so ably discusses, or to defame the memories and labours of both architect and workman, to anything like the degree in which he indulges, as it respects the flippant and slashing sort of criticism of which we are complaining ; and it is in this respect that the tone of the existing style of architectural criticism generally differs from that previously in vogue. The former school looked with a certain respectful consideration upon the labours of the architect, and found fault, when fault was to be found, in a temperate and reasonable manner. The present school is utterly wanting in reverence, is exceedingly self-conceited, and acts as if its single word were final ; it will dismiss a building by a wave of the hand, or a sneer of the lip. It does not hesitate to condemn in such terms as "vile," "detestable," "wretched," and "base," examples, and even whole classes, of style, which

have been the admiration of men for many generations. Mr. Ruskin has fallen into this vice to a degree so perfectly outrageous, as to make it an unpleasant task to read through his books. As upon his individual judgment he has made out Turner not only to be the greatest painter in the world, but has made the greatest painters of the world to sink into contempt beside him, so, in the same unmeasured and foolishly audacious language, would he convict one, ten, or a hundred generations, of architectural misjudgment, and call up some outlandish stones of Venice, which he will make out to be the unrecognized master-piece of the world's architecture. Mr. Ruskin has spoken expressly, in the epithets just quoted, of the Grecian Ionic capital, and modestly asserts that the entire world, which has given its consent to the beauty contained in the right lines of columnar and horizontal architecture, has been most foolish. Assuredly, the foolishness belongs to the man, who, in the extremity of his fondness for one form of beauty, has ceased to be able to find anything attractive in any other; and who, in the indiscriminateness of his passion against all other forms, can find no terms in which to vent his feelings, except such as wise and dignified men have reserved for the depicting of moral derelictions. Could he but be prevailed with to endeavour to put himself in communion with the fine spirit of decorum and true dignity which the most gifted minds of the world have found in Greek art, it would at least make some improvement in his style of writing, if it did not effect some enfranchisement of his architectural bigotry.

It must, nevertheless, be admitted, that while the modern criticism is disfigured by the flippancy of its style, and its dogmatizing spirit, and suffers greatly in these respects, when compared with the reverential temper and manly simplicity of the elder schools, yet in most of the elements of philosophic criticism, the present school is far in advance of the criticism which it has displaced. These principles, however, and they are simply the principles of the modern æsthetics generally, have not as yet, to our knowledge, been applied by the hand of a master to the total subject of architecture. The modern school has thus far busied itself, frequently *ad nauseam*, in special criticism. It will analyze with painful prolixity, the composi-

tion of a piece of Gothic foliage, while in the meantime the great cathedral becomes lost to the view. So entirely has this microscopic passion got possession of Mr. Ruskin's critical method, to such a degree does it confine his attention to the minute enrichments of buildings, that we have looked in vain through such of his books as have fallen into our hands, for a single account of the general impression made upon his mind, by any one of those continental cathedrals, with the niches and tracery of which he is so familiar. His volumes are illustrated by his own sketches, and these sketches consist almost entirely of dormers, spandrels, portions of window-heads and door-ways, and in the same consists the scope of his criticism. It is not unjust to say that the practical sum of his discussions on the subject of architecture, is fully exhibited in his advice to the citizens of Edinburgh, to build, each man, at least one ornamental window or porch to his house, in order to the ultimate securing of real architecture for the city. It certainly would be unjust to say of such a man as Ruskin, that he is incapable of dealing with the real elements of style, or of the author of "*Modern Painters*," that he abstains from describing buildings for any other than a sufficient reason to his own mind, and therefore it is that we the more wonder, how such a man has come to imagine that in the mere act of delaying upon the particulars of style, he is making out the subject of architecture. His manœuvres strike us as those of a man who of set purpose has shrouded his eyes upon coming up to the exterior of the building, and opening them at the door-way, rushes into the interior, wilfully determined to resist every successive attempt of its actual architecture to secure him, and succeeds in doing so, until at last he fastens with avaricious eagerness upon some far off spot of tracery, and hurries forthwith to take it in pencil—it might as well be at once with a view to calico-work or marginal illuminations. The plain truth is, that this school does make about the same use of the cathedral, as the French carpet-makers are said to make of the kaleidoscope.

The artist that in the midst of the full thunder notes of cathedral art, shall not only be able to give his whole mind to the special fascination of some incidental reverberation from a distant corner, but never be able to do otherwise, must be under

the influence of some false view. When we see in other respects sensible men talking about Gothic cathedrals in terms of the flower-garden, we are perfectly certain that something is wrong in the case. It is not possible for one in a right state of mind, always to look at such things through a pricked paper. But this school always does so listen, always does so speak, and always does so look. They praise the subordinate tones, they never speak of the symphonies, or of the grand organ out of which they come. They tell us how to make a handsome eye, nose, and mouth; they never tell us what to do with them. On the contrary, it is their express theory, that beautiful parts make a beautiful whole; forgetting that there can be no parts in art till we have the whole, and that it is the whole which gives character to the parts. They pour unmeasured ridicule upon the previous criticism for its "senseless talk about proportion and harmony." At least so does the author of the *Edinburgh Lectures*. It is his favourite and oft-repeated maxim, "If you will take care of ornamentation in architecture, style and proportion will take care of themselves;" which is about as sensible a remark, as if one should say, "Give all heed to the mixing of your colours, and the composition will come of its own accord."

The truth is, that ornamentation, such as Mr. Ruskin seems ever to have in view, is the merest adjunct to style. What he means by ornamentation bears about the same relation to essential architecture, as the foreground pebbles and plants of which he discourses in "*Modern Painters*," bear to historical composition. Not even, when we include statuary under that term, is it more than the addition of so much light, as it were, to the existing substrata and its proportions. Statuary, indeed, does for the Grecian building what the same school of art is so preposterously trying to make colour do for the statue; but assuredly, the architecture of the Parthenon is still upon the Acropolis, rather than in the British Museum. Far less, however, incomparably less, is foliage ornament to the Gothic, than sculpture to the Greek. Strip any one of the Norman or Italian Cathedrals of every whit of that which Ruskin means by ornamentation, of that which forms the continual illustrations of his pages, and the tiresome insistency of his observa-

tions, and the essential power of the style would not be appreciably disturbed. It is not fair to say that actually, but it is fair to say that substantially, it would amount to no more than striking out some little leaflets and vine-sprigs, nestling in cusps or twined in arch-heads, which the architect may have struck in by way of play, after his imagination had been aching from the transcendental geometry of adjusting the final lines, and the finished mass and shadow groupings of the great pendentive sweeps. Incidents of this kind, in which the fancy of the builder, or it may be of the workman, has left some unexpected footprint of itself at a given moment, are unquestionably matters of interest: they certainly are no more than a few of the accidents of architecture. Take them as a class, and they do not by any means act the part to the building which Shakspeare makes his waiters' small-talk act for the tragedy. They are not intended as a relief to an intolerable continuance of acting power; they are, at the best, the *tolerabiles ineptiæ* of cathedral art; Ruskin's theory would make the cathedral to consist in them. Consider it but for a moment; here is a man who has passed beneath the shadows of a west front, entered the captivated atmosphere of a heaven-aspiring nave, passed through the successive peals of arch upon arch, and pillar upon pillar of its long drawn aisle, walked across the broad transept, and stopped under the awful span of the choir-arches, apparently as unconcerned as the dog at his side, and at last we find the spirit of his sole admiration spending itself over the exquisite beauty of some clover-leaves or oak-tendrils, spied in a corner, or beneath a bracket-plate, which possibly no eye but his own and that of the man that cut them ever saw. Doubtless, a part of Mr. Ruskin's extravagancies is to be attributed to that common weakness of original minds, the passion for being singular; but the greater part of them, and the characteristic peculiarity of all of them, are due to the false theory which governs his views. It is the theory which looks upon architecture as an imitative art, instead of looking upon it as it is, a mental creation.

The extreme form of this theory is that which attributes the total result, as existing in the cathedral or the temple, to successive improvements upon an actual type, which type consisted at the outset in the forms and arrangements of the huts,

the excavations, and the lodges of wattled saplings, which nomades and troglodytes had adopted as their dwelling-places. Thus, the Rhamesseion is but a Nubian cave, turned inside out, Minerva Parthenon is a marble log-cabin, and York Minster is the final result of a multiplication of sheds and lodges formed of saplings and their interlocked branches. The Triglyph of the Doric, that superbly imagined perpendicular emanation which marries the Pediment through the column to the Stylobate, that wedding-ring, which is the pledge of one of the most perfect instances of the coalescence of ideal beauty with physical strength and utility, to be found in the world of art, is the channeled ends of the roof timbers, the flutings of the columns are canals cut for the rain, and the guttae of the mutule-plates are the drops that staid behind. Possibly, however, the flutings might have been for warriors to rest their spears within, and hence in the later orders it was found convenient to cut them a little deeper, also to place a fillet between them, lest the accidental interchange of spear heads should provoke challenges and lead to duels. Now, in addition to the perfectly incomprehensible childishness of this theory, and the continuance of it, it is directly in the face of facts. We are safe in challenging the production of so much as one instance of an ancient people whose original house-building can be shown to bear an appreciable resemblance to their temple-style. There was, in reality, no more connection between their house-building and their temple-building, or architecture, than there is among us, between the moulding of dough to make bread, and the moulding of the clay to make a statue. We are not aware of one instance in history, of a people's temples being made from the resemblance of their dwellings. No question, the contrary can be found, that is, of nations who copied their houses, to some extent, from their temples. But the previous law of procedure is so universally true, that the contrary process is a sure sign of national decadence and degradation. Thus the Greeks, in the days of their degeneracy, began to transfer certain parts of their sacred architecture to the decorating of their houses; scarcely more, however, at that, than the use of pilasters and blank entablatures. So, too, in the case of the Romans, as decisive a case as could be desired, it was not till

the period at which they made a deity of their emperor that they began to attach columns to their villas. Julius Cæsar was the first man whose house had a pediment, and even he dared not put it on, except by a solemn decree of the senate.

The word *Architecture*, to us necessarily and properly includes all kinds of beautiful buildings, and among these what was to the ancients their temples, is to us but a larger house, fashioned with a view to the accommodation of so many persons for purposes of worship. To the gentile, such an idea, as connected with his temple, was utterly strange, and would have been abhorrent. His temple was in no sense a house, as we take it; certainly not a house for himself, nor as it respects his deity, was it a house in the sense of a sheltering place of abode. It was a religious offering, which being completed, the particular deity for whom it was prepared, was supposed to become inresident within its forms and material. The ancient temple (and the ancient temple is the original source of all architecture) was simply the grandest and most beautiful image which the people were able to build up, as an offering to their gods; had it been possible to erect statues of the same size, it would have amounted to the same thing; as much, and no more, a house in the one case than in the other. Because it so happens that we can take a Grecian fane and turn it into a convenient church edifice, it does not follow that its originators had any thought of providing for the comfort of a congregation, as any part of its purpose or arrangements. They would have been puzzled by the thought. The idea of the church, other than as that of a priesthood, was manifestly an impossible conception to the gentile mind. It is a purely Christian process which has turned the temple into a church. The temple of Theseus could never have become a Christian church, had not the votaries of Theseus first turned it into a basilica, a treasury, a store-house.

The history of architecture everywhere shows that the adoption, on the part of a people, of the spoils of their temple-style for the decoration of their own houses, is among the invariable signs of a national upbreking. The resemblance between house-building and temple-building is therefore rather the very last, than the very first, of national signs; and wherever found,

it is found to be the house which copies from the temple, and not the temple from the house. There can hardly exist a stronger ocular demonstration of the fact, that the old religions were departing, and the old nations breaking up, for the coming in of the true religion, and the universal church, than is furnished by the streets of Pompeii, and the villas of Rome. Assuredly, things have altered since the temple has been converted into the church; but they have not so altered as to leave it, either from the light of Christian history, philosophy, or religion, a good sign for any people, to be found using a secular style of architecture decidedly like that of their churches. To those who may be shocked at the thought of attributing any idea of sacredness to church architecture, we have only to say, that the modern tendency towards the abolition of that idea was begun expressly, and at a well known era, by the Roman Church. The first, and we believe the only historical instance of a church style drawn immediately from secular style, is that of St. Peter's at Rome, which is simply an Italian palace turned into a church. If, then, the only historical instances in which the practical denial of the distinction between sacred and secular architecture has been perpetrated, are those of degenerate heathen, who built their houses after their temples, and ethnicalising Christians, who built their church after the style of their houses, surely no good Protestant ought to be afraid of the distinction of sacredness, as between the house and the church. Certainly, at least, it is not in good taste to break up that distinction. When men will turn churches into dwelling-houses, it must be esteemed a sign that they think too highly of themselves, and too poorly of their religion.

Our definition of architecture, going back to its real origin, is that it is the product, in its peculiar form, of the mind of man acting under the impulse of his religious nature. Man was at the first a "mighty builder," by reason and force of his religious constitution, not through the stimulus of his physical wants. The temple, in some form or another, preceded even the cave and the hut. Every man by nature builds his altar before he builds his house. Architecture is the result of man's innate propensity to build, and to build first and largest for his soul, for his deity; in other words, according to the sense of

inresidence adverted to, to provide a house for his gods. The idea of the palace-temple is contemporaneous with that of hero-worship, and does not alter the terms of the definition. The architecture of the ancients was to them, and remains to us, their temples, and nothing else. Civil, secular, domestic architecture, so called, knows no existence previous to the time of imperial Rome—a people to whom their bridges, aqueducts, and triumphal arches, their circus and their colosseum, were their deities, their religion, and their temples.

In addition to the manifest facts, and the *a priori* unlikelihood of the case, that the temple should have been copied after the dwelling, a very strong presumption against the entire imitative theory is the implied infidelity of it. In this respect the theory in question is but part and parcel of that whole unscriptural view of man, which supposes him to have come from the hands of his Maker in the savage state, and that being cast thus unprepared into the world, he went to burrowing in the ground, and afterwards proceeded to the fashioning of mud-huts, and then began to catch fish, and at last congregated, and formed a mumbling language, &c.; and that hence and so forth he took his full degree, and commenced man. The Bible teaches us that man came from the hands of his Maker gifted and endowed with religion, speech, government, and every other good and perfect gift, and among them the gift of being a builder, in virtue of his original constitution.

A single word, of frequent use in the introductory portion of Mr. Ruskin's first lecture in Edinburgh, will give us additional insight, from another point of the same false view, into the rationale of his critical blunders, and those of his school. It is the word "interesting." Now, of all the fine arts, architecture is that which is grand, and grandly beautiful. As correctly might we call Mont Blanc or Niagara, the forest or the oak, interesting, as to apply that term to the creations of architecture. In the necessary fact, that it is obliged to deal with large masses of space and material, as well as because it involves and is actually based upon a manifest utility of purpose in all its productions, it results that its beauty, when successful, must be of that kind which comes from the union of power and grace. It is always Achilles, it is never a Paris. The

beautiful Gothic monument in Trinity burying-ground is indeed an interesting object, but it is an architectural object only in that accommodated sense in which we speak of Biscay image work as statuary. It is architectural only as being a graceful and interesting toy, in the style of the grand temple at whose foot it is placed. It is the characteristic and indispensable effect of every real production of architecture to inspire a feeling of greatness and power. These are the foundation elements of its beauty. The feeling may not, in every instance, amount to that of sublimity, but it must always approach it, it must always be at least akin to that of greatness. Pile up a mass of uncut stone to the size of a building, and it has a power of its own; now, if architecture take hold of that mass and do not leave it still more powerful, as well as beautiful, it has failed of its peculiar function. Thus, there are many buildings which by the ravages of fire or of time, have been brought back to better architecture, than architecture ever did for them. Thus, in the Renaissance, where the frittering of parts through the heterogeneous mixture of the upright, horizontal, and circular line has destroyed all totality of impression, and so robbed the stones of their size; or, as in the Gothic of the florid period, where the stones are not only spoiled of their size, but robbed of their material also, through a profusion of foliage enrichment, architecture has plainly come short of its prerogative; in the one case producing mistaken building, in the other, meretricious decoration. The carrying out of Mr. Ruskin's views on architecture, must necessarily result in the latter. "Take care of ornament, and proportion will take care of itself," is the identical maxim upon which the simple grandeur of the Romanesque and the chastened sublimity of the Early Pointed, were flooded to death in a deluge of tracery and foliage ornamentation. If it should be objected, that the work of the architect is distinct from that of the builder, we deny the assertion; every builder is not an architect, but every architect is and must be a builder; it is at an appreciable point that architecture runs into spurious ornamentation; it is not easy to find the point at which building runs into architecture. The products of architecture are great-beautiful buildings.

But what a degradation and what an absurdity is the whole

of it! To talk of those grand minsters which for so many generations, as at Rheims, Cologne, York, have been discoursing bodily to men in the very greatest language of their actual conceptions, and beyond all other earthly objects of the hand of man, giving them visible assurance of a greatness not yet reached—to talk of such works as *interesting*, is too shameful! How much less an inversion, to speak of the forest oak as consisting in the leaves which qualify its grandeur, or the ivy that foils its strength? What is the work of producing an architectural object, such an object, for example, as Trinity Church or Girard College? It is by implication, a work of ages, of successive generations of thought, science, and skill. It is, then, a work of present reflection, of careful selection, of thoughtful adaptation, a work that ought always to call into counsel the assistance of those who possess gifts of wisdom and knowledge; for the question of deciding upon the design of a building which is possibly to stand before the eyes of men for many ages, is always a question of serious import. It is, in the next place, a work which calls for the exercise of the very highest mental powers on the part of the architect, a work in which are involved œconomics, science, and skill, on the very largest scale; and at last, and throughout, a work in which all these elements are to be articulated and set to the unvarying music of one pervading law, which is that of beauty. It then becomes a work of strong foundations, of digging and cutting, and toiling; of adjusting and building up a structure, fortified, in obedience to mechanical laws and practical foresight, against heat, cold, and tempest, arranged and ordered according to a specific object of use, and when finished, to be found a powerful witness to all who behold it, that there is reality and grace for the imagination of man in this world, as well as hard work for his hands. Whenever we visit the spot where such a work is going on, we are aware that a great work is going on. We experience that sense of expansion of heart which always accompanies the practical contemplation of the wonderful powers and resources of the mind of man. But what now, is the language in which the Edinburgh lectures speak of these works and labours? It is the language of the boudoir, the language of the print-shop and artificial flower-work; it is a language which shows no con-

sciousness of the greatness of the deed, which exhausts itself in speaking of the merest adjuncts. It knows nothing of the Hercules, nothing of the Apollo, and very little of the Graces, who have been about the building—very little of the Graces—not those portions upon which the Minervas have laboured, the Olympus-sublimity of pediments, the superbly chosen depths and appliances of channelings and curves, the noble sweep of arches, and well-directed array of mouldings—but it contents itself with speaking of the stolen chaplets, the stray peaks and playful touches with which the little Cupids have amused themselves, and which the greater gods have left remaining, with a smile at their childish pranks. According to this view, the church dressed with Christmas evergreens, should make better architecture than the piers and columns which they cover.

We remember how, in our early days, we were elated at the idea of having discovered a new style. The building was to represent an actual growth from the soil; engaged tree-trunks took the place of the buttresses, their branches in part to deploy under the cornice, and in part to creep up the eaves, and twine into a little forest of efflorescence along the ridge. The heavily recessed door-way was to show like a deep embosomed grove, and the interior was to display a ceiling with the avenue idea carried out to the full, not only its interlocked branches and clustering foliage, but with its fruitage of pineapple and pomegranate depending. The thing looked well upon paper, and generally, at first sight, was pronounced original and beautiful. But a little reflection soon convinced us that it was a perfect monstrosity. The entire affair, like the theory upon which it and all such things proceed, convicted itself of meretriciousness and utter poverty of imagination. It was just as much, and no more, architecture as the huge hollow tree-trunk which used to be in Peale's Museum, and in which he set his Indians after they had gone through with the war-whoop.

That the lighter ornamentation of style should look to natural forms for assistance, is true enough; but it does not hence follow that the mass of a building should be cut into vegetable figures, or its interior fashioned like an arbour. As legitimately might we seek to sculpture a ceiling into the forms of clouds, or the swellings of the surf in its pavement. The oak

and the mountain ash, the elm and the poplar, are noble and beautiful as such; they are assuredly not noble or beautiful when hollowed into a building. No doubt the men who produced the Corinthian capital, had studied the forms of nature, but had they been under the guidance of the foolish hypothesis which attributes that capital to the accident of the tile-covered basket, and the acanthus plant, or which views the Gothic ceiling as a sculptured criss-cross of the arbour top, the Corinthian capital instead of being the exquisite fancy work that it is, a piece of foliage which has not its equal in the world of art, would have been what the Roman capital, under that identical baldness of fancy, did become, a mere conglomeration of literal leaves stuck fast upon an inverted cone. We are not running the theory to death; would that we could. We are but tracing the actual carrying out of that theory, as revealed in the debasement of the pure Greek, through the poverty-stricken rags and fig-leaf aprons of the ostentatious Roman, and in the debasement of the pure Gothic through the same process of nature imitation. What is it that has destroyed the fine window heads, and defaced the noble surfaces, and suffocated the grand ceilings of the sublime Romanesque? what, in a word, has turned the cathedral of the early Gothic into the bizarre confusedness of a Henry VII. Chapel, but a wretched incursion of foliage drawn in from the forest, because architects were no longer able to draw from their own minds? We need only compare the Roman Frieze with the Grecian Entablature, the Flamboyant Tracery with the Pointed Window, to see at once the work wrought, and the thing that led to it.

So also, at the present time, let this theory again prevail, let it be taken for granted that the best architecture is that which has its obvious type in the vegetable kingdom, and nothing but the hardness of stone, and the expensiveness of cutting, can save our buildings from becoming mere excrescences of vegetable malformations. No longer will the architect go into the depths of his own mind, no longer tax his waking and sleeping imagination for ideal combinations, no longer fatigue his reason, his memory, his eyes, and his hands, in the prosecution of that most difficult of all his studies, the study of proportion; he will take his scrap-book and crayon, and any summer's day, in the

nearest wood, will suffice for the design in hand. The extreme opposite theory, that good architecture is wholly made up of rectilinear and geometric lines, may leave a building somewhat harsh and stiff, but it will at least leave it respectable, and leave it stone. The other will as inevitably spoil the design, destroy its architecture, and disfigure its material, the moment the builder is set free from the coercion of its mechanical laws. He will make his house a folly. It is this that has encumbered the finished pediments of the Doric with the Vitruvian nonsense of the acroteria; it is this that is putting to shame several otherwise correctly conceived Byzantine façades in our cities, by crowning and crushing the gable above its actual finish with huge misshapen masses of scroll and leaf, artificially bolstered from behind, for no assignable reason, unless it be this unfortunate notion of the indispensable necessity of some obvious imitation of nature about the building.

It will be seen that we are taking no unjust advantage of Mr. Ruskin's principles, when we mention the two following facts, from his Edinburgh Lectures. One is, his condemnation of the Greek chevron, an ornament which has, probably, more than any single ornament ever invented, gained the meed of every nation's admiration, on the express ground that he can find no actual type for its justification in nature. He says that he has gone through the vegetable world, he has gone through the animal world, he has examined the teeth and fins of fishes, and scrutinized the forms in crystallization, and not finding in any of them footsteps of the mind that traced the chevron, sufficiently clear to prove the copy, he must condemn it. It is, accordingly, like the Ionic capital and the geometric Greek in general, "base." The other instance referred to, is the fact that he has placed, as the frontispiece of the volume under review, a drawing of a lion's head from nature, and by way of contrast, a lion's head in abstract, such as that which forms the finial to the coronal echinus of the Parthenon fronts. And for what reason? Can it be believed that it is done for the purpose of actually proving that the Parthenon heads are really not right good lions' heads? Poor Phidias! He could make a Jupiter that looked somewhat like the real thing; he could fashion a goddess which commanded

the price of a city; he could fill the pediments and metopes of the Parthenon itself with figures that, in their looks, action, and bearing, have been thought to show no small knowledge of men, but he probably had never seen a real lion, and so was constrained to draw upon his imagination, and behold in the picture, what a fist he made of it! This is certainly one of those things which merit to be called shameful, and it speaks well for the citizens and the art of that beautiful town which is truly called the modern Athens, that they could exercise the degree of patience they did with such vain babbling. If Mr. Ruskin would have had the actual lion's head, with all its superior native vigour, upon which he so innocently discourses, in place of that most exquisite transcendent of a finish which is not a finish, and which forms but one of a thousand of the secret reaches of refined thought which every fresh examination of the Parthenon is bringing to light, then why not go still further? why not let a full formed lion be found emerging from the angles of that universal pediment, and why not have an acroterial lion rampant upon its sealed apex? Phidias would as soon have thought of sticking a literal chariot on those angles, as a literal lion's head.

Here now is a case at which we are at a perfect nonplus. To our view there is no more impressive architectural form than that of the Greek pediment. Precisely what makes it so, we cannot tell. It is a simple triangle, having its angles at a certain depression, made up of three principal lines and a recess. But we have seen this thing—we have met it suddenly in our cities, outstanding from beyond the house fronts, and we have ever felt the same impression of its unique grandeur, the same indefinable power of its haunted enclosure. So have we felt the power of a Phidian Jupiter's head, so have we felt the power of a forehead, and how like that of Daniel Webster! What makes it, we cannot tell, in the one case any more than in the other. We have seen foreheads as broad and high, and brows as deep and shadowy, as Webster's, but we have seen but one Webster. So have we seen pediments and gables of heavier material, and far greater breadth and height than the Doric, but we have seen but one Doric pediment, and whenever we do see it, it remains the same thing. Whether it be in the adjustment of the

angle, that the triangle has come to rest of its own accord, and thus settled at the exact point of æsthetic equilibrium, a point which qualifies the construction, either to be an Atlas to the heavens, or a Zephyr to float into them, and that hence it presents itself as the most satisfactory formula to the mental sense of equilibrium, we cannot tell; but there it is; the impression made by it is not a fancy or a mistake. Let any one compare the pediment of the New York Custom House with the gable of St. Paul's Church, or that of the Philadelphia Custom House (which, however, is wanting in breadth and boldness of cornice,) with the gable of the Girard Bank, and the reality of the thing of which we are speaking will be felt. Now, if nature had crystallized a pediment, we should find no fault with the theory that should attribute this particular to the natural type; but as nature has not so done in any explicit instance, we can but indicate the source of the construction by the analogy of its effect, and say that it is ideal. The cultivated imagination of the architect taught him with what feeling to adjust the angle, to deepen the recess, and to project the mass beyond the peristyle over which it so nobly impends.

At this point we may see more distinctly the reason why the lion's head, in abstract, is made to qualify its outer angles. The tympanum is full, to overflowing, of actual life within a sensible geometric horizon; it must relieve itself at the point of contact, and connect itself with the world around, through the intermediacy of the world of embryo. A literal, particular, or actual torso of animal nature at the point, would, like an actual sculptured plant, shield, or boss, have had the effect of throwing a literal impertinence into an ideal perfectness. Of course there remains no place for argument; we can do no more than assure the man who has succeeded in schooling his feelings against a form of art which the world has consented to own as beautiful, for no other reason than that it does not obviously copy nature, that he is labouring under a mistake.

Architecture is far less imitative than any other of the family of the arts. Perhaps it would be better to say, far less obviously imitative. There have been architects eminent for genius and skill in dealing with all the real elements of their art, and yet, who never could etch a flower or arrange a festoon; men who

could throw up buildings, original, noble, and great, according to the emergency, but who have been absolutely dependent on the limner for the putting in of their ornamentation. What folly to consider the limner-work architecture, and the original creation the subordinate. The gift which enables a man thus to originate, and thus to deal in the real elements of style, is the gift of the higher imagination, precisely the gift which enables him to produce with originality and power in other departments. It is born with the architect, it is not something which may be learned in the drawing-school. This architect will indeed copy from nature, inasmuch as nature is born in him. That is to say, as the sum of all beauty is contained or implied in nature, so his nature has been formed and cultivated to a more spontaneous feeling of the same; but it is also a characteristic of this, his feeling, that it shall act, in production, unconsciously; and by how much it acts with particular consciousness, by so much it is in danger of weakening its original power. Thus the Greek sculptor, whose ideas originated in the secret of his own imagination, would receive assistance, certainly, from the studies of the palaestra, while the modern sculptor, who has little or none of the originating idea in his mind, will go to the dissecting-room for his studies, and will, in all probability, produce a more correct piece of anatomy than the other. It is the prerogative of every piece of real art to have its full existence in the mind of the man. Many such an existence has been spoiled and made a mere critical homily, by the artist's slavish adherence to actual particular nature in the elaboration of his idea. The original architect has a mind which is ever open to nature's hints; his greatest buildings will have in them what he has seen and felt in the mountain and in the cloudy sky, in the deep shadows of caves and forests, in the power of sound, and in the noble grandeur of heroic deeds; in the magnificence of law and order, and in the gracefulness of beauty; but they will be there in incommensurable forms and arrangements, which are the resultant of his feelings and insight into nature. His building will not be made up of the cave of Staffa in its door-way, of stalactites, or of grape-vines for its ceiling, or of poplars or icebergs, or mountain peaks, for its towers and dome. To the real architect it belongs to force

his meditations into that region which lies between the actual and the possible, and which is more or less remotely indicated in the actual, which indication becomes to him the key-note of the forms which he embodies, even as the musician goes into the same region to draw thence the architecture of sweet sound. And this is the process, and the only process, wherein he copies nature in his building. Take the great architectural works of the world, and ask their authors how they made them, and the answer would be about as apposite and satisfactory as the Greek sculptor's explanation of his Elian Jove. Ask the man who first channeled the Doric column, how he came to do so, and his answer is, "I felt that it would be well to do so."

The case just mentioned is a case in hand. Everybody knows the exquisite effect of the Doric channelings, as contrasted with the smooth shaft, the prismatic shaft, the reeded shaft, or with the deeply cut channels of the other orders. We can see before our eyes what has been effected by the Doric channelings, but we question whether Callicrates could tell us why he made them elliptical rather than circular. The thing actually effected is, that the apparent strength, fulness, and power of the column are multiplied, without actually increasing its dimensions, an effect essential throughout to Doric art, whose ruling idea is that of a quiescent grandeur and sublimity, but a sublimity which is never dependent upon actual dimensions.

The Doric temple has the force of the far-off mountain within the boundaries of appreciable limits. The actual limit of the Doric building never shows itself, except in the crowning lines of the pediment, and at the angles so superlatively qualified by the embryonic artifice already described. At the four corners of the building, the limiting angle is formed by a column, actually heavy, pyramidal, perpetual on its base, channeled in such a way as to become in a sort aerial, so that a certain air of indefiniteness is cast over it which magnifies its fulness, and at the same time idealizes its material. The Doric fluting multiplies the column, the Ionic and Corinthian divides it, for a reason which we shall see. The column is thus charged with a swelling, we had almost said a sweltering fulness, which does not alter its nature as stone, but which yet (we can express it in no other way) gives ideality to its substance. And all this

is the direct result of its being cut into shallow elliptical flutings, rather than circular ones. What now if the entire building, what if the lines of the stylobate, what if the lines of the entasis, what if every part as well as the body of the edifice be included within the like transcendent curves; even the same as those which make up the distant mountain, upon which we look, and whose idea we feel at its utmost, only at such time as when, through continued looking, we come to see the mountain while we see it not. We believe it to be so. This is the way in which Greek art makes known its power, namely, through a revery which is excited by continued contemplation, and we believe that as it has the same effect as the distant mountain, it has the same method, the co-operation of the rectilinear line of vision with the curvilinear lines of its forms. We believe that every additional examination of the radical and bounding, as well as of the composition lines of the Doric temple, will be found, as the great lines of the entasis and stylobate have been found, to be portions of a vast ellipse, or other conic sections.

The circular line rules the actual and literal world; it is the line that we can touch, and copy, and describe with mathematical exactness. It is the ruling line of the Roman, and of the Debased Gothic architecture. It is the immediate result in building of the imitation theory. It will make an architect of any hand that can scribe a circle, and it will make a mere literalness of any architecture that falls under its rule. The curves which form the root and body of all ideal forms, are those revealed in the transverse sections of the cone. They can be drawn only by the hand of the man that feels them in his soul. They compose the invisible axis of the Doric building. The Greek architect did, therefore, for the column, what he felt that nature had done for the elm and not for the apple-tree, and gave the invisible entasis to its diminution for the purpose of keeping it strong and making it beautiful—did, what, in some way, we know not how, the real artist does, when he makes a forehead of limited dimensions speak a language which the more literal artist will in vain labour to effect, by heaping up the brain, and swelling out the protuberances. Here, then, is the point at which the real architect is a copyer of nature, not by particular imitation, for the things are not tangible, and

if so, would become preposterous when transferred, but by catching the harmonies of nature, and making them harmonious in building. Hence will it do him good to be in the frequent, and most earnest, and reverent study of nature, but by all means let him leave his port-folio at home. Let his succeeding labours be influenced by the results of his thoughts, moods, and reflections, not by the literal imprint of any particular.

If, with Mr. Ruskin, he come to the conclusion that the pointed arch is the only right way to bridge a space, because he finds its type in the oak leaf, and every other leaf of the forest, then ought he, with him, also to come to the conclusion that the oak leaf contains the whole of architecture, and with him and his school, should unite in justifying the only Gothic that does literally copy in form or in foliage—the Debased. For, singularly enough, the Gothic, which they sometimes seem to admire, and which assuredly we have a right to admire, is that which is remarkable for the simplicity of its ornamentation, and for having what it possesses almost universally in abstract. Its vines, its foliage, its fruitage, its saints and its angels, have come as they ought to have come, and for a reason identically analogous to that in the case of the Doric finial, directly out of the world of embryo.

If, however, instead of inverting the science of his art, and looking to those forms for construction, to which he may, with judiciousness, look for hints for ornamentation, he ask himself how nature actually does bridge her spaces, and finding she does so by supports of every variety and shape, in the air and in caves, and also in basaltic and stalagmite pillars, and by vast lintels in way of boulders cast athwart deep channels, and sustaining mountains above them, then may he know that the bridging of his spaces is an accident of style, which he is at liberty to effect as he may choose, by a triangle, an arch, or a lintel, only so that the way chosen be in keeping with the work he is about. And he may likewise repeat his elements, provided he do so without interruption, as far as his space and means will allow, notwithstanding the sophistical argument of the six hundred and odd similar square windows, which our author objected to the good citizens of Edinburgh. For if those six hundred windows were in contiguous fronts of adequate

height, and *not* broken into by separating intrusions of his arched and decorated windows, and he felt no sense of magnitude, of multitude, and of extent, and hence of something at least approaching a sense of magnificence, then was he void for the time being of the universal faculty of our feelings, in virtue of which the cathedral is to us more than the pyramid, the rolling ocean than the smooth pond, the cloud-involved sky than the mist-mingled air, the continuous cataract than the sluggish stream, the successive thunder than the single explosion, or the roaring surf than the sudden splash! We do not mean to say that the mere repetition of the same elements will of itself, apart from the law that guides their repetition, produce greatness of style, nor to assert that ornamented windows set in proper places and relations, will not help to make more beautiful architecture than the plain window; but we do mean to say, that the windows, and pinnacles, and niches must belong to something, that that something Mr. Ruskin's view leaves out of account, and that in so doing it leaves out the whole. The Greeks could make an architecture without a window, but all the world is not adequate to the work of making windows grow into architecture. The nearest to it are the Crystal Palaces of the day, which are, indeed, just as much architecture as so much glass. If Mr. Ruskin would but withdraw his eye for an instant from its fascinated spell upon the single spot of beauty, and send his glance down the long sweep of the nave, or along the continuous line of the wall mouldings, the dentils, the brackets, the cerbels, or even the baluster of the pulpit stair, he would see how his condemnation of the repeated peristyle and plain window, must put an end to architecture, and to our capacity for art at the same time.

It is too late, by several years, for writers to make the assertion that the Egyptians and Greeks bridged the spaces above their columns and door-ways with the horizontal lintel, only because they were not aware of the arch. They did so because they chose to do great things in their own way. The Gothic has, indeed, done great things with the arch, but has done so only by bringing in the control of the same law of the imagination. If a comparison is to be made, then we are constrained to think that the Greeks, in effecting an ideal product out of so

bald an element, have done an intellectually greater thing than did the Gothic builders. Ruskin's inference from the premises is the opposite. He makes it the criterion of the superiority of Gothic over Classic art, that it is a greater thing to arch a space than to bridge it with a lintel. Constructively it is, and possibly a Coliseum with plain arched windows, is even more beautiful than with plain square windows, though we doubt it. But when the Greeks laid hold of the necessity which they adopted, and produced a Parthenon redolent throughout with mental power and beauty, then we think they did as great a thing as ever builders accomplished.

We have denied, however, and do most strenuously deny, that Greek art is composed about the actual straight line. It has, indeed, the straight lines of nature in their places, even as the straight lines of light that co-operate to form the rainbow; but if it be the artistic universe we take it to be, then it has *in re* or *in posse* all the architectural lines which nature reveals, and in the way that nature uses them. These lines, these solar and lunar lines, these abstract and potential lines, these lines whose rays and echoes are also in the mind, and which, therefore, make the Doric building a grand embodiment of law and order, as well as of grace and beauty; these are the identical lines which Mr. Ruskin knows nothing about for architecture, because he has not *seen* them in his forests. One would suppose he might have seen them gleaming in the airs of some of Turner's sun-sets, or that he might have felt them at least in the spirit-like shadows of the grove, or heard them in the æolian sigh of the pine. He may see them, if he will, and find that nature is full of them, whenever at the rising, the setting, or the noon-day sun, he looks and listens for them, or whenever, in careful silence of the mind, he sends his reverie toward the zenith, or towards the early east, what time the coming dawn may perchance touch their resounding echoes within the answering breast. And even as these, his much despised right lines, come to flood the effulgent east, or move on to give their unseen depths to the ever-deepening zenith, or move down to fire the glowing west, or marshal their proud ranks at other times in the grand array of the aurora, so, perchance, may he come to understand how the chief glory of the building wall, and the

enclosing peristyle receive their colour, and give forth their memnon-music through the same. And if the man is at heart as generous and noble as we take him to be, the process will set him to reflecting, that possibly there is a world of lines into which his imitation view can never penetrate, but only the mind that sits and muses, what time nature may touch their counterparts within, and so might there be reclaimed to the true behests of art, one of the most gifted pens that has been drawn in her service.

The comparison of Gothic art to frozen music has ever seemed to us a disagreeable one, and yet we believe it is given to the real architect to fix the note of the nightingale, and the tones of the æolian, the voice of the cataract, and the murmur of the sea, "the echo of the tempest, and the music of the spheres," and the articulate colours of the prism in solid forms of stone, which shall thus transfer the melodies of nature from the ear to the eye. The cathedral is an organ whose glorious music is seen and so heard, and the temple is a prism that needs no daub of actual tinting. But assuredly the architect does not effect this by sculpturing blowing winds and mimic waterfalls, and painting literal rainbows about the building. He will do it by exhibiting to the space-faculties of the mind, the atlantic surfaces and vistaed reaches of his edifice, by fitting its proportions to the waiting harmonies of the soul, by "digging fiercely into his enchasmed fronts," and by secretly training the radical life of the style through emerging oases on dead walls, that shall be as the floating mermaid on the distant sea; by the sudden effulgence of its whole power in some single condensation, and by its universal diffusion in every part, and in parts not apparently noticed, till found obedient to the master-spirit which has impressed itself throughout. He will do it by his talismanic power over space, and mass, and distance, light and shadow, solidity and freedom, sternness and happy play. He will do it, we know not how, through forms and through the absence of forms, and their arrangements, which shall arrest and take captive, and fill up the mind of the beholder, so that he shall, from surprise, incomprehensibility, and dread, at the last consent to muse and walk amid the forms around him, as his own mind's chosen home. It is certainly possible for architecture

to throw the mind into a state, which shall securely remind it of its very highest and deepest, and most tender and touching impressions, from whatever quarter received. There is a certain thing we see about the distant mountain, and we perceive the same about some of Raphael's heads; some have called it a "swimmingness," some a "floatability;"—neither expresses it, but it is a result which is effected by putting aeriality into matter. Doric art effects this result mechanically, by building beneath the universal influence of those lines in nature which are only seen in their being heard, and felt, and reflected.

It will now devolve upon us to endeavour to trace what we believe to be the actual genesis of the art of architecture. Its prime origin we have already found to be in man's religious nature, under the impulse of his artistic faculty; in the same way, for example, as sculpture had its first original. Man came a builder from the hand of his Maker, and his first buildings were erected for his Maker, even his Maker whom he had denied; and hence, his first buildings form the most signal exponents of the darkness and fear which his sin had brought over his faculties. Reeking with the airs of that region where Satan met sin and death on his passage to the primeval earth, do we find the earliest monuments of the architectural art. The very earliest monuments, 'tis true, are gone in the waters of the deluge; but, from the guilt-begotten and propitiatory images which the natural heart still goes on to build, though it be Juggernauts in air and Dagon in dreams, from the fearful forms which the later heathen have erected, and from the more than diabolic intimations in Hindoo caves, in Assyrian chambers of imagery, in the Typhon terror that still haunts the Egyptian temple, in the revolting forms of the Mexican sculptors, and in the intolerable terrors of Stonehenge circles, we may detect the presence of something like a Beelzebub in the inspiration as well as in the dedication of these early works, thus at once the glory and the shame of man's disordered greatness as a born builder. Take the Christian architecture of the middle ages, or what would be still more forcible, take the christianized architecture of the self-worshipping Greek—if that problem had been solved, and not impossibly the Protestant Church is yet to do it—take the art which is the historical pro-

duct of the true faith, or the art which was the product of the transition period from demon worship to the deification of mental beauty, take the Christian cathedral and the christianized Greek Church, and set them alongside a cavern of Ellora, and a temple of the Nile, and you have as significant a demonstration of what revealed religion has done for the race, as could well be exhibited to the sight.

Whoever has looked upon Stonehenge, or any other great instance of Celtic building, and whoever has been left alone with the frowning terribleness of some vast natural rock, has experienced the essence of the feeling which is peculiar to the finished Egyptian temple. The Pyramids are not usually discussed in the same category with the Temple-architecture of Egypt, but they are perfectly identical as to their sentiment; you pass without revulsion from Cheops to the hypostyle Hall of Karnac. The feeling excited by all Egyptian art is essentially the rock-feeling, only that in the pyramid it is more purely natural; in the temple it is enhanced by science, not by art. As compared with the Grecian or with the Gothic, there is little imagination in the Egyptian, while there is a world of knowledge and of mysticism. What is the Sphinx but a slowly living rock? What the imperturbable secrecy, the brooding silence, and the supernatural dreadfulness of the entire style, but that the chaotic heart of flint, the very spirit of the lifeless granite, is made to come out from its abysmal depths, and to assume to itself an intelligence, not yet human, not yet divine, but earth-born, impersonal, pantheistic? It is the life of the quarry joined with the life of the lotus and the serpent. Whether their builders intended as consciously to represent this pantheistic image in their works, as we can read it in them, is little to the question. They were pantheists in theology, and they could not help being true to themselves, when speaking in architecture, any more than the builders of Greece, Rome, or Byzantium. We should say, then, that Egyptian architecture, like every other original architecture, adopted the forms it did, from a spontaneous internal necessity of the case, and because the use of large stones, immense surfaces, overhanging weight, indistinguishable light, and massive vegetable columns were exactly the elements at hand for embodying its idea. We say

vegetable columns, because every column in the Egyptian temple is but a rock endowed with the life of the Nile plant. The Grecian column, on the other hand, is the same historical rock, endowed with the life of independent beauty, a life precisely analogous to that with which they endowed the stones out of which they made their statues. They did it in the one case no more from the direct imitation of literal types, than in the other. The Egyptian column is a pillar in a temple whose god was nature, earth-born nature—the Grecian, a pillar in a temple, whose deity was man, deified man.

Our theory of the column is, that it has its origin as a purely religious image and symbol; that every Egyptian column means God the sustainer; every Grecian, man the sustainer; and that in every original instance of the carrying out of the idea, they were necessarily impelled to the rock, and not to the tree. In its earliest form, the column was a simple stone, raised, whether as a divine witness in the first place, or as a symbol of the deity, we cannot tell, but the pillar soon came to stand for the god himself. It needs no argument to prove thus much. The Cyclopean and Druidical remains throughout the known world, show that among the very earliest forms of idolatrous symbolism were those of the rock worship. Some nations went beneath the ground, some built above the ground, some took the actual rock mountain and hewed it into a temple, and some took huge boulders and built them into mountains. They built their cities around their tutelar acropolis of rock, and they marked out their consecrated limits with walls of the same, into the heart of which they resorted for worship and fled for refuge; they said literally to the rock, "Thou art my god." If asked why all primitive heathens thus expressed their religious feelings, the answer is, that an earth-born nature-worship is manifestly the earliest phase of idolatry, that the natural rock is the most obvious impersonation of the earth-spirit, and that the natural rock was always at hand, and that the disposition to build mightily for his gods, only the more actuated his perverted nature.

The primitive type of the column was the simple monolithic pillar. In the earliest Celtic remains we find this repeated, so as to form a complete circle. The next advance was that of

the bilitic arrangement, the single upright pillar being crossed with a huge rock on top, forming the shape of the letter T. The last improvement was that of the trilith, or two uprights with an architrave, in the form of the jambs of a door with their lintel. A continuous succession of triliths gives the finished Stonehenge. Changed from the circle to the square, they form the Egyptian quadrangle. At Ypsambul there is a quadrangle, which, in every respect except that of the circular plan, is an exact Stonehenge. This theory of the genesis of columnar architecture was first distinctly put forth by Hosking. In the plates accompanying his *Essay*, which we take to be the ablest work on architecture to be found in the English language, he gives an historical induction of examples, from the rude monolith to the fluted column, and traces step by step the actual progress of columnar architecture, from the Celtic pillar of stone to the classic peristyle. The detached monolith still remains, as in the Egyptian, Mexican, and other Druidical obelisks, in the pillars prefacing the temple of Solomon, and diverted from a religious to a monumental use, in the triumphal pillars used by nations to this day.

We know full well, that fanciful theorizing is a peculiar temptation in architectural studies, and would not knowingly add to the long catalogue, but from a careful testing of the theory of the purely religious symbolic origin of the column, we do not find it possible to resist the inference of its correctness. It is impressed upon the forms themselves, and corroborated by cotemporary usages and settled metaphors of speech. By the column with its architrave, the ancient builders meant their deity in his relation to the world as its Atlas-bearer. A single glance at the comparative table of Hosking, will show how the idea is elaborated from the single pillar of natural rock to the finished obelisk, from the Druid circle to the African quadrangle, from the quadrangle to the temple hall, with its Isis capitals, its Osiris Caryatic pillars, and its vast globe-sculptured architraves, and so on to the Olympus-bearing columns, and human caryatidae of the Athenian acropolis. At least it is quite as scientific to trace the perfect column to the monolith, as to find it in the sapling prop of a log hut, bandaged at the top and bottom with ropes, as if hut builders were in the habit of ornamenting

their cabins with peristyles! One of the most remarkable remains of Celtic architecture known to archæology, the Gate of the Lions at Mycenæ, is capable of a possible solution upon the hypothesis of the religious meaning of the column, and remains a riddle without it. This view being admitted, that single construction represents a national power (the lion) triumphant over a subverted dynasty, (the inverted column and architrave.) That the construction has a symbolic meaning, no one can doubt who has seen a drawing of it.

The process through which the religious conventionalism which characterizes more or less all known architecture until the time of Pericles, gradually fell away so as to end in the revelation of the untrammelled beauty of the Doric temple, coincides with that through which the mind of man in other respects, in letters, government, and civilization, was led to its culmination towards the coming of Him who held the nations in his hand, for the preparation of his own ways. Take the true revealed religion and culture as a parallel, and the comparison of the New Testament form of that religion with the Sinaitic and Judaic generally, will find something not without significance in the comparison of the Grecian form of civilization with that of Egypt, as exhibited in their architecture. What the temple of Herod was to the original temple on Mount Moriah, that, as far forth as the case may go, was the Parthenon of Athens to the Amenophis Memnon of Thebes.

Between the Egyptian and the Grecian lies an undiscovered gap, which the restoration of Tyre and Sidon could alone fill up; but whoever will take the pains to construct in his mind an Egyptian temple, and then strip its sanctuary of its outworks, will, in the process, have done what was done in the historical progress which has been lost, and will find in that sanctuary the part upon which the Doric builders went to work. Grecian architecture started with the Portico and Sanctuary of Apollinopolis Magna; it ended in the Minerva Parthenon of Athens. The Grecian people had their one national art; it was the Doric. It was that of a stylobate, column, pediment, and naos, locked together in a perfect and indissoluble unity. And they had two art-plays, the Ionic and Corinthian, which were those of stylobate, column, pediment, and naos, purposely dissolved

by the introduction of slightly disorganizing elements, such as the base, the decorated capital, and the deeper channelling of the column; in a word, the more manifest perpendicularity of the shaft, and the more manifest horizontality of the entablature. In the one case, that of the Ionic, the object of the capital is to conceal the supporting point of the column, in the other, the Corinthian, it substitutes an object of beauty so exquisite in itself, as to abstract attention from the fact of the disunion or the need of support. Mr. Ruskin considers the Ionic capital a "base contrivance as a *supporting member*!"

Of the surface architecture of its prototype, the Greek retained but that of the unbroken temple walls, and around these walls, as a back-ground, it congregated the aurora prisms, or the enamelled light, or the ray-like halo of the columnar mass and line. The dark spirit of its conventional religionism is sent back to the desert; the Sphinx could not bear the free sunlight of Attica; the dread terrors of Ammon gave way to the more manly fear of Jove, the imperturbable Isis to the wisdom-loving Minerva. The dark rock has been turned into pure crystal, or the vast quarry has been condensed into the living diamond. We might say that the earthly or unearthly remoteness, the fearfulness and the indefiniteness, which form the secret of the power and terribleness of Egyptian art, has lost its terribleness, and found its power humanized and enhanced through the process of a Doric avatar. Grecian art is assuredly self-inclusive. The point that seals the temple is the apex of the pediment; whereas the pedimental point of the Egyptian broods far over and above the actual mass. We may not pursue the subject further, but we are well convinced that the adequate study of the comparative architecture of the great historic Gentile nations will show that there was a Gentile no less than a Hebrew preparation of the world for the coming of the Son of Man. The progressive elimination, and at the same time, real magnification of the elementary greatness of the art, whose fearfulness filled the valley of the Nile, as we find the process completed in the art whose perfect human beauty emanated from the hill-tops of Grecia, is as the Gentile shadow of the true progress which was going on in the education of the chosen nation.

Architecture is thus, in its origin and progress, as we have endeavoured to show, a mental phenomenon to be classed with analogous phenomena of the mind of man and nations; governed by a law in no respect differing from the law under which the human mind has expressed itself in literature, and the other elements of national culture and civilization. So far as architecture has been influenced by circumstances, it has been in the same way and to the same degree that the art of poetry has been influenced, and not otherwise. The school which attributes the origin of architecture to the mere physical wants of man, and finds accordingly the temple in the hut, is the same that finds the origin of poetry in the discovered fact, that heroes were fond of being flattered in verse. It is high time this atheistic materialism were utterly abolished, and the simple fact, which must ever form one of the foundation principles of all worthy æsthetics, be made an elementary axiom; the fact, namely, that man was created with artistic faculties, and hence, goes on to build. The practical bearing of the two views is palpable upon the slightest inspection of the history of architectural art. The almost perfect nobleness and beauty of the Doric, the chaste elegance of the Ionic and Corinthian, and the grand sublimity of the early Gothic, are witnesses for the true theory; the ostentatious rhodomontade of the Roman Corinthian, the paltry efflorescence of the Debased Gothic, and the low-lived frippery of the Revived Classic, stand as witnesses for the imitation theory.

It is to the last degree important, as it respects the enduring worthiness of the architecture which the general revival of the disposition to build shall produce, that our architects should understand, that by their profession as such, they are not copyists either of nature or of art, but poets and students—poets to appreciate and to originate; students both of nature and of art. If they are good master-builders, they will originate works of power and beauty; if they are poor ones, and especially, if made poor through the blinding influence of a false theory, they will show their poverty in their works, not by a poverty-stricken simplicity—would they might do no worse—but by a poverty-stricken meretriciousness and profusion of form and ornamentation, which will be to the disgrace and injury of the land.

Better is a dinner of herbs in a house where content is, than a feast in a palace which is full of confusion. Of few things is this more true, than of the architecture of the house and the palace. It will not hurt a man to worship in a plain church, or to live in a plain house; it will hurt him and shame him, and vex him, to worship or to live in the midst of vicious architecture, unless he consent for peace of mind's sake, to say it is good, and then will it hurt him still worse.

We say solemnly, then, because we believe the question of good art or poor art is a solemn question for the nation, may our land be preserved from the fruitage of such criticism, as that of the lectures, and of the school under review: a fruitage that must, sooner or later, as has ever been the case, reveal itself in an art which will turn its professors into mechanicians, and fill our streets with sickening daguerreotypes of blurred and misshapen nature-copies in wasted stone and mortar, far less cultivating to the people's sense of beauty, than it would be to plant our public parks with the actual nature of the vegetable garden: an art that will enrich our picture galleries with minutely elaborated imprints of veritable things, scenes, and places, whose crowning praise shall consist in fore-ground subordinates so done to nature as to deceive an infant: an art which will send down our Washingtons and Websters to the coming generations, in statuary which shall incontrovertibly fix the shape of the Continental General's cap, and the fashion of the clothes in 1850; an art, in fine, which ignobly degrades that which is among the highest and most spiritual of man's natural faculties, his imagination; the power by which the true artist is enabled to originate forms which shall invite his fellow-men to a recollection of a world of ideality, which is above and beyond this world of merchandize and toil.

ART. V.—*Intellect, the Emotions, and the Moral Nature.* By Rev. William Lyall, Free College, Halifax, Nova Scotia. Edinburgh: Thomas Constable & Co. London: Hamilton, Adams & Co. 1855.

OUR Scotch brethren, wherever they go, betray their characteristic instincts. They soon take rank for their industry and enterprise, their honesty and integrity, their consequent success in the various spheres of life, and importance as members of society. All this is largely due to the fact, that they are no less forward and emphatic in manifesting their quenchless love of Christianity, under the type commonly known as Calvinism in doctrine, and Presbyterianism in government. They evince the spirit and power of this sort of religion in the active interest they take in education, especially in such institutions as are requisite for the Christian instruction of their children, and the effective training of learned and able Christian ministers. Wherever the Scotch colonize, they carry these distinctive principles and institutions with them. Dr. Duff has afforded a stupendous exemplification of the *ingentium perfervidum Scotorum*, in these respects, on Missionary ground. And, aside from the monuments of their zeal in these things, which abound in our country, we find fresh indications of it in the colleges and other institutions for liberal culture and ministerial training, which they are rearing up in the British provinces, although, as yet, they form but a fragment of their population. Our knowledge of Knox College in Toronto, and of the Free College in Halifax, is derived solely from the published productions of their Professors. From each of these institutions disquisitions upon psychology and metaphysics have emanated, which show that this department is prosecuted in them with an earnestness and ability rarely surpassed, and that the Scotch mind loses none of its characteristic relish and keenness for these subtle and sublime investigations, by migrations to new abodes. This is happily and forcibly evinced in the volume of Mr. Lyall, now before us, which gives us our first and only knowledge of him.

This volume displays a freshness, vivacity, independence, together with a general justness and sanity of thinking on these

subjects, which adapt it, in an unusual degree, to general reading, while they indicate some of the most important requisites of the teacher. Indeed, he often expatiates with a fulness of illustration, and a scope of free discourse on the remoter bearings of the principles discussed, which, however interesting and instructive to the general reader, swell the volume to an inconvenient bulk, and make us feel a want of the precision and compactness so requisite in discussions on such subjects. With all its merits, it seems to us that the book would be greatly improved by condensation. Diffuseness is its greatest blemish, and we hope the author will take it as we mean it—not as an offence, but a kindness—if we add, that his style, notwithstanding many salient and pithy passages, which redeem it as a whole, betrays a certain looseness and negligence which not only tend to diffuseness, but even a slovenly obscurity, hardly excusable in such a volume on such a subject. We give an instance or two, to show our meaning :

“What may be desirable in one respect, may not be desirable in another ; and if the non-desirableness in the one respect prevails over the desirableness in the other, even the desirableness itself is not really desirable. We prefer something on the ground of some other of the active principles of our nature ; even while certain of our active principles would lead us to a different choice, makes something else really the object of our desire.” P. 565.

“Taking beauty in its widest sense as inclusive of sublimity, the picturesque, or whatever appeals to the aesthetic emotion—that is, whatever may have more or less of the beautiful and the sublime, and the picturesque—be made up, more or less of each, or any two of them to the exclusion of the third.” p. 576. We should, of course, refer such paragraphs to some freak of the types, were they not too frequent, and were there not so many other indications of a looseness in the structure of sentences, more tolerable in the freedom of extemporaneous oratory, than in an elaborate, heavy volume on metaphysics. We have signalized this point, because it needs only care for its correction. Such care, we are sure, would add to the reputation and usefulness of those future productions of which we trust the present is only the earnest,

As psychology is the science of the soul's phenomena, it holds an intimate relation to theology generally, which, although centring in God as its prime source, object, and end, concerns itself largely with the human soul as being made in the image of God, to the end that it may serve, glorify, and enjoy him for ever. This is eminently true of Christian theology, which relates distinctively to God's method of glorifying himself in the salvation of the human soul. From the necessity of the case, the views which men entertain of the faculties and operations of the soul, (i. e. questions in mental and moral philosophy,) must, as it always has done, give a strong bias to all their thinking in regard to theology in all its departments of anthropology and soterology. Our conceptions of the nature of the thing saved, must affect our views of the nature and method of its salvation. He who has fixed views of the "Intellect, Emotions and Moral Nature," as treated in this volume, has taken a long stride towards determining his whole system of theology.

So far as Metaphysics occupy any ground not strictly included in Psychology, and verge towards Ontology, i. e., so far as they deal with the necessary, possible, or contingent relations and grounds of phenomena, in short, with the meta-phenomenal, whether in the realms of matter or mind, it is manifest that they are constantly touching the very fundamentals of all theology—all religious faith. This is evident enough, if we look at some of the most elementary questions in this science. Thus, if with the empirical school, we say that we can cognize nothing but phenomena, we are at once driven to the atheism of the Positive Philosophy; while, at the opposite pole, Pantheism develops itself in the fiction that God is the only substance of which all else are phenomena. The theory of Hume and Brown, which resolves cause into mere antecedence, by eliminating the element of power and dependence from the relation of cause and effect, is fatal to that great argument for the being of God, which ascends from the creation to the Creator, from dependent and final causes to the First Great Efficient. If all events are not due to some power which produces them, then it is impossible to deduce the existence of things not seen from the things which do appear.

So, if the true doctrine of personal identity be denied, we not only undermine the resurrection of the body, but all moral responsibility. If there be no true substance underlying, supporting, unifying the qualities of objects, then all existence becomes an unreality—only a grand phantasmagoria. If right be not an ultimate, irreducible fact, idea, or truth, we have nothing left but Epicureanism and Utilitarianism. If it be impossible that truth should be communicated to the mind from without, unless it have been already grasped by its own inward intuitions, then all increase of our knowledge by testimony is impossible, and the idea of an external authoritative revelation is chimerical. This is only a condensed statement of the theory of Morell and others of the Schleiermacher school, which has already found a wide and cordial welcome.

The turn which metaphysical science is taking for the time being, can never, therefore, be without the deepest interest to theologians and Christians. This must be all the more so, in proportion as the points agitated touch the fundamentals of natural and revealed religion, and of Christian experience. It is with special reference to this fact, that we propose to notice our author's resolution of some of the hinge-questions lying on the debatable border, where mental, moral, and metaphysical philosophy interblends with revealed religion. Hence, we shall give our attention chiefly to the third and last part of the book, which relates to the "moral nature." We will, however, first call attention to a few of the positions taken in the previous sections.

We fully agree with the author, that our consciousness is "the starting point of philosophy," and we think it deserves to be enunciated with all the emphasis belonging to an axiomatic truth. But when he pronounces consciousness "the only immediate object of cognition,"* we think he strains the doctrine too far. We know the existence and the externality of the table we touch, just as immediately as we know our own consciousness. We not only know that it is, but that it is a *non-ego*, a substance distinct and separate from ourselves. Says Mr. Lyall, "I have sensations, impressions, ideas; how do I know that

* See Table of Contents, p. 1.

these are anything more than sensations, impressions, ideas?" (p. 14.) Sure enough. But suppose that in addition to these subjective states, or modifications of self, I also cognize an external object, or an intuitive truth, (as that no two bodies can fill the same space at the same moment,) do I not know these things as immediately as I know my own consciousness? What is my consciousness here but a consciousness of immediately knowing these and other like things: and is it here a false witness? How, then, shall it be trusted for anything? *Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus*. All our knowledge is obtained either by intuition or deduction. But it is so evident as to be universally conceded, that all deduction must depend ultimately on what we know by intuition, else it is like a chain without a staple. If consciousness then be "the only immediate object of cognition," how can we, by deduction or inference, ever get beyond it? We are reminded of the curt answer of Dr. Emmons to a young clergyman, who asked him why so many ministers had few or no inferences at the end of their sermons. He replied, "because they have nothing to infer from." If all that the author means is, that it is only in and through our consciousness as a condition of all our mental states, that we are aware of the immediate knowledge of other things, this is not only true, but a truism. And this would seem to be what he has in view, if we may judge from such passages as the following, in his argument. "Even those principles which are perceived by pure reason, and are first truths of the mind, are known only as they are the subjects of consciousness." (P. 15.) But it is none the less unwarrantable, notwithstanding, to say that they are not "objects of immediate cognition." The mind is conscious that it knows them immediately, and not by indirection; consciousness, indeed, is simply the knowledge that it so knows them. The author contends with good ground against Dr. Brown, that we perceive external objects by an intuition, i. e., by immediate knowledge. (P. 24.) This is the truth, and our only defence against the idealism of Hume and Berkeley. But we see not how we can hold it, without conceding that somewhat beside consciousness is the "immediate object of cognition."

We are glad to find Mr. Lyall strenuously contesting the theories of Brown, which eliminate the element of power from

the idea of cause, and corporate it into mere antecedence. And we are no less rejoiced to find that in doing this, he does not swing over to the opposite extreme—of late, the fashion of some theistic advocates—of resolving all power and causality into the immediate exercise of the divine efficiency. The following extract will show that the author comprehends the scope and reach of this question, while it affords a happy illustration of the general soundness and freedom from extravagance, of his thinking:

“Every subordinate agency holds of God, but it is an agency; it has an independent action, or there is no subordinate agency; and Spinozism or Pantheism are the true theories of the universe, making God to be all, or all to be God. In this view, then, subordinate agency is absolutely necessary in the universe; and there must be a consistency between independent subordinate agency, and yet a divine agency on which that subordinate and independent agency is still dependent. This looks like a contradiction to which our reasons must succumb. It is what we observe; it is the phenomenon exhibited in *creation*. Creation is the Creator calling into existence agencies besides himself; to give them independent action was not surely impossible, otherwise God is still all, and creation is, as Spinoza makes it, the effluence of God, and nothing apart from Him—but a mode of the divine action and not distinct from God.” Pp. 590–1.

We quote this with the more satisfaction, as we have felt called upon to say substantially the same things in reference to the position taken on this subject by a recent school of theistic writers. We also notice with pleasure that he resists the Kantian theory, espoused also, as we are surprised to find, by Whewell, that space and time are purely subjective, mere forms of thought. For, although, with our limited faculties, it is hard to say whether they are either substances or mere attributes, yet it is simply absurd to say that the distance across the ocean, or the time passed over in the history of the world, are mere forms of our own thoughts, having no objective reality without ourselves. It is a mode of thinking which tends to, and has often issued in, sceptical idealism.

We cannot pass over the author's remark, that Sir William

Hamilton's resolution of the doctrine of causality into "our impotence to conceive the possibility of an absolute commencement," means merely the impossibility of conceiving an effect without a cause. P. 75.

The truth is, that every effect or event is a commencement or beginning of something new, which did not exist before, either in substance or in form. It is just this commencement or beginning to be of something that was not, that the mind undertakes to account for, when it postulates a cause, or asserts that every event must have had a cause. But the idea that there could have been no beginning, so far from accounting for the fact, simply denies it; so far from explaining the idea of causation, virtually annihilates both cause and effect. If this were like many other things of the sort, a mere ingenious speculative figment, having no further reach, we should not deem it worthy of even this casual notice. But it seems to us impossible, on this theory, to preserve any substantial distinction between Creator and creatures. Do not man and nature thus become mere forms, developments, phenomena of the one eternal God? How then shall we escape the Monism or Pantheism of Hegel. We have noticed that several writers have objected to Hamilton's theory of causation, as invalidating the great argument for the being of God, which ascends from the universe of effects to one great First Cause. We think that it is objectionable on this score; but we think it still more so, as tending to that Pantheism which is the worst form of Atheism—although the great metaphysician meant not so, and, doubtless, detested this philosophic abomination as heartily as we. Let the following passage, among others which occur in his discussion of this subject, show whether we have spoken in our haste.

"Now, we are unable to think, that the quantity of existence of which the universe is the conceived sum, can be either amplified or diminished. We are able to conceive, indeed, of the creation of a world; this, indeed, as easily as the creation of an atom. But what is our thought of creation? It is not a thought of the mere springing of nothing into something. On the contrary, creation is conceived, and is by us conceivable, only as the evolution of existence from possibility into actuality, by the fiat of the Deity. Let us place ourselves in imagination

at its very crisis. Now, can we construe it to thought, that the moment after the universe flashed into material reality, into manifested being, that there was a larger complement of existence in the universe and its Author together, than the moment before there existed in the Deity alone? This we are unable to imagine."* It may be due to our own obtuseness. But we are unable to see why this does not make the creation a mere emanation from God, and consubstantial with him.

We do not see that the author's analysis of the cognitive faculties, generally interesting and able, calls for further observations. Nor shall we stop to examine the sections on the emotions, although of course we might note some things that we do not endorse in a disquisition, which, as a whole, we heartily approve. What we wish to say in regard to our emotional faculties, will appear in our observations upon the last section relative to the moral nature, which reaches through the powers of intelligence, feeling, and will.

The first and most fundamental question in Moral Philosophy respects the nature of virtue, right, moral goodness, and moral obligation. If an author goes astray here, we take little interest in following him further. All the various theories on this subject may be distributed into two classes—those which make right an original, simple idea, or quality, irreducible to any elements more simple and original—and those which make it a derivative from, and dependent on, other things of which it is compounded, or to which it is a means. All attempts to analyze the idea of right into anything other, simpler or better than itself, be it happiness, individual or general, utility, the fitness of things, sympathy, conformity to truth, respect for our own excellency, must of necessity fail. They presuppose the very idea they are intended to explain. For, why am I obliged to pursue utility, or my own or other's happiness, unless because it is morally right? The feeling of obligation to conform to truth or fitness of things, presupposes the idea of right, and that the mind has already the knowledge of moral truth and moral fitness. Sympathy is worthless, unless it be sympathy with

* Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, by Sir William Hamilton. Harper's edition, pp. 582-3.

right, and deference to our own spirits; excellency supposes that we have already a standard of excellence. But the fault of these schemes, as mere speculations, is not the worst. Every such analysis vitiates the conception of virtue itself, and, to the full extent of its influence, becomes the bane of morals, theology, and piety. We are glad to see that Mr. Lyall strenuously and ably maintains this view, and insists that the moral idea or quality is "ultimate." A treatise is always welcome to us which makes any contribution to the support of this precious truth. The grosser forms of opposition to it, which were so rife in theological discussion a few years ago, have given way before earnest conflict, aided by the self-affirming intuitions of the soul. But, if we no longer encounter Epicurean or Utilitarian ethics, we find ourselves confronted with laboured efforts to build morality upon the fitness of things, or deference to our own excellency, put forth by distinguished metaphysical professors and speculatists. In these matters, the thing that has been, is the thing that shall be, and we can look for nothing less than ceaseless combat with exhumed errors in the guise of new discoveries.

There is an incidental question connected with this subject which our author seems to us to have treated less happily. In vindicating the truth that moral distinctions are intrinsic, immutable, and eternal, such as no mere will can make or unmake, he occasionally uses language which seems to us unnecessary and unsafe. He pronounces the distinction "independent of God himself." "Were it to depend even upon the nature of God, it would lose half its worth, might we not say all its worth?" P. 491. "It is not too much to put this law then, not above God, but in a place of authority, in which it can be regarded apart from Him, and as of eternal and immutable obligation." P. 493.

Now we think it will not answer thus to set up a standard "apart from" God, and which does not "depend upon the nature of God," by which he himself is to be tried, and to which he is thus subject. It is certainly unnecessary: Right is none the less uncreated, eternal, immutable, in its origin and nature, although the first norm and standard thereof be the moral perfection of the Divine Nature itself. Is not this

uncreated, eternal, and immutable, and so far from being contingent on mere will, the very standard to which God's will freely and unchangeably conforms? There is no necessity then, to go beyond God in order to find a standard of rectitude that is intrinsic, and independent of mere will or caprice. To have an origin superior to mere will, is by no means the same with being "independent of God." Wisdom and truth are independent of mere will. They are intrinsic. Are they, then, independent of God? Is there any wisdom, or truth, or standard thereof, which has not its source, model, law, in the eternal and infinite wisdom and truth of God? Must God take lessons of or bow to some standard of wisdom and truth without, and therefore above himself? And is there any more reason why he should pay obeisance to any standard of morality or other excellence "apart from" himself? We more than suspect not. And we more than suspect that reverent people, the longer they ponder the matter, will agree with us.

If there be any such eternal standard of truth, wisdom, or rectitude outside of God, where is it to be found? Is it in some other eternal mind? And are there thus more Gods than one—a God over the Supreme God? But if it be not in such an eternal mind, where or how in the universe can it exist, or be conceived to exist? Tell who can. There is no need that zeal in combatting one error, should urge us to the opposite and equally dangerous extreme. The fiction of a standard or law of right "apart from" God, logically tends to more Gods than one. And although there may be little danger of its running this extravagant length, yet it lends great countenance to those who would set up the useful, the fit, the pleasant, the true, the beautiful, the good, or some favourite ideal of their own minds, as the ultimate law of rectitude, by which they presume to govern themselves, and test the merits of the divine law itself. Those who think that the revealed law of God needs amendment in conformity to such fancied standards, and who thus refuse to take the yoke and learn of Christ, are not now, nor ever, few. Withal, it seems to us, that the doctrine that God's glory, or the manifestation of his perfections, is the proper ultimate end of his own acts, as well as of the acts of all intelligences, can hardly

stand before the principle that he is subject to a standard or law apart from or superior to himself. In short, this principle seems to us to lower God, and in various ways to work a degradation of theology and piety. For ourselves, we desire no higher source or standard of goodness, than God's infinite and eternal goodness; no better security that "What he does is ever best," than that he cannot deny Himself; no surer object of trust than Him for whom it is impossible to lie; no safer refuge than Him who, since he could swear by no greater, swears by Himself.

The quality of right, our author justly holds, is perceived by the moral faculty, or conscience, or understanding, judging in reference to moral objects—for all these terms denominate the same mental power. So far, this faculty is intelligent and rational. It is no mere blind instinct or sensibility, as some would have it. But the judgments of this faculty have this peculiarity, that they are attended with correspondent emotions, pleasing in reference to right actions, painful in reference to the opposite. But because emotions follow moral judgments, it does not hence follow that they are the essence or basis of those judgments to which they are consequent. This were to install a mere unintelligent impulse as the rightful sovereign to rule our conduct. As has been well observed, this faculty is quite analogous to that of taste, which first perceives beauty or deformity in objects, and is then followed by an emotion, pleasant or painful, occasioned by that perception.

This subject is important, not only because it behoves man, as a rational being, to be under the government of a rational faculty, but because it bears upon the whole question of the relation of the emotional to the cognitive powers. It is often said by mystics, and divines of the intuitional or transcendental school, that religious emotions and affections are the sources and conditions of our knowledge of religious truth; that this truth cannot be known otherwise than by Christian experience; that theology is only the systematic development of the results of that experience; that it cannot be derived from external revelation, since this can teach us only what we know by our experience of religious feelings and intuitions; that this inward experience is the true inspiration, which, therefore, all Chris-

tians have as really, if not as strongly, as the sacred writers; that hence the true standard of faith is subjective within us, not any objective revelation. These men are wont to speak with great emphasis of the "perceptive power of Christian love." It is easy to see, that on such a system, the normal authority of the word of God is a nullity. The only authoritative law to each man is his own feelings and preferences.*

Of the many things which might be said in refutation of this dangerous system, all the more dangerous because it so artfully simulates and perverts to its own interest, the great Christian fact of the necessity of spiritual illumination and Christian experience, we wish now simply to signalize one. It is this. Emotion follows and results from intellectual apprehension. It is not the cause or ground of such apprehension. Whenever the soul moves or is moved in the form of feeling, desire, inclination, or affection, it is in view of some object so apprehended that it thus moves, or is moved. The reverse process of first loving or hating an object, and then perceiving it, is simply an absurd contradiction of our own consciousness. Christian feelings, emotions, and affections are awakened and moulded by the perception and belief of Christian truth. They are Christian only in so far as they are actuated by and conformed to that truth. The "perceptive power of Christian love" is what is implied in the love of truth already perceived. So far from doing away with the necessity of an external standard, it is by its conformity to the Scriptures that we can determine this or any other affection to be Christian.

Many reason about the emotions, as if they were precisely like the bodily sensations or animal appetites—blind, unintelligent feelings or impulses. Sensation precedes and is conditional to the perception of external objects. In touch and vision, for example, the sensation felt precedes, and is requisite to the perception of the object causing it. But even here, the stronger and more obtrusive the sensation, the weaker is the perception, and *vice versa*. The one is inversely as the other, as Hamilton has acutely observed. In vision the sen-

* See Morell's Philosophy of Religion; also Dr. Bushnell's Discourse on Dogma and Spirit.

sation is seldom noticed. The object seen commands the entire attention. In taste and smell, the sensation is the obtrusive thing; in the latter case, the perception of the object causing the sensation is only indirect and inferential. Thus even if the resemblance between bodily sensation and mental emotion were closer than it is, it would furnish but a slender basis for the system which derives intelligence from feeling; since the intelligence would grow weak as the feeling grows strong. But in fact all mental emotion or feeling is consequent upon, and shaped by the intellectual view which excites it. It does not produce, it is dependent on the cognition.* This simple fact, to go no further, overturns this whole mystical and infidel theory, which exalts our own feelings above the written word. This latter view goes to derationalize man, by deriving his intelligence on the highest subjects from unintelligent emotion and shapeless impulse. In an equal degree, it compromises his proper dignity and responsibility.

There is another aspect of the emotions in regard to moral and spiritual objects, which bears strongly on this whole subject. We have said that the emotions are awakened by the perceptions of the intellect. There are many objects which may be known or apprehended in part, so that a certain order of emotions will arise toward them, while they are not apprehended in reference to those higher qualities which alone will call forth those higher and more appropriate emotions, of which these objects are every way worthy. This is especially true of the moral and æsthetic emotions. How many know all about *Paradise Lost*, the finest products of nature or art, except their exquisite beauty, or if they know this, know it only by the testimony of others, not by any personal discernment or appreciation? Of course, they have none of the corresponding emotions of love, delight, and admiration. Precisely the same thing occurs with regard to spiritual truths and divine objects. The unregenerate man often has a conviction of the truth and excellence

* Says our author, (p. 522) "The right is what is *worthy* of these emotions, not merely *what excites* them. The right is an *object of perception*, not merely *what produces an emotion*; it is an object of reason, not of feeling, but so an object of reason that it cannot be seen without feeling; it is perceived, but it cannot be perceived without emotion."

of the Scriptures, and of the consequent obligation to obey the gospel. But he discerns not the divine beauty, glory, and loveliness of it. He may have heard, and may believe, on testimony that these qualities are in it, but he does not discern them for himself. The difference is like that between knowing the sweetness of honey by hearing of it, and by tasting it, between knowing the beauties of a picturesque region by seeing them with an appreciative eye, and believing that they exist from competent testimony. Now, in regard to the spiritual objects and divine truths set forth in the Bible, it is doubtless true that the natural man may know everything, short of what is involved in the personal intuition of their transcendent beauty and loveliness, which alone can draw forth his heart in love, trust, delight, and admiration. That which is most important in them, he has no power to perceive, till the eyes of his understanding are enlightened, that he may know what is the hope of his calling, what the riches of the glory of his inheritance in the saints. There is no form nor comeliness in Christ to his view, that he should desire him. Hence the strict and literal truth of those strong representations in the Bible, of the impotence of the natural man to discern the things of the Spirit, and of his need of spiritual illumination. These passages are plausibly cited by the mystic and intuitional school of rationalists now prevalent, in proof that the gift of inspiration is still continued, and bestowed on all Christians, and that we must look to our own experience instead of the Bible for the truth; in short, that an authoritative external revelation is impossible. As well might it be said that the blind man, whose eyes are opened, is to look to himself and not to the landscape, to ascertain and determine its features and beauties. As well might we insist, that the cultured mind is to look to itself, not to the "*Paradise Lost*," or the "*Excursion*," to learn their sentiments and beauties; that the astronomer is to look *at* his telescope, and not *through* it to the stars, to find what they are; as that we are to look to ourselves, and not to the Scriptures to find what they teach, and what beauties they contain, when God opens our eyes to understand wondrous things out of his law.

The true inward light which God's Spirit sheds into the soul, leads it to search, to understand, to believe, love, and obey the

Scriptures as God's infallible truth, the rule of all faith, the guide of all feeling, the test of all doctrine. Where this effect is not produced, whatever else there may be, there is no divine light in the soul. "To the law and the testimony; if they speak not according to this word, it is because *there is no light in them.*" Isa. viii. 20.* On any other supposition, it is clear that there can be no objective standard, by which religious feeling is either to be moulded or tested. Enthusiasts have it all in their own way; and not only they; all infidels and free-thinkers have an authoritative standard of truth and duty within, which legitimates their revolt from Christianity. Their feelings of aversion to the truth as it is in Jesus, are *inspiration!* This will never do. It upturns all foundations, and obliterates all landmarks. If the foundations be destroyed, what shall the righteous do? There can be but one criterion in this matter. "He that knoweth God, heareth us. He that is not of God, heareth not us. Hereby know we the spirit of truth and the spirit of error." 1 John iv. 6.

It is worth observing, moreover, that our knowledge of the objects of taste, morality, or religion, may be sufficient to awaken just emotions of a certain kind, while it is insufficient to awaken those which are most essential. Many men, in reading Addison or Shakspeare, see enough to excite a certain high approbation, while they have not that insight into their peculiar beauties which produces positive delight, love, and admiration, and leads them to frequent communion with such authors, as a pleasure. So is it with different sorts of men in regard to the various objects of taste. This is eminently true of moral and spiritual objects. The conscience, unless seared into unnatural torpor, compels men in a sort to approve of, or at least, to sanc-

* The argument advanced by Morell and others, that there can be no intelligible revelations to the mind, of any truth which it has not already perceived intuitively, and hence, no external revelation, if good for anything, is good for a great deal.—How could the statutes of the state on this hypothesis, prohibit larceny, burglary, manslaughter, treason, or compel an answer to a writ of *quo warranto* or *scire facias*, in the case of those who are not schooled to know what these things are? How could any new treatise convey any information, or be any guide to those who do not already understand the matters of which it treats? Is it said that nothing but their own moral fault can hinder them from learning whatever they need to know in reference to such books? And is it not as true, that their own sin and moral blindness alone unfit them for apprehending the divine truth and beauty of the Bible?

tion and revere the good and holy—and to reprobate what is sinful and wicked. But this state is compatible with another, as all experience testifies, in which there is no such discernment and appreciation of the excellence and glory of God and things divine, as will allure the heart away from the pleasures of sin, and lead it to find its delight in loving and serving God, and in communing with him as the First Good and the First Fair, having none in heaven, and desiring none on earth besides him.*

Still further, it is of vital moment that we should not forget that this blindness to moral and spiritual excellence in God, his gospel, and people, is sinful and culpable. It is the fruit, or rather the essence of corruption. Deceitfulness is a radical element of sin, in its inception and continuance. Sin depraves all the moral faculties of the soul, cognitive, emotional and voluntary. Such is the constant representation of the Scriptures. Such is the spontaneous judgment of conscience. We cannot believe the man innocent who is blind to moral excellence and moral distinction, or who forms perverse moral judgments. We cannot but echo the denunciations of the Bible against those who call good evil, and evil good, who put light for darkness and darkness for light. An erratic conscience can never make wrong right. A good intention can never do it. The end cannot sanctify the means. Paul sinned in persecuting the church, although he verily thought that he ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus. It has been supposed that the opposite opinion would promote charity, and prevent persecution for opinion's sake. This is a great mistake. If a good intention justifies a wrong act, it will legitimate the hottest persecutions with which the people of God have been tortured. He who has persuaded himself that a wrong act is right, sins against his conscience if he does not commit it, against the law of righteousness if he does. He is in a sore dilemma, as

* Says Mr. Lyall, (page 510,) "There is a certain moral beauty as well as augustness, in the principle of right, and the one as necessarily inspires delight and love, as the other begets awe and reverence. This is not to destroy the rightness of the principle which awakens both, and awakens both equally.... It would seem to be necessary, in order to moral approbation being real, that there should be love as well as reverence for the law; it would be otherwise a distant reverence, not approval; there would be assent to the rightness of the law, not approbation. Distant reverence is at most a cold feeling, and it is not properly approbation till there is love."

has been well observed. His fault lies in neglecting to enlighten his conscience, his remedy in putting away his prejudice, his aversion to truth and goodness, and opening his eyes to the light. For "every one that doeth good, cometh to the light. He that doeth evil, hateth the light and refuseth to come to the light, because his deeds are evil." We have dwelt the longer on the moral æsthetics of our nature, because the topic is generally passed by, or but vaguely alluded to by ethical writers, and lies, we are deeply persuaded, near the roots of some of the most formidable errors of the present time.

We have read no part of this book with greater interest than the closing portions which treat of the will and desires, their relation to each other, and to moral responsibility. Some of the great questions in ethics and soteriology hinge on these points, which are mainly reducible to the following: 1. In what sense the will is a dependent, and in what sense an independent faculty? 2. Whether the emotions and desires relative to moral subjects involve moral responsibility? 3. Whether this moral responsibility attaches to the moral affections, desires and emotions directly, on account of their very nature, or only indirectly, in so far as the will has contributed to their formation?

We are of opinion, that no small part of the interminable disputes relative to this whole subject is due to an ambiguity, or, at least, inconstancy in the meaning of the words will, voluntary, &c., as used by most writers, and in ordinary discourse. Will is sometimes used for the entire optative power of the soul, which shows itself in the form of desire, wish, and choice, and sometimes for the last of these alone, or the power thereof. It means, in this case, the resultant or executive of the predominating desires of the soul, by which it goes forth in act for their gratification. There are few writers, however able in other respects, who do not constantly employ the words in question, in each of these senses. Thus, Edwards, who seldom used language blindly or vaguely, gives for his formal definition of Will, "That by which the mind chooses anything . . . an act of will is the same as an act of choosing or choice."* Again, he speaks of "immanent acts of the *will itself*, or of the *affections*,

* Inquiry on the Will. Part I., Sec. 1.

which are only certain modes of the exercise of the will."* But still further, in defining his position that the will is determined by the strongest motive, or "greatest apparent good," he shows that "the state of mind," its particular "temper," natural, acquired, or casual, has much to do with making an object appear good to one and the reverse to another.† It is difficult to see what is meant by "temper" here, unless those affections or desires which are so various in different men, and excite them to a corresponding diversity of choice. But then, if these excite the exercises of the will, it would seem, according to a previous definition, that they excite themselves. It is probable, however, that he was here governed by a conscious or unconscious reference to that distinction which he elsewhere so clearly defines, between principles or dispositions, and acts; by state or temper of mind, meaning an affection in principle; by exercises of will, meaning that affection in act. His real meaning might, doubtless, be fairly put thus: The acts of the will are considerably determined by its states; the affections are a class of the acts of the will determined by corresponding states of it. According to this view, will denotes the whole optative power of the soul, or what are often called the active and moral powers as distinguished from the cognitive. And this accords with the old distribution of the mind into intellect and will; by the former of which it knows, while by the latter it acts; by the former it apprehends things as true, by the latter, views them as good, and inclines to, or embraces them as such. Accordingly, Edwards says, that "whatever is perceived or apprehended by an intelligent and voluntary agent, which has the nature and influence of a motive to volition or choice, is considered or viewed as *good*; nor has it any tendency to engage the election of the soul in any further degree than it appears such."‡ Yet, if will be simply and merely the power of choosing, according to his first and formal definition, it is something more than the power of desire and affection. However these may be requisite to choice and determinant of it, they are not all we mean by it. They are antecedent and

* Inquiry on the Will. Part III. Sec. 4.

† Ibid. Part I. Sec. 2.

‡ Ibid. Part I., Sec. 2.

lower exercises of the optative power, the whole of which is often denoted by the term will, both in philosophic and popular use. It is so difficult for those who attempt it, to avoid this usage, that there seems to be some foundation for it in the consciousness of our race. All the exercises of the soul, beyond and consequent on mere intellection, by which it tends towards objects viewed as pleasant and agreeable, in the form of inclination, affection, or choice, are in their nature free. They are the free motions of the soul towards some object. Volition is but desire developed and executed. Desire is but inchoate volition. Hence, all those acts, whether of the body (as in the circulation of the blood, or from outward coercion,) or of the intellect (as in discerning a mathematical demonstration,) which involve no free motion of the soul towards any object viewed as good, pleasant, or from it as the reverse, are justly pronounced involuntary and irresponsible, in all those forms of expression in all languages, by which the race utters its universal and unavoidable convictions. On the other hand, all acts proceeding from the desires and inclinations of the intelligent soul, *including such desires and inclinations themselves*, are pronounced free and voluntary, and, if related to moral objects, moral and responsible. To say that an act is morally good or evil, well or ill-deserving, because it is voluntary, is, in all languages, just the same as to say, it is so, because it is an act done of one's own free-will, or desire, or inclination, or pleasure, or that it is his desire, choice, or pleasure. These phrases, whatever else they express, convey to every mind an idea involving the elements of freedom and responsibility.

While will is thus often, and for good reasons, used to denote the whole optative power of the soul, it is, of course, used *eminenter* to denote that condition or exercise of this power, in which its highest collected energy is exerted, i. e., in which it directly chooses some object or course of action, at the bidding and in gratification of desire.

Still further it is to be observed, that there is often a conflict of desires, and that choice is the outgoing of the preponderant desire in acts for its own gratification, and in denial of its competitors. Thus it is the acting of the will's intensest energy. And this brings to view the point at which the action

of the optative faculty becomes deliberative and elective instead of spontaneous, as in the case of the emotions and desires. As there are competing desires urging their own gratification, so deliberation and inquiry arise with reference to them and the comparative claims of the objects on which they severally fix. As we have already seen, the whole emotional and volitional power depends upon the intellect for light and guidance. As emotion and desire arise only with reference to objects as seen and apprehended by the mind, so they arise spontaneously on the mere presentation of such objects, without consideration or inquiry. But since the mind obtains light by inquiry and argument, as well as by intuition, so it employs either method in forming its judgments as to what is good or desirable. And when it comes to decide between given objects or courses of action, it inquires, compares, and deliberates for the purpose of determining which will best further the end it has most at heart. Thus the mind decides between various objects equally put at its election, and which awaken its desires, in nearly all volitions or exercises of will which immediately impel the man to any form of action for the gratification of his desires. As here then is a higher energy of will than in mere unreflective, though not unintelligent, spontaneity, so, on this ground, it has often been discriminated, by classing the exercises of the former as voluntary in distinction from the latter which are spontaneous. Thus the will is not unfrequently by the best writers put in contrast with its own feebler and more elementary exercises, just as the intelligence, as evinced in deduction and discourse, is often contrasted with its own more rudimentary exercises in intuition, perception, and especially sensation.

It is at this highest point of optative energy, as shown in executive determinations, or choices of different objects within reach, that questions have arisen and been controverted interminably as to the power which the will possesses over these determinations, and all the springs and motives in which they originate. Without adverting to the extravaganzas of ultraists on either side, it is enough to say that the question here is not whether the will is free in choosing, or has an alternative object offered to its election; but whether it is of the essence

of liberty and responsible choice, 1. That there should be an ability, under precisely the same motives of external inducement and inward inclination, which prompt it freely to make a given choice, to make the contrary choice: 2. Whether the will is thus a power capable of contravening reason, desire, all internal and external motives, and acting from a state of pure indifference to the objects chosen. The statement of these questions is their answer to all who consult their own consciousness, or would not degrade the will from a rational and responsible to a senseless and hap-hazard agent; and, at the same time, put blind contingency in place of Infinite Wisdom on the throne of the universe. But it becomes all the more clear and incontestable, if we view desire and volition as different stages of the same movement of the soul after its object.

In reference to this subject, Mr. Lyall says, "We never act without a motive; and a motive is just a state of desire, along with a judgment, producing preference and leading to volition. . . It is the strongest desire upon the whole that leads to action. The prevailing desire may not have very much the aspect of a desire; it may seem rather a judgment merely, that a certain course of action is best; but a desire follows that judgment, and the reason that it may be less lively than the other is, that it is the desire, perhaps, of advantage, of worth, something valuable in the estimate of the mind—the desire of value, not of happiness." Pp. 554—556.

While this is undeniable, we think it entirely consistent with certain qualifying or explanatory views which the author offers, and which are requisite to a rounded view of the subject. When these are overlooked, as they often are, by zealous Necessarians, they leave man's free and responsible activity too near the borders of fatalism or passive causation. He says, "the will follows reasons, inducements, but it is not *caused*. It cannot in any proper sense be said to be so. It obeys, or it acts under inducement, but it does so sovereignly." P. 581. "It exhibits the phenomenon of activity in relation to the very motive it obeys. It obeys it rather than another. It determines in reference to it, that it is the very motive which it will obey. There is, undoubtedly, this phenomenon exhibited, the will obeying but elective, active in its obedience. If it be asked,

how this is possible, how the will can be under the influence of motive, and yet possess an intellectual activity, we reply, that this is one of those ultimate phenomena which must be admitted, while they cannot be explained." P. 592.

We deem this view, not indeed every word of the author, but his substantial meaning, important, and fully borne out by consciousness. We are conscious of being active and free in choice, and yet of not being independent of motive. It is important to shun the quicksands of indifference. It is no less important to shun the hidden rock of fatalism which lies in close neighbourhood. It is far safer and more rational to admit both facts, whether we can explicate them into logical harmony or not, than to deny either. Every man knows that his choice is his own free act. No man can conceive of himself as making a choice without any reason or motive for doing it.

When our author contrasts the acts of the will with the emotions and desires, in this respect, as if the mind were passive in the latter, and they were effects wrought in it otherwise than by its free activity, we think him less felicitous. We think this mistake arises from his overlooking the fact, that all these are diversified exercises of one and the same radical faculty, and is the source of some of the perplexities which he encounters in treating of the desires. He says, "Is this action then, the peculiar action of the will to be resolved into an effect merely? Is it an effect just as the emotion is an effect—the desire is an effect—and the whole motive is an effect of circumstances determined by causes? It cannot be said so." P. 592. Now here, we apprehend, is a great though common misconception. The emotions and desires, [except animal appetites and the like] are indeed effects. So also, are volitions. But effects of what? Of the soul's free, intelligent activity. In this case, the passivity is in the objects of desire or choice. The activity is in the mind choosing or desiring. In the spontaneous inclinations there may be a lower form or degree of this activity than in volition—but they are none the less, as Edwards says, "certain modes of the exercise of the will."* They are none the less,

* Mr. Lyall seems to recognize the truth on this subject, when speaking of the first rising of sinful emotion in our first parents. "Here is a volition which it would be difficult to trace to any previous motive, the previous state of the moral

in their measure, exercises of freedom. The love of God, the desire of fame, the thirst for wealth, are free, intelligent outgoings of the soul, totally distinct from involuntary animal appetites, the circulative and respiratory motions of the body, or the mere cognition of facts which excite no emotion.

This view relieves us of all difficulty in ascribing to the desires and emotions of the soul on moral subjects, that moral responsibility which conscience compels us to fasten upon them, despite all logical and speculative objections. So our author constantly maintains, that "while it is to action (volition) that morality belongs, the morality of action depends upon the motive; it is in motive that morality resides. The purpose, intention, feeling, with which an action is done, gives its character to an action." P. 599. This view seems to require that the moral emotions and desires should involve, and be the first subjects of moral character and responsibility; and that so far from deriving these from volition, which is prompted by them, they have them in themselves, and impart them to volition. This our author seems to hold. He says, "a moral emotion without a moral character, seems a contradiction. What can a volition do to that emotion in itself considered? The volition is but the consent to the emotion; the emotion is moral in itself, whether good or bad, virtuous or vicious. If the will could render an emotion good or bad, it would have a transmuting power." P. 601. Again: "it is essential that in the moral emotions there be morality. They are moral in themselves, and an act of the will is not needed to make them so." P. 603. Accordingly, he strenuously and justly impugns the favourite theory of Chalmers, which that great man would proclaim "with the pomp and circumstance of a first principle," that no emotion is "moral or immoral which is not voluntary," i. e., in some way produced or adopted by a volition as distinguished from an emotion. Few maxims are more plausi-

agent being one of perfect moral rectitude. A wrong emotion first will hardly account for the phenomenon in this case. *There must have been consent in the very emotion which first sprung up in the now fallen nature. . . . There would be consent to the emotion, for the very admission of the emotion would be consent.*" P. 603. Thus the very admission of an emotion involves the free consent or activity of the soul. Again he says, speaking of benevolence, "the emotion will be the regent principle, the will, the ancillary and executive. The emotion must will." P. 604.

ble, groundless, or dangerous than this. Its plausibility arises from the ambiguity of the word "voluntary," as already shown. It is proved groundless as soon as that ambiguity is evinced. Its danger lies in ruling out of the domain of moral responsibility, the deepest moral qualities and exercises of the soul. Says Mr. Lyall, "Let covetousness, or improper desire, be the emotion in the mind, is there no blameworthiness till the will has put its stamp upon the emotion, or followed it into action? . . . There was immorality in the first motion in the direction of covetousness or impure desire. The simplest state of the emotion was wrong, must be wrong. If it was inconsistent with the right, then it must be wrong; if it has an improper direction when the will has taken effect, it had the same direction from the first. There is no new direction, and therefore there can be no new character derivable from the will. The state decides the emotion, and if depraved, the emotion must be depraved; and does depravity infer no morality? Does morally depraved nature infer no punishment? All this seems like repeating a truism." Pp. 605, 6.

This is another among the many instances, which illustrate the sound and healthy tone of Mr. Lyall's thinking, in the great results upon which he settles, even when there is some confusion in the speculative and logical processes by which he supports them. Taking for granted the principle which has been current with many ethicists, especially since the time of Chalmers, that the will is simply the executive of the optative faculty, the source of volitions and not of desires and emotions; and that the latter are passive effects, produced otherwise than by the free internal power of the soul, he finds himself compelled to face the formidable puzzle, how these passive effects can involve that moral responsibility which confessedly attaches to them. A large class, with Chalmers, derive this responsibility from their alleged dependence on volition, and deny its existence beyond the sphere of such dependence. But this solution, so far from relieving, only complicates the difficulty. For it is a first principle, that choice is prompted by desire, and derives its character from that desire. So says con-

sciousness. So says Mr. Lyall. So says Chalmers.* So say all, when pressed clearly to define their position. If, then, volition itself depends for its moral character on the emotions which prompt it, how do these get their morality from the volition? There is no such process. Moral character is inherent in the moral emotions from their very nature, as our author well maintains. This is so true, that even where there is a volition antagonistic to an evil desire, arising from the preponderance of conflicting desires, the conscience charges guilt for the presence of such wrong emotion. If, at the bidding of conscience, or a due regard to my well-being, I resolutely strive to subdue the feeling of envy to which I am prone, I still feel guilty for its uprisings. So the Apostle mourns, and all Christians with him, that when they "*would* do good, evil is present with them." Doubtless there is a guilt in allowing and cherishing such passions, which he escapes who repents of and wrestles against them. But this does not destroy the guilt of the motions of sins themselves. This can only be taken away by the blood of atonement. Here lies the Christian conflict, which all Christians know, as a dire reality, but which is too often evaporated into thin air by a false philosophy.

But yet, although our author is with us thus far, this theory of the passivity of the emotions requires him to bring in the will, (in the narrow sense as distinguished from the emotional faculty,) somewhere, in order to legitimate our moral responsibility for them. We have already seen that he holds that "the emotions are moral in themselves, and an act of the will is not needed to make them so." For what then is it necessary? "*An act of the will only makes them ours,*" says the author. "The relation of will to morality is only in making *the act* or *the state* our own." But by what volition are they made ours? He answers, "our emotions are our own in virtue of that primordial volition that occasioned the first apostacy." Pp.

* "A determination of the will may be viewed, not merely as the prior term to the act which flows from it, but also as the posterior term to the influence which gave it birth; or, in other words, either as the forthgoing of a power, or as the result of a susceptibility." (Chalmers's Moral Philosophy, Chap. 4.) "It is quite indispensable, then, that the beneficence should be originated, not by the hope of return, but by a proper impulse of its own—by a genuine principle of well-doing." *Ib.* Chap. 9.

602, 8. "If Dr. Chalmers had taken into account the primordial volition from which our depraved nature took effect; and if his remarks had regarded that volition—all our emotions characterized by that volition, or connected with the guilt of that one act of the will—the principle he announces might have been admitted; for undoubtedly guilt is attached to our depraved nature as springing out of that one volition. How otherwise could there have been *depravity*? And how can *depravity* be separated from guilt? A mere *pathological state* in which there is evil, is impossible." P. 606. "Now was man the cause of his own evil nature? In one sense, he was, in another, he was not. He was, *through federal representation*; he was not, *directly himself by his own immediate act*. The question comes to be then, how far does federal representation make the act his own? And here it must be unequivocally admitted that such a constitution does make the act truly his own, and that for his state man is now responsible; that even for evil in his very nature he must be held guilty. . . . But this very view of the matter shows that volition, will, is necessary in order to moral culpability; for it is *will*, that makes any state our own; without volition, any state would be as little our own as the state of any other being." P. 500. "It is not the will that makes the emotion moral, but a moral emotion supposes the possibility of volition. The two states are the complements of each other. The mind consenting to the emotion, is will in relation to the emotion. . . . The emotion must will." P. 604. "The very admission of the emotion would be consent." P. 603.

We have quoted thus largely, italics and all, that the author's views might be fairly exhibited. We think that our readers will feel with us, that there is some confusion in these views, and that this confusion arises from the clear conviction of the writer that our moral emotions involve responsibility in their very nature, on the one hand; and on the other, from the theory that without an act of volition added to them, they are mere "pathological states," out of the sphere of freedom and responsibility. The first of these propositions is unquestionable. The second is the cause of all the embarrassment. Is it true? Is it consistent with many of the author's own statements? Who could af-

firm more abundantly or decisively that it is not the will that makes the emotion moral, and that it has moral character in itself? For what purpose, then, is the volition needed? To make the emotion our own, it seems. Is this so? Is not the emotion of love, hatred, or envy in any soul, that soul's "own," be there any additional act of the will or not? We think this can hardly be denied. Besides, is there, or can there be, any act or quality having moral character, that does not belong to a rational soul? Never. "Emotion must will." "The very admission of it would be consent," to adopt our author's phrase, so far as to make it fully that soul's "own," in which it arises. On his own showing, therefore, we see no occasion to look further than the emotion itself, to fasten responsibility upon it.

This is all the more evident, when we consider where he is at length obliged to find the guilty volition. It is the choice by which Adam fell, that makes our sinful emotions properly our own, and so properly culpable. We need not here declare our belief in the federal headship of Adam; his representative character in his first sin, the consequent imputation of that sin to his posterity; their condemnation and abandonment to sin and death, as the punishment of that first transgression when the race was tried and fell with him. We believe this doctrine scriptural, a far more rational solution of the present condition of our race, than any that has been offered to supplant it; the key to a sound theology. Yet we do not think it has anything to do with each man's personal propriety in his own affections, emotions, and volitions, or his proper responsibility therefore. It has much to do with accounting for the fact that men are so far forsaken of God, as to be given up to corruption, to evil dispositions, emotions, affections. It shows this sad state of men to be a judicial visitation for their sin in the person of their representative. But it has nothing to do with making each man's corrupt state and exercises really his. They would be just as truly his, if they were in no wise traceable to Adam's sin. They are culpable in themselves, and we are guilty for what they are in themselves. If they are innocent in themselves, they are not made otherwise by any relation to Adam. If they are wrong and blamable in

themselves, they need no "primordial volition" of Adam to make them so. Accordingly, original sin is held to consist of two elements in the great body of evangelical confessions—1. The guilt of Adam's first sin by imputation. 2. As consequent upon that, the want of original righteousness and the corruption of his whole nature from which flow all acts of transgression. Inherent sin is doubtless the consequence of imputed sin. But being inherent from whatever cause, it is doubtless sin and our own sin, and like all moral acts and states has its character of merit or demerit in its nature, not in its origin. This we are sure is the testimony of conscience. Who ever thought of envy, malice, covetousness, being at all the more or less guilty—more or less his own, on account of Adam's fall or any other influence which may have fostered them?

But even if this theory would stand, a further perplexity arises in regard to this "primordial volition" of Adam, which thus makes our emotions and desires our own. If that, like other volitions, was prompted by desires, and derived its character from them, whence did these in turn acquire their moral character and responsibility? To meet this, Mr. Lyall suggests modestly whether "there may not be in the will a *power apart from motive*, and may not this very power, in the degree in which it exists, have been the cause of evil, evil in the will itself?" We rather suspect, it will be difficult to conceive of the will's making a choice, except for reasons, or with some end in view; and that, if this were possible, such an act would not be intelligent or responsible. The following proposition, we apprehend, exhausts our wisdom on the subject, without mastering all the metaphysical grounds of the mutability asserted. "Man, in his state of innocency, had freedom and power to will and to do that which is well-pleasing to God; but yet mutably, so that he might fall from it." That man was thus mutable, is past all doubt. That he is now mutable in many of his emotions and choices, is shown by all experience. That he is capable, under a due change of his internal state, wrought by the Spirit of God, of even loving and choosing the God he has forsaken, we rejoice to know. But that he is

capable of choosing, "irrespective of motive," i. e., of outward inducement, and inward inclination, is what no man can prove, and every man's consciousness disproves. Such a property is no requisite to freedom. It would be destructive of it. We are intimately conscious of our free and responsible agency. We are no less conscious that, in every free choice, we choose something rather than the opposite, and from motives and reasons which prevent the contrary choice. We know that we, not God, are the authors of sin. We may not be able to explain all this to the logical understanding. But we know it with a certainty superior to all logical deductions. We escape no difficulty, we only plunge into a thicket of new ones, by resorting to this figment of a power of motiveless choice from mere indifference. If such a power be essential to free-agency, what security have we that saints or angels will abide faithful another day—that almighty contingency will not usurp the throne of Almighty God in the kingdoms of providence and grace?

We have noticed, that among Christian and theistic apologists, quite a disposition has of late been shown to revive this Pelagian theory of the will, as affording the most facile solution of the origin and prevalence of evil in the universe. Mr. Thompson, in his *Prize Essay on Theism*, after conceding that "God is unalterably determined by the perfection of his will to do what is best upon the whole," p. 117, and that "the feelings, emotions, or dispositions which are the mind's motives to action, are not altogether uncaused [motiveless] efforts of the mind," p. 156, seems to set forth "an ability to act without cause," or a "power of choice without an adequate cause," as the only alternative to dogmatic fatalism, or semi-panteism. P. 158. We are not surprised, therefore, that he inveighs against those who, he says, "think they can exalt the Grace and Sovereignty of God by taking away the free-agency of man;" who state the "doctrine of human depravity in such unqualified terms, that one might think man were in that desperate condition which would have befallen him, if no Saviour had been revealed." Pp. 450, 1. There may be a few ultraists who deserve these vague denunciations. But they are uttered as being widely applicable to current Christian teach-

ing. In this aspect, their extravagance and their animus are too evident to need comment.

Mr. Tulloch, in a competing prize essay on the same subject, not merely clears God, as he should do, of the authorship of sin, by referring its origin to human freedom; but in meeting the question, why God suffers it, or the present degree of it, and does not recover the whole of our race from it, by the power of the gospel, says, "the idea of a forcible and compulsory advance of the gospel is not for a moment tenable, even as a supposition. For in the very statement of this idea there is already implied the annihilation of the moral quality in man. . . . Unless man were truly possessed of a will, the gospel would lose all meaning," &c. This implies, if it implies anything, that the true vindication of God for suffering the sin that exists in the world, is, that it could not be prevented without a forcible annihilation of man's moral agency. Our readers need no refutation of a theory which our Church has long since confronted and banished from her pale; which sustains God's benevolence at the expense of his sovereignty; which renders it uncertain whether another sinner will ever be converted, and whether the saints on earth and in heaven will be kept from falling; which makes the pillars in heaven tremble, and unsettles the moral universe. We simply note it, for the purpose of calling attention to those renewed, though modest and tentative efforts to put life into this *caput mortuum* of a scheme of theology, already effete, if not extinct, on this side of the Atlantic.

ART. VI.—*New Testament Millennarianism: or, the Kingdom and Coming of Christ, as taught by himself and his Apostles*; set forth in eight sermons preached before the University of Oxford, in the year 1854: at the Lecture founded by the late Rev. John Bampton. By the Hon. and Rev. Samuel Waldegrave, M. A., Rector of Basford, St. Martin, Wilts, and late Fellow of All Souls College. London, Hamilton, Adams & Co. 1855. 8vo. pp. 686.

To the Bampton Lectures the religious world is accustomed to look for discussions of the greatest topics of the day by leading scholars of the English Church. The series already forms a little library of itself, restricted however, by the will of the founder, to the Evidences of the Christian Religion, the authority and teaching of the Primitive Fathers, the Divinity of our Lord and of the Holy Spirit, and the articles of the Faith, as contained in the Creeds. It is further provided, that no one shall ever preach the Divinity Lecture Sermons twice, and that after being preached, they shall always be published. All these circumstances confer a special dignity and importance upon the University appointment, and afford a strong reason why the lecturer should choose a subject of high interest. The author of the work which we have named, has, in our opinion, not deviated from the intention of the venerable founder, in selecting Millennarianism as his theme; as there is perhaps no one theological subject on which there has recently appeared so much in print, or so much that is unscriptural, contradictory and absurd. As opposites cannot be true, this must be admitted by sober persons on both sides, or rather on all sides, inasmuch as it is difficult to find any Millennarian writer who fully agrees with any other.

The author of this work is a son of the Earl of Waldegrave, and a late Fellow of All Souls College. From his other publications, as well as from this one, we discern him to be of the pure Evangelical school of the Venns, Milners and Scotts; a branch of Christ's family which we hold in distinguished love and honour, praying that the Lord would increase them more and more, them and their children.*

* Mr. Waldegrave has given several publications to the Christian world, and all in this spirit. We earnestly wish to see the first of them reprinted here. Among

The Lectures evince an extensive acquaintance with the copious literature of this most extensive subject. Indeed, if we except works existing only in the German language, there seem to be no sources, old or new, upon which the diligent and learned author does not draw. We know the importance of ample collection and accurate citation in matters so delicate and so vexed, but we own ourselves to have been sometimes impatient under the extreme load of reference and authority, especially when presented in the indigested mass which is so much in favour with English scholars. Oral delivery, of course, rejects such array of authorities, and hence, no doubt, the peculiarity of such annotation in the present instance; but we frequently look in vain for any good reason why such and such materials should be in the text rather than in the margin. Our strictures have a general bearing upon this whole class of elegant and often elaborate works, in which the notes and the appendix are swollen with every afterthought, even though this ought to have been part and parcel of the original argument. At any rate, the distraction of mind caused by looking two ways at once through a whole volume should be reduced to a minimum. Before we leave the external arrangements of a work which has interested us so much, we must take leave to notice a certain peculiarity of a school which in all great respects has our sympathy and admiration; we allude here to the excess with which chapter and verse are noted. Far be it from us to complain of the frequency of biblical quotation: we only marvel at the disposition to refer every scrap, and often single words, to their particular site in the canon. If so Masoretic a deference to the letter of the text were really necessary to high views of scriptural inspiration and authority, we should rejoice to follow Mr. Bridges and Mr. Waldegrave in this chronicling of every sacred syllable, but we perceive no such benefit to set off against the perpetual ripple and interruption of the pleasing current. Where an authority is cited, we wish to know chapter and verse; but such minuteness is scarcely de-

them are "The Way of Peace, or the Teachings of Scripture, concerning Justification, Sanctification and Assurance, set forth in four sermons, preached before the University of Oxford, in 1847, 1848." "Grieve not the Holy Spirit;" and "Christ Crucified;" sermons before the University.

manded by every illustrative or pertinent phrase which happens to be in the Bible. But we gladly leave a point which is little more than typographical.

Mr. Waldegrave informs us in the Preface, that the present labour had its origin chiefly in his solicitude, concerning the young ministry of his church. As he was led about ten years ago, when select preacher, to bring before the University, in his "Way of Peace," the great and neglected doctrines of man's depravity and ruin, justification by faith alone, sanctification by the Spirit, and assurance of God's love, so in the present instance he is led to his investigations by the affectionate interest in young theologians and preachers, which was caused in him by long residence at Oxford. And how sincerely do we bless God, for providing such antidotes at the very spot where Pusey and Newman brewed their poison. Although we see, as yet, no signs in America of any prevalent morbid thirst for the imaginative schemes which tempt many warm and evangelical minds among the clergy of Great Britain, we know not what a day may bring forth, and therefore, welcome most heartily these contributions of a sound and learned theologian to the stock of prophetic lucubrations. The great questions are well put at the opening: "Shall this earth and this dispensation pass away when he returns? shall sin, the world, and Satan, from that hour, for ever cease from troubling? Shall the redeemed then at once enter upon the perfect and eternal fruition of their glorious rest? Or shall the earth continue? and shall generations of men continue? and shall sin, the world, and Satan be merely placed in abeyance, but not yet be utterly vanquished? In short, shall 'the glorious appearing of our great God and Saviour Jesus Christ' be 'the end' and consummation 'of all things,' or shall it not? These are the questions involved in the Millennarian controversy."

The lectures are eight, and treat of the subjects following: The Right Order of Scriptural Inquiry concerning the Millennium; The Kingdom of Heaven as now existing, the proper Kingdom of Christ; The Kingdom of Christ, as now existing, the true Kingdom of his father, David; The Ingathering and Glorification of the Church; The Judgment of Quick and Dead at the coming of the Lord; The Recompense of Reward to be

conferred upon the Saints at the second coming of their Lord; The Thousand Years, and the Little Season; The true Burden of the Old Testament Prophecy.

A careful inspection of these titles will of itself indicate the method of the author and some of his leading opinions. That these are not of the Pre-Millennial type is sufficiently obvious. It is our intention, not so much to discuss the points raised, as to give our readers some glimpse of the argument, especially as the Lectures have not been reprinted among us.

The First Lecture treats of the Right Order of Scriptural Inquiry concerning the Millennium. The very title speaks volumes. If we must proceed in all sound investigation and exegesis from the less obscure to the more obscure, and from things known to things unknown, then is it of great moment that we should not go about prophetic inquiry in a way that is preposterous. The true method is indicated in the following axiomatic propositions or canons of interpretation:

First: In the settling of controversy, those passages of God's Word which are literal, dogmatic, and clear, take precedence of those which are figurative, mysterious, and obscure.

Secondly: In all points upon which the New Testament gives us instruction, it is, as concerning the full, the clear, and the final manifestation of the Divine Will, our rightful guide in the interpretation of the Old.

Great attention is due to these grave sentences. Upon these hinge all the author's system. To our minds they seem countersigned and accredited as much by strict logic as by common sense. "Simple though these principles are, they will exercise a very material influence upon our present discussion. For they will direct our investigations into a course the very reverse of that which is usually followed by Pre-Millennarians. For it is a fact, more or less perceptible in all their works, that they lay the foundation of their argument and erect their superstructure with materials taken almost exclusively from the Apocalyptic and Prophetic domains of figure and imagery. The unfigurative portions of the divine word are not indeed left unnoticed; but I am guilty of no injustice, when I say, that reference is generally made to them, with the view rather of accommodating their statements to the conclusions thus

established, than of testing those conclusions by their unambiguous teaching." It is a very clear deduction from the first of these maxims, that our inquiries must be directed first to the strictly doctrinal portions of the sacred volume. Since symbol and allegory are the obscurest forms of Divine communication, we must not begin with these; or, as our author happily says, even if the controversy originate, as the Millenarian controversy certainly does, in the Apocalypse, it cannot be decided by it. And such positions concerning the order of inquiry touch not the authority nor the inspiration of the books intended, but only their perspicuity.

We are exceedingly well pleased with the strong good sense of the author in treating the vaunt of Literalism which is continually in the mouths of sundry extravagant zealots, as if no interpretation could be sound which is not literal. This fallacy has come to an end in the places where it began, but is perpetually taken up by new inquirers. There is a time when one must interpret literally, and there is a time when one must interpret figuratively; such is the dictate of common reason, in every language and literature under heaven. No man can proceed an hour in any branch of Scripture without finding it simply impossible to be either uniformly literal, or uniformly spiritual, in expounding prophecy. And the determination of the question, when one method and when the other method shall be employed, is referred to the second of the canons cited above; which is, that "in all points upon which the New Testament gives us instruction, it is our rightful guide in the interpretation of the Old." The basis of this rule is the grand truth that the New Testament is the inspired record of the words of that Great Prophet, of whom it was said, "Him shall ye hear in all things whatsoever he shall say unto you." The four Gospels were only the beginnings of his instruction. He himself declared the instruction given before his passion to be but part of his doctrine, and promised a fuller manifestation of his truth. Under the guidance and power of the Paraclete, the Apostles more clearly opened the truth, and thus carried out the teaching of the Great Prophet, to whom implicit deference is due. The remarkable truth which gives us the key to prophecy is, that

the Lord Jesus, in at least a hundred places, actually expounds the Old Testament: we have the direct quotation, we have express mention of fulfilment.

In cases where there seems to be a conflict between Christ and the old prophets, a difficulty arises. Here our author justly warns us to beware of "difficulties of our own creating." "Take the case of the ritual Law for a first example. You remember what Moses said of the place in which the Lord should choose to put his name there. There and only there were sacrifices to be offered. Thither were all the males of Israel to repair thrice every year. Harken now to the words of Jesus: 'The hour cometh, when ye shall neither in this mountain, nor yet at Jerusalem, worship the Father.' And this is but one example of many. What shall be done? The type must disappear before the Antitype—the shadow must vanish before the substance—the servant of the house must yield to its master and builder. For 'to him shall ye hearken in all things whatsoever he shall say unto you;'—and that, even though he speak of 'the middle wall of partition' being 'broken down;'—even though he tell how 'in his flesh he hath abolished the law of commandments contained in ordinances.' Nor is the lawgiver one whit dishonoured thereby. It is his greatest glory, that, under the plenary inspiration of the Holy Ghost, he wrote of Christ. And I render far worthier homage to that inspiration when I penetrate beyond the veil of a richly varied ceremonial, and discover within the whole gospel of the grace of God, than when, still tarrying without, I gaze with untaught eye upon what are, after all, but 'weak and beggarly elements' which 'perish with the using.' Nor is the case materially altered when it is the Prophets who are seemingly at variance with Christ. For there are, unquestionably, times in which the teaching of Christ appears, directly or by implication, to militate with the announcements of Old Testament prophecy, when at least those announcements are understood in their plain and literal sense. What shall be done? Another meaning of the Prophets' language must be sought for—a meaning which shall leave intact the unequivocal declarations of the Lord Jesus. For, 'him shall ye hear in all

things whatsoever he shall say unto you.' Nor are the Old Testament seers brought into disrepute thereby. To them the words of imagery are no reproach. On the contrary, figure is their natural style. And is it not their greatest honour also, that moved by the fullest inspiration of the Holy Ghost, they bare witness beforehand to Christ? He therefore shows the most true appreciation of their high dignity—yes, and he manifests the most true reverence to Scripture as a whole—who surrenders many a pleasant phantasy, rather than consent that the Prophets should even seem, where no imperative necessity exists, to contradict their Lord."

We consider Mr. Waldegrave as having set forth unanswerable reasons for the proposition, that whenever in matters of biblical interpretation an umpire is needed, the prophetic supremacy is vested in Christ and his Apostles. In so doing he has in no degree taken away the authority of the Old Testament, as constituting with the New, our rule of faith and life, but has only established a principle in the expounding of both. It is scarcely possible to exaggerate the importance of these maxims in the interpretation of prophecy. So difficult is it to gainsay them as premises, that we anticipate battle chiefly in regard to their application. Hence we proceed with interest to what follows.

The second lecture is upon the Kingdom of Heaven, which our author asserts to be now existing. Pre-Millenarians generally deny this, and project the kingdom forward into the great sabbatine and Personal Reign. In approaching the controversy, Mr. Waldegrave makes some important remarks. It may be questioned whether the mediatorial offices of the Lord Jesus are, in operation, separable from each other. He who is now Prophet and who is now Priest, is at the same time God's anointed King. The present kingship of Christ is clearly established by scriptural teaching, first of our Lord himself, and then of his Apostles. Our Lord himself spake much of a kingdom which he claimed as his own; so that the populace accused him of making himself a king. He further taught, that this kingdom was near at hand. It was, moreover, a kingdom widely differing from all that the Jews expected. "My kingdom is not of this world." "The kingdom of God cometh

not with observation." "The kingdom of God is not meat and drink; but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost." It was a kingdom which should be taken away from the Jews, and "given to a nation bringing forth the fruits thereof." Whatever this kingdom is, our Lord taught that it was gradually and widely to extend its bounds by the preaching of the gospel. To which must be added, that our Saviour describes it as continuing, mixed in its character, until the "end of the world." "Is it possible," asks the author, "that, after all, Christ did not intend his people to recognize in that kingdom, when it should be set up, the very kingdom of Messiah? Is it possible, that, after all, that kingdom was not to come for eighteen centuries, at least?"

The Apostles, in like manner, make this a frequent subject, but with this notable difference, that the kingdom which was before announced as at hand, is now spoken of as having been established. The kingdom of Christ is the Visible Church. They tell of the solemn enthroning of Christ and of his universal dominion, and indicate the connection between the King in heaven and his kingdom on earth. He is Head. All power is given unto him in heaven and on earth; and, therefore, evangelists go forth to disciple all nations. The preaching of the word with the Holy Ghost sent down from heaven is a dispensation of his royal bounty. Everywhere it is the doctrine of the Apostles, that Jesus has, from the moment that he sat down on the right hand of God, been as the Christ of God possessed of a kingdom which ruleth over all. This reign must continue till the last trumpet sounds, till the dead are raised, till the living are changed. It is most forcibly urged, that if, as Pre-Millennarians affirm, the kingdom can be introduced only by a personal manifestation of the King himself, it is unaccountable that our Lord gives no indication of a change so abrupt in the manner of his operations. "The sower sows; the leaven works; the mustard plant grows; until the 'end of the world.'" This 'end of the age,' indeed, Pre-Millennarians affirm to be the termination of the pre-millennial economy. But this proves too much for their hypothesis, since this advent is to be followed, not by a mixed, short-lived kingdom, but by

a kingdom of eternal heavenly glory. The scene of these pure joys is heaven itself.

We have followed the masterly argument very closely, but with an almost total omission of that rich array of Scripture proofs by which the whole is defended, but which could not be spread out in a review. The pious reader feels at every step the preciousness of the good old healthful doctrine, that Jesus is our present King, sitting on the throne of heaven. This is the consolation of his Church, that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.

The Third Lecture investigates the true meaning of prophecies which are claimed as proving that Jesus of Nazareth is yet to be manifested as King of the Jews; and concludes that the kingdom previously shown to be now in existence, is Christ's true kingdom of his father David. It is founded on the text, Acts xiii. 32, 33. If the personal reign were Christ's own doctrine, where should we expect it to be more explicitly declared than in Christ's own discourses? Preaching amidst the nationality of Israel, what stumbling-stone would he and his Apostles have been more prompt to take out of the way, than their objection to a spiritual reign? If Israel's ancient glory was yet to be revived under a personal reign, it would have been both pertinent and gracious to have said so, to a generation who were fatally offended at the Cross. If the doctrine was sound, the early teachers would have been forward to apply it in their missionary approaches to the children of Israel. They did not so approach them. Christ and the Apostles, indeed, spoke much of the kingdom. By parables, by discourses, by a triumphal entry, he made the kingdom prominent. The Apostles proved his lineal descent and title. But in regard to the nature of his throne, they taught that the earthly throne of his father David had found its intended anti-type in that heavenly throne on which Jesus was now seated at the right hand of God, ruling in the midst of his enemies, and making his people willing in the day of his power.

The New Testament writers teach the perfect equality between Jew and Gentile. The believing Gentile, though uncircumcised, is much more really a child of Abraham than the circumcised Jew, who does not believe. In the Epistle to

the Hebrews, and elsewhere, we see all distinction done away, and the priesthood, sacrifice, and tabernacle of Aaron superseded, so that, both spiritually and ecclesiastically, "there is no difference; for the same Lord over all is rich unto all that call upon him." Nor shall any such distinction exist in time to come. No intimation reaches us, of any departure, at a coming epoch, from the gracious uniformity of that spiritual process by which the true Israel is saved. The ritual wall of partition between Jew and Gentile is broken down for ever. The ritual service shall never be restored. It has done its work and fled for ever. The analogy of Biblical interpretation, and the examples of inspired exposition force us to take figuratively those very obscure predictions which seem to bear another meaning on their surface. The monstrous tenet of restored bloody sacrifice is utterly irreconcilable with the plain teaching of the New Testament. To tamper with whole trains of argument such as Paul employs on this head, is to weaken the foundations of our evangelical system. The Epistle to the Hebrews contains such a train of argument, which, as ably unfolded by Mr. Waldegrave, not only shows the incompatibility of the Mosaic worship with the present gospel ordinances, but forbids the expectation of any future economy with which the Levitical rites may not be incongruous. To this exegesis and consequent reasoning, which place the matter beyond all debate, we would ask special attention; as also to the subsidiary paragraphs, in which the learned and dexterous author disarms his opponents, first in regard to Paul's occasional conformity to rites, and secondly as to the pretext that future sacrifices may be eucharistic rather than piacular. The sum of this part is, that there is, in the kingdom of God, equality between Jew and Gentile to the very end. Of any pre-eminence of the literal Israel, spiritual or ecclesiastical, present or future, we have not the faintest trace, either in the writings of the Apostles, or in the records of their public ministry. Both are, and both shall be for ever, one in Christ Jesus.

Having thus disposed of the subjects, Mr. Waldegrave goes on in the march of his inexorable logic, to identify Messiah's throne, or the kingdom of his father David, with that very

kingdom of heaven which was ascertained in the second lecture. The Apostles, in announcing the exaltation of Jesus, declare it to be compleatory of the promise, that Messiah should occupy the throne of David. There is no secular pre-eminence in store for the literal Israel, for even now doth Jesus sit on the throne of his father David as a spiritual Prince. This is largely evinced from the Pentecostal sermon. The Apostles continually represent the Son of David as now enthroned, and bestowing salvation upon all the Israel of God. The prophetic kingdom of David is identical with the present kingdom of the Son of David. It is not two stages of one dynasty; the kingdom of David and the kingdom of heaven are one and the same in every respect. Here it is shown, that as both are spiritual, so both begin, and both shall end—so far at least as they end at all—at the same time; and the Apostles are cited as defining with careful exactness both the commencement and the close of this reign, which in both respects precisely coincides with the “kingdom of heaven.”

“Nor can the accomplishment be deemed unworthy of the prediction. The prophetic David is a far more exalted personage than David the son of Jesse; nobler far the triumphs he hath won. It is then but meet that his throne should be exalted in proportion. It is but meet that the blessings of his government should, in their nature and in the extent of their application, far exceed those of the kingdom of his earthly progenitor. No marvel then that when we search for the counterpart of that throne upon the literal Sion from which David, the son of Jesse, after God had delivered him out of the hands of all his enemies, and out of the hand of Saul, governed the literal Israel, we discover it in that heavenly throne from which God’s incarnate Son, having spoiled principalities and powers, and made a show of them openly, dispenses to the nations of the world, Jew and Gentile alike, not the poor, the ephemeral benefits of an earthly sovereignty; but the matchless bounties of a spiritual, an eternal kingdom. Such then was the line of conduct actually adopted by the apostles in their missionary approaches to the house of Israel. Instead of soothing their irritation by the

promise of national glory at the coming of the Lord,—they scrupled not to declare, on the one hand, with regard to the subjects of the kingdom, that in the Church of Christ the distinction between Jew and Gentile is for ever abolished,—and on the other hand, with regard to the King himself, that in Jesus of Nazareth, now reigning over the united company of all his disciples, is to be recognized the fulfilment of the oath which God swore unto David in his truth. My text is a faithful summary of their preaching: ‘We declare unto you glad tidings, how that the promise which was made unto the fathers, God hath fulfilled the same’—ἐκπεπλήρωσε—fulfilled out and out—‘to us their children, in that he hath raised up Jesus again; as it is also written in the second psalm, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee.’ And now what shall we say? Shall we affirm that the apostles have practised a reserve in the record of their ministry? Shall we allege that we have more light than they enjoyed? No! The only conclusion to which we can rightly come is this: that we are not warranted in expecting a future personal reign of Jesus as the King of the Jews. Truly the kingdom of Messiah is already in being. In the overthrow of Zedekiah the tabernacle of David fell from its local, its temporal glory: in the exaltation of Jesus it has been reared again with the greater dignity of an universal, a spiritual majesty. And that the Jews see it not is to be ascribed now, as then, not to partial acquaintance with the prophets—but to a blindness, wilful and total, to the true meaning of them all. ‘They that dwell at Jerusalem, and their rulers, knew him not, nor yet the voices of the prophets which are read every Sabbath-day.’ ‘Their minds were blinded: for until this day remaineth the same veil untaken away in the reading of the Old Testament.’”

The Fourth Lecture, on the Ingathering and Glorification of the Church, is founded on that bright and comprehensive passage, Ephesians v. 25, 26, 27; “Christ . . . loved the Church,” etc. It may be warmly and confidently recommended to sundry smaller minds among American Episcopalianism, that they may be taught how an honoured son of that Anglican Church which they are continually citing rises above their miserable and grovelling adherence to an earthly organism, in

which they place their covenant hope. Mr. Waldegrave holds forth to us, the Church, not of the ritualist and hierarchist, but of the Articles. Thus he teaches on this head: "Christ loved the Church,—Christ gave himself for it,—Christ sanctifies its members by the word. When their number is complete,—when the Word has done its work,—then, and not till then, will he personally come;—for then, and not till then, can he present her to himself a glorious Church; then, and not till then, can there be a 'manifestation of the Sons of God;'—then, and not till then, can 'the righteous shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father;'—then, and not till then, can the bride, the Lamb's wife, have made herself ready;—then, and not till then, can that heavenly vision receive its accomplishment, 'I John saw the holy city, New Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband.'" We wish our readers to ponder on these pregnant words, which moreover contain the sum of the argument on this part of the subject. And we quote—because Mr. Waldegrave quotes—the language of Mr. Brown's admirable work, already noticed in our pages by the hand of one whose venerable wisdom no longer dignifies and graces this journal.* "Dr. Brown, after discussing 1 Cor. xv. 28; Eph. v. 25—27: 2 Thess. i. 10: Jude 24: Col. i. 21, 22: 1 Thess. iii. 13: thus winds up his short but beautiful remarks:—'And now, I think it impossible to resist the combined force of these passages. One broad magnificent conception pervades them all—The absolute *completeness* of the Church at Christ's coming,—The spotless *purity* in which it will then be presented, "as a chaste virgin," to Christ,—The resplendent *glory* in which, as "the Bride, the Lamb's wife," she shall then be "adorned for her husband,"—The *praise* which will rebound from such a spectacle to the Redeemer himself,—The rapturous *admiration* of Him which it will kindle, and,—The ineffable *complacency* with which the whole will be regarded by 'God, even our Father.'"

The Fifth Lecture is on the great and difficult topic of the judgment; 2 Cor. v. 10, 11. Here he is brought at once

* See Princeton Review, 1847, pp. 564—579.

to face and overthrow the first resurrection. The lecture goes even more deeply than those which precede it, into the various and incompatible hypotheses of the Literalists, and is peculiarly valuable to American students for its indication of sources. Pre-Millennarians insist upon a personal advent and first resurrection, which may hourly be expected, and which must certainly take place before the reign of blessedness begins. Our author undertakes to show, that this tenet despoils the judgment of its legitimate terrors. All agree that when Christ comes, a "judgment of assize" will begin. He dwells on the awful circumstances which the Scriptures proclaim as attendant on its opening. He shows that all mankind shall be immediately arraigned at that bar; the dead and the living; with minute and searching scrutiny of individual cases; and he identifies this with the Great White Throne of the Apocalypse. He further settles the doctrine, that the just and the unjust shall be judged simultaneously, with an immediate retribution to both. Such is the awful view of the grand tribunal, which is opened to us by Scripture.

This is, however, introductory to showing that the Pre-Millennial tenet of a first resurrection and a personal reign utterly invalidates this the terror of the Lord. The statement which follows, and which is manifestly founded on a most sober and faithful induction of authorities, presents a mortifying and humbling spectacle of the shifts to which even learned Protestant and devout upholders of evangelical truth may be driven, by the assumption of false principles. Between the sober and the wild upholders of literal resurrection, there is a great distance; specimens of all the varieties may be found in the notes and appendix. Almost all are agreed in holding, first, that the day of judgment is a period of centuries; secondly, that the great assize has two parts; one the judgment of part of mankind in the morning dawn, the other, the judgment of the remainder in the evening shades of that great day of the Lord; thirdly, that while the righteous enter upon their recompense at the beginning, the wicked do not receive their doom till the close of this grand period. These views, in our author's judgment, are inconsistent with the scriptural terrors of judgment. In reference to 2 Peter iii. 7, 10, he says: "These awfully

simple words would seem to warn the ungodly of their own perdition at the coming of the Lord, and of the concomitant destruction of that earth on which all their affections are centered. But no! On the Pre-Millennial hypothesis the saints have all, without one single exception, been caught up to meet the Lord in the air:—and yet men must be found for the double purpose of replenishing the earth during the thousand years, and supplying materials for the great Antichristian confederacy when those years shall have run their course. Moreover, the earth of the Millennium must in all its essential features be identical with the earth that now is, else shall the letter of prophecy in general, as it minutely describes the scenes of that abounding blessedness, remain, after all, unaccomplished; yea, and the promise itself to Abraham shall be, after all, unfulfilled, which said that he was to inherit that very land for ever, in which he was, of yore, but a pilgrim and a sojourner. What was to be done? Some are for postponing the predicted conflagration till the close of the thousand years: others, acknowledging that that conflagration cannot be severed from the Lord's return, are disposed to treat it as an allegory:—others, confessing that there is no metaphor here, and that the time is that of the Lord's second advent, are forward to assert, that 'the heavens and the earth that are now,' mean merely Palestine, or Italy, or 'the prophetic earth,' that is, the Old Roman Empire, or the other hemisphere of our globe:—others again, unable thus to limit the extent of the conflagration, would notwithstanding forbid us to understand the words 'burned up' of destruction;—no! say they, these words point to a process of fiery purification,—divided in its action as some think,—by which the fertility of the crust of this our earth shall be increased an hundred fold."*

It is made to appear that some consider the final conflagration symbolical, while some make it partial, and some hold, as above, that it will renovate and improve; further, in regard to

* "Thus Mr. Brooks, *Elements*, p. 239, note 1,—Unfruitful land is now often pared and burned to produce a soil: and the soil formed by triturated *lava* is excellent! Similarly Mr. Elliott, *Horn Apocalypticæ*, vol. iv. p. 195. 'It has been said, for example, of the Great African Sahara, or desert, that nothing more than fire of this (volcanic) kind is needed to turn it into fertility.'"

the sheep and the goats, that some held them to be all within, and some hold them to be all without, the pale of Christendom; nay, that there are found those who maintain a "prophetic perspective" of such sort, that the sheep take their station at the right hand, and enter upon their reward, at least a thousand years before the goats are summoned to the bar to receive their doom. In recounting and exposing these startling and often disgusting results of false interpretation, Mr. Waldegrave is in nothing more admirable than in his serious earnestness: he does not conceal his grief and horror, but neither here nor elsewhere, is there a smile of contempt, still less an approach to *persiflage*.

The Sixth Lecture treats of the Recompense of Reward which is to be conferred upon the saints at the Second Coming of the Lord. Here the last two chapters of the Apocalypse come in for full exposition, as furnishing the principal continuous representation of the glory which is to be revealed. These are held to represent the reward in the richest imagery; to show that Christ will be present with his people in heaven. Mr. Waldegrave does not assent to the doctrine of a repristinated earth, as taught by Chalmers and others. The earth that now is shall be burned up; and this we are told in terms which import not refinement, but destruction. The inheritance of the saints is "incorruptible and undefiled," without mixture of evil, death the last enemy having been swallowed up in victory; a dignity proportioned to that of joint-heirs, an everlasting triumph of the palm-bearing multitude; an inheritance which, if Scripture can be made intelligible, shall commence immediately upon the appearing of the Lord. Such is the biblical account.

Over against this are placed the varying accounts of Pre-Millennarians, in regard to the circumstances which shall attend upon that happy presence of the Lord with his people. The tabernacle of God is with men, not in heaven, say they, but on earth: this is an integral part of the doctrine of the personal reign, and as such is here formally discussed. The promise of the land to Abraham comes under review, and is held to have been in due time amply fulfilled. Next are considered the "everlasting possession," and the "twelve thrones," the "meek" inheriting "the earth," and the "expectation of

the creature." All students of prophecy recognize the arguments founded on these passages.

Common readers have for ages gathered from the Bible that a period of unmingled purity and peace is to ensue upon the Advent. But here we are met by those Pre-Millennarians who teach that the Millennial state shall be vexed by individual corruption, sin, and death, and also by national sin and punishment. For while these writers assert a consummate glory in Christ's presence, they admit a terrible residuum of evil elements in the heritage of the Saints. Men of depraved natures shall still increase and multiply. The hosts of Gog and Magog shall come forth to battle, after the thousand years, out of some origin which Pre-Millennarians have been much puzzled to point out. Some have limited the Millennial territory, and—dreadful to relate—have brought these rebellious forces from America! Some have confined Millennial perfection to the beginning of the reign. Some have raised the wicked dead, to take arms against the King of kings. Some have espoused the dogma of Adamic innocency. Some have resorted to a waning of gracious influence among the Millennial races. Each of these hypotheses our author maintains to be a confession that the actual presence of evil after the Lord's return is incompatible with what revelation promises concerning the reward of the saints. He also discusses the expedient of those who maintain two departments of the world to come, a "Jerusalem which is above," and a "Jerusalem which is beneath." He grapples also with the much more important and much more general declaration, that 'the Lord is at hand' in such a sense that any moment may witness his appearing. This declaration he rejects as unsound, holding that Scripture has foreshown certain events which must be interposed before the coming of the end. The gospel must be preached for a witness unto all nations; Israel must be restored at least in part; the anti-Christian hosts must meet at Armageddon. The Apostles, indeed, taught believers to fix their eyes upon the Lord's return, as upon the consummation of all their hopes. But they not less certainly declared, that great events and long periods of time must first intervene. When some of Thessalonica were misled into be-

lieving that the "day of Christ" in the very sense contended for, was "near at hand," Paul hastened to dispel the error, 2 Thess. ii. 1, 3. In concluding this lecture, the author charges, that the Pre-Millennial doctrine reduces eternity itself to the level of time, nor can it even exclude corruption and sin. This contravenes the scriptural expectation of good things to come. The Scriptures everywhere designate this future glory by the word "eternal;" the other hypothesis, to be consistent, much exchange this for the word "millennial," a word which the Scriptures do not contain. Not that they ignore all that is eternal, but that their view of Scripture confines us to a temporal prospect. On the contrary a sound interpretation assures us that even now the souls of them that depart hence in the Lord are in joy and felicity, but that at the day of his appearing shall be revealed the full excellency of their glory. This their promised reward is their being "for ever with the Lord," in heavenly mansions, to which no evil can ever approach. No foe shall emerge from unknown quarters to mar this tranquillity. As soon as the Lord appears, his Church, now for a time militant here on earth, is to become the Church everlastingly triumphant in heaven. Such is the clear, tried, ancient catholic holding of God's people, in all ages, which is to be superseded by the sensuous imagery of an earthly kingdom.

The Seventh Lecture is in some respects the most critical, characteristic and important of the series, being that which treats professedly of the MILLENNIUM, and the "Little Season" of the Apocalypse. If in other parts of the work the author has done a negative work, here he becomes affirmative; here he sets forth his own doctrine of Millenarianism, though modestly and alternatively; here therefore we find our handling of his argument most delicate and difficult. If our abstract and summary should awaken animadversion, it will be due to the candid and able author that recourse should be had to his very words as they lie in this discourse. It is perhaps the more important for us to speak thus, because it is just here that we follow our skilful guide with most hesitation. In all that has preceded—particular expositions being excepted—he has carried our judgment, as having utterly and irreparably demolished the main pillars of his opponents: as to this hypo-

thesis of exposition, respecting a passage of nine verses, we crave time for reflection, comparison, and counsel. By which, moreover, we are reminded of a truth which singularly escapes notice, amidst the heated debate and emulous authorship of this exciting topic; namely, that while doctrines, and classes of opinion, derive their style and title from the Millennium, or Thousand Years, as if this were almost as frequent a topic as the 'CHURCH' or the 'CHRIST,' the phrase itself occurs in Scripture seldom and in passing. Of coming glory and the celestial reign we read much; of a Millenary period we read little. And this we hold to be suggestive, in respect to the symmetry of doctrine, and "the proportion of faith."

Mr. Waldegrave begins his exposition of the twentieth chapter with three postulates; first, that in the Apocalypse, many of the symbols which express Christian events are of Jewish origin; secondly, that as to time the book ranges over a period neither wholly past, nor wholly future; and thirdly, as to method, that it does not observe a continuous order. "Chapter twenty may, or may not, chronologically follow chapter nineteen." But chapter twenty exhibits by symbol two successive periods; of which periods, the second is immediately followed by judgment and eternity. Of these two periods, the first lasts a thousand years, and comprehends a binding of Satan, a reign of martyrs and a first resurrection;—the second lasts for 'a little season,' and comprehends a loosing of Satan, a deceiving of the nations, and the assault of Gog and Magog. Here then is the problem of exposition; what is meant by this binding, this reign, this resurrection? When we spoke of our author as presenting his solution alternatively, we meant that he exhibits two different answers to this question, both being opposed to Pre-Millenarianism. The first answer regards the thousand years as yet to come, the second regards them as already past.

First, then, in regard to the thousand years as yet to come. This is sometimes called the "spiritual view." Here chapter twenty follows chapter nineteen in order of time. Chapters seventeen, eighteen and nineteen foretell the doom of Rome, which is yet future. On this doom follows the Advent;—but in what sense? The symbol of chapter xix. 11—15, clearly denotes a potential coming of the Lord by the triumph of his

Gospel; and this is made good by Scripture precedent, especially from Psalm xlv. 2—5, and Rev. vi. 1, 2: "I beheld Satan fall from heaven." Luke x. 18; 1 Peter v. 8. The usage of the Apocalypse itself shows that the symbolic binding of Satan by no means implies his personal banishment or the total cessation of his agency. It rather denotes, that he is forbidden to gather a dominant party, or a dominant influence among the nations of the earth. Such is the exposition which this school gives of Satan's binding.

Next they consider the First Resurrection, which they deny to be a resurrection of persons, and maintain it to be a resurrection of principles; of such principles as those persons once held. The resurrection of the witnesses is a triumphant establishment, in the persons of their successors, of the truths which they witnessed. This view leads to such an interpretation of the second period, or ensuing "little season," as is confirmatory of the hypothesis. In this second period Satan is to be loosed. That is to say, Satan is once more to have a dominant party, and to make head for a last, desperate struggle with Christ and his Church. At the end of the first period—not at the end of the "little season"—there will be a resurrection. "The rest of the dead lived not again, till the thousand years were finished." On the principle of a homogeneous interpretation, this indicates a resurrection of those defunct parties and powers of evil which were in full activity before the Millennial age began. Of this resuscitation the consequences will be momentous. The arch-enemy will make his grand assault, but the Lord himself shall appear as Judge of quick and dead. Such is, in shadow and outline, the first of the two expositions which oppose a Pre-Millennial advent and personal reign on earth. In reply to certain objections founded on Christ's great prophecy delivered on the Mount of Olives, it is maintained, that this prophecy relates to the destruction of Jerusalem; likewise, that the predicted destruction of the Man of Sin does not necessarily require a personal advent of the Lord. From the passage which relates to this, in connection with the parable of the tares and wheat, Mr. Waldegrave infers that Popery, among other delusions, will probably survive till the coming of the Lord.

But, secondly, in regard to the alternative method, the thousand years may be regarded as even now in progress, if not entirely past. Here the author deprecates the impatience of those, who, with or without reason, have learnt to consider the word "Millennium" as a convertible term for a latter day glory on earth. It is the precise meaning of this term, which we are calmly trying to discover. Chapter twenty does not follow chapter nineteen in order of time. It contains a new vision, in which the history of the dragon, (broken off at the end of the second verse of the thirteenth chapter,) is resumed for the purpose of accounting for several phenomena which the Apocalyptic history has, since that interpretation, brought before us.

We now have to re-investigate the binding of Satan. Taking along with us all that is common to this with the former hypothesis, the "deceiving" of the nations may signify the invention and propagation among them of religious imposture; and the binding of Satan may signify, his being restrained from inventing and propagating any new religious imposture among nominal Christians. The thousand years would then denote a period, in which the old fundamental errors continue to prevail. The little season would denote a period, in which new fundamental errors and religious deceits will emerge. Rising and reigning with Christ are not the only characteristics of the millennial saints; they are also sufferers, and martyrs, and this at the hands of the powers that be. Mr. Waldegrave here prefers the more exact rendering of Dr. Wordsworth: "And I saw thrones, and they sat upon them, and judgment was given unto them: and I saw the souls of them that had been beheaded for the witness of Jesus, and for the word of God, and of them who worshipped not the beast, neither his image, neither received his mark in their foreheads, or in their hands: and they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years." On this supposition the thousand years will prove to be a period in which Christ's witnesses are witnesses even unto death—a period, in short, of martyrdom, not of triumph—a period in which Satan, (being precluded indeed from the invention of fresh delusions,) is able notwithstanding to wield those already in existence with such effect, as to make the

church of God to prophesy in sackcloth and ashes. The "resurrection of the rest of the dead" imports, that although there should never be wanting, during the thousand years, faithful witnesses, who should prove themselves to be indeed the blessed and holy partakers of a spiritual resurrection; yet it should not be till after the thousand years were over, and the little season had commenced, that the great body of truly living souls should be brought to God. "If I am right in thus understanding the words in question, the shorter period will prove to be a period marked indeed, as we have already seen, by the abounding of religious error among nominal Christians all over the world—*τὰ ἔθνη τὰ ἐν ταῖς τέσσαραις γωνίαις τῆς γῆς*—for Christianity shall now have extended its sway far and wide; but marked also by a far greater outpouring of the life-giving Spirit than has yet occurred among men.

"This then is the interpretation which I am inclined to give to this remarkable passage of God's word. I believe that it sets before us the working of Satan, for it is his working especially which is here exhibited to view, during two distinct periods in the history of Christendom.

"The first, the longer period, said to last a thousand years, is one in which Satan, forbidden to launch forth into the world any fresh impostures, does notwithstanding prevail with the aid of the civil power to persecute even unto death those faithful souls, who, being risen with Christ, are made by him kings and priests unto God and his Father.

"The second, the shorter period, said to last but a little season, is one in which the number of God's living saints being marvellously increased, and martyrdom being no longer the rule, Satan attempts by other means, even by the multiplication of religious delusions, to compass the destruction of the Church.

"The final issue of all will be the separating off and isolation, each in his own place, of the loyal servants of our God; a fierce and perhaps unprecedented persecution;—and, when Satan seems most likely to triumph, the appearing of the Lord, to deliver his saints and to punish his foes."

We desire here to renew our earnest request that this meager sketch of Mr. Waldegrave's argument may not be substituted, with any controversial intent, for his own full and

guarded dissertation; the rather as this is the most intricate portion of his labours, and that in which he arrives at the most startling results. Of matter pertinent to the subject of this seventh Lecture some is dispersed among the notes near the end of the volume. We ask special attention to all these notes which sum up the literature of Chiliasm, and here more particularly to that which indicates celebrated writers who have treated the passage just under review as figuring a millenary period now past. Among such writers we number Augustine, who dates the binding of Satan from the personal triumphs of the Incarnate Word; Dr. Wordsworth, who reproduces the Augustinian millennium, in his Hulsean Lectures; Brightman, Grotius and Cocceius, who date the binding from the overthrow of paganism in the fourth century; and Hengstenberg, from whom the following sentences are cited: "Strange truly is the prejudice against the view we have propounded of the thousand years' reign, as if it took from us somewhat of our consolation! as if it were fitted to overthrow our hope! On the contrary, it is very consolatory for us to know, that we have the thousand years already behind us; therefore, before us not the mere glimmering, but the clear day;—not the preliminary victory, which is again to be succeeded by a heavy reverse, but the final conquest. If the old earth is always to get more corrupt and full of wickedness, it is a great consolation, that we have got so far over the pilgrimage to the new earth on which righteousness dwells."

The Eighth and last Lecture defines the true burden of Old Testament Prophecy. To this topic the author is led by the assertion of the other side, that the Old Testament predictions constrain us to the expectation of an approaching period of unmingled righteousness and peace, such as the Lord's coming will usher in. The author derives his partition from the two-fold arrangement of counter arguments, which relate first to the matter and secondly to the tone of those ancient prophecies. First, as to their matter, Millenarians assume a reference almost exclusive to the literal Israel; and secondly as to their tone, Millenarians maintain that nothing has yet happened, answerable to their glory, for the counterpart of which we must look to the Great Sabbatism.

Mr. Waldegrave leads off the debate, by inquiring whether Old Testament Prophecy, under New Testament hermeneutics, favours the Millennarian hope. He goes to the Old Testament itself for laws of interpretation, and shows how extensively and how undeniably passages of oriental glow and poetic imagery, when collated with their declared fulfilment, establish another rule. The Law, the Psalms, and the Prophets are unequivocally cited by the Apostles and Evangelists about two hundred times; of these, more than one-half are predictions which are accompanied by express declarations concerning their accomplishment. "And in this manner," he strikingly avers, "we have keys, so to speak, by which to open at least thirteen out of those twenty-seven later chapters of Isaiah, with the true interpretation of which our present controversy is mainly concerned." He accordingly undertakes to show, that the language of the Old Testament prophets does not imperatively require that, in spite of all the plain statements of Christ and his Apostles, we should still harbour the expectation of a Millennarian Sabbatism and a Personal Reign.

In the order already noted he considers, first, the subject of these Prophecies. Here occurs a masterly examination of the pretence of literalism in interpretation; it costs us regret to pass this by. But as the main strength of Pre-Millennarianism lies not in the rule of a universal literalism extending even to details, but in the law of a modified literalism applicable only to the more prominent features of sacred prophecy, he proceeds to show that even when so qualified, the principle in question is not one to which, judging by scriptural precedent, the Old Testament prophets adhere. This he establishes by considering how the terms Israel, Zion, Jerusalem, and the like, are applied not in the New Testament, but in the Old Testament. By this induction he arrives at the clear hermeneutical ground, that we may lawfully give another than the strictly literal interpretation to that proper name of the ancient people of God, which most frequently occurs in prophecy. It is scripturally possible that these great proper names are part of a system of metaphors, by which the Holy Ghost did, in Old Testament times, picture beforehand the dealings of God with his Church of Gospel days. Nor could the case be otherwise, if figure

was to be employed at all in foretelling the Christian dispensation, a state of things differing in so many essential points from the economy then existing.

Another position which Mr. Waldegrave defends very ably is, that Israel after the flesh is not the exclusive nor even the main subject of the glowing predictions in question. He sets out from the distinction which always existed between the nation of the Jews and the holy seed which was the substance thereof. Both are sometimes called Israel. To both the prophets spake. "As the voice of warning to Israel after the flesh waxed sterner and yet more stern, so did the promise to Israel after the Spirit speak in tones of increasingly abundant and rich consolation." Of that consolation the theme was Gospel blessings. So that threatening and promise are concurrently fulfilled. "The warnings truly," says our author, "to Israel have been fulfilled, or are still fulfilling: and with equal certainty the promises to the Church have been accomplished, or are still accomplishing." That promise is not to the carnal Jew, "which is one outwardly," and who by certain modern Chiliasts is regarded with a preposterous veneration, but is the heritage of the entire mystical church, the one grand object of God's peculiar love. "He chose its members," says our author, "every one of them, in Christ, before time was. He purposes to glorify them all with Christ when time shall be no more. Nor have they ever been absent from his mind since time began to run its course." And he expresses there his conclusions in the language of Peter, which are also the words of his text, "Yea, and all the prophets from Samuel and those that follow after, as many as have spoken, have likewise foretold of these days."

Secondly, in regard to the tone of Old Testament Prophecy, it is alleged that nothing in gospel times, and nothing short of Millenarian glory can satisfy the conditions of those exalted predictions. As to pictures of the Church, the Holy Ghost, according to our author's opinion, often depicts a normal rather than an actual condition; and this when speaking of the present and also of the future. Again, there is a distributive plan in communicating instruction through the written Word. That which is partial in one statement, is complete in another.

That which is outline in one age is filled up in another. Add to this the truth, that the most glowing pictures contain some indications of an admixture of evil. Here certain passages are discussed, which are held to require the personal coming and presence of the Incarnate Word, and to foretell that the whole human race shall at some future time be converted to God. On this head, we frankly own that Mr. Waldegrave strikes the prophetic chord too lightly to educe its grand consistent harmonies, nor can we be fully satisfied with a concession so slender as that "it is quite possible, nay, rather probable, that the Gospel may yet achieve greater victories far, both among Jews and Gentiles, than it yet hath won." He does indeed make an admission, which is too seldom made on either side of this controversy, namely, that there are prophetic enigmas of which no solution is yet possible. The conclusion of the whole is impressive and elevating: "And now—men, brethren, and fathers,—I thank you all for the great patience with which you have heard me. It is not to be expected that we shall all meet again, till we stand together at the bar of eternal judgment. It has been my continued effort to make these discourses practical. Will you not second that effort with your prayers? Will you not plead, that it may be proved in that day that I have not laboured altogether in vain? For this you know, my brethren, that except Christ come unto us now in all his quickening, pardoning, purifying might, his second coming must be to us a day of unutterable woe. 'O blessed Saviour'—says one who loved the Lord and his appearing, and yet was no Millennarian—'how busy are the tongues of men,—how are their brains taken up with the interminable construction of this ænigmatical truth, when, in the mean time, the care of thy spiritual reign in their hearts is neglected! O my Saviour, while others weary themselves with the disquisition of thy personal reign here upon earth for a thousand years, let it be the whole bent and study of my soul to make sure of my personal reign with thee in heaven to all eternity.'

"Now unto the King eternal, immortal, invisible, the only wise God, be honour and glory for ever and ever. Amen."

In reflecting on what we have read in this learned, pious and

every way admirable volume, we find that it is not equal in all its parts, and that a few of its subordinate discussions do not attain the measure of the author's ability in this sort of argument. Supposing Mr. Waldegrave to be not yet forty years of age, we augur for him yet greater things, when he shall have worked the rich mine into which he has fearlessly gone down. The first six lectures we esteem truly golden. Not only do they rescue the scriptural doctrine of the kingdom from the hands of judaizing teachers, but in every part they breathe the spirit of genuine evangelical piety. Each step of the progress advances us almost as much in edification as in knowledge, and the harmony of gracious experience is evinced by the very arguments which dispel doctrinal chimeras. The argument upon the Millennium, strictly so called, is ingenious and able, disposed in lucid order and corroborated by various erudition; yet, we are obliged to own, it reaches us less powerfully. One reason of this no doubt is the libration of the author's own mind between two alluring hypotheses. But a deeper reason lies in the nature of the subject itself. On the clear, dogmatic ground, our author made solid discoveries; on the sea of millenary speculation, he is one among many adventurous vessels, seeking the great passage, and doubtless approaching many indications of it, but not yet fully authorized to triumph as a discoverer. The late Dr. Archibald Alexander, who was deeply read in this subject, and who was as humble, sober and patient in his inquiries as he was sagacious and sound in the resulting judgments, thus left his testimony concerning this matter: "To what period the thousand years in the Apocalypse refer, we profess that we do not know; and therefore, we cannot be sure whether it is past or future. We are, therefore, neither Millennarians nor Pre-Millennarians. But we believe that before the second advent of our Saviour, there will be a far more glorious state of the Church than has yet been witnessed, when the Jews shall all be converted to Christianity, and when the fulness of the Gentiles shall be brought in. And we believe that this blessed state of the Church will be brought about by the faithful preaching of the Gospel and the circulation of the Holy Scriptures in the languages of the nations."*

* Princeton Review, *ubi supra*.

These words express the spirit which prevails in the work of Mr. Waldegrave, whose sober and consistent theology and love for the Reformed Latin writings of the seventeenth century have continually reminded us of our late honoured father and fellow-worker, just cited. We are among the books of a library most familiar to the studious Presbyterian clergy of America, when as in these pages we alight upon citations from such men as Lampe and Witsius. There are tokens of our author's acquaintance with American interpretation, and this we hail as one of the many and increasing earnestnesses, that Divine Providence intends to bind the two countries together for ever, for the glory of Messiah's name. It is true a very small portion of Biblical learning in the United States as yet has proceeded from the Episcopalian clergy, and almost nothing from their Bishops. Yet the names of half a dozen American interpreters are as well known in England as are those of any equal number of British scholars in America. We accept it as a token for good, and welcome every such recognition as an olive branch borne across the waters. May the God of peace grant to these two great families of mankind, who after all are one people, an everlasting exemption from the curse of mutual war! It is a comfort to us to know, in regard to our side of the ocean, that this is, without any known exception, the fervent prayer of all our ministry, of every name, of all our colleges and seminaries of learning, of all our men of science and letters, and of all our authors, and of all our evangelical Christians. Amen and Amen.

ERRATUM.—Page 580, line thirteen from foot, for great sabbatine, read Great Sabbatism.

ART. VII.—*The General Assembly of 1856.*

THE General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, met May 15, 1856, in the First Presbyterian Church in the city of New York, and was opened with a sermon by the Rev. Nathan L. Rice, D. D., Moderator of the last Assembly, from 2 Tim. iv. 1.

This discourse was received with great approbation, and a copy was by the Assembly requested for publication.

After the completion of the roll, the Assembly proceeded to the choice of a Moderator. Dr. Francis McFarland, of Virginia, received 119 votes, and Dr. John M. Campbell of New York, 113; whereupon Dr. McFarland was declared duly elected.

Princeton Seminary.

The Thirty-first Report of the Trustees of this Institution was read, at the request of Mr. M. Newkirk, by the Permanent Clerk.

From this report it appears that there is at present in the hands of the Treasurer, James S. Green, Esq., the sum of \$12,010.05, of which a

Balance on Permanent Fund,	\$1254.85
“ Contingent Fund,	2648.86
“ Education Fund,	8742.29
“ John Hoff's Legacy,	4364.55
	<hr/>
	\$12,010.05

A new scholarship had been formed, to be called the John Hoff Scholarship, from the legacy of that gentleman, amounting to the sum of \$2500, and from the same legacy \$1000 had been appropriated to print the annual address contemplated by the testator.

The balance of the legacy of Miss Catharine Naglee had been paid in, and from this sum, as the necessity of a new Professor's house had been obviated, \$1000 were added to the Perma-

ment Fund, and the residue not appropriated continues in the Contingent Fund.

The Library had received valuable donations of 195 volumes, and by purchase two volumes. The present number of volumes is 14,057.

John Donaldson, Esq., the financial agent of the Trustees since 1845, had resigned on account of impaired health, and John C. Green, Esq., had been appointed in his place. The mortgages were reported by Mr. Donaldson as all yielding 7 per cent., and the interest punctually paid.

The Forty-second Report of the Directors of the Princeton Theological Seminary was also read, from which it appears that forty-one new students have been admitted during the year. The whole number present during the year was one hundred and one. One death had occurred. The religious character and studious deportment of the students were commended. Seven students had been licensed by various Presbyteries. The Faculty earnestly repeat their conviction of the injustice done to the Seminary and to the students themselves by their being licensed in the early part of their course, and refer the Board to their early and continued remonstrances on this subject. Twenty-four young men had received certificates of having finished the whole course of study prescribed. The Board request the Assembly to alter the Article II., Sect. 18, so as to read, "During the annual examination, or at its close, a sermon shall be preached before the Seminary by a member of the Board of Directors."

The report was put into the hands of the appropriate Committee.

Danville Seminary.

The Rev. Dr. Humphrey presented the reports of the Trustees and Directors of the Theological Seminary at Danville, Kentucky.

A motion was made to omit the reading of the remaining reports of the Theological Seminaries, and that they be at once put into the hands of their appropriate Committees.

Objections were made from several members on the ground that this would appear invidious. The mover stated that his

object was only to gain time. After some further discussion leave was granted to the mover, and he withdrew his motion.

The Rev. Dr. Humphrey then proceeded to read the reports of Danville Seminary.

From the reports of the Trustees it appears that the whole amount of funds under the control of the Trustees of the Synod of Kentucky, turned over to the use of the Seminary, under the action and pledges of 1853, is	\$22,507.94
Present amount of funds under the control of the Trustees of Centre College of Kentucky, turned over in like manner,	5,343.00
	<hr/>
	\$27,850.94
Total real estate held by the Board for this Seminary,	9,000.00
Cash, notes, stocks, &c.,	40,484.18
	<hr/>
Total,	\$77,335.11

This sum is considerably larger than was originally pledged for Kentucky to the General Assembly. Some difficulty and delay is necessarily anticipated, however, in making a clear collection and permanent investment of so large a sum. The real estate is at present wholly unproductive, and much expense is necessarily incurred in collecting the interest on stocks, &c. with regularity. On these accounts only about \$4000 yearly income can be relied upon for some time to come.

The Report calls attention to the fact, that the pledges given by the Presbyteries of Kentucky for raising funds for the Seminary had been nobly redeemed, and that the time had fully come for making application to other parts of the Church beyond the bounds of the Synod of Kentucky. The Trustees of the Seminary had, during the past year, industriously made such application, and now report to the Assembly that they *had signally failed*. This failure had, however, led to the good result, that on a renewed application to the churches of Kentucky, the Presbyteries of that State had again cheerfully secured a further sum for the temporary support of a third Professor. In the view of the present need of the Seminary, the Trustees make an earnest appeal to the Assembly to take some definite action, in order to open the way for an appeal in the different pulpits throughout the bounds of the Church in behalf of the Seminary.

The Directors of the Seminary report that twenty-two new students had been admitted during the year. The whole

number present during the year is forty-five. Sixty-six students have entered since the origin of the Institution, and twenty-seven of these have been licensed. The plans of instruction have been perfected and fairly set in operation. The labour of four Professors has been wholly borne by two. The Directors urge the appointment of an additional Professor. The Presbyteries of Kentucky are very decidedly convinced of its necessity. One of the present Professors is so enfeebled in health as, in his own judgment, to make his resignation actually necessary. The Report closes with an encouraging statement of the success that has attended the youthful Institution from its beginning, and of the signal favour of God by which pressing difficulties have been met and overcome, and the way opened for its advancement.

The Report was placed in the hands of the appropriate Committee. This Committee subsequently recommended the following resolutions, which were adopted, viz.

In view of the history of this Seminary, and of the previous action of the Assembly constituting it a first class Institution of the whole Church, the following resolutions were submitted:

1. *Resolved*, That this Seminary be commended to the prayers and affectionate regards of the whole Church, and receive the same cordial attention which has been granted to the older Seminaries.

2. *Resolved*, As the Presbyteries of the Synod of Kentucky and the Directors, together with the present Professors, ask the Assembly to elect at its present sessions, a Professor of Pastoral Theology and Church Government, that the request be complied with.

3. *Resolved*, That this Assembly, with thanks to the Great Head of the Church, congratulates the more immediate patrons of this Seminary for the evident smiles of his Providence on their wise and persevering efforts in founding and advancing it to its present prosperous and hopeful condition.

Rev. Dr. Humphrey offered the following as supplementary to the resolutions as to Danville Seminary.

The General Assembly now re-affirms its purpose in conformity with its action in 1853 and its stipulations in 1854, to

proceed in good faith, and with the least practicable delay, to take measures to endow and establish this Seminary as of the first class. To this end it is earnestly recommended to all the congregations under our care, especially those in the West and South-west, to aid by liberal contributions its complete endowment; and the Board of Trustees, as the agents of the Assembly, are renewedly invested with ample powers to institute the means necessary to the collection of funds under this action of the Assembly.

Nominations for the vacant Professorship in Danville being in order, the Rev. Dr. McMullen nominated the Rev. Stuart Robinson as Professor of Pastoral Theology and Church Government.

Dr. Robinson was duly elected. The vote stood, for Dr. Robinson 180; blank 50; scattering 6.

Western Theological Seminary.

The Rev. Dr. Marshall presented the Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of Allegheny Seminary which was referred to the Committee on Theological Seminaries.

The whole number of students during the year has been seventy-nine; *eighteen* have completed the course of study. One has died during the year. The examinations before the Board were reported as very satisfactory, and the conduct of the students exemplary. Two had devoted themselves to the foreign field.

The Report represents the Seminary as in a very flourishing condition. A new Seminary building has been completed together with houses for two Professors. Large additions have been made to the library. Many rooms have been furnished for the use of the students. Receipts of the year, \$22,772.15.

The appointment of a fourth Professor in this Seminary having been proposed, the Rev. Dr. Phillips nominated the Rev. Richard W. Dickinson, D. D.; the Rev. Mr. Beattie nominated Rev. Luther Halsey, D. D. Dr. Dickinson was chosen. The vote stood, for Dr. Dickinson 176; for Dr. Halsey 32; blank 5.

Union Theological Seminary.

The Report of this Seminary was read by Dr. Campbell. It shows a list of twenty-eight students. Six graduated during the year. The Faculty of this Seminary is composed of three Professors. The health of the students has been good.

The Report was put into the hands of the appropriate Committee.

Professor Dabney rose to give a reason why another Report of the Union Theological Seminary than that given yesterday was presented. The Report read yesterday, owing to the time of meeting of the Board of Directors, was eleven months old. The present report is up to May 12, 1856. The report states that during the year nine students had been matriculated. The whole number present during the year has been twenty-three.

The increase of the Seminary has been recently very gratifying, and this new impulse has been cotemporary with the efforts of the Synods to endow it more perfectly. The whole amount of funds is now 75,000 dollars, of which 10,000 dollars are at five per cent., and 65,000 dollars at six per cent. This Institution has been much tried by repeated bereavements—four Professors have died in a few years, and two of these within the last five years. The report repeats the conviction of its friends of the necessity of this Seminary, in order to meet the wants of that particular section of the country. A new Professorship had been established—that of *Biblical Instruction*. The library contains 4870 volumes, of which thirty-nine have been received during the year. The Rev. William J. Hoge of Baltimore, has been elected to fill the fourth Professorship. The Seminary has four scholarships available for the support of needy students. The Trustees have pledged themselves besides, that no necessitous student shall lack the means to get a theological education at this Seminary. The assent of the Assembly was asked to the various organic changes detailed in the report.

The action of the Directors of this Institution in erecting a new Professorship, to be entitled the Professorship of *Biblical*

Interpretation, and their election of the Rev. William J. Hoge of the Baltimore Presbytery to this Professorship, were confirmed.

On motion, the resolution of the Committee to give the choice of two Directors of this Seminary (one minister and one ruling elder) to the Presbytery of Winchester, was approved.

It was stated, that to effect this arrangement the Synod of Virginia had agreed to deduct an equal number from the list which it now has the right to elect.

Board of Domestic Missions, 1856.

The Assembly then proceeded to the next order of the day, which was hearing the Report of the Board of Domestic Missions.

Dr. Musgrave, the Corresponding Secretary of the Board, read the Report, of which the following is an abstract.

There has been an increase in the number of missionaries employed during the year; an augmentation of the receipts, both from the churches, and in individual donations and legacies; an increase in the aggregate appropriations; a larger average salary paid to our missionaries, and an increase in the balance on hand at the close of the fiscal year. In every department there has been an encouraging progress; calling for thankfulness and praise to God for his unmerited goodness and mercy.

*Operations of the Year.—Of Missions—Statistical Details.—*The number of missionaries in commission, April 1, 1855, was 346, to which have been added to March 1, 1856 (11 months) 220, making the whole number 566, and more by 41 than the year previous.

The number of churches and missionary stations, wholly or in part supplied, (as far as reported,) by our missionaries, is 943. The number of newly organized churches is 42.

The number of admissions on examinations is 1832, and on certificate 1836, making a total of admissions of 3668.

The number in communion with churches connected with the Board, is 22,916.

The number of Sabbath-schools is 832; of teachers, 2448, and of scholars, 15,887.

The number of baptisms is 2217.

Of the 566 missionaries who have been in commission during the year, 187 have sent in no special report for the Assembly, very nearly one-third of the whole number; consequently we must increase all the returns very nearly one-third, to make them correct.

Appropriations.—The appropriations made to our missionaries, from April 1, 1855, to March 1, 1856, (11 months) have been at the office in Philadelphia, \$50,103.34, and at the office in Louisville, \$32,475.83; making a total of \$82,579.17.

Adding the appropriations made during the month of March 1856, to the above, for the sake of comparison with the other years, the figures would stand thus: Appropriations made from April 1, 1855, to April 1, 1856, at the office in Philadelphia, \$51,703.34, and at the office in Louisville, \$33,425.83; making a total of \$85,129.17.

The appropriations made to our missionaries, from April 1, 1854, to April 1, 1855, were, at the office in Philadelphia, \$48,735.42, and at the office in Louisville, \$25,759; making a total of \$74,494.42.

From this statement it appears that the appropriations made at the office in Philadelphia, exceeded those made the year before \$2967.92, and at the office in Louisville, they were more by \$7,666.83; thus making the total appropriations this year more than the year preceding, by \$10,634.75.

Receipts.—The total amount of receipts from all sources, from April 1, 1855, to March 1, 1856, (11 months) is \$85,747.73, to which add balances on hand in the different treasuries, April 1, 1855, (less \$320.95, withdrawn by Flint River Presbytery;) \$15,223.34; making the available resources of the Board during the year, \$100,971.07.

Adding the receipts at the offices in Philadelphia and Louisville during the month of March, 1856, for the purpose of comparison with other years, the total amount of receipts from April 1, 1855, to April 1, 1856, is \$94,848.87; to which add balances on hand in the different treasuries, April 1, 1855, as above \$15,223.34; thus making the available resources of the

Board during the year, from April 1, 1855, to April 1, 1856, \$110,072.21.

The amount paid out at the different treasuries from April 1, 1855, to March 1, 1856, (11 months) is \$79,837.90, leaving an available balance in all the treasuries on the 1st of March, 1856, of \$21,133.17. The amount due the missionaries at the same date, was \$13,226.54; leaving an unexpended balance of \$7,906.63.

The aggregate receipts from April 1, 1855, to April 1, 1856, have been larger as compared with the receipts from April 1, 1854, to April 1, 1855, \$23,014.40. The excess has been in individual or special donations and legacies, \$16,958.95, and in the contributions of the churches, \$6055.45. The receipts at the office in Philadelphia, including the Presbyterian treasuries, were larger by \$14,067.95, and the receipts at the office in Louisville, \$8,946.45.

The amount due the missionaries at the close of the fiscal year, as previously stated, was \$13,226.54, leaving an unexpended balance of \$7,906.63. The unexpended balance on April 1st, 1855, was \$5,539.70. From this statement it will be observed, that the unexpended balance in the treasury on the 1st of March, 1856, is only \$2,366.93 more than the amount which was reported on the 1st of April, 1855.

Re-Enforcements and Enlargement of the Church.—During the year, the Board have established new missions in various sections of our country. Three additional missionaries have been sent to California, two to Wisconsin, and one to Minnesota, and one in addition to those already there has been employed in Oregon. We have also sent one to Nebraska, and one to Kansas. Arrangements have likewise been made to send an additional one to Minnesota, and two to Kansas. Thirty-nine missionaries have been either wholly or almost entirely employed as itinerants.

Clothing.—Clothing valued at \$7,837.14 has been received during the eleven months, from April 1, 1855, to March 1, 1856, and distributed among the missionaries who needed it.

Salaries of Missionaries.—During the past year, the Board have increased their *average* appropriation to the missionaries \$11.35.

During the last *three* years, the Board have increased their average appropriations to the missionaries \$41.90, which is a little over 81½ per cent. By this advance, the *annual* liabilities of the Board, with the present number of missionaries, have been augmented nearly \$24,000.

Need of Funds.—Although the available balance on hand at the close of the fiscal year is considerable, and somewhat larger than that of the year preceding, yet it is no more than is needed. It ought to be distinctly understood by all, that the amount on hand at the period of the year when our balance is reported, is always larger than at any other time. From the month of March the receipts begin to fall off, and during the latter part of the spring, the entire summer, and the early part of the fall, the receipts are comparatively small; so that unless our available balance at the commencement of the fiscal year is comparatively large, it would be impracticable to carry on the operations of the Board during the year. For example, at the beginning of the fiscal year, April 1, 1855, we reported an available balance of more than \$15,000; and yet by the 1st of November ensuing, we had only about \$2,000 in hand!—not enough to meet the usual payments for a single fortnight!—and but for the prompt and generous responses to our appeals for aid by many of the friends of the cause, our operations must have been seriously embarrassed.

The receipts *from the churches* from April 1, 1855, to April 1, 1856, *fell short* of the payments, during the same period, *upwards of eighteen thousand dollars*, and but for the balance on hand at the commencement of the fiscal year, and the unusually large amount received from individuals, donations, and legacies, we would have been in debt to our missionaries at the close of the year!

With an increased number of missionaries, and a higher scale of appropriations, the expenditures of the Board have been very largely augmented; so that during the year upon which we have entered, we shall need much larger receipts from the churches.

Moreover, it is very important that the Board should not be hampered or embarrassed in undertaking the establishment of *new* missions.

As there will, probably, be no collecting agents in the field assigned to the Executive Committee in Philadelphia, and probably none in the larger portion of the field assigned to the Western Executive Committee, the Board must rely mainly upon the pastors and sessions to see that collections are taken up for Domestic Missions during the year.

The usual resolutions expressing the approbation of the Assembly were passed. Dr. Hewit said:—Forty years ago he was a member of the Assembly. He is now enabled to cry out, What hath God wrought? Then we had 10 Synods, now 30; then 43 Presbyteries, now 148; then 511 ministers, now 2261; then 881 churches, now 3079; then 37,208 members, now 231,404. According to Scripture, the branch bringing forth fruit shall be purged; this has been verified in the history of the Church. We are two bands. Had we gone on together we should this day number 54 Synods, 256 Presbyteries, 3778 ministers, 4738 churches, and 374,433 members.

He hoped many here would live to see forty years hence, and if so, with what emotion they would repeat the words used to-day—"What hath God wrought?" THEN, with the same ratio of increase, they would see 270 Synods, 1280 Presbyteries, 18,890 ministers, 23,690 churches, and 1,872,165 members. "Hear then the trumpet—Onward, onward—God is with you—fear not!"

Foreign Missions.

On motion of Rev. Mr. Williams, the Rev. Dr. Thornwell was thanked for his able and eloquent sermon on Foreign Missions, preached last evening, and he was requested to furnish a copy to the Board of Foreign Missions.

Rev. Dr. Gibson, from the Committee on the Board of Foreign Missions, reported, recommending that the Report of the Board be approved, and ordered for publication. They also offered the following resolutions, which were adopted:

1. *Resolved*, That this Assembly finds occasion for the devoutest gratitude to God for the success which has attended its missionary operations during the past year, as appears in the extension of missionary operations, and the blessing of God upon the labours of our missionaries, unexampled

by any former year—no part of the missionary field remaining without some special token of the Divine favour, and the admissions to the communion of the missionary churches being more numerous than in any former year.

2. *Resolved*, That this Assembly desires to express its cordial approval of the manner in which the Church's Foreign Missionary operations have been conducted during the past year by the Executive Committee and officers of the Board, and would render adoring praise to God for the success which he has been pleased to vouchsafe.

3. *Resolved*, That this Assembly express special satisfaction in the increased liberality of the churches towards the Foreign Missionary Board, showing the unabated interest of God's people in this great cause so immediately connected in its final success with the glory of the Church's Head.

4. *Resolved*, That this Assembly render special gratitude to God, in that our Board of Foreign Missions has been enabled so much to enlarge its operations during the past year, and for the increased number of missionaries sent into the foreign field, with sufficient means contributed by the Church for their support; and especially for the unusual indications of the presence of the Holy Spirit in almost all our missionary stations and churches.

5. *Resolved*, That it is the indispensable duty of every member of the Church to contribute, according to his or her ability, to the various schemes of benevolence conducted by the Church; and this Assembly express their regret that so many of our churches have failed to contribute anything to Foreign Missions during the past year; and would hereby urge upon the pastors and sessions of those delinquent churches to see to it that the cause be remembered in their prayers and contributions in time to come.

6. *Resolved*, That the General Assembly feel greatly encouraged to go forward in the missionary enterprise, from the fact that from a comparative recent origin, our Board now takes its place alongside sister associations which have done so nobly in this cause, and would urge upon the churches increased and still more vigorous efforts to occupy the fields which are being opened by the providence of God for the

introduction of the glorious gospel of our ever blessed Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.

7. *Resolved*, That the Assembly approve of the course pursued by the Board in regard to the setting apart a special fund for the education of children of foreign missionaries, and because it is due to these men of God that their children be educated in Christian lands, the Committee recommend increased contributions on the part of the wealthy members of the Church to the above fund.

Also, in connection with the above resolutions, the Committee would direct the attention of the Assembly to the fact, that notwithstanding the recommendation of the last General Assembly, the fund of \$20,000, devoted to the endowment of Professorships in the Theological Seminary of the Waldensian Church, is still incomplete by about \$7000, very little having been contributed for that object during the past year.

Rev. J. Leighton Wilson, one of the Secretaries of the Board of Foreign Missions, then addressed the Assembly. Mr. Wilson said, these are times of scrutiny and agitation in reference to our Boards, and he would say that if in the Annual Report presented to the Assembly, there is not as much minuteness as may be desired by some, he knew not in what the deficiency was to be found. Would that there might be as much care in reading it, as there has been labour in preparing it. There has been no period in the history of our missionary work where it has worn so encouraging an aspect; and this whether as regards the steadiness with which the missionaries have been able to prosecute their work, the influence of the truth among the heathen, or the readiness of labourers to engage in the noble cause. Much of the work hitherto has been preparatory; now we are beginning to reap rich fruits. Few of the stations have been without special tokens of God's presence. Additions have been made to one church of 30; to another 26; to another 14; to another 12; and to two others 10 each. In all, something like one hundred and fifty precious souls have been gathered in. There never have been so many doors open, or calls for labourers, as during the last year. Every assault which succeeds must be followed up. For instance: at the Choctaw station something

like one hundred and twenty-five have been added to the Church during the last year, and this chiefly through the labours of one brother, who was occupied with a school. Now should not a man be sent out to take the pastoral charge of this flock? Again: among the Seminoles about twenty-five or thirty were brought in. Hitherto that has been one of the most hopeless of the Indian tribes. Should we not take advantage of these favourable indications to strengthen the hands of those who are there? .

From the Pagan world beyond the seas almost every mail brings hopeful news. In Northern India, until within a few years, the doors were locked and barred against the gospel. But what a mighty change has occurred! Those mighty despotisms that opposed the gospel have been smitten to the dust, and the old pagan superstitions are shaking and tottering. Western Africa, twenty-five years since, was the most hopeless of all portions of the earth. There were not at that time more than twenty missionaries—now there are one hundred and fifty; there were but three churches, and these had barely an existence; now there are one hundred and fifty, and the converts are more numerous than those of both branches of the Presbyterian Church in this great city of New York. Is it nothing that these great changes are occurring? Is not the Church called on for efforts proportioned to such an era?

There has been no previous period when our Board has gone more extensively into its work than during last year. Nearly sixty labourers have gone out this year, being nearly double as many as were ever sent before, and more probably than by any other missionary institution in the world in the same time.

Missionaries are also to be sent to various new stations. This extraordinary extension of the missionary work demands, of course, a large increase of means. But no step has been taken in this work except in obedience to a plain call of Providence. The calls could not be resisted. The Indian tribes in Kansas and Nebraska were instances in case. Missions among them were urgently demanded; and just when the Board were striving to find the means required, our Government voluntarily offered a considerable sum for the support of schools,

which at once removed the difficulty. Mr. Wilson mentioned remarkable providential openings and calls from South America, New Grenada, and the Affghans. The Affghans, with a population of 5,000,000, have not yet learned the first rudiments of the gospel. A young man had offered himself for this work; and just when he was on his way, an Englishman and another offered the Board \$7500 for this very object. This munificent sum will found the mission and support it for two years.

In view of the extent and wants of the field, the Board are sometimes almost overwhelmed with the responsibility which rests upon them. O, that the Church would come up to her full responsibility in this glorious work! A larger liberality is demanded.

Board of Education.

An outline of the Annual Report was presented by Dr. Van Rensselaer, who said:—The number of *new* candidates received this year is 102. The *total* number on the roll is 382, being 18 more than the preceding year. 1. This whole subject is eminently connected with God's sovereignty. 2. Our operations call for gratitude to God. 3. The statistics indicate the inadequate impression of the Church in regard to her responsibilities and duties.

The Board next present a plea for educational operations on the *basis of Scripture*, and maintain the following propositions: 1. The perpetuation of the ministry is made by the word of God an object of special concern to the Church. 2. The Church is required to use means for the attainment of the great end in view. 3. The Scriptures authorize the belief that many of the Church's ministers will always be from among the poor. 4. The ministry should be an educated as well as a pious ministry, called of God to their work. 5. It is a Scriptural principle, that pecuniary aid should be granted to those candidates whose condition requires it.

Agencies.—The whole work of the Board has been performed by the Secretaries, with the single exception of a few weeks' voluntary service, and at a less cost than for any year during the last eleven.

State of the Treasury.—The total receipts for the ministerial

fund were \$40,679.78, being an increase of about \$5000. Of this fund, one-fifth, or \$8000, has been contributed by two churches in New York. The amount raised for this fund is the largest that has been raised since the division of the Assembly. The sum received into the fund for schools and colleges is \$6,833.17, being somewhat less than last year. The aggregate receipts for all the funds were \$48,169.52, and the expenditures were \$48,071.47, leaving a balance, including that of last year, of \$2032.96.

Primary or Parochial Schools.—The number of these schools is about 100, of which 84 have received aid from the Board, and seven more have lately applied. One of the elders of a church in New York city has continued his offer of \$5000 per annum to the object.

Presbyterial Academies.—The number of Presbyterial Academies is 58. These are located in every section of the north, south, east, and west. They contain on an average 70 or 80 students each, and are doing a great work in the cause of thorough Christian education.

Colleges.—The colleges directly under the care of the Church are 18, which, with four others indirectly under our immediate control, make a total of 22 institutions. The number of students, regular and irregular, connected with these institutions is 2100; of these, about 500 are communicants of the Church, and 350 are candidates for the ministry. During the year upwards of 100 students have been hopefully converted to God. Revivals of religion have occurred at Princeton College, Washington College, Pennsylvania, and Oglethorpe University, Georgia.

The Board offer the following remarks on the collegiate policy of the Church:

1. It ought to be the universal aim to incorporate thorough religious instruction into the course of studies.
2. The Church ought to cultivate the harmony, now happily prevalent among our institutions.
3. Our colleges ought to increase in number from time to time; but not too fast, or too near each other.
4. Ample endowments ought to be provided for all our colleges, and chiefly from the districts of country where they are located.
5. A large number of young men ought to be encouraged to

seek the advantages of a liberal education. It may be added, that, whilst our colleges are struggling to secure an endowment, especially during their infancy, it is good policy to assist them with a portion of the funds which the liberality of the churches may supply for the general object.

In conclusion, on the whole, the operations of the Board, in both departments, are in an encouraging state; and with the blessing of God upon the faithful efforts of his people, a constant advance in our work is to be expected.

The only resolution of special interest adopted by the Assembly in reference to this Board is the following, viz.

Resolved, That while the Assembly continues to approve of the course of the Board in establishing schools, academies, and colleges on a definite religious basis, a sound discretion is necessary as to their number and location; and lest the operations of the Board in this relation should be exposed to invidious misconstruction, it should be distinctly understood that the Church does not undervalue the importance of any institution of learning, which though not subjected to ecclesiastical supervision, recognizes the authority, and inculcates the principles of God's written word; much less disparage the common school system, as adapted to useful ends, so long as the Bible is not excluded.

An interesting debate followed the presentation of the Report, in the course of which Dr. Dabney remarked:—This Board does not receive equal regard with the other Boards. There is a great disparity between them in the number of contributing churches. It is asserted that we have already many unemployed ministers hanging about our cities. But it is a fact that the proportion of those educated by our Board of this sort is far, far less than of those educated by their own means.

Again, while the ministry requires a greater number of qualifications, mental and bodily, than any other calling, yet it is a fact that there are fewer failures than in any other profession. Where one has failed here, ten have failed in other professions. But suppose some few have not been worth the cost employed in their education, is there not a loss expected in every enterprise? Does every seed planted come to perfection? Does not every merchant expect that some of his ventures shall turn

out unproductive? Some, at least, fail to stand the severe test of the actual ministry, and that after all the efforts made to test them at every step. He referred to the armory at Springfield. There every sword-blade is subjected to an increasingly severe test at each point of its manufacture. Everything is thus done to secure a good blade. But at last a more severe test than any former one is applied, and there a number fail. What is the result? Are these all lost? Not at all; for those that fail for swords make excellent carving-knives. So, many that, after preparation, fail as ministers, make capital teachers. He thought, also, that a chief means of preventing mistakes was to raise the grade of acquirements necessary. He appealed here to the Presbyteries. They were the proper ones to elevate the standard of qualification. The Board could not go beyond them. The truth was, that our theology, instead of being the strong meat formerly required, is evaporating into diluted potions administered all over the land in small muslin covered volumes, that require no thought or labour to fathom.

This elevation of the requirements of our candidates would increase the number as well as quality of our ministers. We do not get the best sort of men, because we do not demand the best. The true plan to elevate the ministry is to make it hard to be licensed. The opposite course gives the world the best men, and leaves the infirm sort for the ministry. He inveighed against the loose way in which Presbyteries deal with their young men. The ease with which they are allowed to go through their trials, tends to lower their views of ministerial excellence. That which every man may easily get soon, becomes, in every man's esteem, not worth the having, and men cease to seek it. This plan, then, will necessarily lessen the ranks of the ministry.

Rev. Dr. Thornwell wished only to indicate two principles embodied in the resolutions, for which he could not conscientiously vote:—1. That the Board extends its influence over institutions of learning. From this view he must entirely dissent. It was purely an eleemosynary institution for the education of a ministry. It had no part in these collegiate institutions. 2. The second principle was this:—That education

belongs exclusively to the Church. This also he must dissent from. It belongs to the parent, to the Church, and to the State. This was no place to discuss the subject. He would, therefore, only express his dissent. As the Scotch Presbyterians say in their Presbyteries, he had exonerated his conscience, and would stop there.

If the Board has adopted the principle that education belongs exclusively to the Church, it is not only something new, but in direct contradiction to its most explicit official declarations, and to the constant representations and arguments of Dr. Van Rensselaer its distinguished Secretary. We are persuaded that Dr. Thornwell is entirely mistaken as to that point. The position occupied by the Board is that secular education does not belong exclusively to the family or to the State. It has stood on the defensive against those who denied the right of the Church to establish schools and colleges. It has ever asserted the very principle affirmed by Dr. Thornwell, that the education of the young, as the care of the sick and of the poor, is the common duty of the family, of the Church, and of the State. When either of the other agencies fully accomplishes the work, the Church is satisfied; but if parents are incompetent or negligent, and if the State refuses to do any thing, or insists on giving an infidel education, under the plea of excluding religion, then the Board asserts the right and duty of the Church to provide a mode of culture in accordance with the word of God. This is the principle which the Assembly has repeatedly sanctioned by an almost unanimous vote, and which is embodied in the resolution quoted above. That resolution expressly disclaims all disposition to interfere with schools, academies, or colleges under other than ecclesiastical supervision, provided they are religiously conducted. We believe all opposition to the principles or action of the Board on this point has originated in misapprehension. As the Board agrees with Dr. Thornwell, it is to be presumed that Dr. Thornwell agrees with the Board.

Board of Publication.

The order of the day was then taken up, and the Report of the Board of Publication was presented by the Corresponding Secretary, the Rev. William E. Schenck.

Abstract of the Eighteenth Annual Report.—The limits of the financial year of the Board have recently been changed, so that it will hereafter commence annually on the 1st of March, instead of the 1st of April. Owing to this change, the portion of time under review comprehends this year only *eleven months*.

The operations of the Board were presented under the three following heads:

I. Production. II. Distribution. III. Sustentation.

I. *Production.*—The Publishing Agent reports that there have been issued 87 *new* works, viz. 16 new volumes, and 28 smaller publications. Of these new works there have been published 111,000 copies. The *reprints* of former publications have been 485,250 copies. Thus the *total publications* of the year have been 596,250 copies.

The total number of copies published since the organization of the Board to March 1, 1856, has been 5,546,688.

There has been an *increase* in the number of copies of all kinds printed during the past year, of 125,250 copies over the year preceding.

The largest work issued last year has been the "*Assembly's Digest*," by the Rev. Samuel J. Baird, a volume of 856 pages, which has received much commendation. The Board has also issued an edition of the "*Life of Dr. A. Alexander*," by Dr. J. W. Alexander. Several additions have also been made to the Board's list of German tracts.

Much attention has been given to the judicious increase of its *Sabbath-School Library*. An anxious desire is expressed for its enlargement, and suitable manuscripts are invited from ministers and laymen in every part of the Church.

Periodicals.—Circulation of the *Home and Foreign Record*, 17,500 copies, being an increase within the year of 500 copies. *Sabbath-School Visitor*, 43,000 copies—*increase*, 2,000.

II. *Distribution.*—There are three distinct channels through which the publications of the Board reach the hands of the people.

1. Distribution by sales from the publishing-house to private individuals and booksellers. These have amounted during the

eleven months now reported on, to 171,516 volumes, besides tracts, pamphlets, and periodicals. The value of these sales, (including the *Sabbath-School Visitor*, but not the *Record*,) has been \$70,702.28.

2. *Distribution by Colportage*.—In this department, there has been great enlargement and encouragement during the past year.

The number of colporteurs commissioned within these eleven months has been 210, an *increase* of 37 over those of the preceding twelvemonth. These have been distributed throughout 28 States and Territories, as well as through all the British Provinces, from the Gulf of St. Lawrence to Lake Superior. They have also begun to occupy Oregon, California, Kansas, Nebraska, the Lake Superior mining region, and hitherto unoccupied portions of Texas, Arkansas, Missouri, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa, Michigan, and Florida.

These colporteurs have *sold* 125,700 volumes, an increase of 27,940 volumes sold. They have *gratuitously distributed* 13,913 volumes, an increase of 3133 volumes. They have also distributed gratuitously 1,046,964 pages of tracts. And they have visited 91,734 families, an increase of 12,642 families visited.

There is much evidence that the colporteurs have also increased in qualifications and efficiency during the past year, and that the Spirit of God has largely attended and blessed their labours.

3.—*Distribution by donation of Executive Committee*. This has amounted to 3269 volumes and 111,873 pages of tracts, which have been chiefly given to Sabbath-schools, feeble churches, needy ministers, and to individuals for gratuitous distribution.

The *total distribution* of the eleven months has been as follows:—

By sales at Publishing-house,	171,516 vols.
“ “ by Colporteurs,	125,790 “
“ grants of Colporteurs,	13,913 “
“ “ of Executive Committee,	3,269 “
Total of volumes distributed,	313,488
besides tracts, pamphlets, and periodicals.	

III.—*Sustentation*.—There has been so gratifying an increase in the receipts of the Board from every source this year, that for eleven months only, they exceed those of the preceding twelve months. They have been as follows:

Total receipts of eleven months,	\$88,596 20
“ payments “ “	86,039 08
Total receipts from sales of books, tracts, and Sabbath-School Visitor,	70,702 28
Total receipts for Colportage,	14,497 28
Balance in Treasury of Board,	17,033 96
Balance of deficiency against Colportage Fund,	2,352 67

Agencies.—Not a single collecting agent has been commissioned during the past year. There is an evidently growing disposition on the part of pastors themselves to instruct and train their people in habits of benevolence, a tendency in which the Board greatly rejoices. During the past year the income of the Board has been derived from a larger number of Presbyteries and churches than ever before, although there has been no collecting agent in the field.

The whole aspect of the work committed to this Board is one of progress and encouragement, such as it rejoices to be able to spread before the General Assembly, and as encourages it to new and enlarged exertions for the time to come.

Church Extension.

The Report of the Church Extension Committee was made by the Rev. Mr. Coe, the Corresponding Secretary, of which the following is an abstract.

This new enterprise was organized in the city of St. Louis, Missouri, on the 3d July, 1855, under the appointment of the last General Assembly. The Committee elected Rev. N. L. Rice, D. D., Chairman; Archibald Gamble, Esq., Treasurer; and David H. Bishop, Esq., Recording Secretary. On the fourth day of September, 1855, the Rev. H. I. Coe, of Galena, Illinois, was unanimously chosen Corresponding Secretary, and entered upon the discharge of the duties of the office on the twentieth day of the same month. His salary was fixed at \$1500 per annum. The services of the other officers, all

valuable, but especially those of the Treasurer, have, during the past year, been rendered gratuitously.

In carrying on the work entrusted to them by the General Assembly, the Church Extension Committee have, as far as practicable, acted upon the following principles, viz.

1. To make no appropriation to any Church under the care of a Presbytery, without the recommendation of that Presbytery, or its Church Extension Committee.

2. To be guided in determining the amount to be appropriated in each case by the carefully ascertained necessities of that case, and the state of the Treasury.

3. To diffuse appropriations as widely and equitably as possible over the whole country.

4. To require, as the ordinary pre-requisite of the payment of every appropriation from the general fund, a certificate from the Trustees of the Church aided, that the Church lot is fully secured to the Old School Presbyterian Church, and that the amount granted by the Church Extension Committee will complete their house of worship, and leave the whole property free from debt.

5. To withdraw every appropriation not properly called for within two years of its date.

6. To recognize the right of donors to designate the recipients of their donations.

7. Inasmuch as it is frequently of the highest importance to a Church to know definitely the amount of aid upon which it may rely, for a considerable time before the money can be drawn, the Church Extension Committee have felt at liberty to make, in anticipation of the incoming of funds, several appropriations, payable as soon after a fixed time in the future, as the churches aided shall comply with the conditions on which the appropriations are made.

These principles are chiefly deductions from the eleven years' experience of the Church Extension Committee of the Board of Missions, and the past has only added to the evidences of their wisdom.

The number of *new* applications for aid in erecting churches, received from April 1st, 1855, to April 1st, 1856 (including thirteen applications acted upon by the late Church Extension

Committee of the Board of Missions, previous to the transfer of their books, papers, and funds to the present Committee of the General Assembly,) is one hundred and five. These one hundred and five new applications come from churches in the bounds of twenty-six of our thirty Synods, and fifty-three of our one hundred and forty-eight Presbyteries. The amount of aid asked for in these one hundred and five applications is over \$27,000.

Besides these, forty-one *old* applications, amounting to nearly \$7000 (action upon which was deferred by the Committee of the Board of Missions for want of funds,) remain on file, awaiting later information.

In addition to all these, forty-two unpaid appropriations of the Church Extension Committee of the Board of Missions, amounting to \$5090, have been assumed by the General Assembly's Church Extension Committee, and may properly be regarded in the light of applications. The whole number of requests for aid during the year just closed, that may be ranged under the general head of applications, is, therefore, 188, amounting to over \$39,000.

During the year ending April 1, 1856, appropriations have been made to seventy-one churches, to the amount of \$12,785.99.

Appropriations to twelve churches, amounting to \$1525, have been withdrawn.

The balance in the treasury of the Church Extension Committee of the Board of Missions, April 1st, 1855, was \$4173.10. The receipts from April 1st, 1855, to April 1st, 1856, were—from churches, \$8059.72; from other sources, \$1697.59, making in all \$9757.31. This, with the balance on hand, April 1st, 1855, gives for the available resources of the year ending April 1, 1856, \$13,930.41.

The receipts of this year are \$4510.83, or more than 85 per cent. in advance of the receipts of the last year.

The number of churches that have contributed this year is nearly two and a half times as great as the number that contributed last year, and the amount received from churches is considerably more than double the amount received from churches in any previous year.

The number of churches which this year for the first time have sent in donations, is at least one and a half times greater than the whole number of different churches which have contributed in any former year.

The expenditures of the year closing April 1st, 1856, were \$11,083.51, including a temporary loan of \$700 to the Church Extension Committee of the city of St. Louis, out of the contributions of the Second Presbyterian Church of St. Louis, made in accordance with the desire of that Church.

The balance on hand in the different treasuries, April 1, 1856, was \$2,846.90, to meet appropriations made to the amount of \$8,575. The liabilities, therefore, of the Committee exceeded its resources, April 1, 1856, \$5728.10.

Ministerial Support.

Dr. Junkin introduced a resolution for appointing a committee to report to the Assembly on the insufficiency of the support of the ministry, and to draft a pastoral letter to the churches on this subject. Dr. Junkin argued to show the need of some efficient measures being adopted to correct the evil contemplated in the resolution. Rev. Mr. Cater complained of the inequality in the salaries of ministers, and stated that in a Presbytery to which he once belonged, the average salary of the ministers was \$180. The Rev. Mr. Phillips said that the first two years he was a minister he received all told \$225. He walked over a territory seven miles in extent and laboured with all his might. He had been eight years in the ministry and had never yet received \$400 per annum. Dr. Junkin's resolution was adopted. Dr. Dabney, as Chairman of the Committee appointed by the Chair, subsequently reported a pastoral letter on this subject, which was adopted.

It contained a summary of the arguments used in the debate, setting forth the trials and exigencies to which the ministry is reduced by its present inadequate support, and urging upon the churches the need of their immediate and increased liberality in this duty. It dwelt upon the fact of the greatly increased wealth of the Church, the comparatively great increase in the price of the necessities of life, and the conse-

quently increasing inadequacy of the stationary salaries of ministers which have been graduated in past time to meet a very different state of things. It calls upon the churches to take immediate measures to raise an adequate sum, by subscription or otherwise, and to institute efficient means for collecting the same.

There can be no doubt that the ministry in general in our Church is very inadequately supported, and that this is a great injustice and a great evil. The only question is, how can this evil be abated? It certainly does not arise from the poverty of the Church. Nor does it arise, altogether or in chief part, from the penuriousness of the people. We apprehend that the evil in question arises mainly from two sources; first, from the denial or failure to recognize the true principles of ministerial support; secondly, from the want of any suitable organization for carrying those principles into operation.

As to the former of these points, it is, in our judgment, the clear doctrine of the word of God, and the faith of nine-tenths of the Christian world—first, that every minister of the gospel, devoted to his work, is entitled to an adequate support; and, secondly, that the obligation to provide that support rests on the Church as a whole, and not exclusively on the particular congregation of which the minister is the pastor. The first of these principles our Church has always recognized; the second it has in a great measure ignored. The general rule has been to let every congregation provide for its own pastor. If the congregation is rich, the salary is abundant; if the congregation is poor, the salary is inadequate. Our Board of Missions in a measure meets this difficulty, but only in a very small measure. First, because it has always been conducted on the principle that its aid was temporary, designed to sustain churches in their forming period—and secondly, because its contributions are only sufficient and only intended to keep the minister above the starvation point. The Church has required it to act on the assumption that congregations must be self-sustaining; that the duty to support the pastor is a congregational, as distinguished from a church duty. We support our foreign missionaries, but we leave our domestic missionaries to shift for themselves, with the minimum of aid from abroad. The true principle, as

we believe, is that adopted by the Free Church of Scotland. The Church guaranties an adequate support to every minister devoted to his work ; as much as possible of that support is derived from the congregation to which he ministers ; the deficiency is made up by general contribution. We do not believe that it is possible that the crying injustice of such inequality and inadequacy in the support of the ministry can ever be abated, until a similar principle is carried out in our Church. No one supposes that a minister living in New York should have no higher salary than one living in a western village. This would be absurd. But the western missionary is entitled to a salary suited to his necessities, and he has the same claim to such a salary that our city ministers have to an income suited to the greater demands to which they are subject.

Supposing this principle should ever be recognized, of which we have little hope, how can it be carried out? We see no necessity for any new organization for this purpose. Every object would be answered by enlarging the operations of the Board of Missions, and enabling them so to increase their appropriations as to put every faithful minister above the necessity of either starving, or of devoting his time to some secular pursuit. When we said above, that we had no organization for carrying out the Scottish principle of ministerial support, all we intended was that we have no organization intended for that purpose. We have one adapted to it, if the Church would only give it the requisite authority and resources. All that is required is, that we should act towards our ministers who labour among the poor and the unbelieving at home, on the same principles which guide our action towards our ministers among the heathen. Mere exhortation will not meet the difficulty. There must be some plan to equalize the burden of ministerial support.

Fund for Relief of Indigent Clergymen.

Rev. Dr. Rogers made a report from the Trustees for the relief of indigent and disabled ministers, and the families of such. The report stated that they had given aid to 20 persons, of whom 11 were widows, 8 were clergymen, one an orphan daughter. The reasons which justified the bestowal of this

relief were various. Some of the beneficiaries were unable to labour by reason of advanced age, and others by chronic disease. The whole amount of funds at the disposal of the Trustees during the year was \$1580, which sum, divided among 20 persons, would give an average of \$79 to each. The moneys, however, have been divided in different proportions: the largest amount paid to any one person was \$200, and the smallest \$35. The Trustees expressed deep regret that in the distribution of funds they were restricted to so small an amount. The sums appropriated have been necessarily small, from the smallness of the funds placed at their disposal. Had the amount at their disposal been larger they would gladly have awarded, in many cases, sums twice, or even three times as large as those which were actually paid.

The resolutions of the Assembly on the subject had met but little attention. Two of the wealthiest Synods had drawn more than they had paid in during the year. The appeals of the orphans and widows to the Committee had been very touching.

This subject was referred to a committee, consisting of Dr. Rogers, Rev. W. Cater, Judge Porter, Dr. Marshall, and Matthew Newkirk, Esq. This committee reported, recommending, 1. The establishment of a permanent fund for the relief of aged or disabled ministers, and of their widows and orphans. 2. That this fund should be raised by an annual contribution of five dollars from each minister and of ten dollars from each congregation. 3. That the benefit of the fund be confined to the contributors. 4. That the Trustees should apportion the income of the fund according to the recommendation of the Presbyteries, through whom all applications for relief were to be made. These recommendations were severally adopted, but when the motion came to be put for the adoption of the whole paper, a motion was made to recommit it. This was carried. When the subject was again brought up, it was found that great diversity of opinion and feeling existed among the members. Some were opposed to a permanent fund; others thought there was no need of action in the premises, inasmuch as ministers were well enough taken care of. One man said a minister ought to preach as long as he was able to stand, and then lie

down and die; another, that he had no idea of preaching to a people who would not support him; that the oldest ministers were the richest; or they might get their lives insured, or be supported by their children. Another argued that the whole thing ought to be left to the spontaneous action of the Church. The result was that the subject was referred to a committee consisting of Judge Leavitt, of Cincinnati; Dr. Rogers, of Philadelphia; Daniel Lord, Esq., of New York; Thomas C. Perrin, Esq., Abbeville Court-house, S. C.; and Isaac D. Jones, Esq., Princess Anne, Maryland, to report to the next Assembly.

It has been frequently remarked that the laymen in our General Assemblies uniformly manifest greater interest and more liberality of feeling on the whole subject of ministerial support than the ministers themselves. All the remarks deprecating action, or bearing with severity on the feelings of the brethren, came from ministers. This may be natural. They may revolt at the idea of being considered necessitous or dependent, and disposed to resist any plan which seems to hold up the ministry as objects of charity. All this, however, seems to us very mistaken. Is it a matter of charity that the English government gives a retiring pension to all public servants from the Lord Chancellor downward? Are the widows and orphans of our military and naval officers paupers because they receive pensions? It is a simple principle of justice, that when a man devotes himself to the service either of the Church or State, he should be sustained while able to work, and provided for when disabled. It is not only a matter of justice but a divine command, and as Dr. Thornwell said, (though opposed to the report,) the curse of God would rest on the Church if she did not perform her duty in this matter.

There can be little doubt that there is a necessity for some provision for the support of aged or disabled ministers; and that it is the duty of the Church to make such provision. But how shall it be done? One plan is to leave the matter to each congregation or Presbytery to provide for their own cases of this kind. This amounts to doing nothing more than is now done. Another plan is to raise a permanent fund the interest of which shall be applied to the contemplated object. To this it is objected that all permanent funds are precarious;

that it is inexpedient to put a burden on this generation which properly belongs to the Church at all times; that if this fund is to be raised from ministers, and its benefits confined to contributors, it is after all making the ministers support themselves; that no fund which the churches would raise would yield an income adequate to the object. Another method proposes a modification of the plan of life annuities. There are institutions established for the sake of profit, which secure to contributors in consideration of a sum paid at once, or of an annual contribution, a certain annuity payable either when the party attains a certain age, or in case he should at any time be disabled. It has been suggested that the Church should form such an institution—not such as has already been established, to which ministers contribute annually, and the contributors alone are benefitted—but one to which the Church shall annually contribute as she does to other objects, and her disabled ministers, whether contributors or not, should receive the benefit. If an individual minister may be a subscriber to such an institution, or if a particular congregation may subscribe for its pastor, why may not the Church as a whole do the same thing? We are glad that this subject is committed to men of business, and especially to legal gentlemen, who are familiar with the whole business of life insurance and of annuities. This is a subject very imperfectly understood by those who have not made it a matter of special attention. This was made abundantly evident by the discussion on the floor of the General Assembly. The suggestion was made and insisted upon, that the corporation for the relief of the widows and children of clergymen, should restrict their operations to the ministers of our Church. This sounds very much as if a flour or cotton merchant should refuse to sell to any but Presbyterians. The more he sells the better, and the more subscribers to the widows' fund the better. It is the very principle on which such institutions are founded that in the aggregate more must be paid in than is drawn out. One man in a long life will pay in twice or thrice as much as his family can be entitled to draw; while in another case the family may draw ten times as much as the parent paid. On the whole, however, the payments to the fund must exceed the payments

from it, or it would soon become bankrupt. It is for the good, therefore, of all concerned that the subscribers to the widows' fund should be increased as much as possible.

Judicial Cases.

Some eight or ten cases of this kind were presented to the Judicial Committee, but by the skill and wisdom of that body matters were so managed that all but three were arranged without being brought before the house. No. 1 was the complaint of the church of Stillwater against the Synod of New Jersey.

The session of the Stillwater church suspended one of their ruling elders. The ruling elder appealed to the Presbytery, and the Presbytery directed the session to restore him to office; the session then complained to Synod, and the Synod sustained the Presbytery. It was against the action of the Synod the session now complains.

After a great deal of discussion, extending over parts of six days, Dr. Thornwell said he thought the whole question was one of technicalities, and moved that the complaint be sustained *pro forma*, and the session be directed to give Mr. Shafer (the suspended elder) a new trial. This motion was carried almost unanimously.

This is another lesson teaching what the Church seems slow to learn; that a body consisting of upwards of two hundred members is not a very suitable court of appeal. Lawyers tell us that the apparently anomalous plan of making the upper house of the Legislature the ultimate court of appeal in civil matters answered very well, because the house uniformly deferred to the judicial members, except in cases where those members differed among themselves, and then the instinct of the lay members generally inclined them to take part with the right side. Such is not the constitution of our Assembly. It would be more of a parallel case if the appeal in civil matters were from the bench to the whole bar of a state assembled as a court, or if the House of Representatives of the United States were the supreme court of the Union. We believe the necessity for the appointment of a commission is forcing itself more and more on the conviction of the leading minds of our Church.

Another infelicity in our mode of conducting judicial cases was made very manifest on this occasion. This case was introduced on the fourth day of the sessions of the Assembly and decided on the tenth. When the case had been partly heard, other matters were taken up, and the whole subject driven from the minds of the members, and then it was resumed. This was done over and over again. It is obvious the case would have occupied much less time and been much better understood, could it have been heard continuously.

There is another point worthy of remark. It is impossible for any reader of the minutes of the Assembly, or of the debates, to have the least idea of the merits of the case. The complaint is not given, neither the action of the Presbytery nor of the Synod is so stated that the reader can understand either the grounds or the justice of their decision. The only insight he can get is from the conflicting statements of the debaters.

We will venture still further to urge the necessity of the revision of our book of discipline. It is unintelligible, inconsistent, and in some of its parts unreasonable. This is proved beyond dispute from the fact that so much diversity of opinion exists as to its interpretation. We never knew of a judicial case brought before the Assembly where the mode of procedure did not create debate and confusion. Who are the original parties is the question almost certain to be started, and just as certain to receive conflicting answers. In the present case, the Moderator decided the Session and the Synod were the original parties.

But what can the word *original* then mean? The original parties must mean the parties concerned in the origin of the dispute; which in this case, were the elder and the session—another difficulty is, that in the great majority of cases there are no parties, in the sense of plaintiff and defendant. It seems unreasonable and anomalous to make the lower court a party. In civil matters, a lower tribunal does not appear at the bar of a higher, as a party to be tried. Its decision is reviewed—but the original litigants are the only parties, no matter how many steps there may be before the ultimate tribunal is reached. Would it not simplify matters if we adopted the same course?

Our plan is first to try the Synod as a culprit, then the Presbytery, then the session, and at last we get down to the original offender. No wonder we never fail to get into confusion. The simple and natural course, when a case is brought from a lower to a higher court, is to try the cause, and not the court. The thing to be done is to administer justice, that is, for example, to decide whether a member has been rightfully suspended. Why not do this directly, instead of indirectly? Why must we get at the ultimate point by first having the Synod arraigned, accused by one party and defended by another, and then turned out of the house as a culprit, and when all is done, we have to see how the Presbytery acted, and at last we get to the Session. In the State, if a man brings a cause before a lower court and it goes against him, he appeals to the superior court; if not satisfied, he takes it up to the Supreme Court, and if still aggrieved, he goes to the Court of Errors. In every step he takes simply his cause, he does not drag all the courts with him. The case is re-heard at every step, and if injustice was done in the original decision, or in any of the subsequent ones, the matter is set right. The cause goes up with all the records in the case, and is decided on its merits. We cannot see why we should not adopt the same course. If a man is suspended unjustly in his judgment by a session, let him take the case to the Presbytery, and have the case (not the Session) tried over again. If not satisfied with the decision, let him go to the Synod, and have the case (not the Presbytery and Session) re-heard; and if still aggrieved, let him take the case to the Assembly and have it (and not the Synod, the Presbytery and Session,) tried again. This, we are persuaded, would save a great deal of time and trouble, and deliver us from that labyrinth in which our higher courts never fail to get bewildered. It is a natural consequence of making inferior courts parties, to put them out of the house, and deny them any voice in the ultimate decision of the case. What justice is there in this? If it is a question of fact or morals, or of doctrine, or of constitutional interpretation, they have as much right to be heard in the last resort as others. Suppose a Synod consists of three Presbyteries, one with fifty members, another with twenty, and the third with ten, and that the first should unan-

imously pronounce a given doctrine heretical, then, in case of an appeal, sixteen members might set aside the judgment of fifty. Is there any sense or reason in this? Is it a personal matter with the Presbytery any more than with the Synod? Is a circuit judge excluded from his seat in the Supreme Court when his judgment is appealed from? This making lower courts parties, and denying them a voice in the final judgment, and, to cap the climax, turning them literally out of the house, does appear to us a monstrous perversion of judicial principles.

There are several other points in which the obscurity of our Book was manifested. What is meant by the Synod, as a party, being fully heard? Dr. Rice said, it means hearing all that the members appointed by the Synod to defend its judgment had to say. The Moderator decided it means hearing all that any member of the Synod, present at the Synodical decision, might wish to say. Again, it was disputed whether the complaint brought up the merits of the case; some said it did, others, with the Moderator, said it did not; and yet it was so impossible to get on without bringing up the merits, that the Moderator was forced to admit that "it seemed necessary that some little reference to the history of the case should be made!" Is not this pitiable? We do not blame our excellent Moderator, whom everybody respects and loves; we blame the system. The whole process is disreputable. The session suspended an elder, no one knows why; no one knows whether it was done justly or unjustly, regularly or irregularly. The Presbytery ordered the elder restored to office—no one knows why. The Synod confirms the action of the Presbytery, and the Session complains to the Assembly—of what? we have not the slightest idea, and no one else can have from the record. If the proceedings of a civil court or of a court martial were so conducted and so reported, what would the public think? Instead of being behind and below all other tribunals in the mode of administering justice, the Church courts should present a model for all other courts. This can never be done until we have a complete revision of our system.

Case No. 2. Rev. Dr. Campbell of the Judicial Committee reported the complaint of the Rev. H. G. Gardiner against the Synod of Wisconsin, reversing the proceedings of the Presby-

tery of Dane, which recognized the election and ordination of J. G. Clark and others, as elders and deacons of the church at Madison, and also a complaint of the said J. G. Clark against the same decision of the said Synod, and also against their decision reversing the action of the Presbytery of Dane in putting a call from the said church of Madison in the hands of the said H. B. Gardiner to become their pastor. The parties in this case having agreed upon a statement which was laid before the Judicial Committee, the Judicial Committee recommended the following action in the case, which was agreed to.

1. That the complaint be sustained *pro forma*, and the decision of the Synod be reversed so far as it pronounces the election and ordination of the elders and deacons invalid; the Assembly being of opinion that the informality in the call of the congregational meeting was not so serious as to vitiate the election and ordination.

2. That the Synod was right in pronouncing the call of the congregational meeting irregular.

3. That although the Assembly thus recognizes the validity of the election and ordination of the said elders and deacons, they yet recommend, the said elders having assented thereto by their representatives, that in view of the past and existing difficulties the said elders cease to act, according to our Form of Government, until such time as in the estimation of the Presbytery of Dane the church can be reasonably harmonious in receiving them in their official capacity.

It was moved that the report of the Judicial Committee be adopted.

Dr. Junkin stated that this decision would satisfy all parties.

The question on the adoption of the report of the Committee was put and carried.

Case No. 3. In this case it appears that the session of the church of Muncy arraigned General William A. Petriken on three charges. On two of these he was condemned; but on the first charge, the ruling elders of the church being interested, the case was referred to the Presbytery of Northumberland, who tried and condemned him on the first charge. The Synod of Philadelphia afterwards, on the alleged grounds that one of the ruling elders had not been installed, and also that the ses-

sion were interested personally in the case, declared the whole proceedings null and void. The Rev. Messrs. Waller and Gibson now complain of the said action of Synod; and Mr. Smalley appeals.

The only point of general interest involved in this case is, whether installation is essential to constitute a man a ruling elder in any congregation. The affirmative was strenuously asserted by several members of the Synod. The negative was as strongly affirmed by several members of the Assembly. Judge Leavitt stated, "that if installation were necessary, he himself was not a ruling elder, and had no right to a seat in the Assembly." Mr. Hendricks, of Indiana, made the same statement respecting his own position. "He had never heard, indeed, the word installation applied to ruling elders until yesterday." Similar statements were made by others. Mr. Waller stated that "there were five uninstalled ruling elders at his Presbytery last fall. Did that destroy the Presbytery?" The Assembly refused to sustain the appeal and complaint. The vote stood—sustain, 52: not sustain, 100; sustain in part, 14. This might seem to imply that the Assembly intended to sanction the doctrine of the necessity of installation. To avoid that inference, the Rev. Mr. Shotwell moved that a committee be appointed to bring in a minute expressing the judgment of the Assembly in the case. Dr. Humphrey "thought this important, inasmuch as the vote of the morning had placed many members in a very equivocal position. Are these men," he asked, "no longer ruling elders?" The motion was carried. The committee subsequently reported the following minute, which was adopted, viz.

The Committee appointed to prepare a minute in relation to the action of the Assembly in Judicial case No. 4, respectfully recommend the passage of the following resolutions, to prevent on the one hand the bad effects of former irregularities in the installation of ruling elders, and on the other hand to avoid such irregularities in future.

1. *Resolved*, That any ruling elder, regularly ordained or installed in one church, and subsequently elected to the sacred office in another church, and who has heretofore, pursuant to such election, served as a ruling elder in such other church,

without objection, shall be presumed to have been duly installed therein, and his right to act shall not be now questioned.

2. *Resolved*, That when a ruling elder shall hereafter be elected to the same office in a church other than that in which he has been ordained, the minister and session are hereby enjoined formally to install him.

3. *Resolved*, That the Assembly hereby declare that the existing law of the Church as to the mode of installation is as follows:—After sermon, the minister shall speak of the office of ruling elders, as in case of ordination, and shall then propose to the ruling elder elect, in the presence of the congregation, the following questions: “Do you accept the office of ruling elder in this congregation, and promise faithfully to perform all the duties thereof?” “Do you promise to study the peace, unity, and purity of the Church?” The ruling elder elect having answered these questions in the affirmative, the minister shall ask the members of the church whether they accept him, as in cases of ordination. The members of the church having answered in the affirmative, by holding up their right hands, the minister shall declare him a ruling elder of the church; and accompany this act by an exhortation, prayer, and other proceedings, as he may deem suitable and expedient.

Turretin remarks, that in reference to ordination and the appointment of church officers, we must distinguish between “essentials and accidentals.” To make forms essential is the essence of formalistic ritualism, and utterly subversive of God’s law, and of the best interests of the State and of the Church. What is marriage but the covenant between one man and one woman to live together as man and wife, according to God’s ordinance? Wherever this covenant is made, there, in the sight of God, and *in fero conscientiæ*, is marriage. Different States have enacted different laws prescribing the forms or circumstances which should attend this contract, and the modes in which it shall be attested; and it is the duty of all living under such laws, to conform to them. But suppose that from ignorance or recklessness any of them are neglected, is the contract null and void? To answer in the affirmative is to trample the law of God under foot. For a long time the laws of England required that all marriages should be solemnized in church, by

an episcopally ordained minister, and within canonical hours. While these laws were in force, it was the duty of all Englishmen to obey them. But suppose any man was married by a Presbyterian minister, after twelve o'clock, noon, would his marriage in the sight of God be void, and would it be pronounced void by the civil courts, without doing violence to the divine law? In like manner, ordination is the declaration of the judgment of the Church, through its appointed agents, that a certain man is called to the ministry. The Church directs that this judgment shall be signified in a certain way, and with certain prescribed solemnities, such as laying on of the hands of the Presbytery. Suppose any of these prescribed formalities are neglected; suppose the Presbytery omit the laying on of hands, (as we have known very recently to be done,) is the ordination void? No man but a Papist or Puseyite would answer, Yes. In the case of a ruling elder, the choice of the church, and the consent of the person chosen, is all that is essential. The rest is ceremonial. Prescribed forms should be observed; the neglect of them should be censured. But to make them essential, is, in our view, to abandon the fundamental principle of Protestantism and of common sense. It would invalidate the acts of half the sessions in the country.

This matter of installation of elders is very much a novelty. We believe it is unknown in the Scottish and Continental Churches. We have no objection to it. We are perfectly willing it should be "enjoined," and we think the injunction ought to be complied with, but we must renounce our Protestantism before we can believe that an uninstalled elder is no elder. Some years since, an Episcopalian in Ireland was married to a Presbyterian woman, the rite being solemnized by a Presbyterian minister, whereas the law at that time required that when either party belonged to the Episcopal Church, the officiating clergyman should be an Episcopalian. The man repudiated his wife and made her children bastards. In some of our States the law requires a marriage license. A young girl, ignorant of that fact, is married without a license, and her marriage is pronounced void. Is this right? Certainly it is, if the neglect of prescribed forms be allowed to vitiate solemn contracts. Mr. Waller asserted "that Mr. Smalley, the ruling

elder in question, was unanimously elected, after due and sufficient notice," and was immediately invited to take his seat in the session, and did so. This was almost a month before the trial. Any principle which would invalidate his official acts, would justify the repudiation of a wife under the circumstances just stated. If a man sells an estate, and receives the money for it, and then refuses to recognize it because of technical defect in the papers, it would be universally considered an outrage, because everything essential to a sale had been done, and the failure was in unessential and variable formalities. However, therefore, we may be disposed to insist on certain forms attending induction into Church offices, do not let us do as Romanists do, exalt forms into substance.

The New Digest.

The following resolutions were offered and adopted:

Resolved, That the thanks of this General Assembly are due to the Rev. Samuel J. Baird for the labour incurred by him in the preparation of the "Assembly's Digest," recently published by the Board of Publication.

Resolved, That the Digest is earnestly commended to the attention and patronage of all in our connection, and that any person having suggestions to make in reference to any proposed improvement in the work are invited to make them to the author thereof before the issue of a new edition.

The next Assembly is appointed to meet at Lexington, Kentucky.

SHORT NOTICES.

Discourses and Essays; By William G. T. Shedd. Andover: W. F. Draper. 1856. Pp. 271.

This is a reprint of several discourses and essays previously published from the pen of the distinguished Professor of Ecclesiastical History in Andover. They are all marked by profound thought and perspicuity of statement. There is a strain of what we know not how to express more intelligibly than by the word "Transcendentalism" running through the whole volume. The results are perhaps in the general sound, the principles involved, we fear will unavoidably work mischief. We do not believe in the consistency of scriptural orthodoxy, according to the standards of the Reformation, with the new Philosophy. This is not the place to enter either on exposition or discussion. We wish simply to express our high sense of the ability of Professor Shedd, and of the importance of his influence as counteracting the rationalistic school of New England, while we avow our dissent from the characteristic or distinguishing principles of these Essays. Perhaps we may have the opportunity of examining at greater length this suggestive volume.

A Critical Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews. By Francis S. Sampson, D. D., Professor of Oriental Literature in the Union Theological Seminary, Prince Edward, Va., edited from the manuscript notes of the author, by Robert L. Dabney, D. D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, Broadway. 1856. Pp. 475.

This work exhibits abundant evidence of the learning, ability, piety, and orthodoxy of its lamented author. He bid fair to become one of the most distinguished and useful of American scholars. His early death was an irreparable loss to our Church. Professor Dabney has performed an important service in erecting this lasting monument to the memory of his friend. The work will be an acceptable contribution to the rapidly increasing stock of American and English exegetical works. Until of late the student of the Scriptures has been forced to look almost exclusively to Germany for critical commentaries. But the English press is every year issuing works of this class from thoroughly educated men, which, like this work of Professor Sampson's, have the learning and exegetical skill of German authors without their infidelity.

A Commentary, Expository and Practical, on the Epistle to the Hebrews. By Alexander S. Patterson, minister of the Hutchesontown Free Church, Glasgow. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. London: Hamilton, Adams & Co. 1856. Pp. 564.

This elegantly printed volume is designed for the edification of readers of the English Bible. It abounds in references and scriptural citations, and is pervaded by a devout spirit. It does not enter at much length either into critical or theological questions, but gives the sense in a clear and simple manner.

Reformers before the Reformation, principally in Germany and the Netherlands, depicted by D. C. Ullmann. The translation by the Rev. Robert Menzies. Vol. II. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1855. Pp. 636.

This important work, the first volume of which has been before announced, is the eighth volume of Clark's Foreign Theological Library, which we have frequently commended to the attention of our readers.

A Glance backward at Fifteen Years of Missionary Life in Northern India. By the Rev. Joseph Warren, D. D. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. 1856. Pp. 256.

The important service rendered by Dr. Warren, to the cause of Missions in India, renders it a matter of deep regret that providential circumstances have necessitated his giving up his chosen field of labour. This retrospect of his missionary life is well adapted not only to give a clear idea of the methods adopted to promote the gospel in India, but also of the character and manners of the people.

The Prophecies of Daniel and the Revelations of St. John, viewed in their mutual relation. With an exposition of the principal passages. By Carl August Auberlen, Dr. Phil., Licentiate and Professor extraordinarius of Theology in Basil. With an Appendix. By M. Fr. Roos. Translated by Rev. Adolf Saphir. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1856. Pp. 452.

As our knowledge of this book is confined to its title-page, we must content ourselves by announcing its publication to the students of prophecy. Want of time has prevented our examination of the work.

A Treatise on the right use of the Fathers, in the decision of Controversies existing at this day in Religion. By John Daillé, Minister of the Reformed Church of Paris. Second American edition revised and corrected by the Editor of the Board. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 416.

The Wedge of Gold: or Achan in El Dorado. By Rev. W. A. Scott, D. D. San Francisco: Whitton, Towne & Co. 1855. Pp. 182.

Dr. Scott occupies one of the most important positions in our Church, for which his great energy of character, as well

as his zeal and abilities, render him remarkably well qualified. This volume contains a series of discourses on the history of Achan, specially designed for the peculiar character of the people among whom the author is called to labour, imbued with his characteristic force and fervour.

The Bible History of Prayer. With Practical Reflections. By Charles A. Goodrich. Boston: John P. Jewett & Co. Cleveland: Jewett, Proctor & Worthington. New York: Sheldon, Lamport & Blakeman. 1856. Pp. 384.

This is not a treatise on prayer. The writer takes up in chronological order the prayers recorded in the Scriptures, unfolds the circumstances under which they were uttered, and makes them the ground of instruction and edification.

The Words of the Lord Jesus. By Rudolph Stier. Translated from the German. By Rev. W. B. Pope, London, and Rev. John Fulton, Gaval. Vol. II. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. Pp. 439.

Our readers are acquainted with the series of translations of German Theological works published by the Messrs. Clark of Edinburgh. This volume from Dr. Stier forms one of that series.

The Protestant Theological and Ecclesiastical Encyclopedia: being a condensed Translation of Herzog's Real Encyclopedia, with additions from other sources. By J. H. A. Bomberger, D. D., Pastor of the First German Reformed Church, Philadelphia, assisted by distinguished theologians of various denominations. Part I. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1856.

This is a very important enterprise. The work, of which the first part is now published, proposes to "embrace all the subjects belonging properly to the literature of the Protestant Catholic Religion and Church, and will furnish the most reliable results of recent study, research, and discoveries in the various departments of science in its relation to Christianity, including the several branches," of Biblical Literature, Systematic Literature, Historical Literature, and Historical Symbolism. The contributors to Herzog's work are among the most distinguished men of Germany, representing, in its different phases, what is there regarded as the orthodox party. The names of Baumgarten, Delitzsch, Dorner, Ebrard, Güricke, Kurtz, Lange, Nitzsch, Lepsius, Müller, Tholuck, Twisten, Ullmann, Umbreit, are perhaps the best known in this country. There are no higher names in theology than these among the men of our generation. Most of them are strict Lutherans, or followers of Schleiermacher. The work coming substantially from Germany will of course be German. We must take the good and the bad together. The work promises

to furnish a storehouse of learning to our ministers, which they can find nowhere else.

The Internal Evidence of Divine Authorship in Nature and Revelation: an Address, by Rev. A. G. Orton, D. D., of Lisle, N. Y. Cincinnati: C. F. Bradley & Co. 1855. Pp. 54.

We recognise in this address the originality and vigour which distinguished Dr. Orton when we were fellow-students many years ago. Some of the discourses which he delivered as a student in the Theological Seminary are remembered by his associates to this day. We wish that necessity had oftener been laid upon him to appear before the public in the exposition and defence of the truth. He is not too old yet to do the Church good service by his pen.

Summer Vacation Abroad; or Notes of a Visit to England, Scotland, Ireland, France, Italy, and Belgium. By Rev. F. de W. Ward. Rochester: Erastus Darrow & Brother. 1856. Pp. 287.

Every new book of travels either contains something new, or conveys what is old to new readers. This volume of Mr. Ward will be found both entertaining and instructive.

The Communion Sabbath. By Nehemiah Adams, D. D., Pastor of the Essex Street Church, Boston. Boston: John P. Jewett & Co. 1856. Pp. 208.

This elegantly printed volume contains thirteen discourses on topics connected with the sufferings and death of Christ. They are designed expressly, or mainly, for communicants; but are intended to present the subjects which are naturally connected with the celebration of the Lord's Supper in a manner adapted to impress all classes of readers. We need not say they are distinguished by ease, elegance of style, and by a devout spirit. They are properly doctrinal, and aim at being edifying rather than instructive.

Spring-Time of Life; or, Advice to Youth. By Rev. David Magie, D. D., Elizabethtown, N. J. American Tract Society. Pp. 348.

Dr. Magie is known to all our readers as one of the wisest and best ministers of our Church. He has given in this volume a body of sound scriptural counsel to the young on the most important points of moral and social duty.

The Trial of the Witnesses to the Resurrection of Jesus. By Thomas Sherlock, D. D., Bishop of London. To which is added, *The Sequel to the Trial.* Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 214.

A clear and satisfactory harmony of the apparently conflicting accounts of the resurrection of our Lord, rendering the

authenticity of the evangelical narrative the more conspicuous from these seeming contrarieties.

Life Sketches from Scottish History; or, Brief Biographies of the Scottish Presbyterian Worthies. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 144.

The world will never want zealous Presbyterians as long as Scottish blood flows in the veins of any of its inhabitants, or as long as Scottish history is known. Every right principle of our nature sympathizes with the suffering worthies of the Presbyterian Church in Scotland, and it is threefold healthful that the memory of those men should be cherished in all lands. We are always glad to see such books as this on the list of the publications of our Board.

Internal History of German Protestantism from the middle of the last Century. By C. F. A. Kahnis, D. D., Professor of Theology in the University of Leipzig. Translated by Rev. Theodore Mayer, Hebrew Tutor in the New College. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1856. Pp. 328.

This is an instructive history of German Theology during the last hundred years, written from the stand-point of a strict Lutheran.

Lectures upon the Philosophy of History. By William G. T. Shedd, Brown Professor in Andover Theological Seminary. Andover: Published by W. F. Draper. 1856.

Professor Shedd has already achieved a high reputation for the union of philosophic insight with genuine scholarship, of depth and clearness of thought, with force and elegance of style, and for profound views of sin and grace, cherished not merely on theoretical, but still more on moral, and experimental grounds. These characteristics attracted attention as shown in an article published by him in the *Christian Review* a few years back, on the subject of Original Sin. Certain speculative theories which he gives forth as his philosophy of the Fall, and of inherent sinfulness in men before and beneath conscious sinful acts, have been criticised in New England journals, as being a Revived Realism, which asserts either the existence of an entity called the human race, over and above its constituent members; or else makes those members in some mystic sense, physically and numerically one. These views are set forth in the present volume. We do not deem it necessary here to repeat what we have often said in reference to this theory, as connected with the Fall and Incarnation. We rather turn with pleasure to those declarations in behalf of important but contested truths, which constitute the most important feature of the volume.

He most strenuously asserts the bondage of the human will to sin; that man can be delivered therefrom only by supernatural, creative power; that "it is only on the side of moral evil that the will of the creature can act without influence and assistance from the Creator;" that as the development of fallen human nature is the true idea of secular history, the development of regenerate human nature, i. e., of the Church, is the proper matter of ecclesiastical history; that in estimating this development, the proper standard is objective Christian doctrine; that this is in substance known to Christians, and declared in the symbols of the Church—yet the living word of God must be the supreme and infallible standard for judging even these. Of Nicean Christianity he says: "Its determined opposition to heretical conceptions, and its comparatively vigorous missionary spirit, are two characteristics of this period that deserve to be reproduced in all coming time. The Church, in this pantheistic and rationalistic age, should keep fast hold of those statements of the doctrine of the Trinity, and the person of Christ, which had their origin at this period. The Church in this and every age should retain the substance of those profound anthropological views, which were the result of the great controversy between Augustine and Pelagius." He also signifies that the best views of Soterology are to be found in the Reformation era. He strongly reprobates the excessive subjectivity of the Schleiermacher school.

With the ability and earnestness which he manifests in the inculcation of these and other affiliated truths, we cannot but hope that, in his present high position, he will be honoured of God to render signal service to the cause of God and truth.

An Introduction to the Study of Aesthetics. By James C. Moffat, Professor of Greek in the College of New Jersey, Princeton. Cincinnati: Moore, Wiltach, Keys & Co.

While we do not adopt in full the author's ingenious analysis of the idea of Beauty given in the first chapters of this volume, yet it contains much that is not only true, but fresh and suggestive. This portion of it, though valuable, is less so than the subsequent parts, in which he discusses Taste in its relations to the various departments, intellectual and artistic, which call it into exercise. In this respect it supplies a void in our literature. The varied knowledge and lively style of the author render his treatment of these topics pleasing and instructive. The volume contains much suited to the wants of the youthful student, which cannot be found in the same compass anywhere else.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

GERMANY.

The fourth volume of L. Reinke's Contributions to the Explanation of the Old Testament, 8vo. pp. 497, contains twelve treatises upon the various Messianic passages of the Pentateuch and of the historical books, as well as of the Apocrypha. (The author is a Roman Catholic.)

L. von Essen, Ecclesiastes (Prediger Salomos.) 8vo. pp. 107.

P. Schegg, the Roman Catholic Commentator upon the Psalms, Isaiah, and the Minor Prophets, has published an exposition and translation of the Gospel by Matthew, 8vo. pp. 496, as the first part of a Commentary upon the Gospels generally.

An Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans, on the basis of the Old Testament, has appeared from the pen of Umbreit, pp. 360. This volume aims less at the direct exposition of this epistle than at the illustration of the Apostle's doctrine and forms of expression from the Old Testament.

E. Boehmer, On the author and date of the Revelation of John. 8vo. pp. 78.

J. H. Kurtz, Manual of Universal Church History. Vol. II. Part I. Containing from the fourth to the ninth century. 8vo. pp. 564.

K. R. Hagenbach, Lectures upon the more Ancient Church History. Part II. From the fourth to the sixth century. pp. 898.

Hofmann's Scripture Proof has been completed by the publication of the last part of the second volume.

Ewald's Seventh Annual of Biblical Science, pp. 260. The main design of this annual is to present a review from the author's stand-point, of all works relating to Biblical subjects published in the preceding year. Besides this and some subsidiary matters, he takes occasion in the present number to exhibit his critical skill upon the history of the Deluge, and the writings of Isaiah.

O. Strauss, Nineveh and the Word of God. 8vo. pp. 39. The commentator upon Nahum has brought together in this

little pamphlet such illustrations of Scripture as are furnished by the recent explorations at Nineveh.

J. Brandis, *On the historical gain from the deciphering of the Assyrian Inscriptions, with the outlines of the system of the Assyrio-Babylonian arrow-headed writings.* Pp. 126.

M. Uhlemann, *The Israelites and the Hyksos in Egypt,* pp. 95. The ground is taken that Manetho's account of the Hyksos is a sheer fable.

C. Cavedoni, *Biblical Numismatics.* Part II. Appendix and Supplements. pp. xxxi. and 76. This additional matter is chiefly suggested by De Saulcy's recent researches in Jewish Numismatics. Paris. 4to. pp. 192, and 20 plates.

K. Maurer, *The Conversion of the Norwegian Race to Christianity.* Vol. I. pp. 660.

A. Schweizer, *The Protestant Central Dogmas, in their development within the Reformed Church.* Part 2. The 17th and 18th centuries, pp. 884.

Lieut. Van de Velde, *Travels through Syria and Palestine in 1851 and 1852.* Part 1, pp. 337.

C. Bartholomess, *Critical History of the Religious Doctrines of Modern Philosophy.* Paris, 2 Vols. pp. 414 and 590.

E. Renan, *General History and Comparative System of the Semitic Languages.* Part I. pp. 449. Paris. This volume treats of the first part of the subject, the general history of the Semitic tongues.

Hermæ Pastor Græce, *Primum edidit Rudolphus Anger.* Vol. I., containing the Greek text. Pp. xxxii. and 116. This early Christian production has hitherto been supposed to be extant only in an obscure Latin translation. The original Greek is here edited from a MS. recently found in a monastery on Mt. Athos.

Spicilegium Solesmense, embracing hitherto unpublished works of holy Fathers and Ecclesiastical Writers. Vols. 2 and 3. Chiefly *De re symbolica.* Pp. 1181. Paris. These volumes present, among other things, the complete works of Melito, bishop of Sardis, including his *Key*, which had been regarded as lost, but of which the Editor has found and used 8 MSS.

F. Dietrich, *Codicum Syriacorum Specimina.* 4to. pp. 29. These selections from Syriac MSS. of the British Museum, relate chiefly to the doctrine of the Lord's supper, and to the history of the Scriptures in that language. The fac-similes from MSS. of different ages are intended as contributions to Syriac palæography.

F. Hitzig, *the Epitaph (Grabchrift) of Eshmunazar,* pp. 55.

Explanation of the great Phœnician inscription of Sidon and of an Egypto-Aramæic Inscription, with accurate copies of both. 4to. pp. 68. These are attempts by two more scholars to explain the legend upon the royal sarcophagus found in January of last year, and which is the largest and best preserved Phœnician inscription known.

E. Huschke, *The Oscan and Sabellian Monuments*, with an explanation, grammar and glossary. Pp. 421. The execution of this work is far inferior to its pretensions.

W. Wachsmuth, *History of the Political Parties of Ancient and Modern times*. Vol. III. Part I. *Parties of Modern times to the Middle of the 17th century*. Pp. 324.

S. Davidson, *Revision of the Hebrew text of the Old Testament from critical sources*; being an attempt to present a purer and more correct text by the aid of the best existing materials; with the principal various readings found in MSS., ancient versions, Jewish books, etc. London.

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
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CONTENTS OF NO. IV.

OCTOBER, 1856.

	PAGE.
ART. I.—The Bible, the Missal, and the Breviary	601
ART. II.—The Sacred Writings of the Parsis	618
ART. III.—Baird's Religion in America	642
ART. IV.—The Matter of Preaching	655
ART. V.—The Church—Its Perpetuity	689
ART. VI.—Egyptology	715
ART. VII.—Eli Smith's Arabic Bible	732
SHORT NOTICES	737

THE
PRINCETON REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1856.

No. IV.

ART. I.—*The Bible, the Missal, and the Breviary; or Ritualism Self-illustrated in the Liturgical Books of Rome: Containing the Text of the entire Roman Missal, Rubrics, and Prefaces, translated from the Latin; with Preliminary Dissertations, and Notes from the Breviary, Pontifical, etc.* By the Rev. George Lewis, of Ormiston. Edinburgh, 1853: pp. 809.

MR. LEWIS claims this as the first full English translation of the great Roman Liturgy.* The Missal is not to be found in any other spoken language. One Voisin, in the seventeenth century, who presumed to make a French version, was anathematized for his pains, and the book is not extant. Before the present undertaking, Hussenbeth's was the most complete English translation, and he gives all that is necessary for the information of the unlearned in following the service. The small volumes which are in the hands of the worshippers in these churches, are not missals or mass-books, but guides to the observance of what the priest is performing at the altar,

* The copy followed is "The Roman Missal restored, according to the decree of the most holy Council of Trent; published by order of the holy Pius V., and revised by authority of Pope Clement VIII. and Urban VIII. Augmented with the new Masses granted by the indulgence of the Apostolic See. Mechlin, 1840."

with devotions appropriate to the individual worshipper. The congregation are, in fact, spectators of mysteries conducted in their presence, and not requiring their co-operation. It is not a system of common devotions, but each one is left to his own separate worship, under the general suggestions of what is taking place within the sacred enclosure to which every eye is turned.

The Missal is the repertory of all the forms used in the celebration of the Mass throughout the ecclesiastical year. It is the growth of many centuries, and the dogma which has been inaugurated under the reigning Pope has given him the opportunity of immortalizing his pontificate, by incorporating new forms of honour to the Virgin.

The Breviary is the private book of the priest. It is the formulary of the religious reading and devotional engagements required of him every day of his life. It furnishes the scriptures, comments, psalter, prayers, and legends, which he must peruse and use for his own edification. It is his Bible, commentary, and private prayer-book. It keeps him in mind of the festivals and the saints, and of their respective claims on his remembrance. Such a register is eminently necessary, since Rome has made every day a *feria*, or holy day; sometimes crowding into the same day the commemoration of more than one event or name. According to the degrees of solemnity with which the offices are to be performed, the festivals are marked in the calendar as double, semi-double, and single; and these are divided again into double of the first class, double of the second class, and great double. Some of the higher festivals take an octave of days. Of the great *feriæ*, fifteen are in honour of Christ; twenty-four of the Virgin; eleven commemorate incidents in the history of the Church; six exhaust those of the Bible history. In a catechism taught in the city of Rome, the fourth commandment is summarily taught in these words: "Remember to keep holy the festivals." In referring to the honour due to Gregory XIII. for correcting the computation of the year, and making Rome "set her ecclesiastical clock by the sun," Mr. Lewis makes the appropriate exclamation: "Happy had it been for the world, if he had more fully understood the parable the heavens utter to the

earth, and corrected the grave errors which had been accumulating from the days, not of Nice only, but of the Apostle Paul, who saw them already 'working.' "

The calendar of the Missal records two hundred and sixty-eight saints, in addition to angels, apostles, and evangelists, each having a day or an octave. These are only the beatified. The canonized are innumerable. Butler's Lives include more than fifteen hundred. The *Acta Sanctorum* has reached its fifty-first folio volume, and it is estimated that before this sacred directory is complete, it will catalogue more than thirty thousand names; "an amazing proof of the polytheistic tendency of the human mind." The present modes of beatification and canonization took their rise principally from the decree of Urban VIII. in 1625. There are eighteen steps in the progress to canonization. Beatification is reached at the fifteenth, when the candidate is styled "Blessed," and then he may be stopped for want of additional evidence of merit, or fresh miracles by his relics. Applications are not usually entertained at the Vatican until the candidate has been dead ten years, and the entire process of canonization cannot be commonly completed in less than sixty years. There are solicitors in Rome to urge the claims of the aspirants, and a sort of State's Attorney, on the part of the Papal Court, whose business is to scrutinize the case suspiciously, and insist on the full amount of evidence. The first native American name in the calendar is St. Rose of Lima, who died in 1617, and was canonized in fifty-four years; the probation being perhaps abridged in her favour from the fact that her countenance, when an infant, was transformed into the likeness of a rose, that the Virgin enjoined her being called by her own name, "St. Rose of Holy Mary;" and that she heard from Christ the words "Rose, thou art the espoused of my heart."

It is remarkable that there is not one saint taken from the Old Testament. The litany of the Missal sweeps them into a single and partial suffrage, "All ye holy patriarchs and prophets, pray for us." Gregory Nazianzen accounts for the omission, by suggesting that none could reach the honour who had not exercised faith in the incarnate Christ: but against this opinion is the fact that place is given to the Maccabees.

The beautiful Litany, so happily accommodated to evangelical use by Luther, the compilers of the Book of Common Prayer, and others, is desecrated by the long procession of intercessors—such as Raphael, Laurence, Vincent, Sylvester, Anthony, “all holy monks and hermits,” Cecilia, Anastasia, “all the holy virgins and widows”—who in the Missal precede the moving supplications “by the mystery of thy holy incarnation”—“by thy cross and passion,” “by thy death and burial,” “Lamb of God, who takest away the sins of the world,” &c. In this particular, as in some others, Mr. Lewis’s annotations are not supported by his translation. It is not quite correct that “all this” appeal to the intercessory mediators takes place in the Litany, “before the worshipper arrives at the one Mediator,” (page 27); for in advance of the human names come the rogations, “Lord, have mercy. Christ, have mercy. Christ, hear us. Christ, give ear to us. O God, Heavenly Father, pity us. Son, Redeemer of the world, pity us. God, the Holy Spirit, pity us. Holy Trinity, one God, pity us,” (p. 507.)

In every mass, or liturgy for the day, there is a lesson from the Scriptures, but the selections are so short and fragmentary, that if even in their vernacular language, the people could obtain but a very imperfect knowledge of revealed truth. The English and Irish have access to these portions in their translated Missals and Douay Bibles; but comparatively few possess these, and the vaster number of those who hear the word of God at all, hear it in the unintelligible words of the Vulgate. Sometimes even the hearing of the unknown tongue is denied: as on Holy Saturday, when no less than twelve selections from the prophetic books are provided, the rubric is, “The person officiating reads then in a low voice. . . . Before or *while* the Prophets are read, the presbyters catechize,” &c. Of the one hundred and fifty-eight masses of the great festivals, the first seventy-three contain less than an average of fourteen verses of the Bible to a mass. In the next thirty masses, twenty-three entire chapters are given. In the remaining fifty-five, as in the first seventy-three, there is not one whole chapter, and the average of verses is eighteen. The retrenchments are sometimes hard to be accounted for, excepting on the ground that it was thought injudicious for even the priests to see too often

the inspired contradiction of what tradition required them to teach and do: as in the use of the twentieth chapter of Exodus, as a lesson, the first twelve verses—the whole of the first table—are omitted, and are not supplied in the order of any other day. The same want of fulness and continuity in the Scriptural extracts is found in the Breviary. The excellent theory of that manual is to take the clerical reader through the entire Bible once every year, and through the Psalter once every week. At one period this complete course was probably arranged in the tables of the Breviary, but other services being intruded, the Bible was curtailed. Mr. Lewis gives an illustration of the extent of these omissions in the single book of Isaiah. One month is appropriated to that prophet; but out of the sixty-six chapters, thirty-nine are wholly left out, including the 44th, 53d, 55th, and 61st. Again, from the Epistle to the Romans four chapters (vi. viii. x. xi.) are entirely excluded, and as many as 144 verses are dropped from the remaining chapters: so that of 483 verses 259 do not come under the eyes of the priest, unless he adds to his daily task in the Breviary a consultation of the un mutilated text. In like manner no portion of four of the chapters in the Epistle to the Hebrews is given, and of the remaining nine chapters 73 verses are omitted—making an hiatus of more than one half of a work which has special claims to be read by every one who professes to sacrifice as a priest at an altar. About the same proportion of the book of the Acts is withheld. The space in the Breviary which the inspired writings ought to fill, is occupied with 449 selections from twenty-eight fathers and doctors of the Church, from Cyprian (A. D. 258) to Pope Innocent VI. (A. D. 1356.) Of these selections as many as 113 are from Augustine, who lost his popularity as an orthodox teacher when the Reformers began to turn the powerful artillery of his doctrinal theology against those who were ignorant of God's righteousness. In the midst of many inventions and follies, much sound reading is furnished in the excerpts of the Breviary. The doctrine of the Divinity of the Lord Jesus, and that of the personality and work of the Holy Spirit, are faithfully witnessed, though fearfully overlaid with fictions and misinterpretations that endanger the life of the truth. Specimens of the legends are

given in Mr. Lewis's preliminary chapters, interspersed with comments of his own—generally fair—and an occasional good story in point, such as this, after the notice of St. Anthony in the Breviary:

"Anthony, on one occasion visiting Alexandria, found that a cobbler lived next door to him. Calling on him, he entered into conversation on the subject of his faith and his pious exercises. The cobbler told him sincerely what he believed; and as to his daily exercises of devotion, he answered that in the morning, in a short prayer, he gave thanks to God for his daily benefits, and above all, that he had sent his Son; asking the pardon of his sins for the sake of Christ; praying for the preservation of his Church and of his own family; and entreating Christ to make intercession with the Father for all men. Thus resting in the faith, he proceeded cheerfully about his affairs, providing for himself and children, and taking care that they were well cared for and instructed. Having answered thus, the saint asked if he used no stricter exercise than this. 'Stricter exercise!' said the cobbler; 'doth he labour little, trow you, that provideth how his family shall be maintained? Think you that he that governs a house and bears other burdens common to all citizens, hath nothing to exercise and vex him? Dost thou not see how many public and private miseries there be in this life, and to bear them well, and in them to exercise faith and patience, dost thou not think it a warfare hard enough?' Anthony went his way, admonished not to prefer his own exercises before the duties of common life." Even the Tractarian poet of "The Christian Year" sings—

"The trivial round, the common task,
Would furnish all we need to ask—
Room to deny ourselves; a road
To bring us daily nearer God."—*Keble*.

The twenty-four hours of each day are divided into seven portions, within which the clergyman is bound to accomplish a prescribed routine of devotion and reading. *Matins* is begun at midnight; *primes*, at the dawn; *terce*, at the third hour of the day; *sixths*, at noon; *nones*, three hours after noon; *vespers*, three hours later; *compline*, the complement or close, at bedtime. It was in an attempt to make up for the neglect of his

past "hours," by reciting all the over-due offices, that Luther brought on a sleeplessness and nervousness that threatened his intellect. There are indulgences and accommodations which may be resorted to for a relief of the burden in emergencies; even with the most conscientious, the flesh must be often weak to admit of spiritual benefit. Yet on this point, as on many others, those who boast of their evangelical freedom from all yokes, may be admonished of the peril of the opposite extreme. If it be only superstition that prompts the Roman "religious" to draw out his breviary at the canonical hour, though in steamboat or railway-car, it certainly has no worse appearance than to observe the Protestant cleric on his journey, or at the hotel, with almost anything else in his hand but his Bible or book of devotion.

To return to the Missal. It is not necessary to call the attention of our readers to the amazing perversion of the Lord's Supper to a daily and ubiquitous sacrifice of the actual body of the Redeemer. De Moulin, author of the "Anatomy of the Mass," has numbered thirty-five contradictions between the Christian Supper and the Romish sacrifice. Mr. Lewis adds twelve self-contradictions to be found in the mass itself. Most of these imply, in his opinion, an era when the scriptural feast of commemoration had not been adulterated, and no change in the elements, by consecration or otherwise, dreamed of. One of the contradictions is this: "'In memory of me,' the priest is instructed at consecration to say 'secretly,' while he elevates the host openly for the people to worship, as their very Saviour." This is, indeed, a lamentable part of the means of delusion, by which the people are kept in ignorance; but it would have been only fair in Mr. Lewis to have taken notice that the "secretly," as it appears in the full canon of the Mass, has reference to the solemnity of the change that is supposed to be going on under the influence of the private acts of the priest; and that accordingly he not only says secretly the sentence that so clearly indicates commemoration, but also the other sentences, which are the very rock of transubstantiation—"for this is my body,"—"for this is the chalice of my blood." (Comp. pp. 62, 525, 526.) On Corpus Christi day, 1 Cor. xi. 23—29, is read entire. (p. 558.)

It were enough to put the ordinances of the Mass by the side of the simple narrative of any of the Evangelists, or of the Epistle to the Corinthians, to make plain the monstrous diversity, even apart from doctrine, and looking solely at the ceremony. A blessing or prayer; a breaking and distribution of the bread; six or eight words of explanation; then a thanksgiving; a giving of the cup; a single sentence to explain it; a hymn; this was the Lord's Supper, as observed by the Divine founder, when he transmitted the institution with the emphatic "Do this." But the Romish ceremony is indeed a *mass* in the number and complication of its ceremonies, as well as of its absurdities and falsities. There are twenty-five invariable and indispensable parts of each mass, including prayers, confession, creed, consecration, commemoration of the living, of the dead, elevation of the host, administration, and those in connection with manipulations of the chalice, paten, and censer, washings, &c. To these are to be added the special services that happen to fall upon the day of the mass, and which make part of it; as, for example, on the first Sunday in advent, eighteen portions, consisting of additional prayers, gospel and epistle, "secrets," "gradual," and hymn, swell the whole number of acts to forty-three. The celebrant has not only to remember the rubrics for all these parts of the service, but he has to observe concurrently the postures, gestures, and collateral performances which constitute a grand feature of the spectacle. Under the "rites to be observed in celebrating mass," ninety directions are inserted. In drilling himself for the work, the priest is assisted by diagrams of the altar, with measurements and points indicating his positions. Mr. Lewis has made a table of the statistics of one mass, and finds that the directions add up to 830. That is, there is that number of written rules, when and how the officiating persons must fold or unfold hands, sign the cross, kneel, bow slightly or profoundly, incense, kiss, turn the eyes, wash hands or fingers, beat the breast, ring the bell, light or extinguish candles.

"The historian of Alexander the Great," (here our author relates the apposite anecdote) "tells that after the battle of Arbela, which decided the fate of the Persian monarchy, the royal standard of Persia was found in the battle-field; when

stripped of its ornaments of purple and gold and precious stones, which the pride and pomp of each succeeding age had added, it was found to have been originally the leathern apron of a smith, that with a stout heart and strong arm had stayed the flight of his countrymen, turned a route into a victory, and become the founder of the Persian monarchy. Hard as it would have been for the founder of that ancient monarchy to have recognized the apron that the gratitude of his countrymen adopted as the national standard, as it flaunted in the field before the fatal battle, harder still would it be for the first disciples of our Lord, did they visit the modern churches of Rome, to recognize in the mass the last supper of their Divine Master."

The idolatrous idea of the mass has produced a long and circumstantial code of directions as to the means requisite for preserving and guarding it from sacrilege and mistake. There is a curious and disgusting chapter on the "defects occurring in the celebration of mass," which must be well studied by the officiator who would discriminate "Essentials," "Integrals," and "Accidentals," in what he does or omits. There may be fatal defects in the materials used, in the expressions uttered, in the mental intention or bodily condition of the priest. Every imaginable accident is provided for, even to the following: if a fly, or spider, or any other thing, fall into the wine after consecration, the priest must swallow it, if he thinks he can do it without nausea. If he vomit the eucharist, he must swallow it again, unless nausea ensue; in that case the wafer may be separated from the rest of the matter disgorged, and laid up in some sacred repository till rotten, and afterwards cast in the place of relics.

There are but nine hymns in the Missal; but those of the Breviary are numerous. The former include the "Stabat mater," and "Dies iræ." The Day of Wrath is sung in the masses for the dead, but neither invokes saints nor prays for the deceased.

"What shall I be then replying,
To that friend for succour flying,
When e'en saints for fear are sighing?

"Thou, great King of all creation,
Source of love, and free salvation,
Thou shalt hear my supplication.

"Me with weary steps thou soughtest,
 Me with sufferings thou boughtest,
 Finish then the work thou wroughtest."

On the other hand, only one stanza of the *Stabat Mater* is addressed to the crucified; the rest are expressions of sympathy with, or prayers for the help of, Mary.

"Alas! mother, fount of love,
 Make me feel the force of thy grief,
 That with thee I may mourn.

Cause my heart to be on fire
 With love to Christ,
 That I may please him.

Holy mother, deeply fix
 The wounds of the cross
 In my heart." * * *

"O, Christ! when thou shalt call me hence,
 Grant me, through thy mother,
 The palm of victory."

The *Te Deum* is not in the Missal, but is in the Breviary, and has been taken from that for the English Missal.

Besides the Missal for public worship, and the Breviary for his private use, the Roman priest has his Ritual for the administration of the Seven Sacraments. Here, as in the case of the transmutation of the Lord's Supper into the Sacrifice of the Mass, the simplicity of scriptural baptism disappears under the array of sacred oils, salt, silken towel, crumbs, tapers, spittle, exorcisms, anointings, and crossings. The Ritual still provides for the exorcising of those who are supposed to be possessed of evil demons. The forms of adjuration increase in length and violence as the earlier efforts prove ineffectual. Parts of them are in very impressive language, and are capable of being used devoutly by one who would earnestly endeavour, in the strength of Christ, to resist the great adversary in a scriptural way, and put him behind him, or under his feet: "Fear Him who in Isaac was sacrificed, in Joseph was sold, in the lamb was slain, in man was crucified, and became thence triumphant over thy infernal wiles." "Begone, transgressor! Begone, seducer! full of all guile and deceit, enemy of virtue, persecutor of innocence! Give place, most dire; give place, most impious; give place to Christ, in whom thou hast found nothing of thy works; who

spoiled thee, who destroyed thy kingdom, who bound thee, vanquished thee, and plundered thy goods; who cast thee into outer darkness, where, with thy servants, destruction is prepared for thee. But why dost thou savagely withstand? Why dost thou rashly refuse? Thou art accused to the Almighty God, whose laws thou hast transgressed. Thou art accused to his Son, Jesus Christ our Lord, whom thou durst tempt, and didst presumptuously crucify. Thou art accused to the human race, to whom thou didst administer the poison of thy persuasions."

Another of the Ritual books is the *Ceremoniale Episcoporum*, containing general directions for the bishops in their peculiar functions. Besides the book, each bishop may have one or more Masters of Ceremonies, as his counsellors and assistants. The Congregation of Rites in the city of Rome is mostly composed of those who are, or have been in this office. The *Ceremoniale* is a hand-book of small details; the grand forms used by the bishops are contained in still another volume of the liturgical series, the *Pontifical*, embracing the modes of confirmation, holy orders, blessing of abbots, consecration of virgins, coronation of monarchs, consecration of churches, altars, images, bells, &c., &c.; excommunications, degradations, and discipline in general. Even the sexton, under the title of Ostiarius, is solemnly constituted by a bishop. The ceremonies are certainly eminently significant; for that functionary first appears with a candle in his hand, receives from the bishop the church keys, goes to the gate with an archdeacon, and turns the lock, and takes the bell-rope in his hand. The bishop also ordains the clerk, (by clipping his hair,) the reader, the exorcist, the acolyte, sub-deacon, deacon, and priest. Mixed with the mummery of these proceedings may be found much excellent doctrine, and prayers that might well be imitated in their scriptural simplicity, on the occasions of licensing, ordaining, and installing, by the Presbytery: "Let him be a faithful and wise servant, whom thou hast appointed over thy family, that he may give to them food in due season, and present every man perfect. Let him be unwearied in his anxieties, fervent in spirit; let him hate pride, love humility and truth, nor ever desert it, overcome either by praises or by fear. Let him not put light for

darkness, nor darkness for light; let him not call evil good, nor good evil. Let him be a debtor to the wise and to the unwise, that he may obtain the fruits of the profiting of all men."

Or this:

"Protect him, O Lord, and defend him from all his enemies, and all their enmities, visible and invisible. Direct his steps in the way of peace and justice, and largely bestow on him the gifts of thy virtues,—justice, temperance, fortitude, prudence, charity, sobriety, patience, magnanimity, invincible constancy, faith unfeigned, unshaken hope, a devout mind, perfect humility, a sound understanding, gentleness, modesty, oneness of mind, peace, concord, chastity, abstinence, vigilance, discretion, rectitude, knowledge, piety, counsel, and in all good actions inflexible perseverance. Take away, O Lord Jesus Christ, from him whatever is depraved and perverse, whatever is contrary to salvation, whatever is hurtful to the soul—pride, boasting, vain-glory, elation, and whatever may be displeasing to thee. Surround him, inwardly and outwardly, with the aid of thy protection, that defended by thee he may be safe, protected by thee he may be secure, taught by thee he may be wise. Show him the way in which he should walk; bestow on him the treasure of wisdom, that he may know and possess that from which he may bring forth things new and old. Give him in all things to follow thy steps, and from his ministry to obtain joyful fruits; that after the course of this life is run, when he shall come before thy tribunal with much fruit of souls, thou mayest bestow on him that reward which thou hast promised to give to all faithful stewards labouring in thy name."

What better material could go into a charge to a pastor than such as this which the metropolitan delivers to a bishop at his consecration?

"Be constant in preaching; cease not to preach to the people committed to thee the word of God copiously, sweetly, and clearly; and thou shalt be enriched with the dew of heaven. Read oftener the divine writings; nay, as far as possible, let the holy text be ever in thy hands, above all in thy heart; and let prayer interrupt the reading, and let thy soul look into it diligently, as into a mirror, that it may correct what is wrong, or add some new grace to what is lovely. Learn, that you may

wisely instruct others, laying hold of that which is according to sound doctrine and faithful speech; that you may be able to confirm others in sound doctrine, and to convince those that are opposed. Continue in those things which thou hast learned, and in the words of the divine dispensation entrusted to you. Be ready always to give an answer. Nor let your actions put your discourse to shame, lest when you shall speak in the church, any one reply, Why then does he not do as he exhorts?"

Even from the bushels of chaff about the celebration of the Mass, may be winnowed many grains of pure and sweet materials for the meditations and devotions of the Protestant communicant. Take the following from the priest's preparations:

"At the table of thy sweetest banquet, beloved Lord Jesus Christ, I, a sinner, presuming nothing on my own merits, but trusting in thy compassion and goodness, fear and tremble to approach, for I have a heart and body stained with many sins, a mind and tongue not kept with due care. Therefore, O merciful God, O dreadful Majesty, I, wretched, in grievous straits, turn to thee the fountain of mercy, to thee quickly, to be healed. I fly under thy protection. I cannot stand before thee as my Judge. I sigh to have thee as my Saviour. O Lord, I show thee my wounds; I put off all reserve before thee; I know my faults are many and great, for which I stand in fear. I hope in thy mercies, which are more than can be numbered. Look therefore upon me with the eyes of compassion, O Lord Jesus Christ, King eternal, God and man, crucified for men. Give ear to me, for I hope in thee. Pity me, full of misery and sin, thou whose fountain of compassion shall never cease to flow. Hail, victim of salvation, offered for me, for all, on the gibbet of the cross! Hail, noble and precious blood, flowing from the wounds of my crucified Lord Jesus Christ, and washing away the sins of the whole world! Remember, O Lord, thy creatures, whom thou hast redeemed with thy blood. I repent of my sins; I desire to amend what I have done amiss. Take then from me, most merciful Father, all mine iniquities and my sins, that being purified in mind and body, I may be worthy to share the holy of holies; and grant that this holy foretaste of thy body and blood, which I unworthily purpose to take, may be to the remission of my sins, to the purifying of my soul from

all its faults, to the putting to flight base thoughts, to the new birth of good feelings, and efficacious to the bringing forth of works agreeable to thee; also my most assured protection against the snares of all my enemies."

Many of the best short prayers, seldom exceeding one sentence, which make part of each service in the year, have been adopted in the liturgy of the Church of England, where they appear as "Collects for the day." Some of these brief ejaculations in the Missal, are exceedingly rich with suggestions, and models of sententiousness.

"Pour, we beseech thee, O Lord, thy grace into our hearts; that we, who by the message of the angel, have known the incarnation of thy Son, Christ, may by his passion and cross attain to the glory of his resurrection."

"O Lord, we beseech thee, mercifully to give ear to the prayers of thy people, that we who are justly afflicted for our sins, may be comforted with the visitation of thy loving favour."

"Stir up, O Lord, we beseech thee, thy power, and come and succour us by thy great might, that by the aid of thy grace thy mercy may hasten what is hindered by our sins."

"O God, whose only begotten Son appeared in our nature, grant, we beseech thee, that as he was made in outward things like to us, so we may be inwardly renewed after his image."

"May thy gifts free us, O Lord, from all inordinate delights in earthly things, and ever renew us with heavenly nourishment."

"Being fed, O Lord, by thy heavenly delicacies, we beseech thee that we may always delight in them as those things by which we truly live."

"Graciously perfect, O Lord, in us the benefits of thine holy observance, that what we know we ought to do, may be done, through thy power working in us."

"Give, we beseech thee, O Lord, a salutary efficacy to our fasts, that the chastisement of our flesh may be to the quickening of our souls."

"Grant us, we beseech thee, Almighty God, so to abstain from carnal feasts, that we may equally abstain from the vices which assail us."

"O God, who by the mouths of the prophets didst command us to forsake things temporal, and to hasten to things eternal, grant to thy servants that the commands of thine which we know, we may be able to obey through thy heavenly inspiration."

"Grant us, we beseech thee, O Lord, thy Spirit, ever to think what is right, and to act what is right, that we, who without thee cannot exist, may be able to live according to thee."

"O Lord, we beseech thee, let thy grace always go before and follow after us, and make us to be continually intent upon good works."

One of the most touching parts of the Romish liturgy is a choral performance borrowed from the Greek books, and said to have been composed in consequence of an earthquake at Constantinople in the reign of Theodosius. It is the *Improperia*, or Reproaches, in the services of Good Friday, and is sung responsively by two singers, with choruses in Latin and Greek. It begins—

"My people, what have I done to thee? or in what have I grieved thee? Reply to me. Because I have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, hast thou prepared a cross for thy Saviour?"

The pathetic effect may be imagined when the highest cultivation of music and of the voice is employed in the alternations of the following sentences:

"What more ought I to do for thee and have not done it? I indeed planted thee my choicest vine, and thou art become very bitter to me; for thou hast given me vinegar to drink, and pierced thy Saviour's side with a spear. *Chorus*.—Holy art thou, &c.

"For thy sake I scourged Egypt with its first-born; and thou hast delivered me to be scourged." *Choir*.—"My people" as above to "Reply to me."

"I brought thee out of Egypt, drowning Pharaoh in the Red Sea, and thou didst deliver me to the chief priests. "*My people*," &c.

"Before thee I laid open the sea; and thou hast opened my side with a spear." "*My people*," &c.

"I went before thee in a pillar of cloud; and thou didst lead me to the judgment-hall of Pilate." "*My people,*" &c.

"I fed thee with manna through the desert; and thou didst smite me with thy blows and scourges." "*My people,*" &c.

"I gave thee the waters of salvation from the rock; and thou hast given me gall and vinegar to drink." "*My people,*" &c.

"I smote the kings of Canaan for thy sake; and thou hast smitten my head with a reed." "*My people,*" &c.

"I gave thee a royal sceptre; and thou didst give my head a crown of thorns." "*My people,*" &c.

"I exalted thee to great power; and thou didst hang me on the gibbet of the cross." "*My people,*" &c.

Then an anthem swells out in celebration of the cross, and the alternate choirs continue in new tones to rehearse the incidents and blessings of the crucifixion.

The best means of opposing the progress of Popery in the United States is to diffuse its own authenticated books. A sensible, Bible-reading community, could not look through the Missal or Breviary, without perceiving at a glance that, with the many excellent things scattered through their pages, there is an immense overbalance of what is absurd, false, and discreditable to an enlightened age. Compared with Scripture, these books strike every reader as not only in utter variance with the simplicity of the New Testament *cultus* and its plainest doctrines, but as exceeding in the former respect the obsolete ceremoniousness of the Levitical ritual, and almost ignoring the true spirit of the theology of Christ and his apostles. There are many misrepresentations afloat on the Protestant side of the controversy. The work before us might be cited for a number of unintentional departures from the law of candid interpretation. Injustice is done to Rome by declamatory and superficial enthusiasts on the right side of the contest. But when allowance has been made for all this, it is impossible to look at the authorized literature of Romanism, old and new, without seeing the fatal stigma on its forehead. There are Christian words, symbols, titles, and truths, running through the language, but the whole look, sound, and association, is strange and uncouth. It is like something sitting in the temple of God, showing itself off as Divine, yet too unlike Divinity,

too incongruous with the real temple, to impose itself on any but the deluded. The Romanist must have the Bible to undeceive him, as the Protestant must have the Missal to prevent his being deceived. Let the two be put into the hands of any dispassionate, intelligent umpire, Jew, Mohammedan, or Heathen, and the verdict must be that they belong to different systems.

How vain and wasteful, then, is the mere outpouring of ridicule and denunciation upon the adherents of Rome—attended with all the suspiciousness of partisan unfairness—when the whole matter, in all its deformity, is at hand, and open for exhibition at any moment! How prejudicial to the Protestant cause, to make materials of warfare against the Romish religion out of the mere abuses of its tenets and forms, or the personal errors of its upholders, when the acknowledged tenets and forms, by which alone the religion can be honestly judged, are all-sufficient for every end of truth and justice!

Another remark is prompted by the glance we have been taking at these productions. In the mountain of dross there are many precious grains of the imperishable gold of revelation. Much is omitted, but much is preserved. The good and the bad are thrown together, but they are capable of being discriminated and separated. The redemption by Christ, the doctrines of the Nicene Creed, the total pollution and guilt of man by original sin, the sanctifying prerogative of the Spirit, are prominent in the readings and devotions of the public ministrations and private offices. The Scripture extracts which the clergy and the devotees are required to peruse, and which all may read who can, are abundant in inspired testimony against many of the worst and most conspicuous errors of human tradition as given in the same pages. Mr. Lewis, in his notes, often points out these passages, and expresses the thought, that it may be in the designs of Providence to hide this good seed till pious Romanists—clergy and lay—shall at some blessed juncture discern the difference between what is of God and what of man, and large portions of the corrupt Church be regenerated by the truth before the day of destruction. When that time shall come, how striking will be the argument to those who have been taught to say more Ave Marias than Paternosters,

that not a syllable of Scripture—nor even the most ancient of their own symbols—gives example or warrant for the invocation of the Virgin or the Saints! How will the mystery of the real body in the host disappear before Scripture and reason as in the child-like, yet sage-like, logic of Lady Jane Grey, with the Abbot of Westminster. “What took he but bread; what brake he but bread; what gave he but bread? What he took, he brake; what he brake, he gave; what he gave, they eat; and that was bread, not his body, for his body was alive before them, and not broken by himself, nor eaten by them.”

ART. II.—*Commentaire sur le Yaçna, l'un des livres religieux des Parsees, ouvrage contenant le texte Zend expliqué pour la première fois, les variantes des quatre manuscrits de la bibliothèque royale, et la version Sanscrite inédite de Nériosengh, par Eugène Burnouf, Membre de l'Institut, Professeur de Sanscrit au Collège de France. Tome I. Paris, 1833. 4to. pp. cliii. 592, and cxevi.*

Avesta, die heiligen schriften der Parsen, aus dem Grundtexte übersetzt, mit stäter Rücksicht auf die Tradition, von Dr. Friedrich Spiegel. Band I. Der Vendidad. Leipzig, 1852. 8vo. pp. 295.

It belongs to the Church to convert to her own use the accumulated treasures of the world; and no higher honour can be claimed for worldly treasures than that they are capable of subserving the progress and the well-being of the Church of God. Israel spoiling the Egyptians was a type for all after time. Vessels of gold and of silver, rich and costly stuffs, wealth acquired without God and with no regard to his service were, at the bidding of the Most High, and upon the demand of his people, lavishly bestowed upon those who would use them for the construction or embellishment of the sanctuary. This is the destined end of every material and intellectual acquisition. The streams of ancient civilization and culture swelled to their beautiful proportions, that they might empty themselves

into the bosom of Christianity; and the rapid accumulations of modern times tend in the same direction. Religion looks with satisfaction upon the quickened enterprise and intense activity which pervades every department of life at present; for she expects to have that developed from every quarter which will confirm the truth, kindle devotion, or enlarge the means and avenues of good. There is not a field that human diligence can reap, from which she may not cull her proper food and draw from it strength and increase.

It might perhaps seem, at first view, as though one field, to which much and sedulous attention has been turned of late, were utterly unpromising; that the direction of study upon the systems of heathenism would be attended with no profit; that nothing could be gained to the advantage of true religion from what seems so diametrically antagonistic. But the results of the labour expended have shown that this would be a hasty and ill-judged conclusion. However absurd, irrational, or wicked the superstitions of the heathen may be, they should not be dismissed as undeserving of serious examination. They should be studied, if for no other reason, to see how silly and wicked they are, and thus by the contrast to increase our admiration for the glorious gospel, and to heighten our sense of indebtedness to it. The thorough sifting of these false religions is necessary, moreover, for the refutation of the errors which they contain, and the vindication of the opposing truth. The Church is engaged in her struggle with heathenism still. Her missionaries have to meet it upon its own soil, and they must be able to dislodge its batteries and to force its strongholds. A thorough knowledge of the system which they are sent to combat will show them where to plant their artillery with the greatest effect. The apostle, who was raised up to be the chief opposer of Judaism, received his training at the feet of Gamaliel. Paganism has its defences, its subtleties, and its subterfuges; and more skill is needed than upon a hasty consideration might be deemed necessary, so to present or to parry arguments, that the native mind, biassed as it is and accustomed to a style of thought different from our own, may be made to see the falsity of their errors. And in this work aid may be given without personally visiting heathen ground. But lately we

heard inquiries made by a respected brother from India for a popular but thorough refutation of German pantheism, that it might be used against that similar system, which underlies Brahmanical belief. The labours of Burnouf, Spiegel, and others, in unfolding the religion of the Parsis, may not be without their value in the direction just indicated. The followers of Zoroaster are still to be found in inconsiderable communities at Yazd and Kirman in Persia, and in greater numbers in Hindostan. In the city of Bombay, where they most abound, there were 114,698 in 1849, and in the entire peninsula probably more than 500,000. Their wealth, intelligence, and commercial enterprise, give them an importance greater than would be accorded to their mere numbers. That they are rising in consequence will appear from the fact, that "thirty years ago there were but two Parsis employed as English copyists in a government office, and some half a dozen in counting-houses; not only public offices, but banks, merchants' and attorneys' offices are now literally crowded with them."* The Queen of England has knighted one of the professors of this faith, Sir Jemshedji Jijibhai, whose wealth and munificence are such that he is said to have expended a quarter of a million sterling in acts of generosity in twenty-six years. The Parsis have numerous temples, some of which have been recently built, and in a style of great elegance. They support in Bombay seven newspapers, one of which is issued daily. There are also men of some note for learning among them, who have distinguished themselves by publications of various kinds. An evidence of this is furnished by the following statements of Mr. Briggs. "Ardeshir Behramji, the first Parsi interpreter in the Supreme Court of Bombay, published in 1824, a Gujarati Grammar, to facilitate the progress of English students in acquiring that tongue. Sohorabshah Dosabhai has published idiomatical exercises in Gujarati and English. Hirjibhai and Meherwanji of the Lauji family, who visited England, have furnished the public with a volume in English as to their impressions of England and its people. Naurosji Firdunji, one of the present interpreters in the Queen's Court in Bombay, conducted for a

* See *The Parsis, or Modern Zerdusthians*, by H. G. Briggs.

length of time a scientific magazine in Gujarati, called the *Vidhiya Saugar*. Some of the Parsis are intimately conversant with Persian. Sohorabji, the youngest son of Sir Jemshedji Jijibhai, lately issued a translation of a Persian work into the Gujarati dialect. A rising young merchant of Bombay, Shet Dhanjibhai Framji, has devoted upwards of eight years to the compilation of a work on the Zend and Pehlevi dialects,* which he is about to publish. Munshi Dosabhai Sohorabji has published idiomatical exercises in the Persian, Hindusthani, and Gujarati languages, with corresponding lessons in English."

That the polemic value of the investigations into Parsism has not been overlooked by those competent to avail themselves of it, is apparent from the writings of the learned missionary of the Scotch Free Church, Dr. Wilson, especially his "*Parsi Religion Unfolded*." One thing at least can be accomplished without much difficulty. The divergence can be exhibited between their religious books and their present practice, and they can be convicted of departures from their own acknowledged standards. It is well known with what success this has been done in the case of the Vedas and their adherents. It has resulted in a strife amongst the Hindûs themselves, and a movement on the part of some of them to reform Hindûism by rejecting the popular superstitions, and returning to a more simple worship, such as is reflected in their earliest records. And anything seems better than the absolute apathy and stagnation in which the heathen mind is so commonly found. If this can be interrupted, and religious inquiry stimulated by almost any cause, the result can hardly be other than beneficial.

The study of the systems of heathenism may thus be rendered subsidiary to important ends. But besides these indirect uses, there are direct advantages deserving of pursuit. These have been sometimes misconceived, and false, exaggerated or partial views substituted for the true.

By one school of mythologists exclusive stress is laid upon casual and superficial resemblances between the religions of the heathen and revealed religion, and a close dependence of the

* The prospectus of this work, which is a Zend dictionary in English and Gujarati, is contained in the *Journal of the German Oriental Society*, VII. pp. 104—106.

former upon the latter is affirmed. Heathenism is searched for traces or reminiscences of scriptural names or personages, events or rites; analogies are seized upon, however fanciful or remote; Satan is everywhere thought to be aping Jehovah, and in these counterfeit religions, of which he is the author, to have simply caricatured the true; and then these caricatures are adduced in evidence of the fidelity and truthfulness of that heavenly original, which, without the deformities of any, is yet the common source of all. The labours of Hercules have been made to confirm the deeds of Samson. The Titan Japetus is taken as the traditional echo of Japheth, Deucalion of Noah, and Vulcan of Tubal-Cain. Arion cast from the ship into the sea, and borne to land by dolphins, is a garbled account of Jonah; and Visvamisra is the Hindu Job. In the same spirit, and with the same design, it was maintained that the wisdom of all the ancient sages and philosophers was drawn more or less directly from the fountain of Hebrew inspiration. The difficulty in either case arose from the forced and arbitrary assumptions which must be made, and the insufficient evidence on which the theory had to rest. The unsatisfactory nature of this view, when pressed to such an undue extent, led by a natural reaction to an opposite extreme still more extravagant, in which the same premises were insisted on, but a contrary conclusion drawn. In the analogies still instituted between heathenism and revealed religion, the former was made the original, and the latter the copy, with the avowed design of placing it on a par with or even beneath acknowledged superstition. The fact is, that there are some great truths of the primeval religion of mankind, and some great facts in human history prior to the dispersion, of which, as it was reasonable to expect, the memory is still preserved among almost all the tribes of men, though mingled oftentimes with the grossest error, and sometimes quite buried beneath the mass of superincumbent falsehood. But as the seat of divine revelation was so limited, and the chosen people were of set purpose kept so secluded from the other nations of the earth, it is certainly not to be expected that what was for the time designed exclusively for them, should find universal circulation and acknowledgment; and to make such an expectation the guiding principle of an investigation, could

only lead to disappointment and error, as well as to the neglect of what was more real and important.

By others, the myths of the heathen have been regarded as legendary distortions of historical facts. Heroes and kings were converted by their admiring successors into gods and demi-gods; and their deeds, which did not pass beyond the bounds of natural occurrences, grew by repeated recitals into the super-human and miraculous. Now, it was thought, if this process could be reversed, and these accretions of the marvellous could be stripped off, the residuum would be reliable history. This was accordingly attempted. Deities were reduced to ordinary men. Their genealogies were retained, their residences fixed, their dates computed. These fabulous records were made to yield successive dynasties, with long lines of kings and their eventful reigns. Ages of possible history were constructed, which might have given occasion to these myths. All seemed very plausible. It would perhaps be difficult to prove that it could not have been so; but whether it actually was so, it was unfortunately quite impossible to ascertain. A hundred other histories might be invented, possessing as much plausibility as any given one that has been proposed. And so the whole scheme broke down, from the want of any basis upon which to rest it, and from the impossibility of arriving at any solid conclusions. The whole is as intangible and as delusive as those appearances of land, which often present themselves to the eye of the mariner in the distant horizon, and yet are nothing but cloud and vapour. There is besides so much discrepancy and contradiction in the myths themselves, that the attempt to reduce them to anything like consistency and unity, except by the most violent and arbitrary methods, seems absolutely hopeless. Thus, for example, Cicero records (*De Nat. Deor.* iii. 21) that in order to reconcile the current fables of the gods, it was necessary to assume the existence of five different Minervas, five Mercuries, four Vulcans, four Apollos, six of the name of Hercules, three Jupiters, and so on. Varro even thought that there were three hundred Jupiters. Of course the endeavour to draw out the thread of history from such tangled confusion, even assuming it to have had a real historical origin, is utterly preposterous. But while some fables may have arisen in the

manner assumed, there are many more which in all probability were derived from a totally distinct source, and never had a particle of real events in their composition; and there is no criterion by which to decide with confidence in each particular case upon the mode of genesis. The best historians now discard all that has been called history, which is thus constructed. They are content to detail the myths of a people, precisely as they lay in their current superstitions, without undertaking to say what their historical basis may have been, or whether they had any. It may be with regret that we see figures once esteemed real, living men, vanish as airy phantoms. And perhaps some historians are disposed to bring down the age of fable too far. Still it is safer not to begin to build until a solid foundation can be found. This principle, while it sweeps away some cherished scenes from classic ground, is equally relentless in the beginnings of Persian story. So that Professor Roth of Tübingen, who may be looked upon as an authority in such matters, says, after reviewing some of the early portions of Firdusi's great epic, "It is better to confess that we have no history of Persia before the time of Cyrus, than to take Firdusi's kings for history."* Such conclusions coming from such a quarter, and reached by purely literary means, are the more acceptable, as the excesses of the historical view have likewise been chastised, by suffering it also to play into the hands of unbelief. And when the shadowy forms of Egyptian and Asiatic fable are arrayed in the dress of a real history, and their immense mythologic periods are paraded as though their chronological exactness could not be disputed, and the attempt is made thereby to cast discredit on the Scripture record, we cannot be displeased to see these shadows made to disappear at the simple waving of a master magician's wand.

Reaction from the flatness and the incongruities of historical explanation led to what may be denominated the mystical mode of treatment, the assumption that the myths were veils of profound religious and philosophical truths. The vulgar mind, imbued with superstition, may have stopped at the outer shell; but it was the province of the wise to penetrate to the kernel.

* Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft II. 228.

The mysteries especially were instituted to keep alive the great doctrine of immortality, or other tenets equally important. The fables are never to be taken in their gross obvious sense, but in their inner spiritual meaning. This mode of explanation, like the preceding, already found adherents and advocates among the classic heathen in the decrepitude of their decaying systems. As the glaring absurdities of the popular belief pressed themselves more and more upon the attention of thinking minds, and especially as the Christians made unsparing use of these in their polemics, every effort was made to rid themselves of this grievous incumbrance. One class sought escape by denying to the vulgar throng of gods and goddesses any claim to divinity, sinking them to the level of mortals, and finding back of them an undefined object of homage in a supreme but unknown God. The inconsistencies and difficulties which beset this method of relief, have been before alluded to. The other way of escape was to retain the myths, but assign to them a higher spiritual sense. Allegorizing, thus begun, found its way through the Neo-Platonists to the Alexandrine school of Jews and Christians, and we find Philo and Origen applying the same process to the sacred history which their Pagan masters pursued in regard to the heathen fables. It proved as impracticable in the latter case, as it was absurd in the former. It is impossible to carry through a consistent allegory where none was ever intended. The spiritualizing process proves merely a blind and random guess-work, with no settled principles of guidance, and no possibility of verifying results, and it can only lead to endless diversity and uncertainty. All religions fare alike under the application of this universal solvent; and as they who manage it, find everywhere just what they please to find, all religions are discovered to be equally truthful and good. This is precisely the point reached by the Sufies of Persia, and which they are disposed to apply to the myths of their own land, as to all others. A spurious volume is found among them, called the *Desâtîr*, which represents these sentiments, and is ascribed to a high antiquity. It was, in 1818, published by a learned Parsi priest, and the Avesta is now popularly explained by its adherents agreeably to the mode of interpretation therein adopted, which is very much

after the fashion that the followers of Swedenborg deal with the Holy Scriptures.

Others, again, have sought in these mythologies nothing but a reproduction of the phenomena of external nature, clothed in symbolical forms; those phenomena especially which are most striking to the senses, or most important to the life of man. The passage of the sun through the signs of the zodiac, and the revolution of the seasons with the changes which they occasion, give the keynote to the whole. Joyous festivals celebrate the sun's return; grief and wailing mark his departure. Or the geographical features of a country supply contrasts which are looked upon as the foundation of its myths.

Without meaning to deny or question that heathen fables may have sprung from some, and perhaps all of the various origins suggested by the several partial modes of treatment which have been described, we yet think that to confine inquiry to the specific origin of myths, and to aim chiefly at stripping off the mythical dress, in order to uncover the secret which lies hid beneath it, is to miss what is most interesting and valuable in this whole study. The mythical form is, after all, of greater consequence to us than its obscure or casual origin. Whence it came, or how it grew, less concerns us than what it is. These fables cannot be properly understood or explained from anything exterior to man himself. A religion is not to be comprehended by tearing all that is religious out of it, and leaving behind a non-religious residuum, which, however, it may have entered into the framework, or modified the outside appearance, has nothing to do with the real essence of the matter. All the religions of the world, save one which had its birth in heaven, are the offspring of the spiritual nature of man. The human heart is the soil out of which they have all grown; the inborn principles of man's nature furnished the seeds; and outward circumstances, however greatly they may have affected the growth, did not determine nor produce it. This constitutes the chief interest of the study. The religions of the world make the invisible and immaterial visible and tangible. Man's heart is in them developed in its fruits. They are the products of man's spirit, upon which it has deeply impressed itself. In studying them, then, we study man as he has revealed himself

openly and without disguise. Man's outward worship sustains the same relation to his religious nature and feelings, that language does to his thoughts and his intellectual nature. As words are the expression of ideas, and language the utterance of the mind, in investigating them we bring to light the laws of thought, and trace the workings of the intellectual faculties. Just so religion is the language of the heart; and it is the more truthful representative of the inner man, as its outgoings are spontaneous and unstudied. The conscious effort of the individual to state what is struggling within his breast, is often like the breeze which ruffles the surface of the lake, and makes it a less faithful mirror than when sleeping in entire repose. The spontaneous growth of ages and of masses of men is less liable to such disturbance. And especially, if, without confining ourselves to a single specimen, or within a narrow range of observation, we enlarge the scope of our vision so as to take in the most prominent religions of the world, we may thus get beyond the influence of all that is merely casual and local, and gain a view of those great, permanent and pervading characteristics, which belong to the race.

The analogies and points of relation, which subsist between the most remotely sundered and the most widely varying religions, are oftentimes surprising and extensive. The method was once much in vogue of explaining all such resemblances by the assumption of a direct derivation of one from the other. Some Egyptian or Asiatic origin was claimed for everything. The rites of Judaism even were disposed of in the same way: the process was continued *ad nauseam*, until the magnificent and speaking ceremonial of Moses, with its divinely descended truths, was converted into a confused medley of disjointed rites, picked indiscriminately out of every form of heathenism. Even as applied to Pagan rites themselves, the theory cannot be universally carried out without breaking down under the mass which is laid upon it. There are deep analogies hid beneath superficial diversities, of which no satisfactory solution can be found, except the obvious one, that like causes produce like effects. The nature of man is one; and all that springs from it, however separated in locality, or whatever the variety of attend-

ant circumstances, must bear testimony to the community of its origin.

And now, if we look upon the broad surface of heathenism thus, as the natural heart of man, without quickening from above unfolded to our eye, how momentous and how vast the territory before us! There is room for unlimited exploration, and the results of the search cannot but be of the greatest consequence. The universality of religion proves unmistakably and undeniably that a religious nature is of the very essence of man's being. It is as plain as the gravitation of matter. Man was made to worship: he must worship. And the very degradation of heathenism, and the grovelling nature of its deities, serve but to add a new and signal force to the argument. For they show this principle to be so inwrought into the very constitution of man, that he not only pays spontaneous homage when the proper object of adoration is presented to him, but he will do violence to his intellect and his reason sooner than disobey its impulses.

And then, upon this grand but humiliating arena may be seen, under every various phase, the struggles of the heart with those momentous questions, which necessarily force themselves upon it—Whence came the universe? Whence came man, and whither is he bound? Whence came evil? How may sin be removed and the deity appeased? And when we see the hesitating and despairing, or the monstrous and absurd answers which are everywhere returned, differing in every respect, except their common failure to attain the truth, what emblem can more befit such a spectacle than that of men groping their way in a labyrinth of total darkness? A phenomenon which fills so large and so sad a space in the history of mankind cannot be without some important providential reason. We are sent of God to heathenism as our teacher. He suffered the nations to walk in their own ways. And he did so that the experiment might be wrought out upon so grand a scale as to settle beyond cavil the correctness of its results, whether man can save himself—whether he can, by his own unaided efforts, rise to the knowledge of his Maker, to holiness and bliss. The result is a total failure; a failure so absolute and manifest as to occasion, even in the breasts of the heathen themselves, despair of self-

relief, and dissatisfaction with the system under which they live, working thus that sense of spiritual poverty which may prepare them to hail with joy the riches offered in the glorious gospel.

When we search everywhere throughout heathendom, but search in vain, for any just or even tolerable conception of the unity, the holiness, the mercy, eternity, or greatness of the infinite God—when we can find nowhere a lofty and pure morality either in precept or in practice—when, with all the conscience of sin which was possessed, we meet nowhere with any rational mode by which to purge it away, and none effectual in delivering from its power—and when we are obliged to turn disappointed away even from those mighty and populous empires, and from those most refined and polished nations, which make the greatest figure in the ancient world, to a feeble and despised people, not distinguished for any special cultivation, and which never originated any native system of philosophy, and find among them a religion which combines in itself in unalloyed perfection all those truths for which we look in vain elsewhere, and which has given birth to all just conceptions upon these momentous themes, to the most profound philosophies, and to the highest style ever reached of culture and civilization, we may well ask for a reason of all this; and we may well challenge an explanation upon any other hypothesis than that which admits this religion to be from heaven.

It has been seen how instruction may be gained from heathendom surveyed in its totality; if, however, detached portions be regarded separately, this will open new themes of profitable study. Notwithstanding their general features of resemblance, there is anything but sameness in the religions of the world. It is with them as with the various nations of men themselves: they are strikingly alike, and yet as strikingly different. And their points of diversity are no less instructive than their points of agreement. Even such elements as are common to all, are in each case blended in some new proportions. The great problems of human life and destiny are surveyed from different points, and their relative magnitudes are altered as the point of observation is shifted. One question is uppermost in one system, another in another. One seeks its solution by one

route, another by a route wholly different. Thus, for example, the origin of evil is by the Parsi system referred to an independent being, Agra-Mainyus (Ahriman), who is constantly seeking to introduce disorder into the perfect creation of *Ahura-Mazda (Ormuzd); the conflict between these two beings of opposite natures creating the mixture of good and evil which now exists, and which shall finally terminate in the subjugation of Agra-Mainyus, and the triumph of Ahura-Mazda. In express contradiction to this system, the Most High, when predicting by the mouth of Isaiah, the mission of Cyrus, who would be an adherent of it, claims for himself absolute and unlimited control over both the kingdoms of good and of evil: "I form the light and create darkness: I make peace and create evil; I the LORD do all these things." Isa. xlv. 7. Another system, as if a precursor of the doctrine that God, even if so disposed, could not prevent sin in his creatures, represents the universe as a series of emanations, which, by the very act of receding from the primal centre of goodness, necessarily lose their purity and brightness, as light and heat become weakened in proportion to their distance from the body by which they are radiated. Again, one prominent thought in the Hindu system is the removal of sin, and the acquisition of merit by self-inflicted sufferings of the transgressor; no such idea is found in Parsism, which accomplishes the removal of uncleanness by a round of purgations. The systems of heathenism are not absolute unmingled falsehood: there are truths mixed up with their errors, though distorted often, and needing a careful search to discover their existence. It is an interesting subject of inquiry how these various systems stand related to each other and to the great problems of human life; which of these problems is most prominent in each, and what solution is offered by them respectively; also what are the elements of truth and power in each, and in what combinations they are presented, and how these stand related to Christianity. For it is most instructive to observe how the religion of the Bible, like Aaron's rod turned serpent, swallows up all the religions of men; how it, in other words, blends together within itself in their purity and har-

* Some etymologists have remarked an analogy between the formation of Ahura, which seems to be a derivative of the substantive verb, and the Hebrew *אור*.

monious combination all those elements of truth and power, which are elsewhere found isolated and obscured; and how it really and fully satisfies all those various needs and longings, of which heathenism painfully proves the existence, but which it knows not how in any of its forms effectually to still. To study heathenism is to study, under most impressive forms, the wants of men; and this is well adapted to bring to view new features of that blessed word of life which is divinely fitted for their relief. We need have no hesitation in admitting, on behalf of any false religion, all of good that a candid examination can discover in it. The religion of Christ can surely never suffer by the contrast. And such an examination will furnish the best refutation of those extravagant claims, which are sometimes put forth, of the excellence of certain Pagan systems, and of the indebtedness of the true religion to them. Thus it has been stoutly affirmed that the Jewish doctrines of angels, and of the resurrection, were either borrowed or underwent essential modification from the Parsi religion. But it appears from the investigations of Burnouf and Spiegel, that the resurrection formed no part of the original faith of Parsism, and that the supposition that it did, rests upon erroneous translations.* And that it was no prejudice in favour of revealed religion which led Spiegel to this result, is apparent from his statement that the Hebrew canon was not closed until after the time of Alexander;† a statement which manifestly presupposes a denial of the genuineness of one or more of the books of the Old Testament.

This subject also has relations to history, too intimate and important to be overlooked. When the religions of mankind are contemplated in their proper light, as at once products and functions of the history of the people amongst whom they are found, they suggest many interesting deductions. In order properly to appreciate the product of an age, or of a state of things different from our own, it is necessary to transfer ourselves to it, and to live, as it were, in the midst of it. We cannot estimate it justly, if we contemplate it merely from the outside, and from a distance, viewing it from our own stand-

* Zeit. d. Morg. Gesell. I. p. 260; Avesta, p. 15.

† Zeit. d. Morg. Gesell. IX. p. 185.

point, and applying to it our own modes of thought and habits of judging, which may be entirely foreign from those amongst which it had its origin. This is true of a literary composition; it is true of the institutions, usages, and enactments of any people; it is true also of their religion. Now, this is only saying that its whole style and texture have been determined by the conditions in which it arose; it may be made to tell the story, therefore, of those conditions. It contains a picture of the moral and mental states of whole races of men during the period of its prevalence. It reveals their inward belief and the range of their ideas, and will thus save from oblivion a large and important chapter in the history of human opinion. And as it is impossible that this should have been inoperative and uninfluential, we shall be warranted in interrogating it still farther. It will disclose to us the spirit of a people, the ideas, so to speak, which rule them, which predominate in and control their history, and of which the whole course of events in which they take part, is but the expression and the symbol. Here it is in fact, that we must seek the key to many otherwise inexplicable phenomena, and the secret springs of many movements visible upon the surface. The religion of a people is to be regarded as more than a single element, co-ordinated with many others of equal influence in their history. It is rather the master-power which reduces all others to its sway, and harmonizes or subjects them to itself. Rooted in the strongest feelings of our nature, it takes rank correspondent with that of the faculties in which it has its seat. Who could understand the history of the Mohammedan powers, while ignorant of the religion of the false prophet?

The religions of men also indicate plainly the culture of those, among whom they are found. "Thou thoughtest that I was altogether such a one as thyself." Ps. l. 21. This lets us into the mode by which men form their conceptions of the deity. Their notions of spiritual beings and of the spiritual world are based upon the world around them. Their minds are not capable of a range of ideas, or of an elevation of thought much above their own actual condition. Their loftiest ideal is formed by taking one like themselves and simply investing him with superhuman power and splendour. The

gods of Homer are formed upon the model of his heroes. This too is the case in the Parsi religion. Upon this Spiegel remarks, (*Zeit. d. Morg. Gesell.* V. p. 223), "The relations of the Persian divinities are altogether patterned after those of men. Take but the *Shah-nameh* of Firdusi in your hand, a book which is certainly based upon the oldest conceptions of the Persians. Perpetual war exists between Iran, civilized Persia, and Turan, the uncivilized nomads of the north. The king consults with his nobles respecting the war with the foreign barbarians; countless hosts follow him. The fortunes of war are various, and though the Iranians mostly reap the due reward of their valour, the crafty and treacherous king of Turan succeeds often in deceiving them, routing them and even subjecting them. Sore times for Iran follow, but they must be patiently endured, for they are transient. At last a hero is found who restores the royal name to honour, and pays the Turanians with interest for the evil which they have inflicted upon the Iranians. Now it is entirely after this plan that their heaven is arranged. The bright heaven of Ahura-mazda is the heavenly Iran; the deep darkness of Agra-mainyus is the superterrestrial Turan. As the monarchs of Iran and Turan are surrounded by their nobles, so these mutually hostile powers, the one by the Amesha-çpentas (*Amshaspands*), the other by the *Daevas*. The proper field of combat, on which both parties measure their forces is the earth, especially the earth as known to the Iranians. The armies which they lead against each other, are good and bad men. The life of men and gods is accordingly a constant strife. The victory of the latter is slow, but sure; and such as have faithfully adhered to them, shall receive their merited reward and portion of the bliss."

Again, these religions are neither stationary in themselves, nor sundered from all connection with others. They may therefore, be viewed as they are brought into contact, perhaps conflict, with other systems, or as they are influenced by internal causes disposing to change. As they mingle with the great stream of human opinion, the effect may be traced in the modifications which they cause or which they undergo themselves. Scarcely anything is more interesting than to watch

this strife of opinion, or to trace the various doctrines or religious tendencies, which are commingled on the broad arena of thought and discussion, back to their original sources. Who can understand the mythology of Rome without studying that of Greece? or the mythology of Greece unaided by those of Egypt and the East? Or how can the genesis of the ancient philosophies be comprehended if these religions be left out of view? Or what can be made of the early Christian heresies, the Gnostic, the Manichean, and so on, without them?

The internal history, too, of these religions and the proper development of the germs which they respectively contain, furnish instructive hints regarding the law of human culture and progress. It is often assumed that man's progress is naturally and by an inherent power upward and onward; and that the heathen religions are a step in the progress of the mind up to clear and just views of truth. The facts will be found in conflict with this theory, and justify us rather in regarding them less in the light of stages to be passed through, than of falsities to be renounced. The depraved moral nature of man is a dead weight perpetually dragging him downward. Religions will be found to deteriorate, even while knowledge, refinement and general culture are advancing, until the rottenness induced by the former ultimately engulfs the latter. Heathen systems become uniformly by the lapse of time more irrational, more heartless and formal, more oppressive and burdensome, more subservient to the interests of a crafty and pampered priesthood. It is thus with the Brahmanical religion; it is thus with the Parsi; a fact which goes to show that heathen systems are corruptions of the purer faith of the primitive ages of mankind, and that the light which glimmers through them, is to be traced ultimately to that primeval source. No upward tendency is ever discernible, which is not due more or less immediately to revelation from heaven.

The volumes before us are devoted to the investigation of the religious books of the Parsis. Less than a century has passed since these books were first brought from India to Europe. This was accomplished by an ardent young Frenchman, Anquetil du Perron, who, unable to raise the funds needed for so long and expensive a journey in any other way, embarked as a

common soldier. After encountering many difficulties and hardships during his eight years absence, he at length returned, bringing with him 180 manuscripts, and a translation of the Zendavesta, as received from the lips of Parsi priests. This was published in Paris in 1771. Although considerable discussion was at once awakened with regard to the contents of these books, as well as their antiquity and genuineness, for a long time no serious attention was directed to the strange language in which the originals were found. The worth of the language to philology was unknown; and as all the writings it contained had already been given to the world in French, there seemed to be little to attract to its study.

Such was the state of things when Burnouf addressed himself to the study of the manuscripts brought home by Anquetil, supposing that, by availing himself of the aid of his translation, he would have little difficulty in mastering the tongue. He was not long in discovering, however, that from its exceeding inaccuracy but little use could be made of it. The Parsis themselves, from whom it was derived, had lost all accurate knowledge of the language; and as Anquetil conducted his intercourse with them, not in their native tongue but in modern Persian, this was no doubt a fruitful source of misunderstandings and additional errors, especially as the mode of oriental translation, when exactness is insisted upon, is to render with slavish literality word for word, and particle for particle, even though the result be quite unintelligible. In the case of the Vedas, there are numberless native helps of the greatest consequence. There are extensive commentaries upon every word and sentence; there are native grammars and lexicons of the most minute and elaborate character; and there is a vast Sanscrit literature, affording every opportunity for eliciting the meaning of doubtful passages by comparison with others more plain. In the case of the Zend, however, all was different. The Avesta itself, and that a mere fragment of its original extent, comprised all the existing remains of the tongue. There were no grammars, and the native vocabularies published by Anquetil, not to speak of their doubtful origin, were exceedingly meagre, and contained the grossest blunders. The very alphabet, as furnished by Anquetil, needed considerable cor-

rection. The task to be performed was really found to be that of recovering a lost language with the fewest possible aids. And the accomplishment of this task by Burnouf, Bopp, Rask, and others, deserves to be classed with the most brilliant intellectual achievements of modern times. It takes the same rank in philology with the discovery of Le Verrier's planet in astronomy, as a triumphant demonstration of methods and of principles. It may be said, in fact, to have been during the struggle after this result that scientific philology had its birth.

There are two native translations of the Avesta, which furnish all that remains towards its traditional interpretation. The first is in Pehlevi or Huzvaresh. It is an interesting circumstance, that this same language, though otherwise unknown, is found again upon the coins and monuments of the Sassanides, as decyphered by De Sacy, Olshausen, Mordtmann, and others. This, with other considerations conspiring to the same conclusion, is regarded as determining, approximately at least, the age of the version. The language proves to be intermediate between the old Zend and the later Parsi, (from which was ultimately formed the modern Persian,) but with a strong infusion of Aramæan. This has been thought by some scholars to indicate that the version had its origin in Western Persia, where, from the proximity of Syria, Syrian influence would be most strongly felt. This conclusion, however, is not admitted by Spiegel, who thinks the employment of Aramæan words to have been a kind of learned pedantry, equally prevalent in all sections of the country, and analogous to the use of Arabic words in modern Persian. If this version were but intelligible, its aid would be invaluable, but, unfortunately, almost as little is known of the Pehlevi as the Zend: its paucity of flexions, too, makes it incapable of representing adequately the various tenses and cases of the Zend. It will be more likely to be of assistance in ascertaining the state of the Parsi religion and of the Avesta text, and the current of principles of interpretation at the time of the Sassanides, than in throwing much direct light, for the present at least, upon the meaning of the Avesta itself.

The second native translation is reputed to be about four centuries old, and is in Sanscrit. The name of the translator

is given as *Neriosengh*. This version is professedly made, not directly from the *Zend*, but from the *Pehlevi* version just named. It is much to be regretted that this version, so far as is known at present, at least, is but partial, being confined to the *Yagna*, which is but a single division of the *Avesta*. It has been said to contain a part of the *Vendidad*; but if so, this has not yet been brought to Europe. *Burnouf* has made effective use of it in the commentary before us. This version has the advantage of being in a language which is now well understood, and which is equally rich in flexions with the *Zend* itself. But its value is greatly impaired by the fact that the *Sanscrit* is so barbarous from the slavish character of the version, as to be in many cases unintelligible without a recourse to the original, and then it represents the *Zend* only mediately, and contains all the glosses and additions of the *Pehlevi* from which it was made.

With a good version, accurately corresponding to the original *Zend*, it would have been comparatively an easy task to fix definitely the meaning, as well as the grammatical value, of all the words and forms; and the construction of a grammar and lexicon for the language would have been very plain work. But with a periphrastic and inexact translation, the case was seriously altered. And the very first step, viz. the determination of the grammatical character of words and forms could only be accomplished with the greatest toil and difficulty. Happily the close relation which was soon discovered to exist between the *Zend* and the *Sanscrit*, greatly facilitated this labour. The next step, after ascertaining the grammatical character and relation of each word in the sentence, was to apply to it the vague and general sense of the translation, so that each word might have its proper force, as already determined. The comparison of passages in which these words occurred again, or of the *Sanscrit* or other languages in which their cognates were preserved, supplying the corrective. Where these methods failed, it was necessary to have recourse to what *Burnouf* calls a species of divination, but which is now recognized as forming the basis of scientific philology. It is not easy to describe it better than in his own words:—pp. xxvii., etc.

“The problem which I had to solve was this: given a *Zend*

word, to which the Parsis attribute a signification which a comparison of passages and the study of the languages belonging to the same family neither confirm nor explain, to justify the sense given by the Parsis, or to find another. I commenced by detaching from the word to be translated its formative and suffixed terminations, which I had learned from the grammatical analysis of other words, in which the concurrence of Neriosengh, of Anquetil, and of the comparison of languages, left no doubt. I thus reduced the word, about which there was difficulty, to its simplest elements, or what is called its radical. And once master of this radical, I sought to discover whether the languages with which the Zend has most relation, the Sanscrit, Greek, Latin, the Germanic dialects, etc., bore any traces of it. This method led me, in a great number of instances, to very curious results. Thus I have established that the list of Sanscrit roots contained almost all the radicals whose meaning I sought; but that these radicals were infrequently used, if they were used at all in the classical Sanscrit, and that in order to find them in the language it was necessary to ascend to the Vedas. These old radicals were ordinarily strangers to the Greek and Latin languages, for otherwise I would have recognized them more speedily: some were found only in the Germanic dialects. So that the Zend and Sanscrit radicals, viewed with reference to their employment, naturally divided themselves into classes, the most marked of which only I shall indicate at present: 1. Zend radicals, belonging almost exclusively to the language of the Vedas, or to the most ancient Sanscrit, very rare in Greek and Latin, more common in the Germanic languages. 2. Zend radicals not found in classical Sanscrit, but which being mentioned in the lists of roots, have certainly belonged to the language, and probably to its most ancient form: this numerous class is rare in the learned idioms of Europe. 3. Zend radicals belonging to all ages of the Sanscrit, and common to the Greek, Latin, Germanic, Slavic and Celtic tongues. This class is the most numerous of all, and it may be said to form the common fund of all these languages. 4. Finally, Zend radicals, which I have not been able to refer to any known radical of these different languages, but

which I have almost always found again more or less altered in the Persian dictionary.

“If, as I venture to hope, these results at least in the general are incontestable, they cast new light upon the statistics of one of the richest families of human languages. In the first place they establish the high antiquity of the Zend, of which a considerable part is thus found cotemporary with the primitive dialect of the Vedas. In the second place, they evidently prove that the different languages which compose the Sanscritic family should not be regarded as derived one from the other, but that laying aside the different ages of their culture, which establish among them an appearance of chronological succession, they belong primitively to one and the same fund from which they have drawn in unequal proportions. This inequality so striking in the employment of the radicals is found again in the greater or less development which these radicals have received in the different idioms which have preserved them. Thus a root, which in Sanscrit has remained unproductive, has in Zend given birth to numerous offshoots. Another stopping in the midst of its growth has run through only the first period in one of these idioms, and in another only the last. In a word, whether in derivatives or radicals, nothing is absolutely equal in all these languages, but all set out from an originally common fund and are developed by the same laws.

“This community of origin, of which I met such convincing proofs at every step, emboldened me to attempt an account of a certain number of Zend words, which I saw resist the means of analysis, whose process and results have just been summarily indicated. The comparison of words identical or almost identical in Zend and in Sanscrit, for example, had given me a certain number of laws of permutation of letters; laws, whose certainty is greater, the greater the number of observations upon which they rest, and insofar as they have their ultimate reason in the peculiar constitution of the vocal organs. Zend words which differ from Sanscrit only by the change of one letter, and to which the application of one of these laws could be made with certainty, become the base from which I raised myself to other words, in which the simultaneous application of several laws was necessary. So that I came to explain

Zend words very different in sound from the corresponding Sanscrit terms, and to refer them by the comparative analysis of their elements to the form in which they appear in other idioms. I am far from concealing from myself the inconveniences attached to the exclusive employment of such a method, and I am not ignorant of the dangers of applying it without discretion. For the worth of the rules of permutation is not precisely the same for words which differ completely from each other as for those which are almost alike, and the certainty of these laws decreases in some measure in proportion to the need there is of applying them. But the appreciation of the different circumstances, which can permit or limit their use, belongs to criticism, and I hope it will not be found that I have in this work refused to the reader any of the means of verification which it was my duty to furnish him."

By methods such as this the exhumation of this fossil tongue has been accomplished. And it is a most interesting as well as valuable fact for science, that in philology, as in natural history the fossil remains of what has been extinct for ages, fill chasms and supply missing members in existing species and genera. The recovery of the Zend cannot as yet be considered complete. The general question even is still in dispute among those who have made it their special study, what comparative weight is to be attributed in cases of conflict to traditional aid and to that of the kindred tongues. For some passages of the Avesta, Spiegel does not even venture to propose a translation: in others he speaks with great hesitation and doubt. And when the promised translation of Westergaard appears, who is the champion of dialectic aids as Spiegel of tradition, there will, without doubt, be no small divergence between them. Still the work is essentially done. The language is understood; its structure and general character have been fully exposed; and its relations to the great family of languages within which it is embraced, have been definitely settled.

The Avesta, as we possess it, is a motley jumble of prayers, ritual prescriptions and dogmatic statements, mostly in the form of questions answered by direct address of Ahura-mazda to Zarathustra (Zoroaster.) The Vendidad, the Yaçna, which

is wholly of a liturgical character, and the Vispered, a small collection of invocations, constitute together what is called the Vendidad-Sade. To these are to be added the Yeshts, and a few other ancient fragments. The Bundeshesh and other religious writings of the Parsis, manifestly belong to a much later period. Parsi tradition asserts that the books of Zoroaster consisted originally of twenty-one *nosks* or chapters, and that all which now remains is but a fragment of one of these. The destruction of the remainder is charged upon Alexander the Great, who, after translating all that related to astronomy, medicine, and other sciences into Greek, committed them to the flames; the priests subsequently restoring as much as they could from memory. Spiegel thinks it probable that it was first reduced to writing in its present form, during the Bactrian dominion, in the centuries just before or after the birth of Christ. The second part of the Yaçna, which is the only portion written in measure, is supposed to be the oldest. The Vendidad and the first part of the Yaçna, belong to a somewhat later date and perhaps a different place. The Yeshts are later still. The character in which the manuscripts are now written, is not older than the sixth century of the Christian era. The word *Avesta* strictly means "text." Zend, though commonly applied to the language since the time of Anquetil, has properly no such meaning, but denotes translation or commentary, and is the designation of the Pehlevi version. Spiegel proposes to abolish it as the name of the language and substitute Old Bactrian.

ART. III.—*Religion in America: or, an Account of the Origin, Relation to the State, and present Condition of the Evangelical Churches in the United States. With notices of the Unevangelical Denominations.* By Robert Baird. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1856. 8vo. pp. 696.

THIS fine volume is the enlargement of a work which its excellent author published under the same title about twelve years ago, but which he has re-written and greatly improved, by new labour and the results of wider observation. Few persons have had better opportunities than Dr. Baird of knowing exactly what is needed in Europe on the subject of the American Churches. He has, therefore, been enabled to adapt his various studies to the wants of transatlantic readers; and from this point of view his performance must continually be judged. The former edition had a wide circulation in several languages of Europe, and contributed to increase that just esteem in which the author is held by Evangelical Christians in the Old World.

We paid our respects to the volume on its first appearance, and we still adhere to the favourable opinion then expressed. We still hold, that there is no American, however well informed, who may not read it with instruction, and refer to it as a cyclopædia of facts not elsewhere extant in connection. This is the more true, when we reflect that the members of different ecclesiastical bodies live very much apart, so that a Lutheran and a Methodist often know less of one another, than either knows of his own fellowship in England or Prussia. We still rejoice that the work has fallen, not into the hands of a partisan or a fanatic, but of a mild, generous, and large-minded man, who has done as much as any other towards the promotion of fraternity among differing sects. Since we thus expressed ourselves, the work has undergone a thorough revision, for the sake of which the author has retired from important public employments. It has been brought down in its details to our own times. Every sentence has been read, and almost every enumeration has been changed; as was inevitable in regard to a country and a period like our own.

Of eight books, the First is devoted to preliminary remarks,

suited to prepare for the comprehension of what follows. It is well occupied with chapters on the Geography, Colonization, Settlement, Government, and general religious Characteristics of the United States. Four important chapters are given to the consideration of the Voluntary System; a topic which in its interest for foreign Christians fairly overshadows all the rest, and which perpetually recurs in the subsequent details. Matters have greatly changed; for example, in Scotland, since the day when the *Church of Scotland Magazine*, and other prints, afforded the arena for conflict over the American experiment, and when our method of sustaining the gospel was held up to scorn by the very men who have since been driven to the practice of the same principles. Dr. Baird has on this subject done justice to the wise and holy endeavours of our forefathers, while he has communicated to the Churches of Europe facts too weighty, and results too lasting and too vast, to be ignored in any plans for the reorganization of old economics. We will even go so far as to say, that not even the chaotic mass of Anglicanism can be informed by any principle of order, or reduced by convocations and parliaments to any symmetry or congruity, without perpetual reference to the laws of church progress which have been realized in America. And it has been well for those old prescriptive and traditionary structures, amorphous and tottering, ill able to endure the axe and hammer of reform, and fraught with every sort of combustible material, that Providence should have afforded the American field, three thousand miles away, where every explosive experiment might be tried as it were in the open air. Dr. Baird was one of the first to show to foreign inquirers, simply and modestly, but with the incontestable logic of facts, how the high principles of Vinet and others were taking concrete shape, in all the wonderful extent of the Western Republic.

The Second Book treats of the Era of Colonization. The subject is one of the greatest which our age has presented; and though America is no longer the only great territory which invites thronging millions, it still is, and will continue to be, the world's exemplar and grand instance of the law of human diffusion.

The Third Book, entitled "The National Era," treats of the

National Independence of our country, with the political and religious consequences of that event. The ecclesiastical results of separation from the mother country are set forth; it is shown that the dissolution of the union of church and state was gradual, and was not effected by the government. The discussion of these points involves matters of unusual interest, concerning which egregious errors prevail among European Christians. The silent and peaceful revolution, naturally most surprising to investigators whose notions have followed the transatlantic track, is expounded step by step, in what we consider one of the best portions of the work. The question is discussed, how far the State has the power to promote religion; and it is proved that the General Government is not restrained from promoting religion, though it is not free to prefer one denomination of Christians. It is further shown, that so far from being infidel or atheistical, as some zealots have maintained, the Government is Christian; as recognizing the Sabbath, as recommending other stated days of devotion by executive proclamation, as authorizing the appointment of chaplains, as subjecting the administration of oaths to Christian conditions, and as manifesting a religious spirit in its acts. The government of particular States is shown to have been organized upon the acknowledged basis of Christianity, and their legislation is cited as carrying out the same principles. The truths which are contained in this part of the work strike us as having a great value for our own lawgivers and people; especially in their relation to the observance of the Lord's Day, the securing to the poor of their right to rest, worship, and instruction, and the whole vexed question of religious education and the Bible in schools. We greatly wish that these statements, with fuller development and illustration, could be fairly exhibited to those ill-informed, prejudiced, and wrongheaded religionists, especially among the Germans, who, in their dread of Jacobinism, and their revulsion from the antichristian spectres of 1848, are continually citing the instance of the United States to demonstrate that a separation of Church and State is necessarily followed by the elimination of the religious element from the Constitution.

The Fourth Book discusses more fully and professedly the

operation of the Voluntary Principle in America. Here it is that Dr. Baird brings together in great amount those facts which are new and almost incredible to the old-time Statesmen and Churchmen of Europe. It is made to appear most clearly, that the voluntary principle was the great alternative, and that as soon as all union of the Church with the State ceased, religion was constrained to fall back upon spontaneous support, which has thus become the true American policy, underlying all our immensely expanding interests of churches, schools, and charities. It is here shown by what means moneys are raised for church edifices, for the support of pastors, and for missions. The same is carried out in the matter of education, from the lowest primary school to the most distinguished professional seminary or university. The extension of manifold beneficent, moral, and patriotic enterprises in the most remote parts of the land, is adduced to evince the strength and elasticity of this beneficent principle.

The Fifth Book is upon the Church and Pulpit in America. Amidst much under this head which is both true and seasonable, we find some things which savour too much in our judgment of a particular school or party in homiletics, and some things which have become almost obsolete. We refer entirely to the chapters on Preaching, and we admit the inherent difficulties on the subject. It is no easy task to bring under one rubric the various, and we might almost say, opposite modes of preaching which prevail in our extended country. Dr. Baird has unwittingly assumed his point of observation in the midst of a particular class, and hence his descriptions do not represent Episcopalian or Methodist preachers, or Presbyterians of the Middle and Southern States, so much as Congregationalists and Presbyterians of New England and the North. After a careful examination, we do not consider the American pulpit, as a whole, to deserve the praise conveyed in the ten characteristics of the sixth chapter. So, also, on the subject of Revivals of Religion, while in the main we agree with the author, there are assertions and implications with which we totally disagree. That his account is faithful in regard to a certain sort of revivals, and a certain sort of doctrine employed to produce them, we readily admit; but as belonging to a very large and im-

portant branch of that American Church which he represents, we find ourselves unable to accept the portrait. The view given (page 406, sqq.) of the mode of presenting truth, which is characteristic of American Revivals, may be very true of New England and of New School Theology, and of revivals connected with these, but is far from being so of revivals in general, or of the wide-spread awakenings with which God has blessed the churches of our own name. Upon this point, which we consider a very serious one, there can be no fairer method than to adduce the very language which Dr. Baird has adopted as his own, and which we are unwilling to accept on the part of Presbyterians.

“The leading doctrine at such seasons is that of ‘the new birth’—of the sinner’s entire dependence, for a change of heart, on the direct interposition of God. And yet for this very reason, the other doctrine implied above, of *duty*, of *obligation* to immediate right action, is urged with redoubled force. Without feeling this, the sinner cannot feel his guilt, for there *is* no consciousness of guilt without consciousness of having violated duty; and where guilt is not felt, the influences of the Spirit are not given to renew the heart. And here, at this precise point, is the great difficulty in dealing with the impenitent. They do not believe that God requires them, in their present state, to become instantly holy. It is not possible, they think, that He should command them to do that very thing without the influences of His Spirit, which, if ever done, will be the result of those influences. They, therefore, feel that there must be, somewhere at this stage of their progress, a kind of neutral ground—a resting-place, where, having done their part in ‘awaking out of sleep,’ they are allowed to ‘wait God’s time’ (in the customary phrase,) until He has done His part, and renewed their souls. Nor are these views confined to the impenitent. They have been openly avowed by some theological writers, and have exerted a secret but most powerful influence upon far greater numbers who never maintained them in form. There has been, extensively, a feeling that all that the unconverted are bound to do is diligently to use the means of grace; that if they do this, it would be hard in God to withhold the renewing influence of His Spirit; and that He has promised

that influence to their prayers and exertions, if sincere—meaning, of course, a kind of sincerity in which there is no true holiness. These views prevailed in New England previous to the revival of 1735, and were one cause of the great decline in religion which preceded that event. Mr. Edwards was therefore called upon, when that work commenced, to take his ground on this subject, and the principles which guided him in that revival have been the great controlling principles in all our revivals ever since. They are thus stated by his biographer: ‘To urge repentance on every sinner as his *immediate duty*; to insist that God is under no obligation to any unrenewed man; and that a man can challenge nothing, either in absolute justice or by free *promise*, on account of anything he does before he repents and believes.’ The celebrated Whitefield, when he first visited America, in 1740, was much struck with the power imparted to our preaching by these principles. ‘How can *they* possibly stand,’ says he, in a letter to an English friend, ‘who were never brought to see, and heartily confess, that after they had done all, God might, notwithstanding, deny them mercy! It is for preaching in this manner that I like Messrs. Tennents. They wound deeply before they heal. They know there is no promise made but to him that believeth, and, therefore, they are careful not to comfort overmuch those that are convicted. I fear I have been too incautious in this respect, and often given comfort too soon. The Lord pardon me for what is past, and teach me more rightly to divide the word of life in future.’ Against this disposition to ‘comfort too soon’—to allow the impenitent some resting-place short of instant submission, the following very pointed cautions were once given by Dr. Nettleton, who has had great experience in the conduct of revivals. ‘Now what do you mean by this? Do you mean to encourage the sinner in his sins, and take his part against God? You are attempting to ease and soothe him while he is in rebellion against God. When the sinner is in this distress, there are two things that press heavily upon him—a sense of his obligation to repent, and a fearful apprehension that he never will repent. Now, if you tell him to ‘wait God’s time,’ and the like, you take off this obligation at once. You remove all anxiety, and most probably cause him to sink down

into a state of stupidity and indifference on the subject. You take away the apprehension, also; and the danger is that he will sink down into a state of stupidity, or mistake the relief he feels for a change of heart. Now, instead of quieting him in his sins by such language, you should endeavour to increase his distress as much as possible. You should *press him down*, and tell him he must submit to God, and generally he will. I know some have been brought out truly regenerated after all this flattery, but it was not in consequence, but in spite of it. Again, you say, 'Look to the promises.' Now, there is no promise to the impenitent, and how can you expect him to look to the promises while he is in his sins? I distinguish between *promises* and *invitations*. Men are invited to repent, but there is no promise to them till they do repent.' Such has been the uniform mode of exhibiting this subject. The promises of God are a part of His *covenant*, and the indispensable conditions of the covenant are repentance and faith."

Our judgment has not changed since what we wrote eleven years ago, and which we now repeat, with a repugnance to the noxious errors involved, greatly increased by the experience of the intervening period. There is scarcely anything in the historical matter touching revivals, to which we object. But when the writer undertakes to give the instrumental causes of these effects, unless he means deliberately to limit his statements to certain cantons or provinces of the Church, we are unwilling to have such testimony sent across the ocean to our brethren of the Reformed Churches. To them we protest with earnestness, that such are not the views of the genuine Presbyterians of the United States. We abjure, as much as the most zealous adherent of new divinity, the tenet that repentance is not a matter of duty; but we equally abjure every doctrine or system which would make regeneration a *mere item in a series of duties*. And we record our renewed protestation against a plan of teaching, which would represent bare submission to God's rectoral justice, as the critical act to which the sinner must be brought, and which excludes the promulgation of Christ's priestly work, until such time as the convicted soul shall have been sufficiently humbled in the judgment of his spiritual guide. To our Reformed brethren in Scotland, and France, and Swit-

zerland, who honour our pages with their perusal, we declare that these points of what is assumed to be New England Theology are as odious to the sound Presbyterians of America as they can be to themselves. When Dr. Nettleton, therefore, would say in regard to a distressed soul, "you should *keep him down*, and tell him he must submit to God," we persist in rejecting the recipe. It wants all scriptural warrant. It enjoins an act which, in any valid sense, is impossible without faith; and which, as understood, has nothing evangelical. It hangs a thick curtain before the great object, the sacrifice of Christ, and refuses to raise it, till when? Till the moment when the minister shall declare the humbling process to be complete. Awful is the responsibility of that man who shall undertake to determine when that last drop of consummating anguish has been distilled into the cup of bitterness, or when the instant has arrived when a sinner may behold the Lamb of God without damage. How simple, how plain, how safe, how glorious, in comparison, the scriptural advice to an awakened man, *Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved!* Such was the method of Whitefield, as it had been the method of Livingstone, of Knox, of Luther, and of Paul and Silas.

We further express our surprise and disgust, that the shibboleth of New England Divinity, so called, namely, the metaphysical dogma of Natural Ability, should be again paraded before the eyes of our transatlantic brethren, as a principal means of revival. If Dr. Baird means to underwrite the statements on this head, which appear on pages 407 and following, we declare openly that he does not represent the theological teachers, authors, or clergy of the Church to which he and we belong. We trust he rather gives utterance to opinions of the "distinguished friend and professor" to whom resort has been had for the contents of this sixth chapter. We should have been better pleased to hear Dr. Baird in his own person; and his account of revivals, in the diction of New Haven, makes us exclaim, "The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau."

With the serious exceptions above taken, we regard the matter of the fifth book as important. When the author speaks

for himself, on the history, character, and abuses of revivals; we read his observations with much respect, and consider them worthy of wide circulation.

The Sixth Book treats of the Evangelical Churches of America, which it takes up in detail, with abundance of valuable record and statistics. The Seventh Book gives a view of the Unevangelical Denominations of America. As a volume for reference, whether at home or abroad, these two books furnish a treasure-house of information which is not anywhere equalled; but the nature of which forbids either extract or abridgment.

It is with some concern that we find ourselves constrained once more to animadvert on a paragraph which re-appears in this new edition; and we do not disguise our profound regret, that after years of reflection, so crude and groundless a statement, and one so likely to be abused by the patrons of error, as that which next follows, should have been retained and perpetuated:

“The great achievement of American theology is, that it has placed the doctrine of the atonement for sin in the clearest light, by illustrations drawn from the nature of a moral government. Nowhere is the distinction between the work of Christ as the propitiation for the sins of men, and that of the Holy Spirit in renewing and sanctifying the sinner, more clearly drawn—nowhere is the necessity of each to the salvation of the soul more constantly and forcibly exhibited. The tendency of our theology, under the impulse of the Edwardean exposition of the doctrine of the atonement, is to avoid the habit—so common to philosophers and philosophizing theologians—of contemplating God exclusively as the First Cause of all beings and all events, and to fix attention upon him as a Moral Governor of beings made for responsible action. Here it is that the God of the Bible differs from the God of Philosophy. The latter is simply a first cause—a reason why things are—sometimes, if not always, a mere hypothesis, to account for the existence of the universe, another name for nature or for fate. The former is a moral governor, that is, a lawgiver, a judge, a dispenser of rewards and penalties. God’s law is given to the universe of moral beings for the one great end of promoting the happiness of that vast empire. As a law, it is a true and earnest express-

ion of the will of the lawgiver respecting the actions of His creatures. As a law, it must be sanctioned by penalties adequate to express God's estimation of the value of the interests trampled on by disobedience. As the law is not arbitrary, but the necessary means of accomplishing the greatest good, it may not be arbitrarily set aside. Therefore, when man had become apostate, and the whole human race was under condemnation, God sent his Son into the world, in human nature, 'to be made a sin-offering for us;' and thus, by his voluntary sufferings magnifying the law, 'to declare the righteousness of God, that God may be just, and the justifier of him who believeth.' Thus it is that God, as a moral governor, is glorified in the forgiveness of sinners; that he calls upon all men to repent, with a true and intense desire for their salvation; that he sends into a world of rebellion the infinite gift of his Spirit, to impart life to those who are dead in sin; that in a world of sinners, who, if left to themselves, would all reject the offered pardon, he saves those whom he has chosen out of the world; that he uses the co-operation of redeemed and renewed men in advancing the work of saving their fellow-men. Men are saved from sin and condemnation, not by mere power, but by means that harmonize with the nature, and conduce to the ends of God's moral government. This method of illustrating the gospel carries the preacher and the theologian back from the Platonic dreams and dry dogmatizing of the schools, to the Bible. It sets the theologian upon studying, and the preacher upon imitating, the freedom, simplicity, and directness, with which the apostles addressed the understandings and sensibilities of men. And thus it may be regarded as coinciding with other indications of the tendency of religious opinion in the various evangelical bodies of America."

Anywhere else we should regard the opening statement as no other than the cant of New Divinity. It either means nothing definite—an ambiguity which is always dangerous—or it imports a favour for theological error which we repudiate. There is no such achievement of American theology, in any sound sense. There is no American school of orthodoxy, which has placed the doctrine of Atonement in any clearer light than it was placed in by the Reformed Theologians. No valuable illustration

of atonement has been peculiarly derived by American writers from the nature of a moral government. As we once before said, when the same injudicious dictum was set forth, so we now say, for the information of our friends and brethren abroad, the sound theology of the Reformed Church in America claims as its work no such emendation. Various doctrines concerning atonement are held among us. We have, for instance, the doctrine of Calvin and Owen, which is taught in the very terms of transatlantic symbols, by Presbyterians of the sounder sorts. We have the doctrine of Wesley, among the Methodists. We have the doctrine of Taylor, Fitch, and Finney; for omitting lesser differences it is the same, taught more or less extensively in and out of New England. These have no common trait so prominent, as to justify us in asserting of them, that they, or their common tenets, open a clearer view of this august subject than had previously been attained.

The great achievement of American theology, we are told, is, that it has placed the doctrine of the atonement for sin in the clearest light, by illustrations drawn from the nature of a moral government. Can we err in supposing the particular school here meant, to be that of New England? No other has vaunted any new light from this source. The reference to Edwards confirms our persuasion. Now we take leave to say of this venerable man, that nowhere in his works does he exhibit this doctrine in any new mode, which seeks to rid it of difficulties by recourse to the analogy of government. All the old divines drew illustrations indeed from government, but in perfect harmony with the grand scriptural illustration, or rather essential principle, of substitution and vicarious righteousness. To justify any such statement as that of Dr. Baird, he should have adduced something at once novel and American. The statements which he actually adduces in the remainder of the paragraph, exhibit no achievement whatever; but if we except the implied censure of other systems, present not a proposition which would stagger the veriest Scotch Covenanter. We could wish our author to have applied his mind with more discrimination to a point of theology at once so nice and so important. If any marvel at our feeling the allegation to be a grievance, let us remind them, that this claim of a grand achievement on the

part of American theology, in the matter of a "governmental" atonement, is the very claim which is continually and offensively put forward by those who wish to explode the notions of piacular suffering, endurance of penalty, legal substitution, and imputation of righteousness. In place of such an atonement as includes these elements, this school introduces an atonement which seeks, not satisfaction, but only exhibition. This is, we admit, the American view of atonement, if America means the modern Congregationalism of New England. The leading tenet of this scheme surrenders that which is vital to atonement, reducing it to a mere *setting of God right in the view which creatures take of his rectoral acts*. The germ of this doctrine is to be found in the work of Grotius, *De Satisfactione*. Amidst many noble positions of that celebrated treatise, this pregnant error was allowed by the orthodox to remain long unmarked. Not so, however, with the Socinians, who saw that in this concession the real piacular nature of atonement was given up. It was *not* by the elder Edwards that this view of the atonement was first taken, but by later divines of New England, whose sons are now carrying it out to such extremes as make easy fellowship with the more sober Unitarians. According to this doctrine, the atonement removes only that ground of punishment which arises from the tendency of sin to disturb the good order and happiness of the universe. Instead of a legal satisfaction, it is an exhibition or display of the righteousness of God; and this achievement of American theology places the atonement in light derived, not from priesthood and sacrifice, but from the nature of a moral government. If this is not the idea which the reader of Dr. Baird's unguarded statement is likely to take up, what, we demand, is meant by his assumption that the mode which Calvinism had previously employed for representing the atonement was unhappy and obscure, and even that it contemplated "God exclusively as the First Cause of all beings and events"? What system of teaching is here censured, if not that of Dordrecht, of Westminster, of Cambridge, and of Saybrook? Will not every plain reader think of this as the system which has been improved? For ourselves, and for all Presbyterians of our body, and all sound Baptists, Methodists, Lutherans, Episcopalians, and Moravians, we reject the fruits of every such achieve-

ment, and abide by the doctrine and the illustrations which prevailed before the boast of "American Theology" was ever heard. Great as may be the abuses of his remark, we have no cause to believe that the author has individually deviated into any such error as his words might import. The candour of criticism has led us to speak plainly of one or two blemishes which cover only a few pages in a work, which as a whole we esteem, and most cordially recommend.

The Eighth Book relates the Efforts of the American Churches for the Conversion of the World. A concluding chapter gives us a valuable summary, including such topics as the following: the progress of our country, in regard to its material interests, and its intellectual and moral interests; the progress of religious liberty, and the hopeful prospects of the American churches.

We lay down this volume with increased respect for its amiable, diligent, and pious author. Every portion of it bears marks of close observation, industrious research, sound judgment, and generous philanthropy. It is remarkably free from everything like chimera and extravagance. The effort is every where apparent to hold the balance even, among varying sects and conflicting parties. Throughout the book the spirit which predominates is that of a sound and liberal protestant catholicism. We are particularly warmed and comforted by the filial and patriotic vindication of our beloved country, against the calumnies which are rife in Europe. In this respect it is written in a truly American temper; equally remote on one hand from vulgar brag concerning "this great country," as on the other from truckling concession to the arrogant assumptions of European censors. Every day the balance of influence turns a little more in our favour, as to books, schools, churches and charities; but in no particular is this so manifest, as in those things which concern religious liberty and Church independence, topics concerning which this work will take rank as an authority. In all instances, and as well in person as by his authorship, Dr. Baird has been the tried defender of our Christian and national reputation in foreign lands, and we believe this work will crown his valuable services in this regard.

ART. IV.—*History and Repository of Pulpit Eloquence, (Deceased Divines,)* containing the Master-pieces of Bossuet, Bourdaloue, Massillon, Fléchier, Abbadie, Taylor, Barrow, Hall, Watson, McLaurin, Chalmers, Evans, Edwards, Davies, John M. Mason, etc. etc., with discourses from Chrysostom, Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, Augustine, Athanasius, and others among the “Fathers;” and from Wickliffe, Luther, Calvin, Melancthon, Knox, Latimer, etc., of the “Reformers.” Also sixty other celebrated Sermons, from as many eminent divines in the Greek, Latin, English, German, Irish, French, Scottish, American, and Welch Churches, a large number of which have now, for the first time, been translated. The whole arranged in their proper order, and accompanied with Historical Sketches of Preaching in the different countries represented, and Biographical and Critical Notices of the several Preachers, and their discourses. By Henry C. Fish, Author of Premium Essay, “Primitive Piety Revived.” In two volumes. New York: Published by M. W. Dodd. 1856.

THIS long title-page gives a better conception of the general contents of the work, than any brief summary of them which we can frame. The author's design thus clearly and fully announced, must commend itself not only to all intelligent preachers, but to all who appreciate able exhibitions of moral and religious truth, along with the grandest flights of human eloquence. On the whole, we think the execution answerable to the design. We, of course, should not, in every instance, have made the same selection as our author, either of preacher or sermon. This, however, is only saying, that in going over a field so vast, no two men would see everything alike. Of the world-renowned masters of pulpit eloquence, nevertheless, he has not failed to select discourses of acknowledged preëminence, and permanent celebrity. In translating from other languages, he has enjoyed the aid of competent scholars. The critical and biographical observations add to the value of the book. While the best sermons of all ages and countries have an intrinsic literary value for all persons of liberal culture, and a still higher interest for the Christian, they have the highest interest and value for preachers. Familiarity with the best models in any art must increase skill and proficiency in the practice of

that art. Servile imitation, and whatever borders on plagiarism, of course, tends to moral and intellectual degeneracy. It only aggravates the impotence from which it proceeds. Such abuse is no argument against the proper use of the great master-pieces of sacred eloquence, any more than cases of literary aping or theft furnish a good reason why an original writer should keep himself ignorant of literature. As we think that the study of the great discourses in this compilation would be of great service to most preachers, so we know not where else most can have access to them, or their equivalent. The work, therefore, supplies an important desideratum.

We are glad that the author has not confined his selections to those preachers who have attained the highest distinction as rhetoricians and orators, in the more limited or technical sense of these terms. His range extends to those who have been distinguished for the strong and effective presentation of divine truth, and for working strong convictions and impressions in the minds of their hearers, whether according to the rules of rhetorical art or not. Many of the mightiest preachers have been neither elegant nor eloquent, according to a very common acceptance of these terms. That is, they have been distinguished for force of matter, but not for any graces of style or delivery. These graces are by no means to be disparaged. They do not weaken; they intensify what force otherwise exists. But, of themselves, they do not constitute it, any more than a beautiful dress makes a strong man. Ornament is feeble and disgusting, where there is nothing to adorn. We think the preacher may receive quite as much valuable instruction in studying the secret of the power of the great sermon of Edwards, found in this collection, entitled "Sinners in the hands of an angry God," and why, when calmly read from a fine manuscript, held up in the author's hand, it startled a congregation, before thoughtless, into tears, and sobbings, and audible shrieks, as in studying the magnificent funeral orations of Bossuet.

Within a recent period, there has been much earnest discussion relative to the manner of preaching, in distinction from the matter of it. To a certain extent, the matter and manner of preaching interpenetrate and determine each other. All mat-

ter sensuous and intellectual must exist in some form, and, while it remains unchanged, is inseparable from that form; which is only saying, that any substance remaining what it is, is inseparable from the qualities which make it what it is. So far, to determine the matter is to determine the form. To determine that the matter of the human body is an animal organism, is so far forth to determine its form. To determine that the matter of a book shall be moral philosophy, geometry, or chemistry, is so far to determine its form. To settle the point that preaching shall be scriptural, philosophical, doctrinal, practical, Pelagian, Calvinistic, topical, or expository in its matter, is, so far, to determine its form. The discussions in regard to the manner of preaching to which we allude, have had respect to it, not in points wherein it is implicated in the matter, but to points which are independent of it. They admit of indefinite variation in proclaiming essentially the same matter, the same truths, thoughts, reasonings, in the same order of arrangement. They relate to elocution, gesticulation, the use of manuscripts in the pulpit, and whatever in style or delivery affects the vivacity and impressiveness of a sermon, which in substance and matter is essentially what it should be. Manner, in this sense, and as separable from the matter of preaching, (while we by no means underrate its importance,) it is no part of our present purpose to investigate. We inquire rather *what* it is the minister's duty to preach, and *how* he shall do it, only so far as matter and form mutually interpenetrate and determine each other. This is the highest question for the preacher to decide. It is of great consequence how we preach. It is of still greater, what we preach, except so far as the former involves the latter.

But is it, after all, a question, or at any rate, an open question, among Christians, or if among Christians, among orthodox and evangelical Christians, who acknowledge that the preacher's commission is to preach the gospel, and that he fulfils his duty only so far as he preaches the word, the whole word, and nothing but the word? Can it be an open question among those who accept the Reformed confessions as faithful summaries of the teachings of revelation? In one sense, this is not an open question among any who can of right be called Chris-

tians. Still less room for debate remains among those who agree in that interpretation of Scripture which makes salvation wholly of grace. But even among these, there is a vast diversity, not merely in the style of their preaching, but in the matter or substance of it. This does not imply that they necessarily contradict one another. It does not necessarily imply that any impugn, or even that they do not confess and abide by every article of the Confession in their discourses. But it implies something more than that diversity of gifts, by which different men are endowed with special qualifications for commending the same gospel to different classes of minds. The difference lies in the different proportions, surroundings, applications in which they set forth the different elements of the same body of truth; in what they signalize by frequent and emphatic iteration, and what they omit or touch lightly and charily, and in the foreign matter with which they illustrate, obscure, or encumber it. How else shall we account for the fact that one preacher has power chiefly in the aptness and force of his appeals to the impenitent; another, in awakening devout feeling in the hearts of Christians; a third, in his lucid statement and unanswerable vindication of Christian doctrines; a fourth, in the enforcement of the moralities of the gospel; a fifth, in his extraordinary tact at working up occasional, miscellaneous, and semi-secular sermons? Even among those then, who acknowledge fealty to the great principle of preaching the word, it is still an open question, in what proportions, surroundings, applications, and other circumstances, this word and the various parts thereof shall be preached. And this question will bear long pondering by all who have assumed the awful, yet glorious office of watching for souls, and are bound to distribute to each a portion in due season. For who is sufficient for these things?

At the outset, we may safely postulate, 1. That the Scriptures themselves exhibit the various elements of divine truth, in the relative proportions in which it is the preacher's duty to teach and enforce them.

2. That they are also an infallible guide as to the mutual relations and practical applications of these truths; and that, while the manner of exhibiting and illustrating them requires

adaptation to the present circumstances and habits of thought among the people, they may not be intrinsically modified by alteration, suppression, or addition.

3. That the preacher fulfils his mission just and only as his preaching causes these truths to be known and, through grace, operative among his hearers.

4. That all other acquirements, attractions, graces, or means of power and influence in a preacher, are legitimate and valuable in proportion as they subserve this end; and any sources of power in the pulpit, aside of this, no way contribute to the discharge of his mission. Their tendency is to supersede, and thus, in various degrees, to hinder or defeat it.

Finally: The great end of preaching is to glorify God, and bless man, by bringing sinners to the "obedience of faith" in Christ, and promoting their sanctification, their knowledge, love, and adoration of God; their assimilation, conformity, and devotion to him, in thought, desire, word, and deed; their cordial and delighted communion with Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; their love, gentleness, meekness, patience, uprightness, and faithfulness towards their fellow-men. In a word, the great end of preaching, with respect to men, is to advance them "in all holy conversation and godliness."

Starting with these premises, which must be their own evidence to all who concede that our sole commission from Christ is to preach the word, it results:

1. That God should be the great, overshadowing object set forth in the preacher's message. All preaching that violates this precept must be vicious. This appears from every side and aspect in which the subject can be viewed. To say, as we shall say, that Christ should be the burden of the preacher's message, does not contradict, it re-affirms this principle. For Christ is God. In preaching Christ, we simply preach God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses. Whether we set forth the Father, the Son, or the Holy Ghost, either one of the Three, or the Three in One, we directly and immediately hold forth God, and none else. Now, if we look at the Bible or its inspired preachers as models, we find God always and everywhere in the foreground. Indeed, the highest evidence of its divinity is the radiance of God upon it. He is

the first and the last, shining in it, through it, and from it. Its words are not those which man's wisdom teacheth, and it speaks as never man spake. Another consideration is, that the word to be preached is the word of God. It emanates from him exclusively. It is to be enjoined in his name, and by his authority. It cannot be truly received, or produce its due saving effect, unless it be received, "not as the word of man, but as it is in truth, the word of God, which worketh effectually in them that believe." 1 Thess. ii. 18. So the preacher is the ambassador of God. Can he then truly deliver his message, unless He in whose behalf he pleads be the prominent object in his inculcations?

Still further: The truths which the Bible unfolds are truths relating to God, in his nature and attributes, his works and ways; or they concern us in our relations to him, as our Creator, Preserver, Sovereign, Redeemer, and Judge; or they respect the relations and obligations of men to each other, which in turn depend upon their common relation to the one God and Lord of all. Herein are contained all the doctrines, and hence arise all the duties of our religion. How then can they be adequately set forth in any form of sermonizing which does not make God all in all?

If we consider the duties or attainments required in the Bible, they all have God for their object and end. The love, the desires, the worship, the penitence, the sorrow, the self-renunciation, the devotion required, are no otherwise genuine than as they have supreme respect to God. Our duties to men have their strongest bond in his requirements, and are only acceptable when done as unto the Lord: "Not with eye-service, as men-pleasers; but as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart." What better then than a mere counterfeit of Christian teaching can we have, when God is not made its Alpha and Omega?

Besides, all disposition, ability, efficiency for attaining the favour or doing the will of God, are the gifts of his sovereign grace. Whatever we are, or have, or do, that is acceptable to God, or in the least meets his requirements, by the grace of God we are what we are. All is of God. All must come from God. To God belongs all the glory. To God we must look

for every good gift and every perfect gift. When he withdraws, our comforts droop, and all our graces die. Is it conceivable, then, that the religion of God can be inculcated, except as he himself is magnified? And is not this view thrice confirmed, when we consider that the declared end of the whole method of our salvation is that God may be glorified, the issue of the whole is to be, that God shall be visibly, as he is really, all in all?

Many, doubtless, will be ready to say that we have been vindicating a truism. We shall not dispute them. If it be so, it only proves our position the more impregnable. It is one of those truisms that very many need to single out of their neglected and forgotten common-places, and to brighten it into its due lustre, and swell to its due proportions, by surveying it afresh, in its deep grounds and infinite reach of application. Coleridge says, in the first, if not best aphorism of his *Aids to Reflection*, that we can seldom be more usefully employed, than in "rescuing admitted truths from the neglect caused by the very circumstance of their universal admission. Extremes meet. Truths, of all others the most awful and interesting, are too often considered as so true, that they lose all the power of truth, and lie bed-ridden in the dormitory of the soul, side by side with the most despised and exploded errors." That there is a difference as to the extent to which God is magnified, and the whole texture of discourse saturated with the divine element, by different preachers, is undeniable. With some, a sense of his excellency and our own littleness and vileness; of the blessedness of his favour and the terrors of his wrath; of the importance of being prepared to meet him; of living for his service and glory: of dependence upon him for grace, salvation, and blessedness: of the impossibility of finding true felicity, except in the enjoyment of him for ever, is the grand impression sought and effected. With others, the human, the worldly, the philosophic, social, and political, usurp the predominance. These are the great objective elements that loom up and secure an obtrusive, if not overshadowing prominence, in the preacher's unfoldings and inculcations. Man and the world appear so great, that God and heaven are scarcely greater. And in some cases the preacher himself is foremost

in the group, and could hardly say with the Apostle, "we preach not ourselves, but Christ Jesus the Lord."*

If, then, the foremost object to be set forth in preaching, is the Most High, in his being, infinitude, and perfection; in his works of creation, providence, and grace; in his relations towards us as our Maker, Preserver, Benefactor, our Sovereign, Saviour and Judge; then that preaching is neither biblical, christian, nor even religious, which is not so impregnated with this divine element, that God is not only its central, but pervading object; over all, in all, through all, of whom, and through whom, and to whom are all things, to whom be glory for ever.

2. We are thus prepared to understand the attitude in which man should be put by the preacher. As the Bible is addressed to man, and aims to bring him to the salvation it proffers, *i. e.* to spiritual life, holiness and bliss, this is a point of capital importance. But it is needless here to investigate anthropology. The great object of the preacher should be to make him know and feel that he is a dependent, rational, and accountable creature, owing fealty to his Maker—that he was made to love, serve, commune with, and enjoy him; that herein is life and bliss, and that alienation from God by sin is death and woe. These truths, the more earnestly they are pressed, find a responsive attestation in every conscience not seared as with a hot iron. And they are all the more felt, in proportion as God is apprehended in his goodness and holiness, his sovereignty and omniscience. But while this is fundamental and conditional to any religion whatever, it underlies another truth which is cardinal in Christianity. We of course refer to man's fallen state, including sin, guilt, misery, helplessness. In general, it may be affirmed, that men will realize all this, just

* We have been credibly informed that two distinguished living preachers, when formerly stationed in the same Western city, had, for an occasional auditor, an irreligious officer of the army. This gentleman said to our informant, that he listened to the one with the greater pleasure; to the other with less satisfaction, but with greater respect and reverence, if not profit. Being asked to explain himself, he said, "The former exalts the dignity of man, and I always come away pleased with myself. The latter so magnifies God, that I seem nothing, and I always seem oppressed with a sense of my own insignificance and unworthiness." If preaching is to be estimated by the crowds it draws, we believe this man-exalting divine is now *facile princeps* among American preachers.

in proportion as they see and feel what God is. But in order to set forth God effectually for this purpose, his law, which mirrors his perfections in his requirements of man, must be proclaimed in its spirituality and searching import, in its precept and penalty, line upon line, and precept upon precept. The express law of God is but a formal republication of the law written by nature on the heart, although often forgotten, disowned and obscured under the mists of sin. But still it is written there, although sin has blurred the record. -And when it is proclaimed in its full import and awful sanctions, it finds an echo and witness in the conscience, that having been drownded into oblivion of it, is awakened to behold it. The lightnings of Sinai bring out in visible distinctness the writing before invisibly traced on the conscience. For "the conscience meanwhile bears witness." They know the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death. With all the world they become consciously guilty (*ἐπόδοι*) before God. We have reason to fear that too much of our current preaching is more or less emasculated by a deficiency here. We are no legalists. Neither are we antinomian. The law must be proclaimed, not for the purpose of showing us how we can, but that we cannot, obtain life, according to its requirements. It is the grand instrument for producing conviction of sin. "By the law is the knowledge of sin." It is only as the law, in its breadth of precept and awfulness of penalty, is apprehended and witnessed by the conscience, that conviction of sin is felt, that self-righteous hopes are extinguished, or that men are driven from all other refuges to Christ. None will thirst for or flee to the Saviour, till they see their case to be hopeless without him. The whole need not a physician, but they that are sick. But this conviction can be effected only by manifestation of the law which makes it evident that by violating its precept they are subject to its curse, so it becomes a schoolmaster which leads to Christ. Thus Paul was alive, *i. e.* confident of gaining eternal life, without the law once. But when the commandment came, sin revived, and he died. It slew him. Its manifestations under the light of the law were the death of all his hopes. And he further shows that this was accomplished only by a view of the spiritual and heart-

searching elements of the law. For he says, "I had not known sin but by the law; I had not known lust except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet." It is when the law gleams and thunders, that sinners in Zion are afraid, and fearfulness surprises the hypocrites. And it is only when thus "pricked in the heart" by the sword of the Spirit, that they will ask, What shall we do to be saved?

The law is no less indispensable, of course, as a rule of life to Christians. It is the standard of excellence to which they must aspire. They can neither have nor give evidence that they are Christians, unless they are striving after conformity to this perfect standard. The very end of their election, redemption, calling, is that they may be holy as God is holy—a peculiar people, zealous of good works. In proportion as their communion with God becomes perfect, they will be perfect in holiness. But holiness is nothing else than conformity to the law of God. It is true that we do not thus seek a title to eternal life. But thus alone can that life, gratuitously bestowed, exist or manifest itself. Thus alone can we become attuned to, or capable of, the joys of heaven. Although released from the law as a condition of life, yet the Christian joyfully embraces it as a rule of living. He does so, because by the instinct of his gracious nature, he loves the law of God after the inward man, and because the adoption to sonship, which is freely given him in Christ, enables and disposes him to obey it with filial freedom, love, and confidence. He is not without law to God, but under law to Christ. *Having these promises*, he cleanses himself from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit, perfecting holiness in the fear of God.

These commonplaces only need stating, so far as the principle involved in them is concerned. The chief questions which arise, respect the manner of carrying it out. It is here, we judge, that the most serious deficiency will be often found in preaching—a deficiency which too often dulls its edge and destroys its penetrative power. Many insist strenuously on the law, as the standard of goodness which is evermore binding on all rational beings. They thunder its curses upon unbelievers. They insist upon all Christians making it the rule of life. Yet after all, it fails of its due effect in alarming the unconverted, and

purifying the hearts and lives of Christians. In short, it does not reach, enlighten, or awaken the conscience. Why? because it is not unfolded and defined in its import and applications to the manifold relations of our inner and outer life, and the modes of thinking, feeling, and acting therein required. No clear lines of discrimination are drawn, showing precisely where duty begins and ends, and where sin commences either in the form of omission or commission. It is one thing to denounce the curse of the law against the transgressor. It is another to denounce profaneness, or taking God's name in vain, as a heinous sin. But it is yet another, and a very different thing, to point out in clear and graphic delineation the various ways in which this command is violated in thought, word and deed, and to show the criteria which distinguish the lawful from the profane treatment of things divine. This cannot be done, without giving the knowledge of sins before unknown or unheeded, while it relieves the conscience of the sincere believer, not only by defining his duty, but by showing what is not sin, and thus loosing him from the fetters of morbid scruples and groundless despondency. The latter object is often scarcely less important than the former. Many Christians go limping and halting all their days, in the fetters of a Judaical, Pharisaic, or ceremonial spirit; or of a superscriptural strictness and severity on some one or more points of Christian morality. This may make them harsh, sour, censorious, dejected, uncomfortable to themselves and their brethren. But such weights and consequent besetting sins must be laid aside, before they can run with patience and joy the Christian race. Instead of mounting up on wings as eagles, they grow weary, and their soul cleaveth to the dust. Those who undertake to be more righteous than God's law, in any respect, will be sure to compensate their work of supererogation by greater license in some other form of sin. We once knew a candidate for the ministry who denounced as a sin, eating meat, and drinking tea and coffee, and, if we remember right, any violation of Professor Hitchcock's prescriptions for avoiding dyspepsia. He ended with becoming the hierophant of a conventicle of free-love Perfectionists, and doing what he might, to turn temples into brothels. Take the law of the Sabbath, in regard to supe-

riors and inferiors, indeed, the whole decalogue, and let it be so expounded, defined, and applied, that men must see not only what is, but what is not a violation of it—let the preaching of duty be clear, thorough, didactic, casuistic—and would it not oftener leave the arrows of the Lord sharp and rankling in the hearts of his enemies, and promote beyond measure the sanctification, the blamelessness, the usefulness of Christians? Is it not thus, and not otherwise, that the word becomes sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing to the dividing asunder of the joints and marrow, and a discernor of the thoughts and intents of the heart? So is it, and not otherwise, that it becomes profitable not merely for doctrine, but “for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works.”

These principles with regard to the inculcation of the law, apply of course, *mutatis mutandis*, to the whole sphere of evangelical duty; *i. e.* of duty as amplified in its scope, as modified in its source, rule and end, by the gospel. This is only saying that in summoning men to do their duty, we ought to explain and define so clearly as to preclude all mistake, what duty is.* It is simply asserting the didactic element in preaching, which in the light of reason and scripture must needs be an integral and fundamental part of it. The commission given to preach the gospel to every creature, is given by another evangelist as a commission to teach all nations, to do and ob-

* It can hardly be necessary to enter a *caveat* against straining this maxim beyond the bounds of reason and even possibility. Even the applications of principles can be given by the preacher only in derivative principles of greater or less generality. He cannot go into the particular questions of fact, on which, in each case, the question of duty depends. To do so, would be to teach all knowledge, which is impossible, while the attempt to do it would be worse than ridiculous. Thus, that it is a duty to keep our promises, and to make none which are unlawful, or beyond our power to fulfil; and consequently that none ought to undertake the practice of law, medicine, statesmanship, or any calling, without competent qualifications to do aright, what they thus promise to do, is evidently within the province of the pulpit. But who will say, that it is within its province to teach law, medicine, politics, engineering, or bricklaying? Such knowledge, without which none can do their duty in these callings, must be learnt elsewhere. To lecture on Hydropathy and Allopathy, the merits of our various political parties, old line and new-line, straight and crooked, on the right method of tailoring, or plastering, is not to teach or preach the gospel, and if done under colour thereof, it is simply a desecration.

serve all Christ's commands. The instructions given to Timothy and Titus terminate very much in showing them whom, what, and how they shall teach.

We have dwelt the longer on this point, because we are persuaded that not a few are labouring under certain misconceptions regarding it, which impair their vigour and usefulness as preachers. It is a vulgar notion, that all didactic preaching is dry and uninteresting. Hence many have deep prejudice against what they style doctrinal preaching. They crave warmth and life. They want earnest, hortatory discourse. They deem this practical and profitable. But let practice be urged in an instructive way, which displays its grounds, reach, and limits; which produces not merely some vague excitement, but shows them what they ought to be and do, and they stigmatize it as dull, didactic, and doctrinal. We do not dispute that there may be instructive preachers, who by their jejune style and frigid manner, are obnoxious to this complaint. This might happen, whatever the matter of the sermon. But in many cases the objection is aimed at the things said, not the manner of saying them. It is related of the late Professor Stuart, that during his short but efficient pastorate, he dwelt much on certain doctrines of grace, which had been neglected or disparaged by his predecessor. The people were roused. Some said one thing and some another. The result, however, was that his preaching was in the demonstration of the Spirit and of power; his church was filled with eager listeners; and experimental piety was greatly and permanently promoted. Some of his hearers, restive under a tone of preaching to which they were unused, begged him to give them less doctrine, and more practical sermons. He complied with their request, and commenced delivering clear and thorough expositions of the divine law. In a short time, however, the same auditors waited upon him with a request that he would return to the doctrines. They had enough of practice. The truth is, aversion to legitimate preaching, whether of doctrine or practice, originates in one source. It is simple aversion to truth in its antagonism to corrupt nature, which, if doctrinal, requires a correspondent practice; if practical, has its roots in a correspondent doctrine. For truth is in order to goodness. Hence they prefer some

transient and blind excitement of feeling, to that discovery of truth which alone can awaken sound evangelical feeling; which purifies while it quickens the heart, because it gives light to the understanding, and thus makes permanently wiser and better. We have said that preachers are in danger of being influenced by this vulgar prejudice, and to flatter themselves that they can benefit a large class most by imparting to them heat without light. We apprehend that such heat can be but a momentary glow of sympathetic or animal excitement, as flashy as its cause. The rational soul can feel only in view of what it first perceives. Emotions must be founded on and determined by cognitions. Christianity is not a religion of blind feeling or capricious impulse. It is a religion of truth. It sanctifies by the truth. And the great duty of the preacher is, "by manifestation of the truth to commend himself to every man's conscience in the sight of God." Our religion is not, as some one has said, like the moon, giving light without heat, nor like the stove, giving heat without light, but like the sun, giving perennial light, and warmth, and life.

If there is any force in these views, they lead to the conclusion, that the true interest, life, and power of preaching, lie in the exhibition and enforcement of Christian truth and duty; in the justness and force of the answers it gives, to the great questions, What shall I believe, what shall I love, what shall I do, in order to lead a righteous, sober, and godly life; and that, when Christ appears, I also may appear with him in glory?—in a word, in the Christian light it sheds on the intellect and conscience, to the end that it may mould the heart. The feeling awakened by such preaching will be salutary, Christian feeling. The greater the clearness, fervour, and vividness with which such truths are set forth, and sent home, the better. And we may add, that all other sources of interest in a preacher and his sermons, are aside of, if not athwart, the true aim of preaching. That the preacher be admired; that he fascinate by poetry or oratory, by philosophy, or any excellency of speech or wisdom, may answer a great many purposes. But it may all be, without preaching the gospel, or disturbing the thoughtless, or guiding the anxious soul, or edifying the people of God. We by no means underrate a good report of them that are

without. We appreciate the importance of being in favour with all the people, and giving no offence in anything, that the ministry be not blamed. But we know, too, that a woe is upon those who preach not the gospel, and of whom all men at all times speak well. We should esteem the solemn awe, the deep thoughtfulness of the worldling, the alarm of the presumptuous, the ray of spiritual comfort stealing in upon the contrite soul, the devout feeling and holy purpose springing up in the breast of one and another, on leaving the sanctuary, a more precious testimony to the power and excellence of the discourse, than all the plaudits of graceless worldlings, and genteel professors, who are lovers of pleasure more than lovers of God. The self-searching, the humility, the tears of penitence, the sweet and confiding faith, the comfort of hope, the movement of the soul from self and the world, toward God in Christ, with which so many heard the preaching of a Nettleton or Alexander, are a thousand-fold higher attestations of pulpit power, than all the encomiums ever lavished upon merely magnificent oratory. It was a common question among the hearers of the famous Shepard of Cambridge, (who was wont to say that all his sermons cost him tears,) as they left church on the Sabbath, "Who was wrought upon to-day?" These are the best seals of the genuineness and apostolicity of a ministry: "By their fruits shall ye know them."

In the foregoing remarks, we have necessarily anticipated much that applies equally well to what follows. The effect of preaching the law faithfully, will not be to encourage men to attempt to gain life by keeping it, but to show them their utter inability to keep it, and their hopeless condemnation by it. Convincing them of their ruin, it fills them with a sense of their need of a Redeemer. This is the great central truth of revelation, and the foundation of true religion. For "other foundation can no man lay." Therefore, while, as we have shown, God must be set forth, first of all, and above all, in preaching, he must,

8. Be preëminently set forth as "God in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses." It were a poor and unworthy work to smite, and not to heal; to tear, and not bind up; to kill, and not make alive. Hence, since

He, who by death overcame him that hath the power of death, alone can deliver us from sin, our paramount office is to declare Him, who is the way, the truth, and the life. As for us, our mission is to "preach Christ and him crucified; to the Jews a stumbling-block, to the Greeks foolishness, but to them who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God." We need not labour to prove to the Christian, that

"Christ and his cross are all our theme."

All else converges towards him, or radiates from him. It tends to lead us to him, or flows from our union to him. All unfoldings of God, in his perfections and glories; all exhibitions of the character, condition, and duties of man; all inculcations of doctrine and practice, if true and scriptural, lead the soul directly to the Lord Jesus Christ, for wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption. "Ye believe in God," says Christ, "believe also in me." True faith in God involves faith in Christ, as soon as he is set before the soul; for in him all the fulness of the Godhead dwelt bodily. The first archangel never saw

"So much of God before."

We behold his glory in the face of Jesus Christ. Faith in God then is implicitly faith in Christ; it is a germ which will unfold itself as such, as soon as Christ is presented to it. The law slays, thus showing us that Christ is our only life. So every doctrine, every duty, all legitimate matter of preaching, of whatever sort, culminates in Christ, in whom all things shall be gathered into one, and who filleth all in all. All duty leads to him, to discharge the debt incurred by its non-performance, to obtain strength for its future fulfilment; while the wisdom, power, and love displayed in Christ, evoke the highest love and adoration, and incite, while they enable us to render, grateful and devoted obedience.

But upon this general view there is no cause to dwell. Few Christians will deny that Christ should be the centre and substance of all preaching. It is only upon some of the consequences and bearings of this truth, that there is occasion for remark.

1. We apprehend that preachers are in little danger of excess

in setting forth Christ objectively to their hearers. He, God in him, is the great object towards which their faith, love, hope, obedience, and devotion, are to be directed. They are Christians only as they thus bow to that name which is above every name. They are complete in Him who is the Head of all principality and power. Without him they can do nothing. Life, faith, love, hope, come of looking to him, not to themselves, or to anything which they or other men can spin out of themselves. It should never be forgotten that Christianity, although working an inward renovation by the immediate operation of the Holy Ghost, developes this change in accordance with the laws of our rational and moral nature. No Christian affections can arise except in view of their proper objects. These objects are found in Christ, the God-man, our Saviour, in his person, offices, and works. Of course, we do not mean to advocate any monotonous repetition of any single or isolated truth in regard to him. There is no need of this. One of the most remarkable treatises in our language, is that of Bell, showing how much of God is evinced in the human hand. A friend of ours has in contemplation a similar treatise in regard to the honey-bee. If these diminutive objects require volumes to show the extent of divine imprint upon them, can there be any lack of variety, any need of monotony, in exploring the infinite compass and relations of the Redeemer and his work? All life contains inexhaustible variety in unity which never tires by monotony. How much more He who is the Life, and combines in his own person a divine life, a human life, and the source of all life, out of whose fulness we all receive, and grace for grace! The endless sides and aspects in which he stands related to his people, enable us to view him in relations ever fresh and diversified, while yet he remains the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.

2. It hence follows, that the way and grounds of vital union to Christ should be thoroughly and abundantly set forth and cleared up in preaching. The nature of saving faith, as distinguished from all counterfeits of it; its simplicity, as distinguished from all the entanglements with which unbelief would embarrass it; its naked essence, as simple trust in Christ and his righteousness, should be, in one form and another, a fre-

quent theme of preaching, and habitually inwoven with the whole texture of our discourses. This must be done, even if it incur the danger of seeming repetitions. It is the grand requisite to the birth of the soul into the kingdom of God. Simple and rudimentary as it is in Christian teaching, free justification is an article in which men born under the covenant of works are dull learners. There always are those in every congregation who are thinking and inquiring on the subject of religion, but who have never known what it is to believe on Christ to the saving of the soul. There are always babes in Christ, and weak believers, who tremble and stumble in their Christian walk, because they have no adequate view of the free, gratuitous, and full justification which faith embraces and insures merely for the taking. At this point, too, not a few older Christians, "when, for the time they ought to be teachers, have need that one teach them which be the first principles of the doctrine of Christ." Many ministers have been surprised, in conversations with the sick and dying, to find persons who have been their hearers all their days, in a mist on this simple and vital question, How can a sinner be justified before God? They know, indeed, in general, that it is not by their own, but by Christ's righteousness; yet, until the Spirit takes the scales from their eyes, they will be found, in some form, to be working up a righteousness of their own. They will think they must in some way make themselves better, before they can be fit to go to Christ, or he can receive them. Many believers often waver at this point. They doubt whether persons so unworthy have any warrant to appropriate to themselves the Saviour's righteousness. It is of great importance, that all inquiring, doubting, trembling souls be brought to see clearly the true nature of justification, which inures to those that believe on Him that justifieth the ungodly, that so they may stagger not at the promise, but be strong in the faith, giving glory to God. Nor can the preacher well expend too much of his strength here. All the liberty wherewith Christ maketh free; all filial confidence, love, and devotion; all holy strength and courage to serve God without fear, in holiness and righteousness, all the days of our lives; all that is sweet, genial, and buoyant, in our spiritual state, depend upon it. Thus there is peace and joy in believing.

Thus we obtain righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost. Thus alone can we be delivered from the spirit of bondage and slavish fear, or feel ourselves in such a relation towards God as enables us to serve him with a true heart and right spirit. To the carnal eye, it indeed seems impossible that free justification should not encourage licentiousness. To the spiritual eye, it is the purifying spring from which good works must flow, and cannot but flow. We are not to get life in order to come to Christ, but to come to Christ that we may have life.

There is a class of theologians and preachers who involve this whole subject in perplexity, by the theory that love precedes and is the spring of evangelical faith, and that none but penitents are warranted to trust in Christ. The effect of this is to make men feel that until they can find within themselves evidences of penitence and love, they must consider the mercies of the gospel, as Boston says, "forbidden fruit," which it is unlawful for them to touch. On this subject, confusion of mind is the easiest of all things, and the clear truth among the most important. It is true, that no faith is genuine without repentance and love. So faith without works is dead. It is also true, that faith, although in the order of time simultaneous with commencing love, repentance, and good works, is, in the order of nature, before, conditional to, and causative of them. Love can only arise from faith's perception and belief of the excellence and glory of Christ and his cross, and of God as shining through them. It arises, as they see

"What wisdom, power, and love,
Shine in their dying Lord."

But we must discern and believe in this loveliness before it can excite our love. And when we believe and see it, it cannot but draw the heart. Another consideration is, that until we are in that friendly relation to God in which justifying faith places us, we cannot confide ourselves to him. We feel that our sins subject us to his righteous displeasure, and that we merit and must receive vengeance at his hands. Now love is impossible towards those whom we dare not trust, because we are subjects of their righteous wrath. So faith is indispensable to love. And since all works not inspired by faith and love, are slavish, dead works, it follows, that although there be no

faith without repentance, love, and holiness, yet faith is their antecedent and cause, as truly as the sun of its beams, and life of breath. We apprehend that a clear view of this point is of great moment in guiding inquiring souls. He is paralysed in making the gospel offer, who cannot, without conditions, bid every thirsty soul come and welcome; who is constrained to tell sinners that they must get rid of their inward distempers and maladies before coming to Christ, instead of going to him at once for the removal of sin and guilt. This is preaching a fettered gospel, and it produces a fettered piety. It gendereth to bondage. It is alien from the sweet and simple faith, the filial confidence and freedom, the buoyant yet humble hope, the cordial love and genial devotion of the gospel; and which result from going at once to Christ for all, receiving all as a free gift from him, and thence giving all, in love and gratitude, to him. We think this view is sustained by the whole drift of scriptural representations. According to these, faith purifieth the heart: it works (exerts its energies) by love; it is the victory that overcometh the world. This view fully accords with the absolute necessity of love, repentance, humility, and good works, to salvation. Faith, which does not exert and evince itself in these, is not saving faith. Though we have all faith and have not charity, it profiteth nothing. Nor do the calls to repent, with the promise of pardon annexed, conflict with; they rather corroborate this view. On what is this pardon based? On Christ. How apprehended and applied? By faith. When the wicked are exhorted to forsake their way, and the unrighteous their thoughts, and turn to God, who hath mercy, and to our God who will abundantly pardon, it is only a form of teaching, that faith in God's pardoning mercy is prerequisite to true repentance. The definition of the Catechism is a true summation of scriptural teachings on this subject. "*Repentance unto life is a saving grace, whereby a sinner, out of a true sense of his sin, and apprehension of the mercy of God in Christ, doth, with grief and hatred of his sin, turn from it unto God, with full purpose of, and endeavour after, new obedience.*"

The mistaken theory to which we have adverted, of deriving faith from love, and not love from faith, has, we are persuaded, a strong tendency to generate error on the subject of the sin-

ner's inability. The preacher does not see his way clear to direct the sinner immediately to Christ for deliverance from this, and all other evils and miseries of sin. If he cannot bid the sinner go out of himself at once to a strength which is made perfect in his weakness, nor till he has procured penitence, or love, or some other robe of clean linen with which to go, the question arises, How shall he get all this? How can he be incited to work and strive for it? The answer is, the preacher must be prepared to tell him he is able to accomplish it, or else he is hopelessly paralysed, and can do nothing, but leave the inquirer passively awaiting the sovereign afflatus of the Spirit. Hence various fictions of natural, and we know not what other, ability, have been devised to bridge over this chasm. But the inability of the sinner though moral, is real, and inconsistent with anything that can properly or safely be called ability. All modes of teaching which have any other effect than to lead men, under a sense of their own helplessness, to cast themselves on Christ for strength to lead a Christian life, are delusive and mischievous. We are not sufficient for anything, as of ourselves; our sufficiency is of God. When we are weak, then are we strong in the Lord and the power of his might. This is the whole theory of the Christian life. The just shall live by faith; not faith in their own ability, but of the Son of God, who loved us and gave himself for us. The whole may be summed up by adding to the article of the Catechism on repentance, those on faith and effectual calling. "Faith in Jesus Christ is a saving grace whereby we receive and rest upon him alone for salvation, as he is offered to us in the gospel." "Effectual calling is the work of God's Spirit, whereby convincing us of our sin and misery, enlightening our minds in the knowledge of Christ and renewing our wills, he doth persuade and enable us to embrace Jesus Christ, freely offered to us in the gospel."

3. A few words will suffice, after what we have already advanced, to show our views of doctrinal preaching. We can hardly conceive of a Christian discourse which does not implicitly contain, and, with greater or less explicitness, articulate a Christian truth or doctrine. Christian doctrines are but the truths of Christianity. The only real question then is, what

Christian truths shall be preached, and in what relative proportions? Here the word of God is our true model and guide. But shall not certain doctrines be suppressed, although taught in the sacred oracles? Here again our answer is, preach the word. "All scripture is profitable for doctrine," as well as other things, whoever may wish the ninth chapter of Romans, or any other part, expunged therefrom. Generally, the objection to preaching doctrines has reference to those doctrines which the objector dislikes. If he can prove them untrue or unscriptural, his objection is valid, not otherwise. All Christian affections and purposes are inspired by a view of Christian truth. They are otherwise impossible. And there is no Christian truth, which, presented in its due proportions and surroundings, does not tend to nourish some holy affection. There can be no doubt, therefore, that it is a fundamental part of the preacher's vocation, to make these truths clearly understood, as the very condition of true faith, holy living, whatever is involved in right practice. The inculcation of doctrine is sometimes stigmatized as dull and unprofitable; as offering the mere dry bones to souls craving the nutritive milk and meat of the word. We do not deny that there may be doctrinal preaching obnoxious to this charge. We do not think sermons should be theological lectures, didactic or polemic. We think doctrine being clearly defined and established, should always be developed in its practical and experimental bearings. So all Christian practice should be based on its correlate doctrines, and rooted in Christian principle, in order to be of that kind which accompanies salvation. As to fervid discourses which would stir the feelings without illuminating the understanding, we have already said enough. The attempt to edify the Church without doctrinal instruction, is like the attempt to build a house without foundation or frame-work. Let any in derision call the doctrines "bones," if they will. What sort of a body would that be which was flesh and blood, without bones? If any present them in skeleton nakedness, divested of their vital relations to life and experience, this is the fault of those who do it, not of true and proper doctrinal preaching, which on one of its sides is practical and experimental. In fact, the two should never be torn asunder, any more than the flesh and bones.

They should ever blend with and vitally interpenetrate each other, and be pervaded by the unction of the Holy One. No sane man will contend for mere dogmatic abstractions in the pulpit. Much less should it be a theatre for philosophic or metaphysical disquisitions. But it should be a theatre for unfolding, illustrating, enforcing divine truth proved by the testimony of Him for whom it is impossible to lie, to be apprehended by the intellect, and vouched for by the conscience of man. We do not believe this truth so devoid of interest as seems to be supposed by many, who on this account studiously shun it. We believe it to be the only material on which most ministers, who have no coruscations of genius, especially eccentric genius, with which to charm their hearers, can rely for awakening a permanent interest in their ministrations. While there is any religion in the world, he will hardly fail to interest his flock, who feeds them with knowledge and understanding. Dr. Emmons, whose sermons were in a remarkable degree clear and icy metaphysical reasonings, far less attractive than the plain truths of Scripture, read off in the most passionless manner, always had an audience of eager listeners. He said in his laconic way, "I have generally found that people will attend, if you give them anything to attend to."

Polemical and controversial preaching is doubtless to be avoided, except so far as the preacher is called to combat the lusts and errors of hearers. In this sense, faithful ministers will always be obliged, like the apostle, to "teach the gospel with much contention." All preaching is immediately or remotely an assault upon the deceits of sin, and the refuges of lies in which it entrenches itself. And it may happen, when errorists are stealing the hearts of the people, that, with heavenly wisdom and prudence, ministers must dispute daily, as did Paul, the things of the kingdom. This is one thing. To bring the *odium theologicum* into the pulpit; to be fond of holding up other bodies of Christians to reproach and derision; to appear more anxious to gain the victory over our adversary, who has no chance to defend himself, than to save the souls of them that hear; to display wrath, and bitterness, and clamour, and evil speaking, in a place that should be radiant with Christian benignity; or, even without this, to be always thrusting out the

horns dissevered from the body of Christian doctrine and practice, may accomplish a great many things. But we have never seen it productive of any signal fruits of faith, humility, penitence, love, and devotion. In general, it will be found, especially so far as the pulpit is concerned, that the positive and able inculcation of the truth is the best defence against error; and that the more completely impersonal and uncontroversial it is, the less likely is it to arouse those carnal and malevolent feelings which always grieve the Spirit of God. This is the general principle. Cases may arise in which duty requires another course; but they should be exceptional and emergent.

4. In combatting the errors and lusts of men, we do not believe that any great good is effected by abstract metaphysical and philosophical arguments. They are usually unintelligible to the common mind. They are the "wisdom of this world, which is foolishness with God," and which no preacher is commissioned to employ; and if he condescends to found his claims on his philosophy, one man's philosophy is as good as another's. He has a higher sanction for all that he proclaims, even the testimony of God, which shines in its own self-evidencing light throughout the Scriptures. Besides this, he has the witness of the consciousness of his hearers to attest what he affirms in regard to their moral state, their ill-desert, their need of a Saviour, and their chief duties as Christians. Thus, for the principal parts of his message, he has proofs more effective, and exercising a far higher convictive power, than any ingenuity of speculation. And here he has an advantage which largely compensates for the natural apathy and aversion of men to the gospel. He speaks by divine authority, and not as the scribes, if he is true to his trust. Their consciences meanwhile bear him witness. Any other basis of his teachings is of little efficacy in producing scriptural faith. For this is faith, not in any philosopheme or hypothesis of man, but in God and his word; and it must stand, not in the wisdom of men, but the power of God. It is beyond all doubt, then, that the preacher's discourse will be instinct with penetrating, convictive, spiritual, purifying energy, just and only in proportion as he appeals to the authority of God and the consciences of his hearers. This is wielding the sword of the Spirit; and when we use his sword, in devout

dependence on him, we may look for his presence to give it an ethereal temper and penetrant edge. Such preaching, though it come not with excellency of speech or of wisdom, declaring the testimony of God, will doubtless be in demonstration of the Spirit and of power.

As the Spirit works the new creation not by any violation of, but in unison with, the nature and laws of the rational soul, as he persuades while he enables us to embrace Christ, and does this by giving efficacy to the external persuasions of the word read and preached, so the true method of bringing men to the knowledge and belief of the truth, is, as in all cases, to proceed from the known to the unknown. All moral and Christian truths are concatenated and interdependent, like the members of a living organism. Each one either supposes or is confirmed by all the rest. Had we adequate faculties, we should doubtless see, in regard to all these truths, what we now see of some, that they involve all the rest; just as the zoologist will tell from a tooth or a bone all the other parts of the animal to which it belonged. To a very great extent, this mutual connection of the various portions of moral and Christian truth is, or ought to be, known to the preacher, and is a chief element in his reasonings and pleas with all classes of hearers. Few are so totally imbruted, as to be blind to the simplest moral truths. In the light of these, the evidence of higher truths to which they have been blind and indisposed, may be made to appear—as surely as from the letters of the alphabet we may syllable out words, sentences, discourses, all literature. The recognition of the distinction between moral good and evil, cannot be developed without revealing sin, guilt, the need of repentance and redemption, and from these first principles of the doctrine of Christ we must go on unto perfection. As sin is deceitful and blinding, so we must strive to dispel its bewilderments. As it is madness, we must use the fragments of truth and sanity still left, for the restoration of so much of reason as is shattered or lost. In this view, a sound and prayerful discretion is to be used, as to the time and circumstances for declaring the various portions of the counsel of God, the whole of which we may not shun to declare at a proper time. Otherwise, though we give each one his portion, we may fail to do it

in due season, and may oppress with meat, by them indigestible, those babes in Christ, who are not as yet able to bear it. It may indeed be the preacher's fault that they are such as have not their senses exercised to discern between good and evil, and are still such as have need of milk and not of meat; yet in forwarding their growth in knowledge, he must, like all other skilful teachers, adapt himself to their stage of spiritual attainment.

5. Here arises the question, as to the extent to which prudential considerations, and the principle of expediency are legitimate in determining the matter of preaching. We are met by two classes of scriptural instructions, which in sound are contradictory, but in sense are perfectly coincident. The first are those which demand the fullest regard to the dictates of prudence and expediency. They teach us to refrain from lawful things which are inexpedient, to please our neighbour in order to his edification, to become all things to all men, if by any means we may save some. Here the strongest sanction is given to the principle of expediency. We are taught with still greater emphasis, "though we or an angel from heaven preach any other gospel, let him be accursed;" that we may not shun to declare the whole counsel of God; that we may not do evil that good may come; that we must be faithful to the testimony of Jesus, and the truth of his word even unto death, if we would receive the crown of life. There is no question that our duty is to preach the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. All seeming discrepancy here disappears, if we have recourse to the familiar ethical classification of actions as good, bad, and indifferent. In regard to acts in themselves morally right or wrong, no license is given to neglect the one or do the other, out of regard to any considerations of expediency. We are not to lie or blaspheme, or refuse to confess Christ and his gospel, though we might thus save our own lives, or prevent the crush of worlds. No instance can be found in which Paul did or sanctioned such things, strenuous as he was for expediency. On the other hand, in regard to things indifferent, i. e., in themselves neither morally good nor evil, expediency is the governing principle. And, by expediency, we mean tendency to promote what is morally good, or

prevent what is morally evil. To give a familiar example. As to whether we shall worship God and abjure idols, there is no option. But as to the style of dress and equipage I shall adopt, this is a matter to be determined wholly by its relation to my ability to discharge my just obligations, and my influence for good or evil upon my fellow men. For intrinsically, linsey-woolsey and satin sparkling with diamonds are on the same moral footing. We think that the application of these principles to preaching is not difficult or obscure.

1. The minister has no discretion as to setting forth the whole body of divine truth in the course of his inculcations. He may not add to, or take from the word of God.

2. He may not, with a good conscience, when in any way questioned or put to the test, disown, or give it to be understood that he does not believe, what he does believe to be the truth in Christ, on any consideration or pretext whatsoever.

3. But since he cannot, in any one discourse, or in any limited period, traverse the whole circle of divine truth, he must exercise his own conscientious discretion as to the times and occasions, when each respective part is to be so brought forth as to divide to each his portion in due season.

4. As to all matters indifferent, whether of act or word, private and public, they are to be regulated by the single aim of giving the truth more facile and effective access to the souls of men; whether we eat or drink, or whatsoever we do, all must be done to the glory of God and the edification of souls.

5. With regard to rightly dividing the word of truth, in the foregoing cases, as well as all others, much must doubtless be left to Christian prudence; a want of which, more frequently than any other fault, impairs the usefulness of clergymen, and ejects them from their positions. Dr. Dwight says, that by far the larger part of the forced dismissals of pastors within his knowledge were attributable to this cause. There is, however, a general principle in regard to the distribution of the different portions of divine truth, which results from all that we have advanced, is plainly enunciated in the Bible, is enforced by the example of prophets, apostles, and Christ himself, and which no man can safely disregard. In a religion in which mercy and truth, righteousness and peace, are met together,

men must be made to behold both the goodness and severity of God. Great evil results from the disproportionate or exclusive exhibition of either the stern and awful, or the benignant and alluring aspects of the divine character. One class should not be suffered to overshadow the other. The soul's welfare requires that neither should be forgotten or ignored: "For the better understanding of this matter, we may observe, that God, in the revelation that he has made of himself to the world by Jesus Christ, has taken care to give a proportionable manifestation of two kinds of excellencies or perfections of his nature, viz. those which specially tend to possess us with awe and reverence, and to search and humble us; and those that tend to win, draw, and encourage us. By the one, he appears as an infinitely great, pure, holy, and heart-searching judge; by the other, as a gentle and gracious father, and loving friend. By the one, he is a pure, searching, and burning flame; by the other, a sweet, refreshing light. These two kinds of attributes are, as it were, admirably tempered together in the revelation of the gospel. There is a proportionable manifestation of justice and mercy, holiness and grace, gentleness, authority, and condescension. God hath thus ordered that his diverse excellencies, as he reveals himself in the face of Jesus Christ, should have a proportionable manifestation, herein providing for our necessities. He knew it to be of great consequence, that our apprehensions of these diverse perfections of his nature should be duly proportioned one to another. A defect on the one hand, viz. having a discovery of his love and grace, without a proportionable discovery of his awful majesty, his holy and searching purity, would tend to spiritual pride, carnal confidence, and presumption; and a defect, on the other hand, viz. having a discovery of his holy majesty, without a proportionable discovery of his grace, tends to unbelief, a sinful fearfulness, and a spirit of bondage."*

We shall bring these observations to a close, by a few suggestions relative to the extent of the preacher's obligations to give instructions to men in respect to worldly relations and interests, economic, social, and political.

* Edwards's Works. New York edition, vol. iv., pp. 224-5.

1. With regard to all that is commonly understood by the moral and worldly virtues; i. e. virtues which often exist without piety, and are commanded by the natural conscience, and the code of worldly respectability, as well as by the gospel, such as temperance, chastity, honesty, veracity, fidelity, kindness, &c., it is needless to say that they are of self-evident obligation; that if they may exist without piety, piety cannot exist without them; and that they should be enjoined, as they are in the Bible. They should be enforced, not merely by natural and worldly, but by spiritual and evangelical motives. Yet they ought not to fill any large or overshadowing place in preaching. This should be mainly occupied with the glorious gospel of the blessed God, and its heavenly truths and requirements; and with these subordinately, as its subordinate though indispensable fruits. Such is the uniform course of the New Testament preachers; such is the most effective way of promoting morality. It makes the tree good; so the fruit must be good. Unless it be a very distempered and unevangelical type of religion, the most religious men are the most moral individuals and communities, in all countries and all ages. Those who have laid out their chief strength in preaching worldly morality, have had but slender success. Without the fascination of genius, they can seldom keep a congregation together. The mightiest preachers of the everlasting gospel, who have done most to bring men to the obedience of faith, have produced the greatest moral reformations. Dr. Chalmers's experience is a remarkable instance of "philosophy teaching by example." He relates, that in his earlier ministry, he plied his congregation with enthusiastic discourses on the moral virtues, and made it his chief labour thus to effect a reformation of their morals. They loved the preacher, and were charmed with the magic of his eloquence. But they did not reform their morals. He at length felt the hollowness of mere morality, and was brought to the cross for pardon and peace. He at once altered the whole matter of his preaching. In place of splendid moral essays, he gave them clear and fervid discourse on sin, guilt, and retribution; on salvation by the Redeemer's blood, and righteousness; on spiritual regeneration, faith, repentance, holy living, heaven, and hell. Multitudes were awakened, and converted to the

Lord. And not only so, but there was a thorough, wide-spread, and permanent reformation of morals. *Ex uno disce omnes.* The pools of worldly morality will stagnate, unless vitalized by streams from the fountain of life.

As we have said that morality should be taught not so as to crowd into the supremacy of the gospel, but as its necessary subordinate fruit, so the less immediate and direct, the more distant and inferential the duty, the more distant and chary should the pulpit be in treating it. "At the last extremity of a branch, it is difficult to retain a view of the stem. Represent to yourself, for example, sermons on neatness, politeness, &c. Some topics of this sort, doubtless, may be approached, but it must be done incidentally; they should never furnish the subject for a sermon."*

2. With respect to the social and civil relations, and all interests merely worldly, Christianity insists on the exercise of religious principle, and all the virtues of our holy religion in every sphere of life and action. There can be no doubt that God will honour those that honour him in all the spheres and offices of life. They will be blessed in their basket and store, their going out and coming in. Society is elevated and purified, individuals and families are prospered, every worldly interest of man thrives in proportion as religion pure and undefiled before God and the Father prevails. This is its inherent tendency, as it exalts the whole man, and restrains those corrupt passions that blight the body as well as the soul, and destroy both in hell. It is a blessing also often conveyed in honour of his religion by the undercurrents, and secret prospering gales of his gracious providence. But it is often withheld in his wisdom, or prevented by counteracting causes. How often has persecution hunted the people of God to the dens and caves of the earth, while faith has enabled them to take joyfully the spoiling of their goods, and to count not even their own lives dear, knowing that in heaven they have a better and more enduring substance? In all cases, they that will live godly in Christ Jesus must suffer persecution, and endure chastening. The promise will be fulfilled, that through much

* Vinet's *Homiletics*, translated by Dr. Skinner, pp. 82, 3.

tribulation they shall enter the kingdom of God. Their worldly prosperity, so far as it is vouchsafed, follows their religion as the shadow follows the substance. But it is not the substance, it is not that with which religion concerns itself, otherwise than in ways incidental and subordinate. On the contrary, its effort is to raise the soul to a sublime superiority above the transient and worldly. It puts no value upon these further than as they may be linked with and subserve our eternal welfare, than as the scaffolding to the edifice. We are surely not mistaken here. We are charged to take no thought what we shall eat, what we shall drink, or wherewithal we shall be clothed; to look not at things seen and temporal, but at things not seen and eternal; if we are called, being servants, to care not for it, but, if we may be free, to choose it rather; but always to seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, with the promise that all other things shall be added unto us, which our true well-being demands. Of the whole doctrine of Scripture on this subject the Apostle gives the following beautiful summation. "But this I say, brethren, that the time is short. It remaineth, that both they that have wives be as though they had none; and they that weep, as though they wept not; and they that rejoice, as though they rejoiced not; and they that buy, as though they possessed not; and they that use this world as not abusing it; for the fashion of this world passeth away."

In correspondence with all this, it is evidently no part of the preacher's commission to make the promotion of men's worldly interests any prominent object of his inculcations. On the contrary, such a course is clearly discountenanced in the Bible as not only repugnant to religion, but suicidal; for, by displacing the divine and eternal element, it fails of its benignant fruits for this world. For these bear not the root, but the root beareth them. So far as we have observed, those who most signalize worldly interests in preaching, so far from eternalizing the temporal, merely secularize the spiritual. "No man that warreth entangleth himself with the affairs of this world." With respect to those who would encourage servants to be restive under the yoke, or contemptuous of their masters, Paul denounces them as "men of corrupt minds, sup-

posing that gain is godliness; from such withdraw thyself. But godliness with contentment is great gain. For we brought nothing into the world, and it is certain we can carry nothing out." We think that the same principle holds in this matter, which Christ propounds in regard to individuals. "He that findeth his life shall lose it, and he that loseth his life for my sake, shall find it." Preachers who spend their strength in efforts at worldly amelioration, usually spend their strength for nought. Those who spend it in promoting godliness, usually build up every interest of man, temporal, spiritual, eternal, individual, and social. "Godliness is profitable unto all things, having the promise of the life that now is, and that which is to come." All forms of mistaking gain for godliness, betray a radical misconception of the whole nature and scope of the gospel. Says John, "they are of the world, therefore speak they of the world, and the world heareth them. We are of God. He that heareth God, heareth us; he that is not of God, heareth not us. Hereby know we the spirit of truth, and the spirit of error."

It being thus clear that worldly amelioration, however it may be a consequence, is not the direct object of the preacher's inculcations, it follows, that the pulpit, in proportion as it is engrossed with interests less than those of the soul, God, and eternity, usually suffers loss itself, and thus indirectly damages what it undertakes to promote. Let a preacher devote his pulpit to any questions social or civil, which respect simply their better or worse condition in regard to the good things of this life, and he will generally accomplish less for their temporal, to say nothing of their eternal welfare, than if he had devoted himself to the promotion of that godliness which, with contentment, is great gain.

As, however, religion has its development and sphere of action in the world, and includes all social and relative duties, simply because it includes all duty, and requires us to do all things to the glory of God; it of course requires us to act in all good conscience in reference to our country and government; to do what we may consistently with paramount obligations, to make our officers peace, and our exactors righteousness; to procure just and salutary laws; to sustain their authority and

execution; so there can be no question as to the propriety of inculcating these great, and (among Christians) undisputed principles, from the pulpit. Indeed, as Christ taught us to render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's; as Paul enjoined obedience to the powers that be, not only for wrath, but for conscience' sake, so he expressly charges ministers to "put them in mind to be subject to principalities and powers, to obey magistrates, to be ready to every good work." Of course this means a real, an authorized magistrate, not a pretender or usurper; and demands obedience to laws enacted by a competent authority, not by a mob, or any unauthorized assemblage. And it further means obedience to real rulers, as to all other superiors, so far, and so far only, as they do not require us to disobey God. In this case we are clearly taught we ought to obey God rather than man. To obey a magistrate who requires us to blaspheme, is simply to abet him in his rebellion against God. In such a case our only course is to sustain the law, not by obeying its precept, but, if need be, by enduring the penalty. It is no strange thing, to be required to witness a good confession at the cost of martyrdom.

We have no reference here to those great and abnormal emergencies which speak for themselves, when the people, in the exercise of their own *vis medicatrix nature*, by the sudden violent throes of revolution, cast off a government intolerable or outgrown, for one suited to their wants. We only mean to say, that the foregoing principles are proper, and at times necessary to be inculcated in the pulpit. But when we pass from these principles, which must commend themselves to every enlightened conscience, to the details of their concrete application, in actual politics, other considerations have place. There is no question that men ought to regard it, and to be taught to regard it, as a duty to promote the elevation to office of the most faithful and competent men, as well as the enactment of just and equal laws. But few sane men would deem it safe or edifying for the pulpit to discuss the respective merits of different candidates; or whether the tariff, or sub-treasury, or statutes enfranchising and making voters of foreigners were just and salutary. Similar embarrassments may exist, however

firm the preacher's personal convictions, as to whether a given man, or set of men are the legal officers they claim to be. It is not so much on first principles, which few men possessing a moral sense will dispute, as the application of these principles to the vast and complex affairs of nations and communities, that the angry questions of party politics arise. And here, imperfect knowledge, interest, prejudice, party predilections so distort and bewilder, that however strong our own personal convictions, we see vast numbers earnestly enlisted on opposite sides, whose piety cannot be questioned. We do not undertake to say that these questions may not sometimes have an ethical or religious side too obvious and urgent for the pulpit to neglect. But we do say, as the result of considerable observation, that we never knew the pulpit throw itself into the issues that divide political parties, without contracting a stain and a wound upon its sanctity and spiritual power. It inevitably soils itself by such association with the unworthy passions which embitter and disgrace political conflicts. We have not known any instance in which political harangues from the pulpit aided the party espoused, or gained a voter, or did anything more than give intolerable offence to partisans of the opposite side. Others may have witnessed better results. "As to patriotic and political sermons, they are rather to be avoided, and yet in certain grave circumstances, we may be obliged to touch upon such subjects in the pulpit. . . . We must beware, lest we inflame on this hearth, the passions of the natural man. How shall we now speak of politics without taking a side? We must remark, also, the utilitarianism which for the most part is concealed in these subjects. It is better for the preacher, as it is for the navigator, to keep himself in the high sea; it is in the neighbourhood of coasts that shipwrecks are most frequent."—*Vinet's Homiletics*, pp. 86-7. And it may be added, that with the ample sources of political information afforded by a free press, exigencies can rarely occur which call for its dissemination from the pulpit. Its office should rather be to moderate the fierceness of these violent conflicts, by holding up the contrasted greatness of the Infinite and Eternal.

ART. V.—*The Church—Its Perpetuity.*

THE Church is perpetual. Of this there is, among Christians, neither doubt nor dispute. But as to what is meant both by the subject and predicate of this proposition, there exist radically different views. By the Church, Romanists understand the external visible society united in the profession of the same faith, by communion in the sacraments, and subjection to bishops having succession, especially to the Roman Pontiff. The perpetuity of the Church, therefore, must on their theory include the continued existence of an organized society, professing the true faith; the continued legitimate administration of the sacraments; and the uninterrupted succession of prelates and popes.

Anglicans* understand by the Church an external society professing the true faith, united in the communion of the same sacraments, and in subjection to bishops canonically ordained. Perpetuity with them, therefore, must include perpetual adherence to the truth, the due administration of the sacraments, and the uninterrupted succession of bishops.

Protestants hold that the true Church is the body of true believers; and that the empirical or visible Church is the body of those who profess the true religion, together with their children. All therefore that the perpetuity of the Church, according to the Protestant theory, involves, is the continued existence on earth of sincere believers who profess the true religion.

It is obvious that everything depends on the definition of the Church. If you determine the nature of the subject, you determine the nature of its attributes. If the Romish or Anglican definition of the Church be correct, then their view of all its attributes, its visibility, perpetuity, holiness, and unity, must also be correct. And, on the other hand, if the Protestant definition of the Church be accepted, so must also the Protestant view of its attributes. It is also obvious that the consideration

* By *Anglicans* is meant the Laudean, or Oxford party, in the Church of England.

of any one of these points involves all the others. The perpetuity of the Church, for example, brings up the question, whether external organization is necessary to its existence; whether the Church may depart from the faith; whether the prelatial office is necessary, and whether an uninterrupted succession of ordination is essential to the ministry; how far the sacraments are necessary to the being of the Church; whether Peter was the head of the College of the Apostles; whether the bishop of Rome is his successor in that office; and whether submission to the Roman Pontiff is essential to the unity, and, of course, to the existence of the Church. All these points are involved in the Romish theory on this subject; and all, except the last two, in the Anglican doctrine. It would be impossible to go over all this ground in less compass than that of a volume. On each of these topics, ponderous tomes have been written. We propose simply to present, in a series of propositions, a brief outline of the Protestant answer to the question, In what sense is the Church perpetual?

The predictions of the Old Testament, and the promises of the New, it is universally conceded, secure the existence of the Church on earth until the second advent of Christ. Our Lord said to his disciples, "Lo, I am with you always, even to the end of the world." He promised that the gates of hell should never prevail against his Church. As to the fact, therefore, that the Church is to exist on earth as long as the world lasts, there is and can be no dispute among Christians. The only question is, How are these promises to be understood?

The first proposition which Protestants maintain in answer to the above question, is, that the promise of Christ does not secure the continued existence of any particular Church as an organized body. By a particular Church is meant a body of professing Christians, united by some ecclesiastical organization, as the Church of Antioch, of Jerusalem, of England, or of Holland. The proposition is, that, from all that appears in Scripture, any such Church may apostatize from the truth, or cease to exist even nominally. This proposition is almost universally conceded. Many of the apostolic churches have long since perished. The Churches of Antioch, of Ephesus, of Corinth, of Thessalonica, have been blotted out of existence.

Romanists teach that the Eastern Churches, and those of England, Scotland, Holland, &c., have so far departed from the faith and order of the true Church, as no longer to belong to the body of Christ. Anglicans teach, that all societies which have rejected the office, or lost the regular succession of the episcopate, have ceased to be Churches. Protestants, with one voice, deny that any particular Church is either infallible, or secure from fatal apostacy. All parties therefore agree in asserting that the promise of Christ does not secure the perpetuity of any one particular Church.

The great majority of Papists do indeed make an exception in favour of the city of Rome. As the bishop of that city is regarded as the vicar of Christ, and as all other Churches are required to recognize and obey him as such on pain of exclusion from the body of Christ, so long as the Church continues on earth, that bishop must continue worthy of recognition and obedience. Any member of the body may die, but if the head perish, the whole body perishes with it.

But since there is no special promise in Scripture to the Church of Rome, it can be made an exception to the general liability to defection only on the assumption, 1. That Peter was made the head of the whole Church. 2. That the recognition of him in that character is essential to membership in the body of Christ. 3. That he was the bishop of Rome. 4. That the Popes are his legitimate successors in the bishopric of that city, and in his headship over the Church. 5. That the recognition of the supremacy of the Pope is an essential condition for all ages of the existence of the Church. Every one of these assumptions, however, is false.

The second proposition is, that the promise of Christ does not secure his Church from all error in matters of faith. The Protestant doctrine is that a particular Church, and even the whole visible Church, may err in matters of doctrine, and yet retain their character as Churches. "The purest Churches under heaven," says the Westminster Confession, "are subject to mixture and error." By the profession of the truth, therefore, which is declared to be essential to the existence of the Church, must be understood the profession of the fundamental doctrines of the gospel. This distinction between essential and

non-essential doctrines is one, which however it may be denied, is in some form admitted by all Christians. Sometimes the distinction is expressed by drawing a line between matters of faith and matters of opinion; at others, by distinguishing between truths which must be received with explicit faith, and those which may be received implicitly. In some form the distinction must be acknowledged.

What we are concerned to show is, that the existence of the Church does not depend on its absolute freedom from error. This may appear too plain a point to need proof; and yet it is one of the fundamental doctrines of Romanism, that the Church cannot err in matters of faith. That the Church may thus err, is proved, 1. Because nothing can be necessary to the existence of the Church which is not necessary to salvation. Freedom from error in matters of doctrine, is not necessary to salvation, and therefore cannot be necessary to the perpetuity of the Church.

That nothing can be necessary to the existence of the Church which is not necessary to salvation, is so nearly a self-evident proposition, that its terms cannot be understood without forcing assent. Salvation involves union with Christ; union with Christ involves union with the Church, for the Church is his body; that is, it consists of those who are united to Him. Therefore, nothing which is compatible with union with Christ, can be incompatible with union to the Church. Consequently, the Church exists so long as true believers exist. It is a contradiction, therefore, to say that anything is necessary to the being of the Church, which is not necessary to salvation.

That freedom from error in matters of faith is not necessary to salvation, is scarcely less plain. By "matters of faith" are meant those truths which God has revealed in his word, and which all who hear the gospel are bound to believe. Perfect faith supposes perfect knowledge; and such perfection cannot be necessary to salvation, because it is not necessary to piety. It is of course admitted that knowledge is essential to religion, because religion consists in the love, belief, and obedience of the truth. It is therefore conceded, that all religious error must be injurious to religion, in proportion to the importance of the truths concerned. If such errors are so grave as to pre-

sent a false object of worship to the mind, or to lead men to rest on a false ground of confidence, they must be fatal. But it must be admitted that a very limited amount of knowledge is absolutely essential to faith and love. A man may be ignorant of much that God has revealed, and yet receiving with humble confidence all he does know, and acting in obedience to what he has learned, he may be accepted of Him who judgeth according to that a man hath, and not according to that he hath not. As religion may consist with much ignorance, so it may consist with error. There is indeed little practical difference between the two. In both cases the proper object of faith and love is absent from the mind; and when absent its place is of necessity supplied by some erroneous conception. If a man know not the true God, he will form to himself a false god. If he know not that Jesus Christ is the Lord of glory, he will conceive him to be a man or angel. If he know not the true method of salvation, he will build his hope on some wrong foundation. But if perfect knowledge is not necessary to religion, freedom from error cannot be essential. And if not essential to the individual Christian, it cannot be essential to the Church, which is only a company of Christians. The Romish and Anglican doctrine, therefore, that all error in matters of faith is destructive to the being of the Church, or that the promise of Christ secures the Church from all such error, is contrary to the nature of religion, inasmuch as it supposes freedom from error to be necessary to its existence.

This view is confirmed by daily observation. We constantly see men who give every evidence of piety, who are either ignorant or erroneous as to many matters of faith. The Bible also, in various ways, teaches the same doctrine. It distinguishes between babes in Christ, and those who are strong. It recognizes as Christians those who know nothing beyond the first principles of the doctrines of Christ. It teaches that those who hold the foundation shall be saved, (though so as by fire,) although they build on that foundation wood, hay, and stubble. It recognizes great diversity of doctrine as existing among those whom it treats as being substantially one in faith. It is not true, therefore, that a Christian cannot err in matters of faith; and if one may err, all may; and if all may, the Church may.

The perpetuity of the Church consequently does not imply that it must always profess the truth, without any admixture of error.

2. The historical argument in opposition to the Romish doctrine that the Church must be free from error in matters of faith, is no less decisive.

There are two ways in which the Church may profess its faith. It may be done by its public authorized confession or creed; or it may be done by its individual members. The former is the more formal and authoritative; but the latter is no less real. The Church of any age consists of its members for that age. What the members profess, the Church professes. The apostacy of the Church of Geneva was not the less real, because the old orthodox Confessions were allowed to remain. The Churches of Germany were universally considered as sunk in Rationalism, even though the Augsburg Confession was nominally their standard of faith. The lapse of the Romish Church into infidelity and atheism in France was complete, although the Apostles' Creed continued to be professed in the Church services. If no Church could be considered as having lapsed into error, so long as its standards remain orthodox, then no Church can ever become erroneous, so long as it professes to believe the Scriptures. By the faith of a Church is properly meant the faith of its actual members; and by a Church professing error is meant that error is avowed by its members. The doctrine, therefore, that the Church cannot err in matters of faith, must mean that the mass of its members cannot thus err; for they constitute the Church, and if they err the Church errs.

There is no historical fact better established than that no external organized body has ever existed free from error. Even during the apostolical age the Churches of Jerusalem, of Corinth, and of Galatia, were infected with serious errors, and yet they were Churches. During the first three centuries, errors concerning the Trinity, the person and work of Christ, the person and office of the Spirit, and the nature of man, were almost universal. From the fourth to the tenth century, no organized body can be pointed out whose members did not profess doctrines which are now almost universally pronounced

to be erroneous. Since the Reformation, the Lutherans and the Reformed differ in matters of doctrine. The Church of England differs from the Greek and Latin Churches. So that it is impossible to maintain that freedom from error is essential to the perpetuity of the Church. No Church is absolutely pure in doctrine; and even if the standards of the Church should be faultless, still the real faith of its members is not. The promise of Christ, therefore, securing the perpetuity of the Church, does not secure the constant existence on earth of any body of men who are infallible in matters of faith and practice.

The third proposition is, that the perpetuity of the Church does not involve the continued existence of any visible organized body professing the true religion, and furnished with regular pastors.

At the time of the Reformation it was constantly urged against the Protestants that they were bound to obey the Church. To this they replied, that the Church to which the obedience of the faithful is due, was not the Romish, or any other external organization, for they had all departed from the faith, and taught for doctrines the commandments of men. To this, Romanists rejoined, that if that were true, the Church had perished, for no organized visible society could be pointed out which professed the doctrines avowed by Protestants. To this again the Reformers replied, that the perpetuity of the Church, which all parties admitted, did not require the continued existence of any such society; the Church might exist, and at times had existed in scattered believers. Calvin says: "*In his cardinibus controversia nostra vertitur: primum quod ecclesiæ formam semper apparere et spectabilem esse contendunt: deinde quod formam ipsam in sede Romanæ Ecclesiæ et Præsulorum suorum ordine constituent. Nos contra asserimus, et ecclesiam nulla apparente forma constare posse, nec formam externo illo splendore quem stulte admirantur, sed longe alia nota contineri: nempe pura verbi Dei prædicatione, et legitima sacramentorum administratione. Fremunt nisi ecclesia digito semper ostendatur.*"*

* Preface to the Institutes, p. 15. Had Calvin lived in our day he would hear with surprise zealous Protestants, and even Presbyterians, crying out against the doctrine that visible organization is not essential to the Church.

In support of what Calvin thus calls one of the cardinal doctrines of Protestants, that the Church may be perpetuated in scattered believers; or, in other words, that the apostasy of every visible organized society from the true faith is consistent with the perpetuity of the Church, it may be argued,

1. That the definition of the Church necessarily involves that conclusion. If the true Church consists of true believers, and the visible Church of professed believers, then the true Church continues as long as true believers exist on earth; and the visible Church so long as professors of the true religion exist. It is only by denying the correctness of these definitions that the necessity of a continued visible organization can be maintained. Accordingly Romanists and Anglicans have been obliged to depart from the scriptural view of the nature of the Church, and to make external organization an essential element of its definition in order to have any ground on which to stand. They maintain that the Church is something more than a company of believers, or a collective term for a number of believers. They insist that it is a visible organization, subject to lawful pastors—something that can be pointed to with the finger. If to such an organization the promise of perpetuity was originally given, then Protestants were schismatics, and their Churches are apostate. But if their view of the nature of the Church be correct, then their view of the sense in which it is perpetual must also be correct.

2. The promises of the word of God which secure the perpetuity of the Church, require nothing more than the continued existence of professors of the true religion. Thus, when our Lord says, the gates of hell shall never prevail against his Church; if by Church he meant his people, his promise only renders it certain that he shall always have a seed to serve him, or that there shall always be true followers and worshippers of Christ on the earth. Thus, also, the declaration of Christ, "Lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world," holds good, even though all the temples of Christians should be destroyed, their faithful pastors scattered or slain, and they forced to wander about, being destitute, afflicted and tormented, hiding in dens and caves of the earth. Nay, his presence will only be the more conspicuous in the sight of saints and angels,

in sustaining the faith and patience of his people under all these trials, and in causing them to triumph through suffering, and become great through weakness. The presence of God was more illustriously displayed with the three confessors in the fiery furnace, than with Solomon in all his glory. Protestants believe with Tertullian—“*Ubi tres sunt, etiam ei laici, ibi ecclesia est.*”

The predictions in the Old Testament, which speak of an everlasting covenant which God was to form with his people, (Isa. lxi.) and of a kingdom which shall never be destroyed, (Dan. ii. 44,) do indeed clearly establish the perpetuity of the Church, but not of an external organization. The kingdom of God consists of those who obey him; and as long as there are any who recognize Christ as their king, so long will his kingdom continue. His promise renders it certain that such subjects of the heavenly King shall never entirely fail from among men; and also that their number shall ultimately so increase, that they shall possess the whole earth. More than this these predictions do not render necessary. They do not preclude the possibility of the temporary triumph of the enemies of the Church, dispersing its members, and causing them to wander about, known only to God. Nor do they preclude the occurrence of a general apostasy, so extended as to embrace all the visible organizations calling themselves churches. Whether such an apostasy has ever actually occurred, is not now the question. All that is asserted is that these promises and predictions do not forbid its occurrence. They may all be yea and amen, though the faithful for a season be as few and as unknown, as the seven thousand who did not bow the knee unto Baal.

Further, when St. Paul says, “Then we who are alive and remain, shall be caught up together with them in the air, and so shall we be ever with the Lord,” (1 Thess. iv. 17,) the only inference is, that there shall be Christians living on the earth when Christ comes the second time. The parable of the wheat and tares proves that until the consummation there will be true and false professors of the religion of the gospel, but it proves nothing more.

Such are the leading scriptural arguments urged by Bellarmine* and Palmer† for the Romish and Anglican view of the perpetuity of the Church. They prove what Protestants admit, but they do not prove what their opponents assert. That is, they prove that the people of God shall continue to exist on the earth until the second coming of Christ, but they do not prove the continued existence of any visible organization professing the true faith, and subject to pastors having succession. If it be granted that the word *Church*, in Scripture, is a collective term for the people of God, then the promises which secure the continued existence of a seed to serve God as long as the world lasts, do not secure the continued fidelity of the visible Church, considered as an organized body.

8. A third argument on this subject is, that there is no necessity for the continued existence of the Church as an external visible society. That is, there is no revealed purpose of God, which involves such existence as the necessary means of its accomplishment. Bellarmine's argument on this point is, "If the Church should ever be reduced to such a state as to be unknown, the salvation of those out of the Church would be impossible. For no man can be saved unless he enters the Church, but, if the Church be unknown, it cannot be entered, therefore, men cannot be saved."‡ Mr. Palmer's argument is to the same effect. "If the Church as an organization were to fail," he says, "there would be no way to revive it, except by a direct and immediate interposition of God; which would prove the gospel to be a temporary dispensation, and all living subsequently to its failure would be deprived of its benefits."

The answer to this is that the argument rests on the unscript-

* De Ecclesia, cap. 13.

† Palmer on the Church, part i. ch. i. sec. 1. Mr. Palmer's chapter on this subject is one of the most illogical in all his elaborate work. Without defining his terms, he quotes promises and predictions which imply the perpetuity of the Church, and then quotes from Protestant writers of all denominations, passages to show that the continued existence of the Church is a conceded point. Every step of his argument, throughout his book, and all his important deductions, rest on the assumption that the Church, whose perpetuity is thus proved or conceded, is an external organization, consisting of those who profess the truth, without any error in matters of faith, and who are subject to pastors episcopally and canonically ordained. Everything is founded on this chapter, which quietly takes for granted the thing to be proved.

‡ De Ecclesia, lib. iii. c. 13.

tural assumption, that we become united to Christ by being united to the Church as an external visible society; whereas union with Christ in the divine order precedes, and is entirely independent of union with any visible society. "That our union with some present visible Church," says Dr. Jackson, one of the greatest divines of the Church of England, "is a native degree or part of our union with the Holy Catholic Church, [i. e., the body of Christ;] or, that our union with some present visible church is essential to our being, or not being members of the Holy Catholic Church," is what "we utterly deny."*

That such union with the visible Church as the argument of Bellarmine supposes, is not necessary to salvation is plain, because all that the Scriptures require in order to salvation, is repentance towards God, and faith in the Lord Jesus Christ. Baptism has indeed the necessity of precept, as something commanded; but even Romanists admit that where the desire for baptism exists, the mere want of the rite works no forfeiture of salvation. And they also admit the validity of lay baptism; so that even if the necessity of that ordinance were conceded, it would not involve the necessity of an external organized Church, or an uninterrupted succession of the ministry. If, therefore, the whole visible organized Church should apostatize or be dispersed by persecution, the door of heaven would be as wide open as ever. Wherever Christ is known, men may obey and love him, without the intervention of a priest.

Mr. Palmer's idea, that if the Church as a society should fail, it could only be revived by a new revelation or intervention of God, rests on the assumption that the Church is a corporation with supernatural prerogatives and powers, which if once dissolved perishes entirely. The Church however is only the people of God; if they should be scattered even for years, as soon as they assemble for the worship of God, the administration of the Sacraments, and the exercise of discipline, the Church as a society is there, as good as ever; and a thousand times better than the fossil churches which have preserved

* *Treatise on the Church*, p. 143.

their organic continuity only by being petrified. Should the succession of the ministry fail, no harm is done. The validity of the ministry does not depend on such succession. It is not the prerogative of prelates to make ministers. A minister is made by the inward call of the Spirit. The whole office of the Church in the matter is to sit in judgment on that call, and, if satisfied, to authenticate it. The failure of the succession, therefore, works no failure in the stream of life, as the Spirit is not confined to the channel of the ministry. The apostacy or dispersion of the whole organized Church, is not inconsistent with its continued existence, or incompatible with the accomplishment of all the revealed purposes of God. Men may still be saved, and the ministry and sacraments be perpetuated in all their efficiency and power.

Again, Bellarmine presents the following dilemma. "Either," he says, "those secret men who constitute the invisible Church, continue to profess the true religion or they do not. If they do, the Church continues visible and conspicuously so, in them. If they do not confess the truth, then the Church in every sense fails, for without confession there is no salvation."

This is an illustration of the impossibility of errorists avoiding lapsing into the truth. Here is one of the acutest polemics Rome ever produced, surrendering the whole matter in debate. These secret confessors are not a society of faithful men, subject to lawful pastors and to the Pope. It is precisely what Romanists deny, and Protestants affirm, that the Church may be perpetuated in scattered believers, each in his own narrow sphere confessing the truth, and this is here conceded. This is what Protestants affirm of the Church before the Reformation. Every conspicuous organization had lapsed into idolatry, and yet the Church was continued in thousands of God's chosen ones who never bowed the knee to Baal.

4. A fourth argument on this subject is derived from the predictions of general apostasy contained in the Scriptures. Our Lord foretold that false Christs should come and deceive many. He warned his disciples that they should be persecuted and hated of all nations; that iniquity should abound, and the love of many wax cold; that false prophets should arise and show signs and wonders, insomuch that, if it were possible,

they would deceive the very elect. He intimated that faith should hardly be found when he came again; that it will be then as it was in the days of Noah, or in the time of Lot, only a few here and there would be found faithful. The apostles also are frequent and explicit in their declarations that a general apostasy was to occur. The Spirit, says Paul, speaketh expressly that in the latter times some shall depart from the faith. 1 Tim. iv 1. In the last days, perilous times were to come; (2 Tim. iii. 4.) times in which men would not endure sound doctrine, (iv. 3.) The day of Christ, he says, was not to come before the rise of the man of sin, whose coming was to be attended by the working of Satan, with all power, and signs, and lying wonders, when men (the professing Church generally) should be given up to believe a lie. Peter foretold that in the last times there should be false prophets and scorers, who would bring in damnable heresies. 2 Pet. ii. 1; iii. 8. And the apostle Jude reminds his readers of the words which were spoken by the apostles of the Lord Jesus Christ, how they told you that in the last time there should be mockers, walking after their own lusts. Jude 18.

Although these passages do not go the full length of the proposition above stated, or render it necessary to assume that no organized body was to exist during this apostasy, which professed the true faith, yet they are entirely inconsistent with the Romish and Anglican theory. That theory is that the catholic Church, or the great body of professing Christians united under lawful pastors, can never err in matters of faith. Whereas these passages foretell an apostasy from the truth so general, that true believers are to be few and scattered, driven into the wilderness, and in a great measure unknown to men.

5. The history of the Church before the advent of Christ, proves that its perpetuity does not involve the continued existence of any organization professing the true religion. The Church has existed from the beginning. We know, however, that there was, before the flood, an apostasy so general that Noah and his family were the only believers on the face of the earth. Soon after the flood the defection from the truth again became so far universal, that no organized body of the worshippers of God can be pointed out. Abraham was, there-

fore called to be the head of a new organization. His descendants, to whom pertained the law, the covenants, and the promises, constituted the visible Church; nevertheless they often and for long periods lapsed into idolatry. All public celebration of the worship of the true God was intermitted; altars to Baal were erected in every part of the land; the true children of God were scattered and unknown, so that under Ahab, the prophet complained: "Lord, they have killed thy prophets, and digged down thine altars, and I am left alone." Where was then the visible Church? Where was then any organized society professing the true religion. The seven thousand who had not bowed the knee to Baal, were indeed *the* Church, but they were not an organized body. They were unknown even to Elijah.

To this argument Bellarmine answers, that the Jewish Church was not catholic in the sense in which the Christian Church now is, because good men existed outside the pale of the Jewish Church: and therefore, although all within the Jewish communion had apostatized, it would not follow that the whole Church had failed. This is very true on the Protestant theory of the Church, but not on his. Protestants hold that the Church consists of true believers, and therefore so long as such believers exist, the Church exists. But according to Romanists the Church is a corporation, an external, visible, organized society. It is very clear that no such society existed except among the Jews, and therefore if the Jewish Church lapsed into idolatry, there was no Church on earth to answer to the Romish theory.

Another answer to the above argument is, that the complaint of Elijah had reference only to the kingdom of Israel; that although the defection there had been universal, the true Church as an organized body was continued in the kingdom of Judah. To this it may be replied, that the prophet probably intended to include both kingdoms, because he complains of digging down the altars of God; but there were no altars of God except at Jerusalem. Besides, the prophet could hardly have felt so entirely alone, and wished for death, if the worship of God were then celebrated at Jerusalem. What, however, is more to the purpose is, that it is plain that the apostle

in Rom. xi. 2, evidently uses the word Israel not in its restricted sense for the ten tribes, but for the whole theocratical people. He appeals to the words of the prophet for the very purpose of proving that the rejection of the Jews as a body involved no failure of the divine promise. As in the days of Elijah there were an unknown few who, in the midst of general apostasy, did not bow to Baal; so notwithstanding the general defection and rejection of the Jews at the time of Christ, there was still a remnant according to the election of grace. Paul's design was to teach that the Church might be perpetuated, and in fact had been perpetuated in scattered unknown believers, although the visible Church as a society entirely apostatized.

Admitting, however, that the complaint of Elijah had exclusive reference to the kingdom of Israel, it still proves all that the argument demands. It proves that the Church as visible in that kingdom had apostatized and was continued in the seven thousand. This proves two points: first, that scattered believers, although members of no external society, may be members of the Church; and second, that the Church may be continued in such unknown believers. This is precisely what Romanists and Anglicans deny, and what Protestants affirm; and what Calvin declares to be one of the cardinal or turning points in our controversy with Rome.

Besides, whatever may have been the condition of the Church in Jerusalem at the period to which the prophet referred, it is certain that idolatry did at other times prevail contemporaneously in both kingdoms; and that after the captivity of the ten tribes wicked kings set up idols even in the temple. Thus we read in 2 Chron. xxxiii. 4, 5, that Manasseh built altars in the house of the Lord, whereof the Lord had said, In Jerusalem shall my name be for ever. And he built altars in the two courts of the house of the Lord. . . And he set up a carved image, the idol which he had made, in the house of God . . . made Judah and the inhabitants of Jerusalem to err and to do worse than the heathen. It is plain that the public worship of God, all the institutions of the Jewish Church, all sacrifices and service of the temple were abolished under this and other wicked princes. And when at last the patience of

God was wearied out, Jerusalem itself was taken, the temple was destroyed, and the people carried away. During the seventy years of the captivity the visible Church as an organized body, with its priests and sacrifices, ceased to exist. It was continued only in the dispersed worshippers of the true God. Subsequently to the return of the people and the restoration of the temple, under the persecutions of Antiochus Epiphanes the public worship of God was again suppressed. Idols were erected in the temple, and altars dedicated to false gods were erected in every part of the land. It must be remembered that under the old dispensation the visible Church had, as it were, a local habitation. It was so connected with Jerusalem and the temple, that when those sacred places were in possession of idolaters, the Church was, for the time being, disorganized. No sacrifice could be offered, and all the functions of the priesthood were suspended.

There is another consideration which shows that the perpetuity of the Church does not depend on the regular succession of a visible society, and especially on the regular succession of the ministry, as Romanists and Anglicans assert. By the law of Moses it was expressly ordered that the office of High Priest should be confined to the family of Aaron, and descend in that family by regular descent. Even before the captivity, however, the priesthood was changed from one branch of that family to another, descending first in the line of Eleazar, (Num. iii. 32. Deut. x. 6;) from Eli to Solomon in that of Ithamar; then returning to that of Eleazar, (1 Sam. ii. 35. 1 Kings ii. 35.) From the latter passage it appears that Solomon displaced Abiathar and appointed Zadok. Under the Maccabees the office was given to the hero Jonathan, of the priestly family of Joiarib, (1 Macc. xiv. 35, 41;) after his death it was transferred to his brother Simon; and under Herod the office was sold to the highest bidder, or given at the discretion of the king. (Josh. Antiq. xx. 10.) Caiaphas was made High Priest by Valerius Gratus, the Procurator of Judea, and soon after the death of Christ he was displaced by the Proconsul Vitellius. (Joseph. xviii. 4, 8.) If then, notwithstanding the express injunction of the law, the priesthood was thus changed, men being introduced into the office and dis-

placed from it by the ruling powers without legitimate authority, and still the office continued, and the actual incumbent was recognized as high priest even by Christ and his apostles, it cannot be supposed that the existence of the Church is suspended on the regular succession of the ministry under the New Testament, where there is no express law prescribing the mode of descent. The Old Testament history, therefore, distinctly proves that the perpetuity of the Church involves neither the perpetual existence of an organized body professing the true religion, nor the regular transmission of the ministerial office. In other words, the apostolical succession in the Church or in the ministry, which is the great Diana of the Ephesians, is a mere figment.

Another illustration on this subject may be derived from the state of the Church during the time of Christ. The Jews were then divided into three sects, the Pharisees, the Sadducees, and the Essenes. Of these the Pharisees were the most correct in doctrine, and yet they made the word of God of no effect by their traditions, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men. They asserted the doctrine of justification by works in its grossest form; they attributed saving efficacy to external rites; and they were great persecutors of Christ. The people in their organized capacity, through their official organs, the priesthood and the Sanhedrim, rejected and crucified the Lord of glory. The Christian Church, as distinguished from the Jewish, was not organized until after the resurrection of our Lord. Where then, during the period referred to, was there any organized body which professed the true religion? The Protestant theory provides for this case, the Romish theory does not. The one theory is consistent with notorious historical facts; the other theory is inconsistent with them.

To all this, however, Bellarmine and others object that the privileges of the Christian Church are so much greater than those of the Jewish, that we cannot infer from the fact that the latter apostatized that the former may depart from the faith. To this we answer that the promises of God are the only foundation of the security of the Church. The promises addressed to the Jewish Church were as explicit and as comprehensive as those addressed to the Christian Church. If those promises

were consistent with the apostasy of the whole organized body of the Jews, they must be consistent with a similar apostasy on the part of Christians. God promised to Abraham to be a God to him and to his seed after him; that though a woman might forsake her sucking child, he would never forsake Zion. But he did forsake Zion as an organized community; he did permit the seed of Abraham as a body to lapse into idolatry, to reject and crucify their Messiah; he permitted Jerusalem to be destroyed, and the people to whom were given the covenants, the law, and the promises, to be scattered to the ends of the earth. These promises, therefore, as Paul argues, were not intended to guaranty the continued existence of Israel as a society faithful to the truth, but simply the continued existence of true believers. As the Jews argued that the promises of God secured the continued fidelity of the external Israel; so Bellarmine and Mr. Palmer, (Rome and Oxford,) argue that his promises secure the continued fidelity of the visible Church. And as Paul teaches that the rejection of the external Israel was consistent with the fidelity of God, because the true Israel, hidden in the external body, continued faithful; so Protestants teach that the apostasy of the whole external organized Church is consistent with the promises of God, provided a remnant, however small and however scattered, adheres to the truth. The argument from the history of the Church under the old dispensation is therefore legitimate and scriptural. Nothing is promised to the Church now, that was not promised to the Church then. Whatever happened to the one, may happen to the other.

6. The history of the Church since the advent of Christ is no less conclusive against the Romish theory. It is not necessary to assert that the whole visible church has at any time been so far apostate, that no organized body existed professing the true faith. All that is requisite is to prove that the Church, in the sense in which Romanists and Anglicans understand the term, has at times denied the faith. By the Church they mean the multitude of professed Christians subject to Prelates or to the Pope. This body has apostatized. There have been times in which the Church has officially and by its appropriate and acknowledged organs, (as understood by

Ritualists,) professed doctrines universally admitted to be heretical. Romanists and Anglicans say that this Church is represented by the chief pastors or bishops, and that the decisions of these bishops, either assembled in council, or each acting for himself, are the decisions of the Church, to which all the faithful are bound to submit. The decision of the three hundred and eighty bishops assembled at Nice, in favour of the proper divinity of the Lord Jesus, is considered as the decision of the whole Church, notwithstanding the fewness of their number, and the fact that they were not delegates or representatives, and the further fact, that they were almost entirely from the West, because that decision was ratified by the silent acquiescence of the majority of the absent bishops. The fact that a great many of the Eastern bishops dissented from that decision and sided with Arius, is not allowed to invalidate the authority of the council. By parity of reasoning, the decisions of the contemporaneous councils, that of Seleucia in the East, and of Ariminum in the West, were the decisions of the Church. Those councils together comprised eight hundred bishops; they were convened by the Emperor, their decisions were ratified by the Pope or bishop of Rome, and by the vast majority of the bishops of Christendom. Yet the decisions of these councils were heretical. They denied the proper Divinity of our Lord.

It cannot be pretended that the acquiescence in these decisions was less general than that accorded to those of the orthodox council of Nice. The reverse was notoriously the fact. Jerome in his Dialogue "*Contra Luciferianos*," says: "*Ingemuit orbis terrarum, et se Arianum miratus est.*" In his comment on Psalm cxxxiii.—"*Ecclesia non in parietibus consistit, sed in dogmatum veritate; ecclesia ibi est, ubi fides vera est. Ceterum ante annos quindecim aut viginti parietes omnes ecclesiarum haeretici possidebant; ecclesia autem vera illic erat, ubi fides vera erat.*" Athanasius himself asks: "*Quæ nunc ecclesia libere Christum adorat? Nam si alicubi sunt pii et Christi studiosi (sunt autem ubique tales permulti) illi itidem, ut magnus ille propheta Elias, absconduntur, et in speluncas et cavernas terræ sese abstrudunt, aut in solitudine*

aberrantes commorantur." *Lib. ad solitar. vitam agentes.* Vincentius Lirinensis says: "Arianorum venenum non jam portiunculam quandam, sed pene orbem totum contaminaverat; adeo fere cunctis Latini sermonis episcopis partim vi partim fraude deceptis caligo quædam offunderetur." *Adv. hæres. novationes.* Thus according to Jerome the heretics were in possession of all church edifices; according to Athanasius the worshippers of Christ were hidden, or wandered about in solitude; and according to Vincent, the poison of Arianism infected the world. "After the defection of Liberius," says Dr. Jackson, "the whole Roman Empire was overspread with Arianism." If therefore the Church was orthodox under Constantine, it was heretical under Constantius. It professed Arianism under the latter, more generally than it had professed the truth under the former. For the bishops were "forty to one against Athanasius."

It will not avail to say that these bishops were deceived or intimidated. First, because the point is not why they apostatized, but that they did apostatize. This, the Romish and Anglican theory teaches, the representatives of the Church cannot do, without the Church perishing and the promise of God failing. And secondly, because the same objection might be made to the validity of the decisions of the council of Nice. Many bishops feigned agreement with those decisions; many signed them from fear of banishment; many because they thought they could be interpreted in a sense which suited their views. If these considerations do not invalidate the authority of the orthodox councils, they cannot be urged against the authority of those which were heterodox. Every argument which proves that the visible Church was Trinitarian at one time, proves that it was Arian at another time; and therefore the Church in the Romish and Anglican sense of that term, may apostatize.

So undeniable is the fact of the general prevalence of Arianism, that Romanists and Anglicans are forced to abandon their fundamental principles, in their attempts to elude the argument from this source. Bellarmine says, the Church was conspicuous in that time of defection in Hilary, Athanasius,

Vincent, and others.* And Mr. Palmer says the truth was preserved even under Arian bishops.† Here they are on Protestant ground. We teach that the Church is where the truth is; that the Church may be continued in scattered individuals. They teach that the Church, as an organized body, the great multitude of professors under prelates, must always profess the truth. The facts are against them, and therefore their doctrine must be false.

7. The only other argument in favour of the position that the external Church may apostatize, is the concession of opponents. So far as the Anglican or Oxford party of the Church of England are concerned, they are estopped by the authority of their own Church and by the facts of her history.

Before the Reformation, that Church, in common with all the recognized Churches of the West, and the great body also of the Eastern Churches, held the doctrines of transubstantiation, the sacrifice of the mass, subjective justification, the priestly character of the ministry, the invocation of saints, the worship of images, extreme unction and purgatory. These doctrines the English Church rejected, pronouncing the mass idolatrous, and the other errors heretical. According to her own official declaration, therefore, the whole Church embraced in the Oxford definition of the term, had apostatized from the faith, and become idolatrous. To say, with the Anglican party, that the points of difference between Rome and England are matters of opinion, and not matters of faith, is absurd. Because both parties declare them to be matters of faith, and because they fall under the definition of matters of faith, as given by the Anglicans themselves. Any doctrine which the Church at any time has pronounced to be part of the revelation of God, they say is a matter of faith. But the doctrines above mentioned were all for centuries part of the faith of the whole catholic Church, and therefore cannot be referred to matters of opinion. It is, therefore, impossible that the Church of England can deny the proposition that the catholic Church, as a visible organization, may apostatize. All the great divines of England, consequently, teach that the Church may be perpetuated in scattered believers.

* *De Ecclesia*, lib. iii. cap. 16.

† Palmer on the Church, vol. ii. p. 187.

The concessions of Romanists on this point are not less decisive. They teach that when Antichrist shall come, all public worship of God shall be interdicted; all Christian temples shall be occupied by heretics and idolators, the faithful be dispersed and hidden from the sight of men in caves and dens of the earth. This is precisely what Protestants say happened before the Reformation. The pure worship of God was everywhere forbidden; idolatrous services were universally introduced; the true children of God persecuted and driven into the mountains or caves; false doctrine was everywhere professed, and the confession of the truth was everywhere interdicted. Both parties agree as to what are the consequences of the coming of the man of sin. The only difference is that Protestants say he has come already, and Romanists say his coming is still future. But if the promise of Christ that the gates of hell shall never prevail against his Church, consists with this general apostasy in the future, it may consist with it in the past. If the Church hereafter is to be hidden from view and continued in scattered believers, it may have been thus continued in times past. Romanists and Anglicans spurn with contempt the idea that the Lollards were the true Church in England, and yet they admit that when Antichrist shall come, the faithful will be reduced to the same, or even to a worse relative position. That is, they admit the external visible Church may become utterly apostate. Thus Bellarmine says: "Certum est, antichristi persecutionem fore gravissimam et notissimam ita ut cessant omnes publicæ religionis ceremoniæ et sacrificia. . . . Antichristus interdicturus est omnem divinum cultum, qui in ecclesiis Christianorum exercetur."* Stapleton says: "Pelli sane poterit in desertum ecclesia, regnante Antichristo, et illo momento temporis in deserto, id est, in locis abditis, in speluncis, in latibulis quo sancti se recipient, non incommode quæretur ecclesia."† During the reign of Antichrist, according to the notes to the Romish version of the New Testament, 2 Thess. ii. "The external state of the Romish Church, and the public intercourse of the faithful with it, may cease; yet the due honour and obedience towards the

* Rom. Pontiff. lib. iii. c. 7.

† Princip. Doctrin. cap. 2.

Romish see, and the communion of heart with it, and the secret practice of that communion, and the open confession thereof, if the occasion require, shall not cease." Again, in verse 4, it is said: "The great Antichrist, who must come towards the world's end, shall abolish all other religions, true, and false; and put down the blessed sacrament of the altar, wherein consisteth principally the worship of the true God, and also all idols of the Gentiles." "The oblation of Christ's blood," it is said, "is to be abolished among all the nations and churches in the world."

These passages admit that as great an apostasy as Protestants have ever asserted has occurred. The public exercise and profession of the true faith is everywhere to cease: idolatry, or the worship of Antichrist, is to be set up in every church in the world; the only communion of the faithful is to be in the heart and in secret; believers are to be scattered and hidden from the sight of men. Romanists, therefore, although the admission is perfectly suicidal, are constrained to admit that the perpetuity of the Church does not involve the continuance of an external visible society, professing the true faith, and subject to lawful pastors. They give up, so far as the principle is concerned, all their objections to the Protestant doctrine, that the true Church was perpetuated during the Romish apostasy, in scattered believers and witnesses of the truth.

8. The last proposition to be sustained, in vindicating the Protestant doctrine, is included in what has already been said. The Church is perpetual; but as its perpetuity does not secure the continued existence or fidelity of any particular Church; not the preservation of the Church catholic from all error in matters of faith; nor even the preservation of the whole visible Church as an organized body, from apostasy—the only sense in which the Church is necessarily perpetual, is in the continued existence of those who profess the true faith, or the essential doctrines of the Scriptures.

The perpetuity of the Church in this sense is secured, 1. By the promises made to Christ, that he should see of the travail of his soul, (Isa. liii.) that he should have a seed to serve him; as long as sun or moon endured, (Ps. lxxii.) that his kingdom was to be an everlasting kingdom, as foretold by all the pro-

phets. 2. By the promises made by Christ, that the gates of hell should never prevail against his Church; that he would be with his people to the end of the world; that he would send them his Spirit to abide with them for ever. 3. By the nature of the mediatorial office, Christ is the perpetual teacher, priest, and ruler of his people. He continues to exercise the functions of these several offices in behalf of his Church on earth; and therefore the Church cannot fail so long as Christ lives: "If I live," he says, "ye shall live also." 4. The testimony of history is no less decisive. It is true, it is not the province of history to preserve a record of the faith and knowledge of all the individuals of our race. The best men are often those of whom history makes no mention. And therefore though there were whole centuries during which we could point to no witnesses of the truth, it would be most unreasonable to infer that none such existed. The perpetuity of the Church is more a matter of faith, than a matter of sight; and yet the evidence is abundant that pious men, the children of God, and the worshippers of Christ, have existed in all ages of the world. There is not a period in the whole history of the world, and especially of the world since the advent of the Son of God, which does not in its literature retain the impress of devout minds. The hymns and prayers of the Church in themselves afford abundant evidence of its continued vitality. The history of the Church of Rome has been in great measure, a history of the persecution of those who denied her errors, and protested against her authority; and therefore she has by the fires of martyrdom revealed the existence of the true Church, even in the darkest ages. The word of God has been read, even in the most apostate churches; the Psalter, the Creed, and the Ten Commandments, have always been included in the services of the most corrupt churches; so that in every age there has been a public profession of the truth, in which some sincere hearts have joined.

This is not a point which needs to be proved, as all Christians are herein agreed. If, however, the Church is perpetual, it follows that everything necessary to its preservation and extension must also be perpetual. The Scriptures teach that the word, sacraments, and the ministry, are the divinely appointed means for that purpose; and on this ground we may be assured,

prior to any testimony from history, that these means have never failed, and never shall fail. The word of God has never perished. The books written by Moses and the prophets are still in the hands of the Church. The writings of the apostles have been preserved in their integrity, and are now translated into all the important languages of the globe. It is impossible that they should perish. Their sound has gone into all the earth, and their words unto the ends of the world. So too with the sacraments. There is no pretence that baptism in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, has ever ceased to be administered agreeably to the divine command. And the Spirit of God has never failed to call men to the ministry of the word, and duly to authenticate their vocation. Whether there has been a regular succession of ordinations, is a small matter. Ordination confers neither grace nor office. It is the solemn recognition of the vocation of the Holy Ghost, which may be effectually demonstrated to the Church in other ways. The call of Farel and of Bunyan to the work of the ministry, though unordained by man, (if such were the fact,) is abundantly more evident than that of nine-tenths of the prelates of their day. In perpetuating his Church, God has therefore perpetuated his word, sacraments, and ministry, and we have his assurance that they shall continue to the end.

On the principles above stated, it is easy to answer the question so often put to Protestants by Romanists, "Where was your Church before the time of Luther?" Just where it was after Luther. *Ubi vera fides erat, ibi ecclesia erat.* The visible Church among the Jews had sunk into idolatry before the time of Hezekiah. That pious king cast down the idols, and restored the pure worship of God. Did that destroy the Church? The Christian Church at Jerusalem was long burdened with Jewish rites. When they were cast aside, did the Church cease to exist? The Church in Germany and England had become corrupted by false doctrines, and by idolatrous and superstitious ceremonies. Did casting away these corruptions destroy the Church in those lands? Does a man cease to be a man, when he washes himself?

Or, if Bellarmine and Mr. Palmer may say that the Church was continued during the Arian apostasy in the scattered pro-

VOL. XXVIII.—NO. IV. 91

fessors of the true faith, why may not Protestants say that it was continued in the same way during the Romish apostasy? If the Jewish Church existed when idolatry prevailed all over Judea, why may not the Christian Church have continued when image worship prevailed all over Europe? Truth alone is consistent with itself. The Protestant doctrine that the true Church consists of true believers, and the visible Church of professed believers, whether they be many or few, organized or dispersed, alone accords with the facts which Romanists and Protestants are alike forced to acknowledge. And that doctrine affords a ready answer to all objections derived from the absence of any conspicuous organization professing the true faith and worshipping God in accordance with his word. Admitting, therefore, that such witnesses of the truth as the Albigenes, Waldenses, and Bohemian brethren, do not form an unbroken succession of the visible Church, the doctrine that the Church is perpetual is none the less certain, and none the less consistent with Protestant principles. A man must be a Romanist in order to feel the force of the arguments of Romanists. He must believe the Church to be a visible society subject to the Pope, before he can be puzzled by the question, Where was the Church before the Reformation?

In like manner, if the above principles be correct, it is easy to see that the charge of schism cannot rest against Protestants. Schism is either separation, without just cause, from the true Church, or the refusing to commune with those who are really the children of God. If the Church consists of true believers, the Protestants did not withdraw from the fellowship of the Church; neither did they refuse to admit true believers to their communion. They did not form a new Church; they simply reformed the old. The same body which owned Jesus Christ as Lord, and professed his gospel from the beginning, continued to worship him and to confess his truth after the Reformation, without any solution in the continuity of its being. The fire which sweeps over the prairie may seem to destroy everything, but the verdure which soon clothes the fields with new life and beauty is the legitimate product of the life that preceded it. So the Church, although corruption or persecution may divest it of all visible indications of life, soon puts forth new flowers

and produces new fruit, without any real discontinuance of its life. The only schismatics in the case are the Romanists, who denounce and excommunicate the Protestants because they profess the truth.

ART. VI.—*Egypt's Place in Universal History: an Historical Investigation, in Five Books.* By Christian C. J. Bunsen, D. Ph. and D. C. L. Translated from the German, by Charles H. Cottrell, Esq., M. A. London: Longman, Brown, Green & Longmans.

MATERIALS for the history of Egypt have, by the research of scholars and antiquarians, of late years accumulated to a large amount. Especially is the internal life of the nation expounded with great variety of detail and unmistakable certainty. But one thing is lacking, without which the mass can never be history. Amid all their labour and devices to transmit a record of their achievements to future time, the authors of the Egyptian monuments forgot to furnish a system of dates. Consequently, clear as the subjects of many of the monuments are, the periods of time to which they belong have to be determined, if at all, by a criticism, which derives its data from various quarters. This is the one grand difficulty which embarrasses the history of that interesting country. Had their book narratives been preserved, no doubt much of our difficulty would have been prevented. But, unfortunately, nothing of the kind is known to be extant, except a dry list of kings, taken from their historian Manetho, and existing in several partial and undoubtedly corrupt copies, the dates in which are not harmonious with each other.

Greek writers on Egypt also conflict; the dates of Herodotus with those of Eratosthenes, and those of Diodorus Siculus with both, while it is notorious that the Greeks themselves had no certain chronology prior to 776 B. C., and the difficulties in Egyptian history pertain to an earlier time.

The Hebrew Scriptures alone approach to what the historian demands as a basis for his structure. Yet, there are questions

of no little embarrassment even in the carefully recorded chronology of Scripture; and Egyptian history it touches only at distant points. Moreover the Hebrew writers never mention the proper name of an Egyptian king, until a comparatively recent period. Had they recorded the name of the Pharaoh, under whom Abraham visited Egypt, or of him, whom Joseph served, or the king of the Exodus, it might have furnished a key to the reconciliation of much that seems now contradictory. But such is not the case. The first undoubted synchronism between Hebrew and Egyptian royal names belongs to the latter part of the reign of Solomon.

We might have a tolerably fair history of Egypt, could we only determine how the extant materials are to be distributed among the years prior to the tenth century before Christ. The object of Dr. Bunsen's work is to settle this question, from a critical comparison of all the available data, and thereby to assign to Egypt her proper place in the general history of civilization.

The work consists of five books. The first treats of the sources of information concerning Egyptian chronology, in which the ancient history of the country is found to divide itself into three periods, designated the old, the middle, and the new. The second book aims at settling the chronology of the old monarchy, the third that of the middle and the new. In the fourth book, the results of these investigations are submitted to the tests of astronomy and synchronism with the history of other countries. And the fifth consists of a survey of general history, and the relation that ancient Egypt holds to it, and points out the development of strictly Egyptian history, as it appears upon a review of the results.

It is the author's aim, throughout this work, to present his readers with proofs of every doctrine which he maintains. The book is really a history preceded and accompanied by demonstration of its facts. Differently as his critics may estimate the results of his investigations, there can be but one opinion as to their thoroughness and perfect honesty. Great as are the merits of Lepsius, and in the field of original inquiry he has few equals in Egyptology, he is a bold speculator, whose argumentations are liable to be biased by an enthusiastic

pursuit of a foregone conclusion; the caution and laborious erudition of Bunsen spreads out before his readers the data whereupon his structure is built, and furnishes the means of ascertaining the soundness or unsoundness of the whole. To such a length is this carried, that he actually furnishes a grammar and dictionary of hieroglyphic writing, more complete and better digested than are elsewhere to be found. Every known source of Egyptian history passes under review and is put to trial before his searching criticism. Egyptians, Hebrews, Greeks, arts, sciences and statistics, all persons and things professing to hold any testimony on the subject, are brought separately to the stand and interrogated with the closest scrutiny.

The chief sources are, naturally, native Egyptian books and monuments. The former are unfortunately very few and brief, owing to the wholesale neglect to which the literary productions of that nation were long abandoned. Yet the accounts which remain of some of them give us reason to believe that invaluable historical material has perished in their loss. It needed less direct testimony than actually exists to assure us that literature must have flourished in Egypt at a very ancient date. The hieroglyphic sign of the papyrus roll is found upon monuments as early as the twelfth dynasty, a period considerably anterior to that of Abraham; the figure of the inkstand and writing implement, upon those of the fourth dynasty, and the monumental characters can be traced upon contemporary records above a century earlier. Tradition consistently asserted that chronological registers of the kings from Menes down had been kept by the priests, of which tradition Bunsen remarks that none of antiquity admits of being better authenticated. One thing, at least, is certain; that there is not a period in Egyptian history to which we can point as being antecedent to that of books. The earliest extant writing belongs to the same system with the later, and presents characters entirely similar. And if, as Herodotus remarks, no Egyptian omitted to take accurate note of extraordinary or striking events, there can be no doubt that tradition is also correct in representing their books as very numerous.

According to Clement of Alexandria, the Egyptians had, in

his time, forty-two sacred books. These were arranged into six different classes. The first class consisted of two books of sacred poems, one containing hymns in honour of the gods, and the other a description of royal life and its duties. Four astronomical treatises composed the second class, of which the first treated of the fixed stars; the second and third of the sun and moon; and the fourth, of the risings of the heavenly bodies. The third class contained books called, *Of the Hierogrammatist or sacred scribe*. Of these the first taught the hieroglyphic art, including the rudiments of writing. On this subject there was "a royal author of primeval times, the elder Sesostris, in the beginning of the third dynasty." The next book treated of cosmography and geography. The two following were of the sun and moon and the five planets; but wherein they differed from the astronomical books of the second class is not known. The fifth and sixth books were of the topography of Egypt, and the delineation of the course of the Nile, within the limits of the Egyptian territory. The four succeeding books contained a "description or inventory of each temple, of its landed property, (the estates of the priests,) of its weights, measures, and other utensils."

Ten books, devoted principally or entirely to religious worship, constituted the fourth class. Clement quotes, among the contents of the separate books, "regulations concerning sacrifice, first fruits, hymns, prayers, festive processions, and the like." To which, most probably, may be added ceremonies in honour of the dead.

Other ten books, concerning "the laws, the deities, and the entire education of the priests," formed a fifth class, wherein were contained also instructions as to the apportionment of the taxes, one of the sacerdotal privileges, as well as their system of mythology, upon which their laws were based. The civil laws, according to Diodorus, were treated in eight books. "In these was recorded the name of each king, by whose judgment in any particular case a point of law had been finally established, or who was the author of any general enactment." The same author gives also a list of the most celebrated legislators, in their chronological order. "The oldest is Mnevis, probably the third successor of Menes, who received from Hermes his

written laws, the first the Egyptians possessed. Bocchoris, the unfortunate reformer of the eighth century before our era, who lost his throne and life in the war with the Ethiopians, is the first legislator of the new empire. The oldest of those fundamental laws may have been contained in the sacred books of the Prophets, and also have been introduced into the civil code. This code, therefore, was not unlike the digests of Justinian, and perhaps in form had still more resemblance to Colebrooke's Indian Pandects on the rights of inheritance, without, however, being like them confined to one branch of jurisprudence. Such a work must have contributed, doubtless, materially to fix the historical chronology of the kings, and in part also of the history of Egypt."

The last class of canonical Egyptian books consisted of six on the art of medicine, one of which was attributed to the authorship of Athothis, a son of Menes, their first king. Although we have no evidence that a single section of those books was of such a nature that it could be justly called a history, yet their loss has deprived us of much that might have "imparted fulness and substance to the dry lists of kings," as well as rectified the traditions collected by the curiosity of the Greeks. The records of the kings was a work separate from their sacred canon.

Of the above-mentioned books we are not aware that any are now extant, except the celebrated "Book of the Dead," which Bunsen believes to be one of the fourth class. A copy of it exists in the Museum of Turin, another was found by the French expedition in the tombs of the kings at Thebes, and others, in whole or in part, have been discovered since. No translation of it has yet been completed; but the numerous pictorial illustrations distributed through its whole length, as well as the Phonetic writing which has been read, leave no ground of doubt that the subject of which it treats, is the departure of a human soul from its earthly habitation, together with its trial and various adventures beyond the grave. There can be no dispute of its very great antiquity. The papyrus of Turin must itself belong to the best days of Egyptian graphic art. In the opinion of Lepsius it was written in the 18th or 19th dynasty, and consequently some fifteen hundred years

before the Christian era. It is to be remarked also of this work that, while in all other extant remains of Egyptian literature the hieratic character is used, it is written in the pure monumental hieroglyphics; a feature which very likely distinguished the sacred canon from books of secular production.

Of ancient manuscripts in the hieratic character there are quite a number, but generally more or less mutilated. One of the most important is the Papyrus of Sallier, in which Champollion discovered a "Narrative of the expeditions and campaigns of the great Rameses, written not long after that conqueror's death." This work is now in the British Museum. Several others of a similar nature are preserved at Berlin. "They all offer precisely the same palæographical character common to other records of the 18th and 19th dynasties." As yet, however, the philological branch of hieroglyphic study has not advanced far enough to admit of their translation. There is also extant a papyrus manuscript, of the times of the Rameses, containing a chronological register of the previous dynasties. It was brought to Europe by the French consul-general Drovetti; but is now in the possession of the Turin Museum. It lay neglected as a mere mass of illegible fragments, until discovered by Champollion in 1824. He immediately perceived its value, and undertook to arrange its principal fragments; but did not complete his work. To Professor Seyfarth belongs the merit of reuniting the whole in a durable manner, and "with scrupulous fidelity." It has also been examined with the utmost care by Lepsius, in whose "Records" it is now presented to the public.

In addition to the dynasties of gods, this manuscript presents a list of one hundred and nineteen mortal kings, fifty-four of whom belong to the old monarchy, and sixty-five to the Hyksos period. But not a single name of the eighteenth, or of any succeeding dynasty, occurs in it.

But the most extensive remains of ancient Egyptian records, as well as the best preserved, are those which are inscribed upon the rocks, many of them extending to very great length. They are of various classes, but chiefly designed to commemorate the achievements in war and peace of the kings by whom they were erected, as well as the elaborate ceremonies connected with

their sepulture. Of these monuments two are especially worthy of remark in connection with the last mentioned papyrus. Like it they contain lists of the ancient kings; and the three taken together "mutually illustrate and restore each other in the most satisfactory manner."

One of these monumental records was found by Burton, in a chamber of the temple-palace of Karnak, erected by Tuthmosis III. It consists of a series of sixty-one kings, the predecessors of Tuthmosis, who are represented as receiving offerings at his hands. Over the head of each figure is inscribed his royal title. Here also not a single name as late as the eighteenth dynasty appears, except that of Tuthmosis himself. Consequently these kings belong to the same period which is covered by the Turin manuscript. The other was found upon the walls of a chamber within the temple built or restored by Rameses the Great, in the city of Abydos. It consists of a similar series of fifty Egyptian kings represented as receiving offerings from the hand of "their son, the king Rameses." In this list, the kings of the eighteenth and nineteenth dynasties, as well as those of the old monarchy, are arranged in regular order down to Rameses himself, while those of the Hyksos period are omitted, without the indication of a blank.

Other monuments present battle scenes, triumphal processions, funeral ceremonies, operations of art, industrial occupations, festivities, and so forth, both by means of pictorial delineation and phonetic description.

Upon movable articles, also, as mummy cases, pieces of furniture, and so forth, the Egyptians contrived to perpetuate some information of themselves, by means of writing.

Materials for the internal history of Egypt are thus very largely supplied; but much has yet to be done before these can be fully turned to historical account. For, after all the wonderful achievements of critical ingenuity, the language of the inscriptions is still but partially mastered. The method of writing—in other words, the alphabet—is now known; but the ancient Egyptian tongue being dead, when the words are spelled correctly, a further inquiry is needed in order to ascertain their meaning. From various sources, about five hundred, chiefly

independent roots, with their grammatical system, have been determined. But many passages of extant Egyptian writing still defy interpretation. Hence the object of Egyptian scholars is now to enlarge their vocabulary. For this purpose they are applying to the further study of the Coptic, a language which holds such a relation to the ancient Egyptian as the Italian or French to the Latin.

The information obtained from the monuments and manuscripts, however, extends considerably beyond the limits of the above mentioned vocabulary; in the first place, because all proper names, hieroglyphically written, can be read with facility; secondly, because a very numerous class of hieroglyphic signs are ideographic, and of meaning ascertainable without a knowledge of the Egyptian words which correspond to them; and, thirdly, because the historical pictures to a great extent tell their own story, independently of written description.

Of history proper, the golden age of Egyptian refinement presents no specimen; nor even a hint that any such work was then in existence. The earliest historian of Egypt was not born until long after the glory of his nation had passed away, and Greek literature had established her dominion in the land of the Pharaohs. Manetho, the priest of Sebennytus, flourished in the days of the first and second Ptolemies, and consequently in the end of the fourth and beginning of the third century before Christ. He wrote in Greek, with the obvious design of making the history of his country accessible to the reading world of his time—a work similar to that which Josephus, at a later period, accomplished for the Jews. “Manetho,” says Eusebius, “not only reduced the whole Egyptian history into a Greek form, but also their entire system of theology, in his treatise entitled ‘The Sacred Book,’ as well as in other works.” Theodoret, in the second quarter of the fifth century, describes him as also the author of a mythological work, or works, “concerning Isis and Osiris, Apis and Serapis, and the other Egyptian Deities.” And through Diogenes Laertius we learn that he had also written a compendium of Natural Philosophy. Other books are also ascribed to him, and quoted by subsequent authors as unquestionable authorities on Egyptian matters. His “Three Books of Egyptian History” were compiled,

according to his own statement, from genuine records, and were held in the highest esteem.

The first book of this work contained the ante-historical or mythological period, together with the first eleven dynasties of mortal kings. The second book began with the twelfth and ended with the nineteenth dynasty; and the third contained the remainder, to the end of the thirtieth. "It is impossible to overlook, in the arrangement of Manetho, the character of a genuine, historical, and artistic plan." Although a purely historical division of the thirty dynasties into three books of ten dynasties each, might seem, on external grounds, the most natural, Manetho had abundant reason for adopting a different method. "The last brilliant epoch of the old empire was the twelfth dynasty. The king, in whom the historian recognized the hero of the Sesostrid legends, belonged to it. The third king of the thirteenth dynasty lost Memphis and his throne by the irruption of the shepherds. Then succeeded a period of national degradation, extending over a long series of ages. Royal Egyptian houses, indeed, continued to reign at Thebes and Choïs, but tributary and powerless. A long and arduous struggle ensued after this period of humiliation and oppression; but the holy city of the empire was not reconquered and the empire restored till the eighteenth dynasty." "From the nineteenth dynasty sprang, finally, Sesostris Rameses, the hero of the new empire, who avenged the shame of Egypt on Asia. As Manetho began his second book with the twelfth dynasty, its narrative opened with the glorious exploits of Sesostris, and closed with those of the king he calls the great Ramesside. The third book opened with the twentieth dynasty, the commencement of which is a comparatively flourishing epoch, and closed with the thirtieth, the last king of which, Nectanebo, is the last indigenous ruler of Egypt."

This great work of Manetho has been suffered to perish. But epitomized lists of the dynasties have been preserved in the chronological treatises of Africanus and Eusebius, the former a writer of the third century of the Christian era, and the latter the eminent ecclesiastical historian of the days of Constantine. The list of Eusebius has come to us through two channels, the Armenian Latin version of his chronicle,

and the comparative Manethonian dynasties in Syncellus. These three copies present a number of discrepancies; and yet, after all, they constitute the principal clue to the chronology of ancient Egypt. As compared with the other more partial lists they form a guide to the general arrangement, while receiving occasional correction of their errors.

Other Egyptians of later time followed the example of Manetho; but still fewer fragments bear testimony to their labours. The earliest of these writers was Ptolemy of Mendes, who composed three books on chronology, in which he endeavoured to harmonize the history of the kings of Egypt with the primitive Greek annals, and also, in some points at least, with the Hebrew. The antiquarian Apion occupies a prominent place among them, but is treated by Bunsen with scanty reverence. He lived in the first century of the Christian era. Somewhat earlier, Chaeremon had also written a history of Egypt, from which a few fragments are preserved by Josephus and Eusebius. None of them, however, seem to have commanded such general respect as Manetho.

In addition to the native authorities we have also some valuable material for Egyptian history, woven in with that of the Hebrews. The synchronisms, which have been settled therewith, furnish the earliest secure footing for the Egyptian chronologist. The king Shishak, who was reigning in the latter part of the life of Solomon, has been identified both in the lists and upon contemporaneous monuments. The antiquities of those two nations mutually throw light upon each other. While the manners and arts of the Egyptians illustrate the life of the Hebrews, the clearer history of the latter must be adopted as a valuable guide to the chronology of the former.

To the Greek, Egypt was, of all countries, except his own, the most interesting, the land of mysterious antiquity, the discoverer of the sciences and mother of the arts he loved. But that Egyptian custom, whereby the principles of the arts were carefully shut up as secrets within the respective fraternities that practised them, opposed an insurmountable barrier to all investigations from abroad. The most ancient traditions connected the early days of Athens and of Argos with colonies from Egypt; Homer wove the country of the Nile into his

beautiful romance of Helen; productions of Egyptian art had kindled up the superior genius of Greece; and many of the elements of Egyptian social order had been planted among the mountains of Hellas, to grow and ripen into a fuller and more liberal existence; but direct information concerning Egyptian life and history was not to be obtained in Greece, until the older nation had reached its decline. The most ancient Greek, who presented his countrymen with any historical knowledge of Egypt was Herodotus. The mass of the material which he collected on this subject he digested into the second book of his history. Defective as his information necessarily was, the fidelity with which his report is made confers upon it a most honourable distinction. His information was, however, obtained at second hand, not from the national records immediately; but from the reports of the priests concerning them, and the chronological discrepancies, which these involved, he had not the means of reconciling.

A few scattered remarks upon Egyptian affairs are to be found among the writings of Plato, and of Aristotle; to which may be added some fragments of Theophrastus and Dicæarchus. The Alexandrian scholars, under the Ptolemies, first, second, and third, naturally devoted much attention to the subject; but there are "few more bitter sources of regret to the modern student, than that the profound historical and critical labours of those remarkable men should—to a few trifling fragments—have utterly perished." One of the most valuable of those fragments is the list of Theban kings from the works of Eratosthenes. Beginning with Menes, it covers a period of 1076 years, embracing thirty-eight royal names, with their Greek translations and the number of years attached to each reign.

It is in this fragment that Bunsen finds what he believes to be the true series of the old monarchy. The preservation of it is due to George Syncellus of Byzantium, a writer of the eighth century, who has introduced it into his Introductory notice of Egyptian Chronology. It is to be observed, however, that he did not receive the passage directly from Eratosthenes; but as a quotation found by him in a work of Apollodorus, a writer from whom we have also a brief but valuable fragment pertaining to this subject.

The only Greek author who ventured to grapple with the whole "subject of Egypt, in its integrity," was Diodorus Siculus, who visited the country about 58 years before Christ. The first book of his Historical Library is devoted to Egyptian affairs. Unfortunately he brought to the task a "mere acquaintance with books, without either sound judgment, critical spirit, or comprehensive views." His simple honesty alone recommends him, and renders his collection of facts and legends, uncritical as it is, a valuable addition to the sources of Egyptian history.

Diodorus is the last of the ancients who conducted systematic inquiry into the subject. The remarks of Tacitus and Pliny, in respect to it, are of but little value.

A new life was given to the study of Egyptian antiquity by the spread of Christianity. To Tatian, who flourished about A. D. 180, we are indebted for some valuable extracts, and still more to Clement of Alexandria, the fifth book of whose work called *Stromata*, contains a description of the hieroglyphical manner of writing.

"As early as the beginning of the third century, Julius, the African priest or bishop of Emmaus-Nicopolis in Judea, and founder of the Library of Cæsarea, which was enlarged by Eusebius, compiled a chronological work in five books," of which some scanty fragments remain. These fragments awaken the greater regret for the loss of the complete work, inasmuch as they "exhibit throughout the man of judgment, integrity, and information, zealous in collecting and examining the oldest Chaldee and Egyptian records, those especially of Berosus and Manetho. His object was not the arrangement of a system of annals with regular notation of synchronisms—an attempt fraught in other cases with so much perversity and fraud. He gave the traditions unadulterated, just as he found them, contenting himself with proving from their own internal evidence the extravagance of those myriads of years admitted in the computation of his pagan opponents." His edition of the lists of Manetho is justly regarded as the most reliable of those now extant. This remark must, however, be qualified by the probability that he did not copy immediately from the original work, but from some previous epitome.

The next, as far as we know, who gave any attention to this

subject, was the ecclesiastical historian Eusebius, bishop of Cæsarea, in Palestine, in the earlier part of the fourth century. "He had undertaken a comprehensive scheme of adjustment between the Scripture dates and those of all the other ancient nations." This plan was executed upon the basis of the chronology of Africanus, in the work, still extant, called the *Chronicon*. For a long time it was known to exist only in a fragmentary state; but was discovered entire in an Armenian version at Constantinople, and published at Milan in A. D. 1820. There is also a Latin translation of the work by Jerome. It contains a copy of Manetho's lists, which, in addition to the royal names and dates, gives brief annotations appended here and there to the different reigns.

Succeeding writers added nothing to the stores of information on the subject, if they did not impair their value by injudicious criticism, until the time of Syncellus, who, about the year 800, prepared a new and really valuable work on chronology. Syncellus constructed his *Chronographia* upon the *Chronicon* of Eusebius; but criticised his predecessor without mercy. The compilations relating to Egypt are the most valuable additions he made. To him are we indebted for the extracts from Eratosthenes and Apollodorus. At the same time he added no little to the embarrassment of later scholars by the introduction of passages which have recently been detected as spurious. Among these are to be enumerated extracts from the "Book of Sothis," or the Dog Star, a forgery upon Manetho, and the so-called Old Egyptian Chronicle. He also embodied in his synchronistic tables an anonymous list of Egyptian kings, which is now regarded with equal distrust.

Such are the materials out of which the historian has to reconstruct the narrative of Ancient Egypt. And when we consider their fragmentary character, their chaotic disorder, scattered about and inwoven in so many different works, subjected to so many causes of corruption, and their manifold contradictions, it is cause of astonishment that so much reliable fact should have been obtained from them as recent scholarship has elicited.

The Egyptologers of modern times belong to two different series: the earlier consisting of those who preceded the disco-

very of the hieroglyphic alphabet, while the later have been formed by it. The former began with the illustrious Joseph Scaliger, who, in the end of the sixteenth century, published his great work upon general chronology. In respect to Egypt, he had not the means of going much beyond a mere re-editing of the chronological lists. Notwithstanding the labours of Petavius, Goar, and Marsham, Scaliger cannot be said to have had any worthy successor in this field, until the end of the seventeenth century, when Zoega published his learned work on the Obelisks, which may be regarded as an anticipation of a more recent style of scholarship. In 1711, Jacob Perizonius published his *Origines Egyptiacæ*, one of the most profound and ingenious productions of that century in the department of historical research, and which Bunsen describes as the "last critical analysis of Egyptian chronology, before the late discoveries in hieroglyphics. From that period, the inquiry passed from the province of the philologist into that of the general historian." In this light it was ably pursued in the end of last century by Heyne and Heeren, whose example and principles laid the foundation of a new and superior school of historical criticism, constituting the transition period to that which was ushered in by the discovery of the hieroglyphic system.

This brilliant triumph of ingenious scholarship was first announced by Champollion in 1822. It had been suggested to him, and, even at an earlier date, to Dr. Young of England, by a study of the Rosetta stone. This celebrated monument had been found by the French soldiers when in Egypt, and afterwards captured by the English and deposited in the British Museum. It consists of a slab of basalt, having its length divided into three portions, each containing an inscription in a different character. One of these was in Greek, from which it appeared that the other two were of the same meaning, in the hieroglyphic and demotic, or common writing of the country. For, being a decree connected with the coronation of Ptolemy Epiphanes, it closed with the following order, "And that it may be known why in Egypt, he is glorified and honoured, as is just, the God Epiphanes, most gracious sovereign, the present decree shall be engraved on a stela of hard stone, in sacred characters (that is, hieroglyphics,) in writing of the

country, and in Greek letters: and this stela shall be placed in each of the temples of the first, second, and third class existing in all the kingdom."

It was immediately perceived that this inscription might be of great value, and fac similes of it were distributed to the learned throughout Europe. De Sacy, Akerblad, and Dr. Young early made observations upon the Demotic; but it was not until 1819 that any step was taken towards deciphering the hieroglyphic portion. In that year, Dr. Young, in an article contributed by him to the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, announced his discovery that some of the hieroglyphic signs were also used alphabetically. He did not, however, prosecute the subject farther than to the spelling of a few proper names. And when, three years later, Champollion came forward with his paper on the subject, it was to present the same view, most likely originating also with himself, but unfolding a much more complete and comprehensive system. The truth of his method was soon admitted by the ablest minds, that bent to the labour of examining his evidence. A new life was thus given to Egyptian studies, and many rivals, of the highest learning and talents, entered the field. In a few years, England, Germany, and Italy, as well as France, could boast their hieroglyphic scholars. But the ardour and genius of Champollion not only led the way, but outstripped all competition in subsequent attainment. In 1828, he went at the expense of the French government to Egypt, accompanied by professor Rosellini of Pisa, who was sent out by the government of Tuscany. Four artists attended each.

These two expeditions proceeded jointly and harmoniously with their investigations, which resulted in an almost complete exposition and extensive illustration of the hieroglyphic system.

At the very time of Champollion's visit to Egypt, several eminent Englishmen, who had learned his method, were at work in the same country in a similar manner. Some of those have, since, obtained great distinction, among whom may be mentioned Burton, Wilkinson, Prudhoe, and Felix.

The materials brought to Europe by Champollion and Rosellini were designed for two immense works, to be published,

the one in Paris, under the care of Champollion, and the other in Florence by Rosellini, the former consisting of the historical monuments and the grammar of the hieroglyphic system; the latter the civil monuments and a hieroglyphical dictionary. Champollion lived only to finish his grammar. He died in 1832, in the forty-second year of his age. By his death the whole task of publication was thrown upon Rosellini, who also died before it was completed. The plates, amounting to four hundred in folio, were issued during his lifetime; the text of the historical monuments, amounting to five volumes, in octavo, appeared from 1832 to 1841, that of the civil monuments, in three volumes, from 1834 to 1836, while two other volumes, one on the religious monuments, and another, containing general indices to the whole, remained to be published at his death.

To the distinguished names already mentioned must now be added those of Bunsen and Lepsius of Prussia, and Birch of England, and several others, who equal if they do not excel their predecessors in Egyptian learning.

An expedition to Egypt under the direction of Dr. Lepsius was in 1842 sent out by the king of Prussia, to "investigate and collect, with an historical and antiquarian view, the ancient monuments in the Nile valley, and upon the peninsula of Sinai." It consisted, besides Lepsius, of seven artists and a dragoman, together with a large number of servants. The government of the country favoured their enterprise; and for three years it was prosecuted with most cheering success. The result is a magnificent work, "surpassing everything that has hitherto appeared on the subject, not only in the truthfulness and accuracy of the drawings and inscriptions, but also in its systematic historical arrangement. The same may be said as to the completeness of its contents, although it gives no monuments previously published, except in cases where the inscriptions were so inaccurate that the corrections could not be marked in any other way." It consists of more than eight hundred lithographed plates in imperial folio, accompanied by descriptive letter press.

Thus, by the industry of recent scholars a vast mass of material has been collected among the ruins of ancient cities and temples, in tombs, and from hitherto illegible manuscripts,

hidden in various European collections. The chief object of Egyptology is now to complete the work of deciphering, and to determine the system of dates according to which the materials are to be arranged. Dr. Bunsen conceives that he has found the key to the chronological problem of the old monarchy, in a critical comparison of the lists of Eratosthenes with existing monuments, in a similar treatment of the fragment of Apollodorus and of Manetho for the middle, and of Manetho for the new. The value of this method and of the conclusions thereby reached, it is not our purpose at present to discuss. Whatever they may amount to, the persevering toil and honest purpose which have attended ingenuity in the effort to attain a true result, merit unqualified approbation.

The student of Biblical history, especially, owes a debt of gratitude to Egyptologists, for the amount of material thus laid to his hands. It remains for him, not superciliously to reject the gift, as is too often done, but with docility to bend to the work of discriminating investigation of its contents. Truth is truth wherever found, and there are eternal principles, whereby it can be distinguished from error, and whereby the certain can also be separated from the doubtful. No mind, properly prepared for the study of Scripture history in other lights, will find, in these recently collected stores, anything to dread which he has not encountered in other secular sources, unless it be some additional toil. And, whether they admit of chronological arrangement or not, the isolated facts are themselves of incalculable value for the elucidation of a phase of ancient life and manners, with which Hebrew civilization was most intimately connected. Erroneous interpretations have undoubtedly been given to some of them; but empty declamation will not afford the corrective. It is to be expected that in matters so much and so long entangled, some mistakes will be made in the earlier efforts to unravel them; but when so many points have been already satisfactorily cleared up, surely the effort to accomplish more is deserving of approbation and encouragement. At all events, works of the gravity, learning, ingenuity, and patient research of those of Rosellini, Wilkinson, Burton, Lepsius, and Bunsen, not only claim, but have a right to demand a serious examination at the hand of every

one who pretends to offer a judgment upon the subject of which they treat; and, though they may embrace more that is still matter of doubt, can no more be set aside by a sneer than can the works of Newton or Laplace.

ART. VII.—1. *The Old Testament, translated into Arabic*, by Eli Smith. Beirut. 8vo. pp. 160.

2. *The New Testament, translated into Arabic*, by Eli Smith. Beirut. 8vo. pp. 16.

THE Arabic language is one of the most interesting and important in existence. It claims the honour due to venerable age; for though its extant literature is comparatively recent, its use as a vernacular dialect runs back to a remote antiquity. We have little reason to doubt that the language of Arabia has been as permanent and uniform as her population and her manners. It is also interesting from its affinities to other tongues, belonging to the great Semitic family, and holding a distinguished place between its Hebrew and its Aramaic branches. Its internal structure is marked by a rare combination of simplicity and richness. Though destitute of compounds, and of that variety of moods and tenses, to which the Greek owes so much of its exquisite expressiveness and flexibility, the Arabic possesses a surprising variety of what grammarians call *conjugations*, but what might have been more accurately designated *voices*, in which, by a slight change of vowels, or the simplest consonantal addition, the most delicate distinctions, of a certain kind, may be expressed with all precision. This, with the almost fabulous extent of its vocabulary, entitles it to a conspicuous position in the foremost rank of dead or living languages. But over and above this venerable age and these intrinsic qualities, the Arabic possesses an historical interest, not only as the instrument by which invaluable stores of ancient learning were preserved, when Europe was involved in

darkness, but also as the vehicle and depository of a strange religious faith, the living force of which, for good or evil, has as yet been scarcely weakened. The Arabic language is essential to Islam, or as it is the fashion now to call it, *Islamism*, a form to which *Christianityism* would be a fair equivalent. The Koran, as a sacred book, exists in Arabic exclusively, every translation used by Moslems, if we err not, being always accompanied by the original; a vast advantage, which the Christian Church might almost envy, and which she may hereafter emulate. To this and other causes may be traced a further distinction of this noble tongue, that while it has preserved itself astonishingly free from all admixtures, it has entered as an element into the formation of so many others, we may say of all, in which the Mohammedan faith is professed or its worship offered. The chief examples of this fact are those afforded by the Persian and the Turkish languages; as unlike Arabic in their ultimate basis and original structure as they are to one another, and yet each exhibiting not only an Arabian dress, or alphabetic character, but an immense mass of Arabic vocables, incorporated with or without modification into the body, both of the written and the spoken language. Another interesting circumstance connected with this language, at the present moment, is its prevalence around the old historical centres of the world, and more especially the mastery which it has now maintained for ages over Palestine and Egypt, and the whole coast of North Africa, as well as in its proper and original domain. As to its actual extent as a vernacular, we venture no assertion, but we might quote high authorities in favour of the statement, that it is spoken over a wider surface, although not by greater numbers, than any other language. The local variations of its dialects are proved by philological comparison to be far less than they appear, when clothed in the discordant and empirical notation of unlearned travellers. A striking illustration of this fact, as well as of the one previously mentioned, is the recent announcement, among other signs of progress and new means of influence in the rescued and resuscitated Turkish empire, of a newspaper to be published at Constantinople, but designed for the most distant circulation, and therefore to be printed in the Arabic language—which must consequently be regarded as

a more effective and far-reaching instrument than any other of the tongues conventionally known as "oriental."

But while we watch with interest the subsidizing of this noble ally in the service of mere civilization, we feel still more deeply the importance of employing it to circulate divine and saving truth. There is no other form of living human speech, in which a version of the Bible seems so much a matter of course, or rather of necessity. On looking back to see what has been done in former times, it seems at first sight as if nothing more were needed. But a closer inspection shows that of the many Arabic versions which are spoken of in books, a very large proportion are without immediate value, as mere versions of versions, and a large proportion of what still remains is in the shape of partial limited translations. Thus the famous version of Saadia Gaou, so far as printed, is confined to Isaiah and the Pentateuch, and even in manuscript, so far as we know, extends only to Hosea and the book of Job. Out of many partial versions, and some mediate ones, a whole Bible may be and has actually been compiled. But such a book must be unequal and devoid of that homogeneous unity, which is nowhere more desirable than in translation. For this and many other reasons we regard a new and masterly translation of the Bible into Arabic, as one of the most useful and most interesting projects that can be proposed, both in a literary and religious point of view, but at the same time one of the most difficult and dangerous. We should tremble to see it in the hands of a smatterer or a sciolist, however zealous or devout; but in the same proportion we rejoice to know that it is actually in the hands of the only man perhaps now living, to whom it could be safely and implicitly entrusted.

These remarks have been occasioned by the first sheets of a new Arabic version of the Pentateuch, and a single sheet of Matthew, printed at Beirut, in Syria, under the eye of the translator, Eli Smith. The advantages possessed by Mr. Smith for this important task, are various in kind and extensive in degree. Unusual strength of mind, and soundness of judgment, a thorough early education, long experience as a working missionary, intimate acquaintance with the language, both as written and as spoken, unlimited command of native counsel

and assistance, a position in the midst of oriental habits and of Arabic associations, are combined in his case with access to the exhaustless stores of European learning. Not the least of Mr. Smith's advantages and qualifications for a work like this, is his long familiarity with literary labour of other kinds. The Bible ought not to be translated by a man who can do nothing else, and who has trained himself, if he is trained at all, for this exclusively. The more varied his experience, the wider the sweep of his acquirements and his culture, the more likely is he to succeed in this most arduous and delicate of all employments. To say nothing of the other fruits of Mr. Smith's exertions, we may specify his essential aid in two important services of exploration—one in Armenia, and the other in the Holy Land—because, for some inexplicable reason, perhaps from the vagueness of his surname, he is now seldom mentioned in connection with his two associates; and yet they have themselves borne witness to his large share both in their bodily and mental labour. The Arabic philology of Dr. Robinson's great work on Palestine belongs exclusively to Mr. Smith; and no man could have handled it with more acuteness, judgment, and precision. At the present moment, he is prominent among the first of living Arabic scholars. While his knowledge of books can scarcely be inferior to that of any French or German Orientalist, it must be combined, in larger proportions than in any of that class, with experimental knowledge of the spoken language. When to these philological accomplishments, we add the moral and religious qualities belonging to this veteran in the new crusade against Mohammedan and pseudo-Christian error, we have said enough to justify our strong expressions as to his preëminent fitness for the great work of translating the whole Bible into Arabic. Besides all this, it is to be remembered that Mr. Smith holds a high place among that distinguished corps of labourers in the East, who have done so much honour to themselves and to their country, in the eyes of the most watchful, not to say most jealous, representatives of Christian Europe; so that even English generosity and candour have, in high and public places, awarded them the first rank among modern missionaries.

Of the version itself we shall not presume to speak as critics.

We can only say, that by a simple and empirical comparison of what we have before us with the Arabic of lexicons and printed books, we have been strongly impressed with the simplicity and purity of its diction, which affords a grateful evidence, not only of the writer's learning, taste, and judgment, but of the wonderful extent to which the old Koranic Arabic is level to the comprehension of the modern oriental reader. The only outward circumstance with which we are disposed to quarrel, is the almost too complete assimilation of the work to an English Reference or Family Bible, with its figures in the text and citations in the margin. Even as to this question, which is one of usefulness, and not of show, we would not for a moment weigh our judgment against that of the translator; but we candidly confess that, as a matter of mere taste, we much prefer the aspect of the specimen of Matthew, which is free from these useful but disfiguring encumbrances.

We sincerely hope that this great work may be continued and completed by the same hand, without interruption or undue delay, from loss of health or any other providential hinderance. There are no lives more precious to the Church, than those of competent translators of the Bible, whose places every day of fresh experience makes it harder and harder to supply, and for whose preservation, therefore, the whole Christian world is bound to pray.

SHORT NOTICES.

Preach the Word. A Discourse delivered at the opening of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, May 15th, 1856, by the Rev. N. L. Rice, D. D., Moderator. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, No. 530 Broadway.

This sermon was so widely diffused through the newspapers, and so generally read and admired soon after its delivery, as to render any extended notice here unnecessary. The form in which it is issued by the Carters is one peculiarly attractive and convenient.

Missions needful to the higher blessedness of the Churches. A Discourse at the Anniversary of the Society of Inquiry of the Union Theological Seminary, on Sabbath evening, May 4th, 1856, by William R. Williams. Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway, New York.

This discourse, issued in the same style as the above, is fairly characterized by its title. The truth announced in the title, and well argued and illustrated in the discourse, is one of profound importance.

Memoirs of John Kitto, D. D., F. S. A. Author of "Daily Bible Illustrations," and editor of the "Cyclopædia of Biblical Literature," etc. Compiled chiefly from his letters and journals. By J. E. Ryland, M. A. Editor of "Foster's Life and Correspondence," etc. With a critical estimate of Dr. Kitto's Life and Writings, by Professor Eadie, D. D., LL.D. Glasgow. In two volumes. Pp. 404 & 352. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers.

This work is essentially an autobiography. It details, by selections from the journals and letters of Dr. Kitto, the labours, the struggles, the misfortunes, the experiences, and travels of a singularly laborious scholar and author. All forms of biography are interesting and instructive, and Christian biography is doubly so, as showing not only what men are in themselves, but what they become under the power and influence of the gospel. They are examples of the life of Christ in men. The editor seems to have executed his task with skill and judgment.

Africa's Mountain Valley; or the Church in Regent's Town, West Africa. By the author of "Ministering Children." New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. Pp. 259.

This is designed to be a consecutive history, founded upon materials drawn from the "Memoir of the Rev. W. A. B. Johnson," containing the diary and letters of that remarkable missionary. It is divided into thirteen chapters, being not only a statement of the historical facts, but a series of discourses upon them.

Notes on the Gospels, Critical and Explanatory; incorporating with the notes, on a new plan, the most approved harmony of the four Gospels. By Melancthon W. Jacobus, Professor of Biblical Literature in the Western Theological Seminary at Allegheny, Pa. *John*, pp. 348. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers.

The lateness of the time at which this volume of the series of Dr. Jacobus on the Gospels, has been laid on our table, prevents such an examination of it as would warrant an extended notice in this number. It completes the series, with the previous volumes of which biblical scholars in this country are already well acquainted, and which may justly be regarded as a valuable addition to the means of understanding and illustrating the New Testament by the minister and the student of the Bible. The good taste, the correct and varied scholarship, the sound judgment, and the attractive piety exhibited in them, make it not only a duty but a pleasure to commend the work to those who desire to study the record of the Saviour's earthly life.

The Martyr of Sumatra: a Memoir of Henry Lyman. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. Pp. 437.

This tragic story of the death of two American Missionaries by the hands of the cannibal Battahs of Sumatra, June 28, 1884, in an attempt to explore the country, is told in this beautifully printed book. It has a most touching and melancholy interest.

The Victory Won. A brief Memorial of the last days of G. R. By the Author of the Memoir of Captain H. Vicars. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. Pp. 106.

An account of the conversion and death-bed experiences of an English Physician.

Trade and Letters: their Journeyings round the World. Three Discourses, delivered before the Mercantile Library Association of San Francisco, and published at the request of the Association. By W. A. Scott, D.D. New York: Carter & Brothers. Pp. 168.

These discourses touch directly and incidentally on a great variety of topics, and they possess not merely the local interest of place and occasion, but the general interest of matter and treatment. It is good for young empires to have such men as Dr. Scott in their bosom.

Elements of Moral Philosophy: Analytical, Synthetical, and Practical. By Hubbard Winslow, author of Intellectual Philosophy. New York: D. Appleton & Co. London: 16 Little Britain. 1856.

The author's skill and tact in writing works of this description, have been evinced in the success of a previous work on

Intellectual Philosophy, which has gone through several editions. The present volume is clearly the product of extensive reading and patient thinking. He has spared no efforts to do justice to his high theme. He unfolds moral science in its psychological, theoretical, and practical aspects. After tracing it up to its union with Christianity, he developes the ethical code in the light of the Bible, thus giving us a system of practical Christian morality, not only in its outline, but in considerable detail. This portion of the work is exceedingly well done. We rarely notice any deliverance here from which we should dissent, and, all in all, it is uncommonly just, discriminating, clear, and felicitous.

Throughout the whole book the author adopts a style more perspicuous, free, and lively, than is usual in books of this description. Indeed, he signifies that one part of his purpose has been to render these subjects intelligible and interesting to the popular mind.

With regard to the theoretical and psychological part, in which are discussed the nature and faculties of moral agency, together with the principle or idea of morality itself, the author goes into an analysis which is strict and thorough, and, now and then, distinguishes things which do not differ; *e. g.* we see no distinction between appetite and the desires to which it gives rise, which Mr. W. signalizes, (p. 32,) unless it be the difference between a principle and its exercises. Per contra, he says, (p. 22,) "We use the terms *power* and *faculty* as synonymous, and, in accordance with established usage, to indicate what is strictly a *state* or exercise of mind, as well as a constitutional ability. A desire or volition is a power," &c. We think that to make a mere state, much more an exercise, a faculty, must cause great confusion. If we do not misinterpret the author, he deems the fact that any quality or act is natural, sufficient to divest it of moral quality. "When our affections, desires, emotions, volitions, are simple spontaneous outbursts, such as mere nature designs and prompts, they are as characterless as nature herself." (p. 27.) It is possible that the author means less than we suppose in these and some similar passages. But on their face, how do they consist with original sin and righteousness, and with the moral excellence of the qualities imparted in regeneration by the Holy Spirit? We had marked a few other passages for critical comment. But they are so few, and his position on the minor points is so satisfactory and so ably maintained, that we are not inclined to make minor differences between him and ourselves obtrusive. We would rather rejoice in the great result he reaches, that regeneration

is "not merely a change of appetite, or of affection, or of desire, or of volition, so that one of these, being itself renovated, may rectify the others. Neither is it a change or refining of mere taste, nor a quickening or exaltation of emotion. It extends to and embraces all these, but is restricted to neither. Deeper, more thorough and generic, it is a change of the *man himself*. He is 'born again.'" (pp. 273-4.)

The Words of the Lord Jesus. By Rudolf Stier. Vol. Fourth. Translated from the German, by William B. Pope, Hull. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clarke. 1856. Pp. 478.

This is the eleventh volume of the new series of Clarke's Foreign Theological Library, which we have so often commended to our readers. The same house has also this year published the second volume of the translation of the new edition of Hengstenberg's Christology, by far the most important of that distinguished writer's works.

An Elementary Treatise on Logic. Including Part I. Analysis of Formulæ. Part II. Method, with an Appendix of Examples for Analysis and Criticism, and a copious Index of Terms and Subjects. Designed for the use of Schools and Colleges, as well as for Private study and use. By W. D. Wilson, D. D., Trinity Professor of Christian Ethics, and Professor of Logic, of Intellectual Philosophy, and of History, in Hobart Free College, at Geneva, Western New York. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1856.

On the whole, this is the most thorough and exhaustive work on Logic, which has appeared for a long time. The author has incorporated into his treatise all the real improvements which recent writers have made in the different branches of the science. We are glad to see that he properly estimates and therefore repudiates certain alleged discoveries which have obtained a consequence from the celebrity of their authors, which they never could have gained upon their intrinsic merits. We allude to Professor Dr. Morgan's attempt to reduce the syllogism to a sort of arithmetical process, and Sir William Hamilton's scheme for the quantification of affirmative predicates. We do not believe that either of these will add anything of permanent value to the science, much less, as their authors suppose, serve as a *novum organum* for it. Dr. Wilson confines logic within its true sphere, as the science of inference and proof. He adopts for its basis the Aristotelian syllogism as amplified and improved by the schools. He supplements it by the addition of whatever is valuable in recent investigations, and by original suggestions. The whole bears evidence of having been thought out and digested by his own mind. The part on Method may be studied with great advantage. Thorough as the work is in its matter, it is rather stiff

in style. Invaluable as it must be to those who wish to become proficient in the science of logic and art of reasoning, it seems to us rather unwieldy, as a manual for rudimentary learners in schools and colleges. The efforts to produce such a manual have been many, and of various success. But there is ample room for more.

Elements of Logic: together with an Introductory View of Philosophy in general, and a Preliminary View of the Reason. By Henry P. Tappan. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1856.

This book is, in all essential features, in sharp contrast with that of Dr. Wilson. In style it is more elegant and classic. Here its superiority ends. Instead of being entitled a treatise on "Logic, with an Introductory view of Philosophy in general," it would be more proper to style it a Treatise on Philosophy with an Appendix on Logic. Logic has about as much to do with making the substance of this volume, as stone in making the stone broth, which its inventor explained that he could make by adding sufficient meat and vegetables. It is no excuse for this to say that as logic has for its object to test the validity of our knowledge, it therefore includes "philosophy in general." The province of logic is to ascertain and prove the validity of our knowing, by means of deduction and argument from premises, neither more nor less. Great confusion and mischief result from extending it beyond this definite sphere, and absorbing into it Metaphysics, Ontology, Psychology, and "Philosophy in general." As a work on these subjects, it contains much that is profound, acute, and instructive, set forth in a style of considerable force and felicity. Dr. Tappan's Pelagian theory of the will, however, occasionally crops out. His whole vein is too transcendental. He attributes to gravitation, the centrifugal force, affinity and repulsion, the characteristics of ideas having "universality and necessity." pp. 198-9. If this be so, then, on the same principle, whatever is, cannot but be. Is not this a sort of transcendental Fatalism?

Western Africa: its History, Condition, and Prospects. By Rev. J. Leighton Wilson, eighteen years a missionary to Africa, and now one of the Secretaries of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1856. Pp. 527.

Many of our foreign missionaries are very much like other ministers, and even a residence of years among the heathen, and the not unfaithful prosecution of the missionary work, do not, in many cases, seem to result in the formation of a higher grade of character than the prosecution of the ministry at home. At other times, however, they do. The separation from

the world, from its business and contests, the singleness of object, and frequently the constant exercise of self-denial, which it demands; the absence of those aids and appliances on which we are prone indolently to rely, the necessity of living near to God in order to live at all, involved in the foreign missionary work, certainly do sometimes, by the grace of God, issue in the formation of a character such as we have never seen produced in any other sphere. There is something so unearthly, so unselfish, so translucent and single in many veteran missionaries, whom it has been our happiness to know, that we feel ready to kiss their feet, and wish for those dearest to us no higher destiny than to be devoted to so sanctifying a work. Not less remarkable in many cases, is the development of the intellectual character effected by the labours of a foreign missionary. See what it made of the shoemaker Carey, of Ashmun, and of many others living and dead. We believe some of the ablest men now living, devoted to the service of the Church, are to be found in the ranks of our foreign missionaries. The missionary is often placed in circumstances which tax all his resources of intellect and will to the utmost, and that for years. He has to devise and execute new plans, to control other minds, to grapple with formidable systems of error defended by acute and cultivated intellects, to master difficult languages, and sometimes, as in the case of the author, to reduce those languages to writing, to discover their laws, and to create their literature.

The work before us is a monument of this kind of labour. We know no other work in which so comprehensive, philosophical, and condensed exhibition of the topography, of the ethnology, of the languages, of the present state and future prospects of Western Africa, can be found. It cannot fail to excite intelligent interest in that important portion of the globe, and to exalt the missionary work in the estimation of men of science and of business, as well as in the view of Christians. Mr. Wilson is one of the men over whose missionary life and their results the Church has reason to rejoice.

The Wedge of Gold; or, Achan in El Dorado. By Rev. W. A. Scott, D. D. Philadelphia: Board of Publication. pp. 162.

This volume, written in San Francisco, the modern Ophir, is commended by its origin and adaptation to the state of things in that thronged temple of Mammon. Few men occupy a more important or a more difficult position than the author of this little work; and we rejoice to see that he is employing, not only the pulpit, but also the press, in the energetic prosecution of his work.

Discourses on Special Occasions, and Miscellaneous Papers. By O. Van Santvoord. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1856. Pp. 456.

The author of this volume is pastor of the Reformed Dutch Church, Saugerties, New York. It is made up principally of contributions to various periodicals. It is evidently the production of a cultivated and able man.

The old Chest and its Treasures. By Aunt Elizabeth. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1856. Pp. 304.

A collection of anecdotes and incidents, mostly religious, making an interesting and useful book.

Kindling; or, A Way to do it. By a Sabbath-school Teacher. With an Introductory Note, by Rev. R. S. Storrs, Jr., D.D. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1856. Pp. 384.

The author of this book is "a thoughtful, earnest Christian merchant, who has been for many years energetically engaged in efforts to extend the kingdom of Christ in the world, especially by Sabbath-school instruction; and who eagerly desires to awake a fresh sense of responsibility among Christians, in regard especially to the use of the same vital, effective, and useful Christian agency."

Hints on Missions to India: With Notices of some Proceedings of a Deputation from the American Board, and of Reports from it to the Missions. By Miron Winslow, Missionary at Madras. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1856. Pp. 236.

"On the passage home, by the way of England," says the author, "this little book was composed, as a sort of digest of experience and observation, for nearly thirty-seven years; with the double hope of assisting those who may be considering the question of personal devotion to a mission in India, and of aiding the supporters of such a mission in its intelligent support and direction." As Mr. Winslow is one of the oldest and most distinguished of the band of American missionaries, the record of his experience and his counsels will be received with grateful reverence by all those who either contemplate the work of missions, or who are interested in its successful prosecution.

The Faith of Christ's Ministers an Example for his People. A Discourse Commemorative of Benjamin Holt Rice, D.D. Preached in the First Presbyterian Church, Princeton, N. J., on Sabbath morning, July 20th, 1856, at the request of the Session. By Rev. William Edward Schenck, Corresponding Secretary of the Presbyterian Board of Publication, formerly Pastor of that Church.

This, in the language of the Session of the church, in their vote of thanks to the preacher, is "a just and appropriate" tribute to the memory of a distinguished and beloved servant

of God. Dr. Benjamin H. Rice was a man of singular excellence. In a long and intimate acquaintance with him, we never heard him speak evil of any man. We never knew him to give, or to take offence. He never, so far as we know, ever made an enemy, and he was an enemy to no man. This did not arise from insipidity or mere harmlessness of character, but from principle; for he was a man of strong feelings, as well as of strong mind. He was devout and zealous as a Christian, and fervent in his preaching. He never failed to secure the confidence, respect, and affection of any community in which he lived, and his memory is cherished with tenderness by every church to which he ministered. At least, we know that it is so in this community. We never heard a word from any one who knew him, that did not evince both respect and love. The record of his services to the Church, presented in this discourse, though necessarily brief, is sufficient to show that he was among our most useful ministers.

The Sower and the Seed. By John Hall, D. D. Philadelphia: Board of Publication. pp. 127.

This exposition of the parable of the sower, is not only judicious, but pointed and forcible, having a directness of application well adapted to render it useful.

An Exposition of the Assembly's Shorter Catechism. By the Rev. Thomas Vincent. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. No. 265 Chestnut Street.

This work, recommended nearly two centuries ago by Owen and Calamy, is still perhaps the best body of divinity, in the same compass, (excepting of course such formularies as the Helvetic and Westminster Confessions, and the Heidelberg and the Shorter Catechisms,) that we know in the English language.

Plantation Sermons: or, Plain and Familiar Discourses for the Instruction of the Unlearned. By Rev. A. F. Dickson, Charleston, S. C. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 170.

The Rev. J. L. Kirkpatrick, of Charleston, South Carolina, has prefixed an introduction to this volume, on the responsibility of the Southern churches, touching the instruction of the coloured people around them. He commends these discourses as well adapted for that object. They are, however, adapted for a wider sphere. It is very difficult to find sermons suited for congregational or family reading, and we should judge that this volume will prove very useful for that purpose.

The following books are also among the recent publications of our Board.

Lizzie Ferguson, or the Sabbath-school Scholar. A narrative of Facts. Written for the Presbyterian Board of Publication. By S. S. Egliseau.

God's Word to Inquirers, compiled by Rev. J. H. Boccock. pp. 56.

This is a simple yet original work in its idea. It consists of passages of Scripture arranged under such heads as these:—The character of your heart by nature. The awakened heart's view of sin. God's view of sin. The object of faith, &c., &c.

Aunt Sarah's Stories. By Minnie Woodruff.

Ellen Sinclair, or The Earnest Inquirer. A True Narrative.

Sermons, Doctrinal and Practical. By Rev. William Archer Butler, A. M. late Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Dublin. First Series. Edited, with a Memoir of the Author's Life, by the Very Rev. Thomas Woodward, M. A., Dean of Down. First American from the third Cambridge edition. Philadelphia: Parry & McMillan. 1856. Pp. 446.

The *North British Review* for February, 1856, in speaking of the author of this volume says: "Few men ever brought to the service of the Christian ministry such a junction of needful qualities, and few sermons in our language exhibit the same rare combination of excellencies: imagery almost as rich as Taylor's; oratory often as vigorous as South's; judgment as sound as Barrow's; a style as attractive, but more copious, original, and forcible, than Atterbury's; piety as elevated as Howe's; and a fervour as intense at times as Baxter's."

The Bible Hand-Book: an Introduction to the Study of Sacred Scripture. By Joseph Angus, D. D., member of the Royal Asiatic Society. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien, No. 144 Chestnut Street. 1856. Pp. 660.

This, for condensation and for the amount of matter compressed into a single volume, is really a wonderful book. The labour which it must have cost is beyond estimate. It goes over all the ground included in the heavy volumes of Horne's Introduction, and presents the student with an outline of Scripture History, Chronology, Botany, Geography, Interpretation, Prophecy, &c., &c. It will probably meet the wants of a large class of readers, and be found a useful book of reference to have constantly at hand.

The Book of Ecclesiastes Explained, by James M. McDonald, D. D. 1856. 12mo. Pp. 414.

Ecclesiastes has long been regarded as one of the most puzzling books of the Old Testament. Its difficulties, however, concern the theologian more than the exegete or the philologist. They do not, for example, like those of Hosea or a part of

Isaiah, arise from elliptical or obscure expressions, bold and unusual constructions, or words of rare occurrence and doubtful meaning. The sentences are for the most part individually plain; the style has been charged with being diffuse rather than too concise; and yet it has proved no easy task to expound the book as a whole, to exhibit its plan, the relations of its several parts, its general scope, and the position which it occupies in the scheme of Old Testament revelation. That these difficulties were not first felt in modern times appears from the statement in the Talmud, that some of the wise regarded this book as favouring heretical or immoral sentiments. And Jerome speaks of a slight having been cast upon it by some of the Jews, in consequence of its taxing the creatures of God with vanity, and commending earthly pleasure, though, as he adds, the solemn close of the discussion "fear God and keep his commandments" is of itself sufficient to redeem it from any such reproach. The Fathers generally gave to its exhibition of the vanity of earthly things, with Augustin, the aim of awakening desires after what was heavenly, or used it with Jerome as an argument for the renunciation of the world, and for a life of asceticism. In more modern times, Grotius cut the knot, by denying the existence of any consistent plan or unity of design in the book, and maintaining that the word "preacher" meant rather a collector of various opinions. In the judgment of others, conflicting views are expressed in different parts of the book, but its unity is defended by the supposition that it is the aim of the author to sustain the one and refute the other. This hypothesis has been variously modified by assuming that we have here the debates of a society met for philosophical disputation, or the views of Solomon during his career of sin, as well as in his after repentance, or the words of various objectors in reply to the lessons of the preacher, or the rash views of an earnest but impatient inquirer, perpetually interrupted by the sage admonitions of his aged and experienced teacher, or that the book was begun by the writer while still in a tumult of doubt, from which he gradually, as he proceeded, argued himself into settled convictions. Others ascribed these supposed discrepancies to interpolations and errors of the text, and sought to remove them by critical emendations. Those who assert the harmony of all the views which it contains, are still disagreed as to its main scope. By some it has been censured as the production of a skeptic, a fatalist, or an Epicurean. Umbreit thinks its design was to show that the chief good was unattainable by man on earth; Hengstenberg, that its aim was to teach wisdom in general; others, that its main intent was

to exhort to the fear of God, or to resignation to God's inflexible will, or to a moderate and thankful enjoyment of the pleasures of life. Desvœux, in his philosophical and critical essay on Ecclesiastes, takes the ground, that "the author's design is to prove the immortality of the soul, or rather the necessity of another state after this life, from such arguments as may be afforded by reason and experience." This is the view also taken of the book by Dr. McDonald. That the doctrine of a future state and a coming judgment underlies the whole Old Testament, and that it is asserted in this book, as well as more or less distinctly in passages found elsewhere, are clearly shown in the volume before us. But that it is the aim of this book to reason out this doctrine from natural considerations, is not so convincingly made out. Many will feel, we presume, that the argument belongs to the commentator, rather than to the sacred writer.

The composition of Ecclesiastes by Solomon, which it has been the fashion recently to call in question, is ably maintained by Dr. McDonald. The only objection which has any appearance of force, is derived from the character of the language. There are considerations enough, however, if not to account entirely for this, at least to show the precarious nature of the argument which is based upon it. It is affirmed, that the Aramaeisms are so numerous, and of such a character, as to infer a composition after the exile, and that the diction and style are so unlike the other writings of Solomon, that this cannot have proceeded from the same author. But the abbreviated relative, which is the most frequent of its alleged Aramaeisms, is not only found occasionally in writings of much earlier date—*e. g.* Genesis and the Song of Deborah—but the only other book of the Old Testament in which it occurs with anything like the same frequency, is the Song of Solomon. And Hävernicks (*Einleitung* I. p. 235) has pointed out such a community of words and expressions between Ecclesiastes and Proverbs, as constrained him, though denying their identity of authorship, to assume an intentional imitation of the latter by the writer of the former. And when, in addition, proper allowance is made, on the one hand, for the differences of subject, and in the character of the compositions, for the change of style from early life to old age, and for the various modes of thought and expression which are within the compass of such a genius as that of Solomon: and then, upon the other hand, for the fact that many of the alleged Chaldaeisms are not really such; that many of the forms alleged to belong to the later Hebrew are gratuitously assumed; that the paucity of Hebrew remains

makes our knowledge of the language, in its different epochs, limited and uncertain; that Aramaeisms, so called, may be induced by the poetic character of a composition in the earliest periods, as well as by the deterioration of the language in a later period; and that there may be special reason for their occurrence in the writings of Solomon, from his intercourse with Phœnicians and Syrians, and his association with foreign wives. When proper allowance has been made for all these considerations, there will be no such force remaining in the argument, as can weigh against the stringent reasons which point to Solomon as the writer of this book, and which are mainly derived from the positive statements of the book itself, confirmed by uniform tradition, by its reception into the canon, and by the infallible sanction given to that canon by our Lord himself. When, however, an argument of genuineness is based on the assumption, that the poor and wise child who comes out of prison to reign, (iv. 18, 14,) means Jeroboam returned from Egypt, and the old and foolish king means Solomon, we fear that it is not at bottom much more reliable than Hitzig's fancy, that the king a child (x. 16) is Ptolemy Epiphanes, who was but five years of age when his father died, from which and similar grounds he concludes that this book could not have been written before B. C. 204.

The devout student of Ecclesiastes will find much in this volume that is interesting and instructive; and though the digressions are suffered to run to a greater extent than is ordinarily desirable in an exposition, it may perhaps on that account prove more acceptable to the general reader.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

ENGLAND.

E. Purdue, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans.

A. S. Patterson, A Commentary expository and practical on the Epistle to the Hebrews. 8vo. pp. 570.

P. Fairbairn, Prophecy viewed in respect to its distinctive nature, its special function, and proper interpretation. 8vo. pp. 542.

W. Gillespie, The Truth of the Evangelical History of our Lord Jesus Christ proved in opposition to Dr. D. F. Strauss. 8vo. pp. 200.

T. Smith, Zaphnath-Paaneah; or the History of Joseph viewed in connection with Egyptian Antiquities. 8vo. pp. 266.

J. W. Etheridge, Jerusalem and Tiberias; Sora and Cordova; a survey of the religious and scholastic learning of the Jews, designed as an introduction to the study of Hebrew literature. 12mo. pp. 507.

E. A. Litton, The Mosaic Dispensation considered as introductory to Christianity. 8vo. pp. 362. Bampton Lectures for 1856.

P. E. Dove, The Logic of the Christian Faith, being a dissertation on Scepticism, Pantheism, the *a priori* Argument, the *a posteriori* Argument, the Intuitional Argument and Revelation. 8vo. pp. 424.

J. Macnaught, The Doctrine of Inspiration, being an inquiry concerning the infallibility, inspiration, and authority of Holy Writ. 8vo. pp. 814.

A. P. Stanley, Sinai and Palestine in connection with their history. 8vo. pp. 580.

The History of the Church in the first three centuries, by Rev. J. J. Blunt, is in press.

C. M. Kennedy, The Influence of Christianity upon International Law. 8vo. pp. 158.

J. B. Marsden, History of Christian Churches and Sects from the earliest ages of Christianity. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 930.

J. B. Owen, Business without Christianity, with some statistics and illustrative facts. 12mo. pp. 34.

The fourth volume of C. Merivale's History of the Romans under the Empire has appeared, and the fifth is announced.

Grote's History of Greece has been completed by the publication of the twelfth volume.

The fifth volume of Alison's History of Europe brings down the history of France to 1837, of Turkey and Greece to 1841, of England to 1834, and of Germany to 1848.

The seventh and last volume of the Life of James Montgomery is announced.

The "Diary of Luttrell," so frequently referred to by Mr. Macaulay, and which has so long remained in MS., is about to be published by authority of the University of Oxford. The MS. occupies seventeen volumes, in small thick quarto.

The Political Life of Sir Robert Peel, by Thomas Doubleday. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 1036.

J. Wilson, The Lost Solar System of the Ancients discovered. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 961.

T. T. Meadows, The Chinese and their Rebellions. 8vo. pp. 656.

S. C. Malan, The threefold San-Tsze-King, or the Trilateral Classic of China, in English, with Notes. 8vo. pp. 78.

The late Samuel Rogers bequeathed to the British Nation three well-known pictures from his collection, the Titian "Noli me tangere," the Gorgione, a "small picture of a Knight in Armour," and the Guido "Head of Christ crowned with thorns."

FRANCE.

G. Meignan, The Messianic Prophecies of the Old Testament. 8vo. pp. 664. The Prophecies of the Pentateuch preceded by proofs of the authenticity of the books of Moses.

P. E. Baillif, The design of the Gospel of John. 8vo. pp. 38.

J. Berger de Xivrey, On the Text and Style of the New Testament. 8vo. pp. 168.

F. J. Biet, Historical and Critical Essay on the Jewish School of Alexandria. 8vo. pp. 352.

H. Vernet, Opinion upon certain relations between the dress of the ancient Hebrews and that of the modern Arabs. 8vo. pp. 24.

Abbé Guettée, History of the Church of France, from original and authentic documents. Vol. 12. 8vo. pp. 472.

J. Garnié, Dissertation on the Polemics of the Pagans in the fourth and fifth Centuries. 8vo. pp. 80.

Behr, Researches into the History of the Heroic Times of Greece.

M. Guizot, History of the Protectorate of Richard Crom-

well and of the Re-establishment of the Stuarts. 2 vols. 12mo. pp. 960.

C. de Remusat, England in the 18th Century. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 1076.

An important series of works, comprising a collection of the Latin inscriptions of the classic ages, has been commenced at Paris, at the expense of the French Government; the first, "Inscriptions Romaines de l'Algérie," by M. Léon Renier, will contain about 5000 inscriptions, which, with the letter press, will form two volumes in the largest quarto. The second collection, "Inscriptions Chrétiennes de la Gaule, antérieures au huitième siècle," by M. Leblant, is in print. The third series will include all Latin inscriptions of old Gaul to the sixth century. Upwards of 100,000 francs is annually expended upon this undertaking.

A Collection of old French Poetry, from the earliest periods, and extending to forty volumes, is about to appear under the authority of the French government.

The number of books, pamphlets, etc. published in France in the course of last year, in French, Greek, Latin, and other languages, was 8235; that of musical productions was 1105; and of engravings, lithographs, etc., 2857. The number of books and pamphlets was larger than has been known for the last forty-four years, with the solitary exception of the year 1825, when 8265 productions were brought out. The total number of printed publications in France, since the 1st of November, 1811, when a regular account first began to be taken, to the 31st of December last, was 271,994. In Russia, the number of works printed in 1854, was about 1300.

The works of Galileo have been published for the first time, complete in 15 volumes, edited by Professor Alberti.

GERMANY.

The only commentary which has reached us from Germany, since our last issue, is one on Malachi, by Dr. Laurenz Reinke, professor of theology and of the oriental languages in a Roman Catholic institution at Munster. 8vo. pp. 629. There have appeared from the same source, since 1851, four volumes of a somewhat miscellaneous character, entitled Contributions to the Explanation of the Old Testament, and at an earlier period (the first in 1836) three extended essays upon important messianic passages in Isaiah, and one upon Jacob's prophecy of Shiloh; all these are accompanied with the *imprimatur* of competent authority, giving assurance that they contain nothing contrary to the Catholic faith. Reinke is one of that class of

German Romanist theologians, whose acquaintance Protestants may cultivate with profit. Though diffuse and tedious, he is a man of learning, and in the battle with Rationalists and Sceptics, will be found always occupying the right ground. The only points where we must part company with him, are where the dogmas of his own Church are concerned—*e.g.* when he finds the unbloody sacrifice of the eucharist predicted, (Mal. i. 11.) Bade, the author of the *Christology of the Old Testament*; Welte, the editor and annotator of Herbst's *Introduction*, and the author of an independent defence of the genuineness of the *Pentateuch*, as well as other productions; Schegg, (bolder and more original in his views than the former,) the commentator upon *Psalms*, *Isaiah*, the *Minor Prophets*, and the *Latter Prophets*, may be mentioned as other representatives of the same class.

A second edition is publishing of Hävernicks *Introduction to the Old Testament*, revised by Professor Keil.

E. Meier has published a *History of the Poetic National Literature of the Hebrews*, (8vo. pp. 584,) which takes the palm for paradoxes and absurdities, even from his own previous productions. We presume no one will be in haste to infringe upon the right, which he ostentatiously reserves to himself, of translating the book into other languages. Our readers may judge how much they would be likely to learn on the subject of Hebrew poetry, from one who assigns the blessings of Jacob and Moses to the period of the judges; who alleges that the elegies over Saul and Abner are all that can with certainty be ascribed to David, though possibly one psalm, and part of another, and the song in Ex. xv. may be his; and that not a single proverb can with any confidence be attributed to Solomon.

C. H. Weisse, *The Question of the Gospels in its present Stadium*. 8vo. pp. 292.

W. Mangold, *The False Teachers of the Pastoral Epistles*. 8vo. pp. 135.

H. Messner, *The Doctrine of the Apostles*. 8vo. pp. 421. The author, who is only known to the public from his having revised a portion of De Wette's *Commentary on the New Testament*, and who is a follower of Neander and of Lücke, has undertaken to develope distinctly the forms of Christian doctrine presented by James, Jude, Peter, Peter's Second Epistle, (which is attributed to another,) Stephen, Paul, the Epistle to the Hebrews, John, and the Revelation, (which is held not to be John's.) Whatever propriety or advantage there may be in such discussions, under any circumstances, it is plain that erro-

neous views as to the authorship or genuineness of apostolic writings vitiate all conclusions from the start.

A new and cheap edition is publishing of Neander's Church History, in which the eleven volumes of the original edition will be comprised in two. The price is to be ten thalers.

Five volumes of Herzog's *Encyklopædie* have appeared, reaching to *Hermeneutik*. The work is to be completed in twelve volumes, the whole to be published by the close of 1859. The first number of the sixth volume contains an article on *Hiob* (Job) from the pen of Delitzsch, in which we see with pain that he denies the genuineness of the discourse of Elihu, and maintains that another passage though genuine has been removed from its proper place. It seems that the course begun in his commentary on *Genesis* is to be followed out in the rest of the Old Testament. The adoption of the principles of an unbelieving criticism by a believing interpreter is an experiment as dangerous as it is novel.

E. Nägelsbach, *Hebrew Grammar*. 8vo. pp. 248.

The *Koran* translated from the Arabic into the Hebrew by H. Reckendorf.

T. Nöldeke, *De origine et compositione Surarum Qoranicarum ipsiusque Qorani*. 4to. pp. 102.

Luther's Shorter Catechism was printed first at Wittenberg in 1529, then again in 1529 "enlarged and improved," and modified still farther in 1531. This last with some slight alterations chiefly in the texts of Scripture, which were made to correspond with Luther's own translation, continued to be the standard for all subsequent editions. Professor Harnack of Erlangen, has been for some time engaged in investigating the history of this catechism and collecting its oldest editions. He has published the results of his researches in *The Shorter Catechism of Dr. Martin Luther in its primitive form*. 4to. pp. 91. So far as is known, not a single copy of the first edition is now in existence. Professor Harnack, however, found two editions published at Erfurt and at Marburg, in 1529, which do not contain the additions of the second Wittenberg issue, and probably are reprints of the first. A Low Dutch translation was also found, which seems to have been freely made from the second Wittenberg. The treatise of Harnack contains an account of the various editions and their relations to each other, so far as this can now be ascertained, reprints of the Erfurt edition of 1529 with antique letters resembling the original, and of the second enlarged Wittenberg edition of 1529, with the lines though not the paging preserved, and a fac-simile of the Wittenberg edition of 1589.

Satires and Pasquils from the Times of the Reformation, edited by O. Schade, vol. i. pp. 245. A collection of the fugitive pieces and pamphlets, which constituted the popular polemics of the Reformation, on both the Protestant and Romanist sides. The present volume contains fifteen, some of them with very quaint and curious titles.

A. F. Pott, *The Inequality of Human Races*, principally from a philological point of view. 8vo. pp. 275. This is in reply to a work by the Duke de Gobineau bearing the same title, and takes earnest ground against its position that the white is the only historical race, and is by nature unconditionally superior to the yellow and black races, which therefore were designed to be for ever subject to the first as the dominant race. Besides the physiological and historical grounds on which the argument is conducted, special attention is devoted by the great etymologist to the languages of the various races, and to the mental capabilities and powers which their inner structure and organism infer, though from lack of favourable circumstances these may have remained undeveloped. Pott weakens his cause to a most unfortunate extent by his disbelief in the unity in origin of the human race. He inclines to the opinion that each continent originated a distinct race.

A new edition of Hesychius is to be issued at Jena, in from 16 to 20 numbers, to be completed within two years. The editor is M. Schmidt.

H. Brugsch, *New Researches on the division of the ancient Egyptian year*, followed by a memoir on the planetary observations recorded on four Egyptian tablets in the demotic character. 8vo. pp. 64.

The same distinguished Egyptologist has promised a work to be issued the present autumn, upon *The Geography of Ancient Egypt and of contiguous countries, particularly Palestine*, according to the ancient Egyptian monuments, for the first time collected, and compared with the geographical statements of the Holy Scriptures and of Greek, Roman, Coptic and Arabian writers. It is to consist of two quarto volumes and will cost about 25 thalers. The contents are given as follows, viz. Vol. I. Part 1. *Ancient Egypt*. 1. Egypt's situation and boundaries in the different epochs of its independent political existence in antiquity. 2. The nomes of Egypt according to the monuments, and its division into northern and southern. 3. The ancient Egyptian nomes according to the monumental lists in the different periods of the kingdom. 4. The deities of the nomes. 5. The principal cities of the nomes and their political and theological significance. 6. The other cities of

Egypt in lexical order. Part 2. The ancient world from the Egyptian point of view. 7. The neighbouring people and states in the south of Egypt. 8. The same in the north of Egypt. 9. Historical deductions from the geographical relations of Egyptian antiquity. Vol. II. Parts 1 and 2. Fac-similes of inscriptions from the monuments, illustrative of both parts of Vol. I. Part 3. Maps of 1. Egypt under the Pharaohs. 2. The ancient world according to Egyptian monuments. 3. Egypt under the Greeks and Romans. 4. Egypt with Coptic nomenclature. 5. The modern country.

De Wen, of Naples, is about to publish the second part of Fiorelli's important work on Pompeii, containing fac-simile copies of the inscriptions at Pompeii, as large as they actually exist.

Twelve newspapers and four reviews are now published in Constantinople. Twenty-four journals and reviews are published at Athens.

NOTE.

The Rev. Edwin Cater, of South Carolina, writes to us, that he thinks the remark made on page 581, of our last number, in reference to the debate on the "Corporation for the relief of the Widows and Children of Clergymen," although his name is not mentioned, may be applied to him. As the views referred to are repudiated by Mr. Cater, he feels that injustice has been done to him, and asks "that reparation which is due." We know not how to make reparation for an injustice of which we were entirely unconscious, otherwise than by referring our readers, as he refers us, to his speech as reported in the "Presbyterian Magazine," for a correct exhibition of his opinions.

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